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
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Editor's Note

THE articles in this issue of the *Middle East Journal* provide new insights on important topics of long-standing interest to scholars, specialists, and students of the Middle East: the changing status of women, US security policy, and Israeli voting behavior. Our lead article by Nesta Ramazani examines the issue of women's rights in Iran, a country that has become the focus of considerable—and often sensational—media attention since the end of the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Ramazani challenges a popular—and even scholarly—stereotype that a government led by Muslim clergy inherently must be opposed to the expansion of educational and employment opportunities for women. Her article provides persuasive evidence that the issue of women's rights has been debated extensively within Iran since the 1979 revolution that overthrew the secular monarchy. Although the clergy insists that women must observe a strict public dress code, or *hejab,* leading officials, including the revolution's spiritual guide, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1902–1989), have urged women to participate actively in the construction of an Islamic society. Ramazani demonstrates that hejab has legitimated the right of modestly attired women to assume highly visible public roles in education, government, and diverse sectors of the economy.

Although Ramazani's observations and analysis hopefully can contribute to the process of deconstructing some of the myths that have impeded a rational understanding of Iran during the past 14 years, it must be recognized that it is not the status of women or any other domestic policy issue that has prompted the current heightened attention on Iran. The primary reason is an assumption among many US and Arab policymakers that Iran poses a security threat to the political stability of several countries in the Persian Gulf region. In our second article, David Isenberg demonstrates how the Pentagon has been responding to the perceived threat from Iran (and Iraq) by implementing plans to establish an unprecedented—at least in peacetime—US military presence in waters surrounding the Arabian Peninsula. Isenberg analyses how the Pentagon—convinced of the likelihood of a second war in the area—has been applying the lessons it learned from the war with Iraq to intervene speedily and decisively. These plans potentially commit Washington to the use of force in the case of unspecified threats to friendly regimes. Isenberg raises pertinent questions about the ultimate objectives of overall US policy in the Persian Gulf, questions that to date have not received the public scrutiny necessary for generating a national consensus on intervention should a major political crisis erupt in the region.

Unlike security issues, elections in various Middle Eastern countries typically attract considerable attention. Since April 1992, important parliamentary elections have taken place in Iran, Israel, Kuwait, and Yemen. The June 1992 Knesset elections in Israel were especially significant because they resulted in the defeat of prime minister Yitzhak Shamir's right-of-center government. Our last two articles provide an invaluable follow-up to Leon Hadar's analysis in his autumn 1992 MEJ article, "The 1992 Electoral Earthquake and the Fall of the 'Second Israeli Republic'." In their assessment of the 1992 vote, Don Peretz and Sammy Smooha argue that the electoral shift that provided a victory for the Labor Party and its allied bloc make these elections "critical," and possibly represent a long-term political trend in favor of Labor. They examine the reasons why three significant constituents—Oriental Jews, Soviet immigrants, and Israeli Arabs—preferred the Labor bloc over the Likud bloc. Peretz and Smooha conclude that the Oriental Jews, a primary support base for Likud since 1977, became dissillusioned with the party because of its internal factionalism and their perception of discrimination by its Ashkenazic members.

In their article, Bernard Reich, Noah Dropkin, and Meyrav Wurmser argue that voter dissatisfaction with the failure of the Shamir government to address pressing economic and other problems was a primary cause of Likud's defeat. The authors focus primarily on the voting behavior of the 340,000 immigrants who came to Israel from the former Soviet Union between 1989 and the end of 1991. Approximately 62 percent of the immigrants were eligible to vote in the 1992 elections, and their participation proved pivotal. Contrary to early expectations that Soviet Jews would support Likud, nearly two-thirds of them voted for the Labor bloc. Reich, Dropkin, and Wurmser conclude that the Soviet Jews abandoned Likud because of their general disillusionment with its policies.

As with previous issues of MEJ, the work of the staff was made much easier due to the dedicated assistance of our volunteer, Nancy Wood, and four interns: Eleni Eleftheriou, University of Michigan, 1990; Pinar Taşkin, Connecticut College, 1991; Stacy Tobin, University of California at Santa Barbara, 1993; and Roxanne Varzi, American University, 1993. Many thanks to all of them.

Eric Hooglund

WOMEN IN IRAN: THE REVOLUTIONARY EBB AND FLOW

Nesta Ramazani

IN discussions of the status of women in Muslim societies, it has long been axiomatic that secularism is the principal prerequisite for progressive reform in women's social, economic, and political lives. In light of the empirical evidence emerging from Iran, however, it might be prudent to reexamine that assumption. Paradoxically, and contrary to all expectations, this essentially theocratic state has been quietly introducing progressive reforms affecting women, even in areas of law pertaining to marriage, divorce, and child custody—the areas traditionally most resistant to change. Although secular purists, viewing the reformist measures through the perspective of feminism or Western liberal democracy, might consider the measures taken as inadequate, they nevertheless cannot deny that reforms have been effected.

The clerical elite in Iran—both hard-line and pragmatist—have targeted women as an important social force. The hard-line clergy have advocated essentially repressive measures in the name of Islamic purity, while the more pragmatic clergy have supported moderately reformist laws, programs, and new institutions. The overall ascendancy of radical forces during the early phases of the 1979 revolution had a particularly deleterious impact on the lives of women. The pragmatic tendencies first identified in 1985, however, have grown considerably since the death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1989, creating a climate more receptive to reform on issues affecting women.[1] Many extremist policies of earlier years have been overturned, while others coexist with more moderate ones, fueling contradictions in word and deed in the Islamic republic. For example, women serve in the armed forces, but are restricted in what they may study in school; women have been elected in unprecedented numbers to the Majlis, yet are cloaked in *chadors*; and women have won the right to claim "wages in cash" from husbands who file for divorce, but they still ride in the back of buses, segregated from men.[2]

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[1] See R.K. Ramazani, "Burying the Hatchet," *Foreign Policy,* no. 60 (Fall 1985); see also, idem, "Iran's Foreign Policy: Both North and South," *Middle East Journal* 46, no. 3 (Summer 1992).

Nesta Ramazani is a free-lance writer who specializes in women of the Middle East.

The reformist approach of the pragmatists, meanwhile, has had the unanticipated consequence of increasing the demands for change. As Eliz Sanasarian observes, every time the male elite compared Muslim women to Western women and argued that "women have been oppressed in the West but not in Islam, they raised awareness. Every time they reasserted female equality and praised women's abilities, they raised expectations. Every time they admitted that oppression of women is ongoing in Iranian society, they raised demands. . . . The state officials unwittingly entangled themselves in gender discourse."[3]

The outcome of this dialectical relationship between the pragmatic political elite and women in Iran is potentially promising, as the attempts to coopt women, and the initiatives women are taking in response, are gaining momentum. That is not to say, however, that the pragmatists or women have clear sailing ahead. Quite the contrary, they are both under intense pressure from the conservatives, who still wield considerable power as allies of the influential *bazaaris* and as a strong force in the Majlis.[4]

THE REPRESSIVE APPROACH: EARLY EXCESSES AND CONTRADICTIONS

In the early years of the revolution, Iran's clerical leaders rescinded the shah's Family Protection Law, which included modest restrictions on polygyny. The clerics also reduced the marriageable age for girls, closed day-care centers and family planning clinics, banned abortions and birth control devices, and required *hejab* (modest dress) in public for all women. *Mut'a* (temporary marriage) was encouraged and all obstacles to polygyny removed. De facto segregation was instated at the universities, and women were barred from some fields of study. The clerics prohibited women from being judges, dismissing those already practicing that profession.[5]

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[2] Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report*–Near East and South Asia (FBIS–NES), November 24, 1991, p. 66; see also, *New York Times*, December 17, 1992.

[3] Eliz Sanasarian, "The Politics of Gender and Development in the Islamic Republic of Iran," *Journal of Developing Societies* 8 (1992), pp. 65–6.

[4] A solid 60 percent of Majlis deputies belong to the conservative bloc. The conservatives also exert much influence over the *bonyads*, multibillion dollar foundations that are holding companies for the confiscated properties of the former ruling class. See, *New York Times*, January 31, 1993.

[5] Not allowing women to be judges is the norm in Muslim countries, Turkey being the only exception. In Iran today, however, women assistant judges sit in courts hearing divorce cases and criminal cases involving women. For more on actions against women in the early days of the revolution, see Farah Azari, "The Post-Revolutionary Women's Movement in Iran," in Farah Azari, ed., *Women of Iran: The Conflict with Fundamentalist Islam* (London: Ithaca Press, 1983), pp.

In rewriting the constitution, the revolutionary leaders encouraged motherhood and domesticity, stressing in the preamble the importance of the family as "the fundamental unit of society" and emphasizing a woman's "important duty" as "mother."[6] Moreover, although Article 20 provides "equal protection of the law" for men and women, it states that "all human, political, economic, social and cultural rights will be based upon Islamic precepts," thus placing women in an unequal position with regard to polygyny, divorce, and child custody.[7]

Paradoxically, at the same time that the revolutionary leaders were trying to domesticate women, they were also mobilizing them on a massive scale for political and military participation. Whereas in 1964 Ayatollah Khomeini had declared it "un-Islamic" for women to vote, in 1979 he urged them to vote in the first postrevolution parliamentary elections, declaring the vote a "religious, Islamic and divine duty." In 1984, at Khomeini's behest, the *basij* (paramilitary forces) started recruiting women. As the war with Iraq continued, Khomeini urged women to volunteer for military training in order to "double the strength of the men" already fighting. Four thousand females trained for information-gathering tasks and security missions as part of the *pasdaran*'s volunteer mobilization force.[8] Burdened by the war, the government started to replace male laborers with females; the number of women government employees actually increased.[9] As a result of their involvement in these activities, women became a major political force whose support was useful to the revolutionary regime. Even the hard-line elements of the leadership felt compelled, in their search for female support, to champion some new rights for women.

THE REFORMIST GOVERNMENT

Well before his accession to the presidency in 1989, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani was promoting reform measures to improve the status of women. All of these reforms were rationalized largely in terms of Islamic norms. In urging women to participate in the economic development of Iran, for example, Rafsanjani, while Majlis speaker, admonished them to do so "without the corruption" of Western societies; in encouraging women to join the ranks of the military, he called on them to retain their "Islamic morality"; and, in promoting

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190–225; and Erika Friedl, "State Ideology and Village Women," in Guity Nashat, ed., *Women and Revolution in Iran* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 217–30.

[6] For the text of the constitution, see R.K. Ramazani, "Document: Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran," *Middle East Journal* 34, no. 3 (Spring 1980). For comments on the constitution, see Nashat, *Women and Revolution,* pp. 195–216; Eliz Sanasarian, *The Women's Rights Movement in Iran: Mutiny, Appeasement, and Repression from 1900 to Khomeini* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983) pp. 138–9; and Nesta Ramazani, "Behind the Veil: Status of Women in Revolutionary Iran," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* 4, no. 2 (1980).

[7] Val Moghadam, "Women, Work, and Ideology in the Islamic Republic," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 20 (May 1988), p. 226.

[8] Ibid., p. 237.

[9] Ibid., pp. 223 and 228–33.

greater female activity in the social arena, he lauded the "progressive" Islamic code of ethics that sanctions the full social participation of women.[10] Rafsanjani believed that economic and political exigencies required a reordering of social relations between men and women.

Education

Nowhere was the need for social engineering more evident than in efforts to educate women and to recruit them into the nation's work force. In promoting the education of women, in 1988 Rafsanjani asserted that in Islam "there are no barriers to the education of women in any field,"[11] and, as president, in 1989 emphasized the need to create "greater higher education opportunities" for Iran's youth as well as "equal pay for equal work by women." The *faqih* (spiritual leader) Ali Khamenehi claimed in 1991 that "an Islamic environment cannot tolerate even one illiterate person."[12] Women also joined the discourse. Zahra Mostafavi, Ayatollah Khomeini's daughter, who holds a doctorate in philosophy, described her father as having been a staunch advocate of female education. She attributed the bias of Iranian society in favor of male education to *sonatha-ye qalat,* "erroneous traditions," that are incompatible with Islam.[13]

In practice, Iranian clerical leaders have begun to overturn earlier policies that had closed certain technological, veterinary, and arts programs to female university students. They removed many of these barriers in 1986, partly because of pressures brought by women under the leadership of Zahra Rahnavard, a university professor and prolific writer who advocates Islamic reform. Women students at the university level are now studying in nineteen academic disciplines, including some engineering fields.[14]

Some revealing statistics show that as early as the academic year 1986/87, female admissions to such fields as dentistry, physiotherapy, audiology, statistics, optometry, radiology, and radiotherapy were on a par with male admissions.[15] In other fields, such as agriculture and veterinary medicine, female admissions went from zero to 10 percent. Although the largest number of female students remain in health and medicine, teacher training, humanities, and the natural sciences, other disciplines now open to women undoubtedly will gradually attract more women as job opportunities in these fields increase during the postwar reconstruction process. In 1992, 42 percent of Iran's university graduates and roughly one-third of those with doctorates were women.[16]

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[10] FBIS–Middle East and Africa, March 3, 1986, p. I1, and March 4, 1986, p. I1.

[11] FBIS–NES, February 11, 1988, p. 60, and August 23, 1989, p. 44.

[12] *Zan-e ruz,* no. 1327 (1370/1991), p. 4.

[13] Ibid., no. 1361 (1371/1992), pp. 6–9.

[14] The 1986 census listed 2,259 women in engineering. Valentine M. Moghadam, "The Reproduction of Gender in Equality in Muslim Societies: A Case Study of Iran in the 1980s" (Unpublished paper, Helsinki, UNU/WIDER).

[15] Afsaneh Najmabadi, "Faza-ye tang-e nasazegari" (The narrow space of noncompatibility), *Nimeh-ye degar,* no. 11 (1369/1990), appendix, pp. 39–40.

Impressive though such statistics are, they can be misleading. Of the 13 million literate women in Iran, only 2.2 percent have had higher education. As yet, full and free selection of fields of study at the university level is not available to women. Some academic disciplines—including banking, accounting, and archaeology—remain closed to them.[17] One of the requirements for admission to a university is passing a test on Islamic theology, a procedure that effectively screens out a large number of applicants, particularly those who might be lax in their religious commitment. Although the government claims to have reduced illiteracy among women by 57 percent, 15 million out of 28 million Iranian women—58 percent—remain illiterate.[18]

Employment

As stated earlier, faced with the need for skilled women workers in many fields, the clerical elite started a process of reeducating the public to the "progressive" attributes of Islam and the value of women working and being socially active. President Rafsanjani suggested in 1990 that women should play a larger role in Iranian arts, sports, politics, and religion, and said, "We are in need of a women's labor force."[19] Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi confirmed that in Islam "women enjoy the same rights as men."[20] The government, however, faces deeply entrenched norms and attitudes that make it difficult for women to enter the work force in large numbers. One study, conducted over a period of two years, 1985–87, found that for all 72 women interviewed, working outside the home was neither a major goal nor highly valued. These women viewed work as an "obligation" to undertake in the event of necessity, such as when men are at war, or sick, or deceased, or unable to support the family. For some, work was a means of achieving social distinction.[21]

Recognizing the double burden that working women in Iran carry—the care of their children and homes as well as their jobs—the government has enacted laws to try to address their problems. A 1985 law mandated part-time work privileges for mothers of young children. It also instituted three months of paid maternity leave and two half-hour periods per day for nursing mothers to feed their babies; established pension benefits for women; and decreed that companies hiring women should provide day-care facilities for the young children of female employees.[22]

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[16] FBIS–NES, June 10, 1992, p. 50. In 1987, 32.2 percent of university graduates, 24.3 percent of postgraduates, and 32.9 percent of the population with doctorates were women. FBIS–NES, June 16, 1992, p. 40.

[17] *Zan-e ruz,* no. 1327 (1370/1991), p. 26.

[18] FBIS–NES, June 10, 1992, p. 50, and June 16, 1992, p. 40; see also *Zan-e ruz,* no. 1362 (1371/1992), p. 4; and *Washington Post,* February 16, 1993, p. A24.

[19] FBIS–NES, July 6, 1990, p. 41.

[20] *Resalat,* no. 1749, January 25, 1992, p. 14.

[21] Fariba Adelkhah, *La révolution sous le voile: femmes islamiques d'Iran* (Paris: Editions Karthala, 1991), pp. 226–46.

Working women, however, are finding these laws inadequate and are voicing their complaints in letters to women's magazines, through female representatives in the Majlis, and through newspaper and magazine articles.[23] Their demands include stricter enforcement of existing laws; shorter work-days (by two hours), more available and better quality day-care; provisions for keeping jobs while on leave; longer maternity leave; shared-time work, which is two employees sharing one job; greater availability of part-time work, and higher wages for it (rather than the current rate that is lower than that for full-time work); 10–15 more days of personal leave for women (so they may take leave when their children get sick); earlier retirement (noncompulsory, after 20 years service); and promulgation of new laws.[24]

It is evident that much remains to be done to give women full educational opportunities and to bring them more fully into the work force. Yet it is equally clear that practical realities are forcing the issue. Clerical leaders must reconcile the traditional moral order with the exigencies of modern life if they wish to maintain power and legitimacy. Their rhetoric passionately extols the virtues of Islam and the disciplined morality of an earlier "golden age," while their practice departs from the norms of that past era to cope with the harsh realities of the contemporary world.

Islamic Family Planning

Probably one of the most serious realities that Iran's clerical leaders must confront is a high birth rate that is partly a consequence of early postrevolution policies. Following the government's pro-natal policies of the early 1980s, Iran's birthrate reached a 3.9 percent high in 1983—more than twice the world's average population growth.[25] This rate of growth occurred despite the enormous loss of life during the Iran-Iraq War and although "23 percent of married women of childbearing age" had resisted governmental pro-natal policies and had "used contraceptives."[26]

Increasingly aware of the enormity of the problem, in Tehran in 1990 the government sponsored a seminar on population control and started gradually to modify pro-natal government policy, changing the earlier "Islamic stance" on the use of contraception. While condemning abortion as unlawful and un-Islamic,

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[22] *Zan-e ruz*, no. 1316 (1370/1991), pp. 6–11; no. 1317 (1370/1991), pp. 6–11; and no. 1321 (1370/1991), pp. 10–13.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid.

[25] FBIS–NES, May 14, 1990, p. 49.

[26] Moghadam, "Women, Work, and Ideology," p. 227.

Iran's leaders now allow and promote other methods of birth control that earlier had been taboo.[27] Several high-ranking theologians have noted that the government's plans to control the population do not violate Islamic law and have suggested that smaller families make it easier for parents to meet their children's needs.[28]

Economics and Finance Minister Mohammad Javad Iravani has also spoken out on the need to discourage large families.[29] In 1990, the deputy health minister announced plans to import large quantities of contraceptives for free distribution to women in health centers, and promised that hospitals and health centers would sterilize women free of charge.[30] Educational plans have been announced to raise public awareness of the consequences of population growth.[31] The Badr Health Clinic has mobilized a corps of women volunteers to go door-to-door in poorer neighborhoods to instruct women on the drawbacks of having too many children and persuade them to use the clinic's facilities.[32]

In the fall of 1991, Mohammad Hosain Badakhsh, director-general of health services for the province of Tehran, announced a "basij plan" to establish 90 health clinics and 50 associated hospitals in Tehran. The health clinics are to inform and counsel families in birth control methods and present them with choices of contraception, including the pill, condoms, IUDs, tubal ligation, and vasectomy. Badakhsh said that if prevailing patterns continued, 20 percent of the 1,800,000 children reaching elementary school age each year would not be able to enter school; 60 percent of students in north Tehran and 50 percent of students in south Tehran would have no health care.[33]

In the fall of 1991, the minimum age for marriage—which earlier had been reduced to 13 for females and 15 for males—was raised to 15 and 18, respectively, making marriage below those ages legal only with a court's permission.[34] In addition, Health Minister Reza Malekzadeh announced, effective July 1992, punitive measures devised to discourage large families. The measures deny all assistance to families having a fourth child beyond that date, including insurance, maternity leave, money exchange privileges, discounts on airfares, and ration coupons. Malekzadeh stated that the previous 18 years of unchecked growth had been equal to that of the preceding 100 years. The government's new policy promotes the prevention of pregnancy by all viable contraceptive means other than abortion, emphasizes that all the burden for contraception should not be placed on women, and encourages more men to consider having vasectomies.[35]

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[27] *Zan-e ruz,* no. 1321 (1370/1991), p. 4.
[28] FBIS–NES, June 9, 1989, p. 44.
[29] Ibid., July 14, 1989, p. 67.
[30] Ibid., April 18, 1990, p. 41.
[31] Ibid., April 27, 1990, p. 52.
[32] Robin Wright, "A Teheran Spring," *New Yorker,* June 22, 1992.
[33] *Zan-e ruz,* no. 1325 (1370/1991), pp. 20–1.
[34] Ibid., no. 1328 (1370/1991), p. 24.

All these measures, combined with economic pressures, appear to be having an impact because more couples are limiting to two the number of children they have.[36] The Civil Status Registration Organization announced in June 1992 that a 25 percent drop had occurred in registered births over the previous four years, resulting in a reduction of half a million births per year.[37] A medical practitioner, Mohsen Naghavi, told a visiting American reporter that today 70 percent of Iranian women use contraceptives. According to a report from the Ministry of Health in April 1992, the population growth rate has been brought down from the 1986 high of 3.9 percent to the 1976 rate of 2.7 percent, placing Iran's birth-control program among the most successful in Third World countries.[38]

There are now 10,000 health centers in Iran working to curb population growth, and there are plans to increase this number to 15,000 by the end of the current Five-Year Plan in 1994.[39] Although there is insufficient information to assess the efficacy of the hospitals and health centers or their monitoring of the proper use and side effects of various contraceptive devices, women's access to information and the means to control their fertility has increased considerably. Furthermore, women appear to be sensing that having smaller families might enable them to take advantage of increasing opportunities.[40]

Although abortion is not permitted to terminate an unwanted pregnancy, it is available to women in instances where carrying the pregnancy to term might be dangerous to the health of the mother. It must be performed within the first 120 days—after which the fetus is considered viable, or "ensouled"—and then only with judicial permission, the consultation of a physician, and approval of the mother. Approval of the father is not necessary. Any abortion carried out illegally after ensoulment, however, subjects the doctor or midwife to three years imprisonment.[41]

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35. Ibid., no. 1321 (1370/1991), p. 4. In the first three months of 1370—March to June 1991—of 7,000 sterilizations, 4,770 were performed on women, 1,917 on men.

36. Vahe Petrossian, "The Free Market Dawns in Iran," *Middle East Economic Digest*, November 15, 1991, p. 4.

37. Katayoun Ghazi, "Helping Women Raise Sights in Islamic Society," *New York Times*, March 14, 1992, p. 2.

38. Wright, "Teheran Spring," p. 74. Not all religious leaders agree with the government's campaign to control the population. Hojjatolislam Seyyed Baqer Kharrazi, chief of the *hezbollahi* of Qom, has harshly criticized those who "go back and find a tradition from the Sunnis" to impose birth control on a Shi'i "culture of procreation." FBIS–NES, September 15, 1992, p. 43.

39. FBIS–NES, June 24, 1992, p. 70.

40. Wright, "Teheran Spring," p. 74.

41. *Zan-e ruz*, no. 1370 (1371/1992), p. 4.

PERSONAL STATUS LAWS

Polygyny and Divorce

Pragmatic considerations are forcing changes even in areas most jealously guarded by zealots, specifically men's rights to have four concurrent wives and to initiate unilateral divorce. In 1986, the Majlis passed a 12-article law on marriage and divorce that limited the privileges accorded to men by custom and traditional interpretations of Islamic law. In respect to women's rights in divorce, the law contains some strikingly forward-looking provisions.[42]

Islamic law permits a couple to place in a marriage contract any condition that is mutually agreeable to them so long as it is not against the nature of marriage. In October 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini said that secular laws were unnecessary to provide divorce rights for women, as Islam already contained such rights. "If in their wedding vows they make a condition stating . . . that they may divorce whenever they wish, or if . . . they are abused or if, for example, a husband marries another woman, there will be no problems . . . and they can have a divorce."[43] Traditional attitudes, however, and fears of jeopardizing a daughter's marriageability mitigated against the use of these religiously sanctioned remedies. The Majlis, therefore, set about to codify in law specific procedures for prenuptial agreements granting women protection against some of the worst customary abuses.[44] All marriage contracts now allow for prenuptial agreements, and numerous articles in newspapers and magazines—as well as statements by religious authorities—urge women to take advantage of this procedure to protect their interests.[45]

The 1986 law also recognized divorced women's rights to a share of the property couples acquire during their marriage and increased alimony rights. Article 1 of the law provides that if a divorce is sought by a husband and if, according to the court's judgment, it is not prompted by the moral deficiencies of the wife or by her failing in wifely duties, then the husband must give her half of his worldly goods, or the cash equivalent, as determined by the court. Traditionally, a woman would receive financial support only for three months following a divorce or, if pregnant, for nine months, or until the birth of the child.[46] A divorced woman often was left financially stranded and rarely could collect her *mahr*—the sum of money stipulated to be paid to the bride at the time of marriage (but in practice seldom paid) or at the time of divorce, when most women forfeit it.[47] The new law, therefore, affords divorced women unprecedented protection, at least in theory.

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[42] Najmabadi, "Faza-ye tang-e nasazegari," pp. 36–8.

[43] FBIS–Middle East and North Africa, October 30, 1979, p. R6.

[44] Najmabadi, "Faza-ye tang-e nasazegari," pp. 36–8.

[45] *Zan-e ruz*, no. 1322 (1370/1991), pp. 10–11; no. 1362 (1371/1992), pp. 6–9, 56; no. 1376 (1371/1992), pp. 14–15, 51.

[46] John L. Esposito, *Women in Muslim Family Law* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1982), pp. 26–7, and J.N.D. Anderson, *Islamic Law in the Modern World* (New York: New York University Press, 1959), pp. 42–3.

Twice in 1992 the Majlis proposed a change in the divorce laws that would allow a woman who was divorced "unjustly and unfairly" to collect payment from her former husband for the services she had rendered during the course of the marriage. Twice the Council of Guardians proclaimed the proposals contrary to the principles of Islamic law and returned the bill to the Majlis.[48] Women advocates, such as Zahra Mostafavi and Zahra Shojai, director of the Cultural and Social Council for Women, pressed for ratification of the bill. Finally, the Council of Expediency, headed by President Rafsanjani, approved the bill in December 1992. While the measure may be difficult to implement, in part because of the lack of a formula for determining a housewife's wages, the ratification has been a symbolic victory for women. The law, for the first time, also allowed women to sit on the bench in Iran's Islamic courts as assistant judges.[49]

Article 12 of the 1986 law provides women some protection against polygyny. It effectively reinstates the provision of the 1975 Family Protection Law granting a wife the right to obtain a divorce if her husband marries a second woman without the wife's permission or if, in the estimation of the court, a man does not treat his wives fairly and equally as required by Islamic law.[50] Flexible interpretations of Islamic principles thus have enabled Iran's rulers to institute major reforms protective of women in family law.

The area of family law in which women see the most pressing need for change is that of child custody. Numerous heartrending letters to newspapers and magazines complain about the injustice of the civil code (based on Islamic law) that awards sons to their mothers only until the age of two and daughters until the age of seven. In rare cases where custody is awarded to a mother because of the undeniable evidence of drug addiction or alcoholism on the part of the father, the award is made contingent upon the mother's remaining single. If she remarries, custody automatically reverts to the father. Articles have appeared in women's magazines in which child psychologists and social workers point out the personal and social costs of such laws, and call for reforms that will take the child's emotional well-being more into account.[51]

Iran's clerical leaders are starting to address the custody issue. Hojjatolislam Mostafa Mohaqeq Damad, a professor of Islamic law and expert on family legislation, pointed out that the current law is based on a *fatwa* of Islamic jurists among whom there were sharp differences of opinion regarding custody. He cited changed social circumstances as a valid reason to look carefully at the fatwa and consider using the opinions of contemporary jurists to change the law to better fit "existing circumstances." Ayatollah Sayyed Mohammad Musavi Bojnurdi made a similar case for changing the custody law. Citing the Shi'i Islamic tradition of using *ijtihad* (independent reasoning) to reinterpret religious edicts, he said that custody law should be reexamined by contemporary jurisprudents.[52] Such public discussions of child custody seem to be preparing the way for reforms to make the law more equitable.

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[47] For an interesting discussion of current practices in Iran regarding the mahr, see Adelkhah, *La révolution sous le voile*, pp. 165–75.

[48] *Zan-e ruz*, no. 1354 (1370/1991), p. 6.

[49] *New York Times*, December 17, 1992. Sharif Imam Jomeh, *Reuter Library Report*, December 8, 1992.

[50] Quran (4:3). For an interesting discussion of this point see Fazlur Rahman, "Status of Women in the Qur'an," in Guity Nashat, ed., *Women and Revolution in Iran* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 45–8.

[51] One article cited the testimony of several child psychology experts, stating "There is no denying that for a child it is better to be with its mother." *Zan-e ruz*, no. 1324 (1370/1991), pp. 6–9, 52–4.

Repressed Desire

One of the hallmarks of the Iranian Revolution in its early days was its insistence on the public separation of the sexes. The early revolutionaries not only enforced the public veiling of women, but also segregated schools, swimming pools, public transport, and even parks. Couples walking together in public were frequently accosted by *komitehs* (committees) or paramilitary enforcers of public morality known as *Khaharan-e Zeynab* (Sisters of Zeynab), and required to produce evidence that they were married or otherwise related.

Against that background, President Rafsanjani's pronouncements in November 1990 on the subject of male-female relations were startling.[53] During a Friday sermon, he laid out a new road map for sexual conduct, saying that to be good Muslims young people need not "live . . . in a state where their desires are suppressed." He said it was "Iranian culture," not the Quran or "Islamic ethics," that had sanctioned such repression in the past. While warning against being "promiscuous like the Westerners" he suggested mut'a as the Islamic alternative, not only for young people, but for the many women "who are without guardians—widows, divorcees, and those who have not yet married. . . . "[54]

Mut'a, practiced only by Shi'i Muslims, allows a man to take a *sigheh* (temporary wife) as his legal spouse for any length of time agreed to by the couple upon the payment of a mahr. At the end of the agreed time, the marriage ends automatically, without divorce, unless renewed. Any children from the union are legitimate heirs of the father. Rafsanjani said that registering a mut'a was not necessary, but would be desirable "if there are children." He added that mut'a was sanctioned by Islamic ethics. Historically, mut'a's principal function has been to contain human sexual needs within a legal and moral framework.[55]

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[52] Ibid., no. 1325 (1370/1991), pp. 6–9, 52–5.

[53] FBIS–NES, December 3, 1990, pp. 63–4; and *Zan-e ruz*, no. 1294 (1369/1990), p. 55.

[54] FBIS–NES, December 3, 1990, pp. 63–4; see, Shahla Haeri, "Temporary Marriage and the State in Iran: An Islamic Discourse on Female Sexuality," *Social Research* 59, no. 1 (Spring 1992).

Rafsanjani's speech provoked a strident public debate, with articles in magazines, editorials in newspapers, and letters from readers, all fueling the controversy. Although Shi'i jurists have recognized the validity of mut'a for centuries—the practice is condemned by Sunni legal scholars—during the early decades of the twentieth century temporary marriage fell into disfavor and became a marginalized institution. After the 1979 revolution, however, some clerics started advocating mut'a as a culturally authentic response to what they saw as Western-style "free love."[56]

The president's unexpected advocacy of rehabilitating the practice prompted supporters and opponents of mut'a to revile, laud, applaud, and condemn. *Zan-e ruz,* a leading women's magazine, questioned the distinction between temporary marriage and its supposed Western cousin, free love, while a reader argued the benefits of such marriages as preludes to permanent ones.[57] A female Majlis deputy condemned mut'a as a way of exploiting women and Hojjatolislam Seyyed Baqer Kharrazi, a critic of the pragmatists, denounced it as promoting "premarital relations." Others advocated it as freeing women from repressive sexual strictures.[58]

Many women objected to mut'a on the basis of Iranian mores and particularly men's attitudes toward virginity and premarital chastity. According to a woman interviewed by Fariba Adelkhah, "Such an arrangement would be ill-thought of for a young girl. It would ruin her reputation, and then no one would want her as a permanent wife." Social disapproval extends as well to widows and divorcees, even though "there are many women . . . for whom it would be a good arrangement."[59] *Zan-e ruz* continues to run articles on the subject, informing readers of the pitfalls of temporary marriage and how women can protect their interests if entering into such an arrangement.

Unless specified in an agreement between the man and the woman, under mut'a a man may terminate a temporary marriage early, even without the wife's consent or knowledge; he is responsible for a child's financial support, but not for the wife's—even if she is pregnant—unless agreed to prior to the marriage; and a man may not forbid his temporary wife to work, unless so specified in their agreement. Insertion of a conditional clause and registration of the agreement are the best protections for women.[60]

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[55] For a comprehensive study of mut'a, see Shahla Haeri, *Law of Desire: Temporary Marriage in Shi'i Iran* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1989); see also *Zan-e ruz,* no. 1294 (1369/1990), p. 55.

[56] Shahla Haeri, "The Institution of Mut'a Marriage in Iran: A Formal and Historical Perspective," in Guity Nashat, ed., *Women and Revolution in Iran* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 231–54.

[57] *Kayhan,* December 11, 1990, as cited in Haeri, "Temporary Marriage," p. 207. See also, *Zan-e ruz,* no. 1294 (1369/1990), p. 4.

[58] FBIS–NES, April 19, 1991, pp. 52–3, and September 15, 1992, p. 43.

[59] Adelkhah, *La révolution sous le voile,* pp. 188–9.

In addition to launching a national debate on the subject of mut'a, Rafsanjani's sermon also made it more difficult for zealots to enforce the former austere code of social morality. It allowed unrelated men or women accosted in public to take refuge in mut'a. As a consequence, harrassment of couples, although not eliminated, at least has diminished.

Bad Hejabi

Harrassment of women on the streets, however, has been making a comeback. The summer of 1992 saw a wave of attacks upon women for *bad hejabi* (improper veiling) by zealots attempting to "uphold virtue and combat vice." Bad hejabi is a new term that gained currency gradually as women took advantage of the somewhat freer atmosphere, evident under Rafsanjani's administration, to relax their observance of hejab. They started using brighter colors, patterned stockings, and occasionally, even lipstick.[61] They no longer had to fear flogging or imprisonment as they had in the early 1980s before the komitehs—who rigorously enforced the dress code and the ban on alcohol and Western popular music—were merged with the police and gendarmerie and lost their freedom of action.[62] At most, women could expect a reprimand and fine for violating the dress code. They adopted more stylish, colorful *roopoosh*s, also known as *manteaux*, the Islamic tunics worn over trousers—an innovation that sprang from the impracticality of the chador, which needs to be held in place. Some women gradually replaced the *maghnaeh,* a black head cover designed to be worn with a roopoosh, with brightly colored shawls that revealed more hair.[63]

During the summer of 1992, conservatives succeeded in renewing a clampdown on women's public dress. They also forced the dismissal of Minister of Culture Mohammad Khatami Ardakani, whom they accused of having gone too far in allowing Western influences on Iranian cultural programs. Since Khatami's resignation in July 1992, there has been a veritable chorus of calls for more rigorous observance of Islamic morality and a repudiation of "corrupt" Western mores. In exhortations to "promote virtue and combat vice," numerous sermons, addresses, articles, and editorials have condemned bad hejabi and lamented the betrayal of the values of the Islamic revolution.[64] For example, Hojjatolislam

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[60] *Zan-e ruz,* no. 1376, (1371/1992), pp. 14–15, 51.

[61] *Washington Post,* July 16, 1989, p. A18; *New York Times,* July 11, 1991, p. A4.

[62] Philip Shenon, "In Iran, a Glimpse of Ankle Can Bring Out the Komiteh," *New York Times,* July 16, 1990, p. A1.

[63] Judith Miller, "Islamic Radicals Lose Their Tight Grip on Iran," *New York Times,* April 8, 1991, p. A1.

[64] For example, see *Resalat,* no. 1884, July 22, 1992; FBIS–NES, August 5, 1992; August 24, 1992; September 15, 1992; September 29, 1992; December 11, 1992; December 17, 1992; December 18, 1992.

Mohammad Musavi Kho'iniha denounced bad hejabi and advocated a "fundamental approach" to dealing with it. Former prosecutor general Sayyed Hosain Musavi Tabrizi said, "Anyone who rejects the principle of the hejab is an apostate." Two days later, however, he protested foreign press reports quoting him as saying violations of the dress code would result in execution.[65]

During July and August 1992, a veritable barrage of rhetoric against "lust and materialism" erupted. Spiritual leader Khamenehi condemned "poisonous" foreign television programs that "corrupt youth."[66] His calls for a national campaign to "promote virtue and prohibit vice" unleashed a spate of "harsh and unprecedented" attacks upon women by self-styled promoters of virtue.[67] Later, attempting to calm inflamed passions, he declared that vice was not limited to how women dress, but also included "ethical vices, political vices, and economic vices."[68] Similarly, Ayatollah Mohammad Emami Kashani, while applauding the idea of engaging basij and hezbollahi forces in the fight against corruption, stressed the need for "ground rules."[69] An editorial in *Zan-e ruz* called for a program to educate people on the meanings of vice and virtue.[70]

The exhortations continued into the fall with predictably zealous reactions on the part of hard-line members of the public. After several particularly ugly incidents in which women were pummelled and beaten for bad hejabi, Khamenehi called on the public to put their fight against immorality ". . . into words. . . . We did not say use fists, sticks, or force . . . " and urged that attention be paid to vices other than bad hejabi.[71] In an interview published by *Zan-e ruz*, Hojjatolislam Elahi suggested that bad hejabi should be rooted out through *ershad* (guidance), verbal testimony or reprimand, and reference to judicial powers, not by violence.[72]

The virulent campaign against bad hejabi took place as part of a massive and widespread battle against an "enemy plot" bent on destroying Islamic culture and "spreading prostitution and sacrilege," a backlash to the period of innovation in the arts and relaxed censorship under Khatami Ardakani.[73] Minister of Culture Ali Larijani identified a "cultural invasion" taking place "on Islamic learning" and values.[74] Majlis deputy Nafiseh Qiazbakhsh declared, "Today the enemy is waging the most dangerous war against . . . our Islamic culture."[75] In a speech to the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, Khamenehi denounced the spread of Western influence in the classroom.[76] Such concerns reveal the dialectical tensions and conflicting interpretations of Islam that continue to divide the traditionalists from the pragmatists.

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[65] FBIS–NES, August 20, 1991, p. 51.

[66] Ibid., July 14, 1992, pp. 48–9, and July 16, 1992, p. 65. *Resalat*, nos. 1874–1884, July 9-July 22, 1992, contain numerous sermons by various religious leaders on the same topic.

[67] FBIS–NES, September 15, 1992, p. 44.

[68] Ibid., July 30, 1992, p. 36.

[69] Ibid., July 14, 1992, pp. 48–9; July 16, 1992, p. 65.

[70] *Zan-e ruz*, no. 1370 (1371/1992), pp. 3, 56.

[71] FBIS–NES, October 22, 1992, p. 39.

[72] *Zan-e ruz*, no. 1377 (1371/1992), pp. 8–9, 60. For the interview with Hojjatolislam Elahi on the subject, see *Zan-e ruz*, no. 1377 (1371/1992), pp. 8–9, 60.

[73] *Resalat*, no. 1896, August 5, 1992, p. 5.

[74] FBIS–NES, September 14, 1992, p. 19.

The rhetoric of the pragmatists, however, is no less "Islamic" than that of the traditionalists. Their every reform is accompanied by relentlessly pronounced Islamic justification. Rafsanjani, in calling for more women in offices, universities, and schools, emphasized that the "creation of a suitable moral climate in the work places of men and women" was "one of the significant distinctions of the Islamic Republic of Iran. . . . "[77] Both radicals and pragmatists rely on Islam for justification of their programs, but the tension between them is graphically illustrated by the issues of bad hejabi and the extent to which "Islamic culture" can be kept free from Western influences. One example of how this is being attempted has been Iran's hosting of the first Muslim Women's Olympiad in February 1993. In these Olympic competitions, women were either dressed in Islamic attire or strictly shielded from male spectators for such events as swimming.[78]

WOMAN POWER

Iranian women are gaining some forms of political power. In the second round of Majlis elections in June 1992, nine of the two hundred sixty-eight deputies elected were women. Of these, two have degrees in philosophy and Islamic law, one in Islamic culture, one in philosophy, one in midwifery, one in French language and literature. One is a surgeon, another an obstetrician.[79] Not one is a secular feminist bent on overthrowing the Islamic regime; all are ardent supporters of the propagation of Islamic norms in their society. At the same time, however, they are vocal supporters of rights for women. Deputy Qiazbakhsh spoke of the "dangerous war" being conducted against Islamic culture, while advocating better teacher training and remedial education.[80] Deputy Maryam Behruzi, while attacking the "cultural debauchery" being promoted through books and films, declared that the "true status" of Islamic women must be "worked on."[81] Deputy Qodsiyeh Seyyed Alavi, while calling on women to fight against "Western decadent culture," spoke of the scientific growth and development of women in the medical field, in which women comprise 52 percent of all specialists in women's surgery. She called for expansion of educational opportunities for women.[82]

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[75] *Resalat,* no. 1914, August 13, 1992, p 5; FBIS–NES, September 14, 1992, p. 23.

[76] FBIS–NES, December 11, 1992, p. 52.

[77] Ibid., December 15, 1992, p. 26.

[78] *Mahjubeh,* no. 105, February 1993, pp. 5–6; Geraldine Brooks, *Wall Street Journal,* February 25, 1993.

[79] *Zan-e ruz,* no. 1359 (1371/1992), pp. 4–5.

[80] FBIS–NES, September 14, 1992, pp. 22–3.

[81] Ibid.

The Islamic tenor of calls to improve the status of Iranian women are not isolated incidents, nor are they the empty rhetoric of a handful of women in high positions. Rather, they must be seen in their social and historical context as part of a widespread and unprecedented participation of women in Iranian society. Paradoxically, under clerical rule women seem to have a greater sense of participation than they had under the Pahlavi dynasty, when all the models for appearance and behavior were Western and irrelevant to native norms.[83]

The clerical regime, like the Pahlavi regime, has engaged in both the coercion and the cooptation of women. Its attempts to cloak women in an Islamic identity distinct from the "tarnished" Western one promoted by the Pahlavis, however, has initiated a lively public debate on Islam and women's issues. The same leaders who have promoted women's hejab have encouraged women in education, work, and other social participation. Paradoxically, hejab has become the means to social activism. By wearing the badge of purity, women can move about freely. By wearing the badge of modesty, they may fight for women's rights. By wearing the badge of moral rectitude, women compel the state to back up its claims to the equality of men and women within Islam.[84]

By learning about Islam, women have been able to turn the tables on those who use religion to oppress them. Women's interest in informing themselves about Islam and its teachings is without precedent. Having expanded their spheres of activity through militant revolt and military participation, women have gone on to find other avenues in which to expand the parameters of their social participation. Some have joined women's organizations concerned with women's social and cultural affairs, such as the Association of Muslim Women, founded in 1989 by Zahra Mostafavi to fight for women's greater access to higher education. Others have joined Zeynab, a women's organization, which, among other activities, held an international meeting of Islamic scholars—all women—in Tehran in February 1992. The announced purpose of the meeting, reflecting that of the organization, was to "help bring about a profound educational change" in Iranian society and to study the application of Quranic teachings to the lives of women.[85] Other women have been going to *jalasehs*, religious gatherings given over to serious discussions and interpretations of the Quran and Islamic law, in which women are able not only to participate, but sometimes to play leadership roles.[86]

In the past, female *mujtahids* (religious scholars) and *qaris* (reciters of the Quran) were often daughters of clerics, tutored at home by their fathers. Learned in Islamic law, they enjoyed much prestige. Now, the establishment of a *hozeh-ye Islami*, a higher theological school, to train women in theology and jurisprudence has created new opportunities for women from many backgrounds to study the Quran and Islamic law. Others are studying Islamic law at universities. Such formal training lends new authority and weight to their interpretations of Islamic law, giving them ammunition to wage battles on matters of vital concern to women.

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[82] Ibid., supplement, pp. 2–3.

[83] Adelkhah, *La révolution sous le voile,* pp. 1–76.

[84] Sanasarian, "Politics of Gender and Development," p. 65.

[85] *Resalat,* no. 1753, January 29, 1992, pp. 1–2.

[86] Adelkhah, *La révolution sous le voile,* pp. 135–40.

Many women have taken up the pen to explore the "true" standing of women in Islam.[87] Among them Zahra Rahnavard and Tahereh Saffarzadeh stand out. Reexamining Islam, they claim that many extant Islamic practices derive from patriarchal interpretations of the Quran in male-dominated societies where the prevailing norms influenced men's largely biased interpretations of the holy book. They call for a reinterpretation of many current practices that are labeled "Islamic."[88]

Far from silencing women's voices, the revolution has resulted in a proliferation of books by and about women and an outpouring of "women's literature" without precedent in Iran's history.[89] This cultural life has allowed women to write and publish in unparalleled numbers and to explore new themes, ideas, and modes of expression. Women have been scrutinizing the most intimate and personal matters as well as the broadest questions of life and culture.[90] New publications have appeared, such as *Gahnameh-ye adabi va honari-ye khaharan* (The sisters' literary and artistic proclamation), that provide women a forum for their poetry, essays, and short stories. For the first time, women have begun writing autobiographies. The public reads their works avidly.[91]

The government does not, however, tolerate all points of view, nor does the populace. The Ministry of Guidance has denounced some women writers, particularly those taking a Western-style feminist stance. It censored two works by Shahrnoosh Parsipour, author of *Women without Men*, labeling the author a "complex-ridden spinster."[92] Recently an angry group of veiled women besieged the offices of *Gardoun*, a popular literary magazine, protesting the representation on its cover of a woman in a chador lying lifeless on the ground, appearing to symbolize the fall of Islamic values.[93]

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[87] Farzaneh Milani, "Conformity and Confrontation: A Comparison of Two Iranian Women Poets," in Elizabeth Warnock Fernea, ed., *Women and the Family in the Middle East: New Voices of Change* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985), pp. 317–31; and Milani, *Veils and Words: The Emerging Voices of Iranian Women Writers* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1992).

[88] Farzaneh Milani, "Revitalization: Some Reflections on the Work of Saffar-Zadeh," in Guity Nashat, ed., *Women and Revolution in Iran* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 129–40, and Rahman, "Status of Women in the Qur'an," pp. 37–54.

[89] Farzaneh Milani, "Adabiyat-e zanan ba'd az enqelab" (Postrevolutionary Iranian women writers), *Nimeh-ye degar*, no. 14 (1370/1991), pp. 111–22.

[90] Abbas Amanat, "Cultural Developments in Post-Revolutionary Iran," *Iran: A Decade after the Revolution* (Proceedings of the conference held at Montclair State College, Upper Montclair, New Jersey, October 26, 1990).

[91] Milani, "Adabayat-e zanan ba'd az enqelab"; idem, *Veils and Words*.

[92] Katayoun Ghazi, "Love Conquers All but the Ministry of Guidance," *New York Times*, August 30, 1991, p. A4.

Since the revolution, *Zan-e ruz* has changed its format from one largely devoted to fashion, housekeeping, and child care to one concerned with the social and cultural debate surrounding the issue of women's place in today's Iran. *Zan-e ruz* has taken the position that only "true Islam" will elevate women to their rightful position. It does not denigrate the role of wife and mother, but promotes activism in the public sphere as well. It has been a major critic of social policies that limit women's activities and an advocate of greater representation of women in the parliament and other state institutions.[94] At the same time, it publishes numerous articles on Islam. Last year, for example, it ran a weekly extract from a book on women and Islam by Ayatollah Javadi Ameli.[95]

Initially, after the revolution, women were without official representation at the highest level of government. Then, in January 1992, President Rafsanjani appointed Shahla Habibi as his advisor on women's affairs.[96] Shortly, thereafter, her photograph appeared full-size on the cover of an issue of *Zan-e ruz*.[97] With her face barely showing from behind a tightly clutched chador, she looked like the very model of a traditional woman. A truly traditional woman, however, would not have allowed her photograph to appear on a magazine cover, even veiled. Furthermore, Habibi is a university graduate, a biologist, with years of political activity to her credit, including during the revolution. During the 1980s, she took up educational affairs, supervising and evaluating teacher training programs and winning the title "expert teacher." She has been charged with identifying the needs of women and drawing up plans to address them.

Commenting on the conditions facing women in Iran today, Habibi said, "I believe women, while preserving their Islamic virtues, can attain the highest positions." She urged women to fight for reforms. "As women's progress has been insufficient so far, with the guidance of Islamic principles that *make no distinction between men and women,* we hope to achieve greater progress. Much will depend on women's own efforts."[98]

Habibi has been working with diverse ministries to gather and analyze information and statistics on women's problems. In the summer of 1992, working women were brought under the jurisdiction of her Bureau of Women's Affairs.[99] In a speech to a gathering of women workers, Habibi stressed that to improve their working conditions women needed to know their rights. Among the subjects discussed were rules and regulations governing working women, means of conflict resolution, unemployment benefits, and rules governing the welfare of workers.[100]

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[93] *Zan-e ruz,* no. 1325 (1370/1991), p. 4.

[94] Manijeh Saba, "Tahlili az dibah-cheh-haye *Zan-e ruz* dar dowreh-ye ba'd az enqelab" (*Zan-e ruz* editorials after the revolution: An analysis), *Nimeh-ye degar,* pp. 8–34.

[95] *Zan-e ruz,* nos. 1352–1376 (1370–1371/1991–1992).

[96] Mahnaz Afkhami had been minister for women's affairs in the Hoveyda government under the shah's regime. During the shah's last days, as he sought to placate the demands of religious elements, the shah abolished the ministry.

[97] *Zan-e ruz,* no. 1346 (1370/1992).

[98] Ibid., pp. 10–13, emphasis added.

[99] Ibid., no. 1361 (1371/1992), p. 4.

CONCLUSION

The high visibility and compulsory nature of Islamic hejab in Iran has obscured the cautious reforms that the clerical leaders have been making gradually in the interests of the survival of their rule and revolution. Contrary to conventional wisdom, this essentially theocratic state has found the advancement of women compatible with its interests. The empirical evidence in support of this proposition in the case of Iran calls for an important reassessment of the correlation between secularism and reformism. The former may not be the prerequisite of the latter, if, indeed, religious reinterpretation can lead to adaptations to the realities of modern life.

The women of Iran, in turn, newly awakened to fresh possibilities, have taken up the gauntlet and, using the leadership's own rhetoric and logic, have held the government's feet to the fire in regard to implementing the "equality of men and women in Islam." They have seized the initiative to demand changes in education, in family laws, and in the workplace. Paradoxically, the very hejab imposed by the leaders has become a means to combat marginalization and increase female involvement in the social, political, and cultural life of the nation. Out of the ashes of the revolution may rise a new female identity, one whose cultural and ideological authenticity give it the legitimacy to question and contest many of the traditionally oppressive institutions supposedly sanctified by Islam—whether polygyny, divorce, or seclusion. Grasping the moment, women have forged a vocal voice, a visible (if veiled) presence, and a viable women's movement through which to realize their aspirations.

Iran's women now see themselves in a leadership position in the Muslim world. They sponsor conferences on Islam, discuss the real meaning of passages from the Quran, head cultural exchanges, and even criticize other Muslim countries for not living up to Islamic precepts—for instance, when they criticized Kuwait for not allowing women to vote. While Egyptian women, once at the forefront of the Middle Eastern women's movement, now find themselves suffering setbacks or treading water, Iran's women proudly point to the progress of women in their country as an example of the gains that women can make under Islamic leadership.

This does not mean that women are resting on their laurels. Much remains to be done. Attitudes toward women change only slowly and the battle is an uphill one. Islamic reforms have been marked by controversy, contradiction, and strife. Further decline in economic conditions could affect women adversely, reducing educational opportunities and government support of programs. Even worse, an alliance between the radical and conservative forces may threaten the moderate clerics' hold on power and jeopardize the reformist approach to the status of women.

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[100] Ibid.

Yet, three basic considerations call for cautious optimism. First, conservative forces, if in power, cannot escape any better than the pragmatists from the pressures of economic realities if they wish to survive politically. Second, they cannot challenge the legitimacy of the interpretation of Islamic law by the pragmatic leaders. For the first time in Iran's modern history, clerics, as political leaders, have been reinterpreting Islamic law in light of modern life realities—a task that no secular leader could dare attempt. Third, and finally, the consciousness of large numbers of women has been raised irreversibly to the necessity of improving their status in Iranian society. The genie is out of the bottle, and is not likely to be forced back inside.

DESERT STORM REDUX?

David Isenberg

THE US military has not rested on its laurels since its success in Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm. Defense analysts have been hard at work incorporating the lessons learned from the war against Iraq into their training, tactics, doctrine, strategy, weapons acquisition, and deployment capabilities.[1] Questions regarding the use of military space systems, ballistic missile defense, utility of air power, proper mix of ground forces, mine warfare, intelligence collection and analysis, reliance on reserves, use of special operations forces, and increasing airlift and sealift capability are being hotly debated.[2]

The Persian Gulf War of 1990–91 is perceived by many military and civilian analysts as the benchmark against which to measure likely future conflicts. It also is seen as a war that is likely to be repeated in the future. Military planners believe that they will be called again to fight somewhere in the US Central Command's (CENTCOM) jurisdiction in the not too distant future. To that end they are not only strengthening the US military presence in the Middle East, but also are restructuring the entire US military in order to be able to support US forces better when they are called upon to intervene.

In this effort US policy resembles a "back to the future" scenario. The renewed emphasis on being able to conduct military intervention in the Middle East only perpetuates a long-standing interventionist policy. As one analyst noted: "The United States, as the heir to British imperialism in the region, has

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[1] See for example General Accounting Office, *Operation Desert Storm: War Offers Insights into Army and Marine Corps Training Needs,* Report NSIAD-92-240, August 25, 1992.

[2] For a list of issues being debated by Congress, see Congressional Research Service, *Persian Gulf War: Defense-Policy Implications for Congress,* Report 91–421 F, May 15, 1991.

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been a frequent object of suspicion. Since the end of World War II, the United States, like the European colonial powers before it, has been unable to resist becoming entangled in the region's political conflicts. Driven by a desire to keep the vast oil reserves in hands friendly to the United States, a wish to keep out political rivals (such as the Soviet Union), opposition to neutrality in the cold war, and domestic political considerations, the United States has compiled a record of tragedy in the Middle East."[3]

NEW CERTIFIED THREATS

The US government foresees yet more tragedy in the Middle East. Its perception of the region is simple and straightforward: it is an area of extraordinary volatility and menace. Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Robert Gates said, "The Middle East represents an area of special concern, because half of the countries have nuclear, chemical or biological weapons programs, at least in development. Iran has embarked on an across-the-board program to develop its military and defense industries—and this includes their weapons of mass destruction programs."[4] Gates warned that "Iran's behavior in rearming its military and developing a strategic deterrent is ominously analogous to Iraq's action in the 1980s—and could pose a grave threat to regional stability."[5]

To this end there has been much fevered commentary in the US media about how Iran's acquisition of up to three diesel attack submarines from Russia represents a potential threat to Persian Gulf shipping. To showcase this purported threat, the United States sent the USS *Topeka,* a nuclear-powered attack submarine with anti-submarine warfare capability, into the gulf in November 1992, just days before Iran's first sub arrived.[6] A second nuclear-powered attack submarine, the USS *Louisville,* entered the Persian Gulf in January 1993 where it remained for weeks, stopping at ports in Abu Dhabi and Dubai for "routine repairs."[7]

Recently defeated Iraq is still considered a viable threat. According to Gates, "Saddam still has significant residual programs in all four areas [nuclear, biological, chemical, and missile] of weapons of mass destruction. And he will continue to pursue those programs regardless of the expense and regardless of the state of UN sanctions and inspections."[8]

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[3] Sheldon L. Richman, *"Ancient History": U.S. Conduct in the Middle East since World War II and the Folly of Intervention,* Policy Analysis no. 159 (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1991), pp. 1–2.

[4] Central Intelligence Agency, "Weapons Proliferation: The Most Dangerous Challenge for American Intelligence," Remarks by Robert Gates, Comstock Club, Sacramento, California, December 15, 1992, p. 7.

[5] Ibid., pp. 9–10.

[6] "U.S. A-Sub Enters Persian Gulf," *Washington Post,* November 4, 1992, p. A40, and "SSN Sent to the Gulf," *Jane's Defense Week,* November 7, 1992, p. 5.

[7] "Second U.S. Sub Monitors Iran's Fleet," *Washington Times,* February 12, 1993, p. 7.

[8] Central Intelligence Agency, "Weapons Proliferation," p. 11.

Persian Gulf countries are among the few nations that the Pentagon specifies as future threats. According to an assessment in August 1992 by General Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), "We can still point to North Korea, a weakened Iraq, and even a hostile Iran as specific threats for which we must maintain forces. One or two other concerns—such as instability in the Balkans—might be added to such a list without straining credibility, but the real threat we now face is that of the unknown and the uncertain."[9]

In a February 1993 JCS report on roles and missions of the US military, General Powell wrote, "In the Middle East and Southwest Asia, radical politicized Islam and a politically and militarily resurgent Iran threaten regional stability and directly challenge a number of U.S. interests, including access to Gulf oil, political reform and democratic development and settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute."[10]

"Islamic fundamentalism" has emerged as the new monolithic bogeyman for the West to fear. One analyst summarized a current view: "For most of the 1980s, those who saw Islamic fundamentalism for what it is saw groups as violent and dogmatic as any in the world. These were people who mixed nostalgia with grievance to produce a millenarian vision of an Islamic state—a vision so powerful that its pursuit justified any means."[11]

Such a view is a caricature. Former *Jerusalem Post* bureau chief Leon Hadar observed, "Now that the Cold War is becoming a memory, America's foreign policy establishment has begun searching for new enemies. . . . That peril is symbolized by the Middle Eastern Moslem fundamentalist—the 'Fundie,' to use a term coined by the *Economist*—a Khomeini-like creature, armed with a radical ideology, equipped with nuclear weapons, and intent on launching a violent jihad against Western civilization."[12] Hadar pointed out that this distorted view is shared by many persons in policymaking positions.

Terms such as "uncertainty" and "instability" are in vogue at the Pentagon when the discussion turns to the Middle East. As the Pentagon stated in its *National Military Strategy, 1992* report, "Iraq has been ejected from Kuwait, but the Middle East and Southwest Asia still face an uncertain future. Continued Iraqi belligerence, Iran's support for historically radical groups, nationalism, religious fanaticism, the Arab-Israeli issue, water rights, and the continuing rift between rich and poor countries contribute to instability. Dissolution of the Soviet Union raises the possibility of new regional coalitions, particularly among the former Soviet Islamic republics and other nations in Southwest Asia. Historic disputes, fueled by arsenals of modern weapons, will continue to challenge regional stability for the foreseeable future and keep us actively engaged in this region."[13]

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[9] Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *1992 Joint Military Net Assessment,* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 1–8.

[10] Department of Defense, *Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States,* by General Colin L. Powell, Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 1993 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office), p. I-4. The US military appears to define Southwest Asia as the area west of the Indian subcontinent to the shaykhdoms on the western shore of the Persian Gulf. Saudi Arabia is designated as part of the Middle East. These designations' distinctions, however, are often blurred.

[11] Martin Kramer, "Islam vs. Democracy," *Commentary,* January 1993, pp. 35–6.

[12] Leon T. Hadar, *The "Green Peril": Creating the Islamic Fundamentalist Threat,* Policy Analysis no. 177 (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1992), p. 1, and idem, "What Green Peril?" *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 2 (Spring 1993); see also, Abdul Aziz Said, "Islamic Fundamentalism and the West," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 3, no. 4 (Fall 1992), and Bernard Lewis, "Islam and Liberal Democracy," *Atlantic Monthly,* February 1993.

These warnings about hostile regimes originate from government analysts and are quite independent of those given by lobbyists on behalf of such "moderate" or "friendly" states as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The United States is committed to defending these countries even though independent organizations have criticized their governments for serious human rights abuses. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have had the acumen to hire high-powered lobbyists to boost their images.[14]

To many scholars the end of the Cold War does not mean there will be stability in the Persian Gulf. Political science professor Stephen David has observed that "conflict within and among Persian Gulf states may prevent the production of oil regardless of economic costs. There have been sixteen disruptions in the Middle East since 1950, and, as the 1991 Gulf War so vividly demonstrates, interruptions in supply are not dependent on the Cold War."[15] He also argues that future threats emanating from the region might be motivated by cultural and religious factors. "Those who minimize the threat posed by American dependence on Persian Gulf oil assume that whoever controls the oil will behave in an economically rational (i.e., profit maximizing) manner. But what rationality or desire for economic gain underlay Saddam Hussein's torching of the Kuwaiti oil fields when defeat for the Iraqi forces was imminent?"[16]

Efforts by the Persian Gulf states to provide for their own common defense are not taken seriously because of neighboring rivalries and the imbalance of military power between these states and such countries as Iran and Iraq. After the 1991 defeat of Iraq, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—composed of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—devised a defense plan that involved Egypt and Syria. Although both Egypt and Syria said they wanted to participate, they eventually declined because of disputes among the GCC nations. An Omani proposal for a 100,000-man joint gulf defense force has been referred for further study, but experts believe it is very unlikely that it will ever become a reality.[17] Internal dissension among GCC states serves to deepen those nations' dependence on the United States for their security needs. Kuwait, in particular, is explicit in expecting the United States to provide protection. According to Kuwaiti defense minister Ali al-Sabah, "Protection is the friends you have, not the weapons you have."[18]

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[13] Department of Defense, *National Military Strategy, 1992,* August 21, 1992 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office), p. 3.

[14] See Pamela Brogan, *The Torturer's Lobby: How Human Rights-Abusing Nations Are Represented in Washington* (Washington, DC: Center for Public Integrity, 1992).

[15] Stephen R. David, "Why the Third World Still Matters," *International Security* 17, no. 3 (Winter 1992/93), p. 149.

[16] Ibid., p. 150.

[17] See James Bruce, "USA Ponders as Gulf Alliance Sinks into the Sands," *Jane's Defense Weekly,* May 25, 1991, p. 875; idem, "Search for Gulf State Security," *Jane's Defense Weekly,*

None of this, however, is surprising or particularly unwelcome to the US Department of Defense (DOD). In fact, much of the Pentagon's plans for maintaining its budget and force structure, in an era of reduced fiscal resources, is predicated on continuing threats from the Middle East and the Persian Gulf region. The end of the Cold War and the war with Iraq have served only to formalize what has been a de facto policy long before the Carter Doctrine of 1980. In fact, President George Bush's decision to go to war with Iraq proved to be an extension of the 1980 State of the Union address, in which President Jimmy Carter declared: "An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf regions will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America. And such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."[19]

The Middle East is the area for which military planners are drafting future intervention scenarios. In one classified study, drafted as a part of the Pentagon's *1994 to 1999 Defense Planning Guidance and Its Illustrative Planning Scenarios,* Iraq invades Kuwait and northeast Saudi Arabia with 2,000 tanks and 21 divisions seeking to capture oil fields, air bases and sea ports.[20] In fact, even before the war against Iraq began, analysts at the RAND Corporation had been examining what would be required in the way of a US military presence to deter a future Iraqi attack against the Arabian peninsula.[21]

Even as the Pentagon is reducing its personnel to the previously announced "base force," it will still have more than enough forces for another operation such as that against Iraq. An analysis by the Congressional Research Service noted that the gulf war required 22 percent of total active combat forces. Under the Bush-planned base force of 1.6 million active personnel, a similar war would require only 26 percent of total active forces.[22]

The potential of another Persian Gulf War-like threat will continue to drive US military force structure planning in the Clinton administration. Before he was picked for secretary of defense, Representative Les Aspin, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, issued a series of papers in which he argued for

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October 26, 1991, p. 762; and Michael Dunn, "The GCC at 11: Part 2, The Common Defense," *Estimate*, December 31, 1992, p. 5.

[18] "Picking Up the Pieces," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, March 28, 1992, p. 531.

[19] Jimmy Carter, "The State of the Union," January 23, 1980, in *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, vol. 16, January 28, 1980, p. 197.

[20] Patrick Tyler, "7 Hypothetical Conflicts Foreseen by the Pentagon," *New York Times*, February 17, 1992, P. A8.

[21] See David A. Shlapak and Paul K. Davis, *Possible Postwar Force Requirements for the Persian Gulf: How Little Is Enough?* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1991).

[22] Congressional Research Service, *U.S. Military Force Reductions: Capabilities versus Requirements*, by John M. Collins, Report 92–43 S, January 8, 1992, p. 12.

"threat-based force planning." In this approach he nominated "Iraq or Iraq-equivalent as a benchmark or unit of account of future threats."[23] "Option C," his favored US force structure for the future, would allow the United States to handle an Operation Desert Storm-type undertaking along with two lesser contingencies. Under his plan, the army would have nine active and six reserve divisions, the marines would have two active and one reserve division, the air force would have ten active and eight reserve wings, and the navy would have three hundred forty ships.[24]

A PIECE OF THE ACTION

The Pentagon looks at the Middle East and Southwest Asia as the place "where the action is." According to the General Accounting Office, the DOD estimates that it spent $21.4 billion during fiscal years 1980 through 1990 for military programs and activities directly related to Southwest Asia-specific missions. These programs and activities included such items as military construction, equipment prepositioning, and CENTCOM headquarters. Also, DOD estimates it spent another $5.8 billion for other programs and activities that were oriented primarily toward Southwest Asia. The department estimates it invested about $272.6 billion in programs that, although justified by requirements outside the region, have proven to be useful in meeting regional contingencies. Since this amount does not include the cost of past military operations such as the reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers, the Persian Gulf War, or security assistance programs,[25] the $272.6 billion figure is probably low.

Earl Ravenal, a former Pentagon official, calculates that the annual military cost of insuring access to Persian Gulf oil is about $71 billion.[26] According to the congressional Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus, "While the U.S. is reducing its presence in Europe, it is rapidly expanding its presence in the Middle East: not only has the U.S. increased its pre-Gulf War military presence in the Gulf by more than ten times, but also in the last years it has concluded or expanded defense cooperation agreements with three Gulf countries (Kuwait, Oman, and Bahrain) and is currently negotiating with three others."[27]

To the DOD the prospect of renewed conflict in the Persian Gulf has a "bright side": It helps to justify preserving force structure and warding off possible congressional cuts to the Pentagon's base force. According to congressional testimony given in September 1991 by General Powell, US military forces dedicated to Southwest Asia will include a carrier battle group and a Marine Corps amphibious-ready group permanently committed to the Persian Gulf, north Arabian Sea, and Indian Ocean.[28]

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[23] Les Aspin, "An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces for the Post-Soviet Era," House Armed Services Committee News Release, January 24, 1992, p. 8.

[24] See Les Aspin, "Defense 1997 Alternatives: A Briefing," House Armed Services Committee, February 25, 1992. This is an unnumbered supplement to Aspin's report, "An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces for the Post-Soviet Era: Four Illustrative Options," February 25, 1992.

[25] General Accounting Office, *Southwest Asia: Cost of Protecting U.S. Interests,* NSIAD-91–250, August 14, 1991, pp. 1–2.

[26] Earl C. Ravenal, *Designing Defense for a New World Order: The Military Budget in 1992 and Beyond* (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1991), p. 54.

[27] Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus, *Global Outreach: The U.S. Military Presence Overseas,* June 1, 1992, p. 2.

Crisis response reinforcements stationed in the United States will consist of three active army divisions with National Guard roundout brigades and six reserve component divisions, two active and eleven reserve fighter wings, four carrier battle groups and a Marine Corps expeditionary force. Reconstitution elements in the United States will include two army National Guard cadre divisions that could be brought up to full strength over a period of months and naval reserve frigates.[29] Currently, on the average, the United States has more than 20,000 soldiers, sailors, marines, and air force personnel in the Persian Gulf region. This includes an air wing, a carrier battle group, amphibious ships, and soldiers on training exercises in one or more gulf countries.

A replay of Operation Desert Storm would, in the Pentagon's view, require a massive deployment, including forces dedicated to CENTCOM as well as forces dedicated to other US unified commands. "In the event of an emergency of Desert Shield/Storm dimensions in the Persian Gulf or elsewhere, NATO will be able to draw upon the Rapid Reaction Corps, U.S. forces deployed in Europe, and Atlantic and contingency forces based in the United States. In total, this force amounts to 13 to 16 ground divisions, about 1,100 tactical combat aircraft, 4 to 6 carrier battle groups, and other naval combatants. Once again, this posture's adequacy will depend upon political availability, training and readiness, and prompt deployability. In terms of size, however, it is sufficiently large to match the posture that was deployed to the Persian Gulf for Desert Shield/Storm, which proved to be adequate."[30]

Other unified military commands are happy to see CENTCOM preparing for future military operations because it gives them an additional rationale to justify their own force structure requirements. For example, Richard Kugler's RAND analysis, *The Future in U.S. Military Presence in Europe,* notes that a major regional contingency in the Persian Gulf would require the US European Command to provide eight to ten divisions or other units, ten to thirteen air wings, and four to six carrier battle groups as well as extensive command, control and communications, and logistics support.[31] Such arguments are of great utility as the Pentagon seeks to ward off proposals to cut the US military personnel presence in Europe to 100,000–150,000. Similarly, another Rand analysis noted that a threat to

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[28] Glenn W. Goodman, Jr., "Powell Details Base Force Concept," *Armed Forces Journal International,* November 1991, p. 19.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Richard L. Kugler, *The Future in U.S. Military Presence in Europe: Forces and Requirements for the Post-Cold War Era* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1992), p. 84.

[31] Ibid., p. 125.

Persian Gulf oil fields might require the Pacific Command to provide one carrier battle group, one marine expeditionary force, and one tactical fighter wing.[32]

PREPARING FOR THE NEXT STORM

What the world now knows as CENTCOM has a longer history than most realize. Whether it is called the Quick Strike Force, Unilateral Intervention Corps, Unilateral Intervention Force, or Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force—CENTCOM's immediate predecessor—the concept of having military units carrying out combat in the Persian Gulf goes back decades.[33] What we now know as CENTCOM came into existence as the latest US geographic unified command in January 1983. Today, CENTCOM's area of responsibility encompasses northeastern Africa and southwestern Asia, including the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Aden, the Gulf of Oman, and the Red Sea. This includes the three distinct but interrelated subregions of South Asia, the Persian Gulf/Arabian Peninsula, and the Red Sea/Horn of Africa. With regard to the latter, CENTCOM coordinated the deployment of US forces to Somalia as a part of the relief effort called Operation Restore Hope. It has not, however, been neglecting its fighting strategy. Support of CENTCOM'S theater strategy is a continuing effort that takes place in peacetime as well as wartime. The elements that directly support the strategy in peacetime are combined exercises, security assistance, military construction, prepositioning, and personnel.

Combined Exercises

To the US military, combined exercises in the Middle East demonstrate US commitment to the region. According to congressional testimony by General Joseph Hoar, the successor to General Norman Schwarzkopf as head of CENTCOM, "The planned exercise program has increased five-fold compared to pre-operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm levels. In FY[fiscal year]90, 14 JCS and non-JCS exercises were conducted. In FY91, all JCS exercises were canceled, but 20 small maritime exercises were conducted, more than twice the number planned in previous years. In FY92 we have 56 JCS and non-JCS exercises scheduled with 9 of the 18 countries in our area of responsibility; and in

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[32] James A. Winnefeld, Jonathan D. Pollack, Kevin N. Lewis, Lynn D. Pullen, John Y. Schrader, and Michael D. Swaine, *A New Strategy and Fewer Forces: The Pacific Dimension* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1992), p. 86.

[33] For a history of the formation of CENTCOM, see David Isenberg, *The Rapid Deployment Force: The Few, the Futile, the Expendable,* Policy Analysis no. 44 (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1984).

FY93, we have 71 exercises planned with 12 of the countries. We are expanding the Kuwaiti program to provide exercises on a virtually continuous basis."[34]

Security Assistance

So-called security assistance is the term used for government to government and direct commercial sales of weaponry and military equipment and funds for training foreign military personnel. According to Hoar, "These programs enhance stability by enabling countries in the region to improve their defensive capabilities in a balanced, controlled manner. At the same time, security assistance provides interoperability with U.S. and other coalition partners."[35]

The fact that continued arms transfers by the United States to the Middle East after the gulf war contradicted the Bush administration's public declarations did not serve to reduce the flow of such transfers. During the war, Secretary of State James Baker testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, "The time has come to try to change the destructive pattern of military competition and proliferation in [the Middle East] and to reduce the arms flow into an area that is already over-militarized."[36] On May 29, 1991, President Bush announced a Middle East Arms Control Initiative aimed at curbing the spread of nuclear arms, chemical munitions, ballistic missiles, and "destabilizing" conventional weapons. There also have been meetings of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council to consider guidelines for the control of foreign military sales.

None of these pronouncements, however, has had much practical effect. US policymakers still operate under the assumption that US arms transfer are good—it is only those by other nations that are bad. Also, from the perspective of military officials, transferring US arms makes the next war easier to fight. As General Hoar testified in his first appearance before Congress in 1992, "From my point of view, the necessity of selling American equipment out there so that we have the interoperability in training, doctrine, spares and weapons whether it be to Saudi Arabia or UAE or Kuwait is extraordinarily important to our warfighting capability in years to come."[37] Indeed, the United States formally established a Military Training Mission to Saudi Arabia as early as 1953. In 1990 alone the mission helped Saudi Arabia buy $16 billion worth of US matériel and training.[38]

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[34] Senate Armed Services Committee, "Prepared Statement by Gen. Joseph P. Hoar," US Central Command, *Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1993 and the Future Years Defense Program,* 102d Cong., 2nd sess., Part 1, S. Hrg. 102–833, p. 283.

[35] Ibid., pp. 53–4.

[36] Michael T. Klare, "Conventional Arms Transfers: Exporting Security or Arming Adversaries?" March 19, 1992, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, p. 5.

[37] Senate Armed Services Committee, *Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1993 and the Future Years Defense Program,* p. 320.

[38] Major Jim Dart, "USTM: Point Guard on the Arabian Peninsula," *DISAM Journal* (Winter 1991–92), p. 1.

Michael Klare, an arms transfer scholar, has noted three errors in this reasoning. "In most cases, U.S. deliveries to a given power in a region will only fuel the insecurities of neighboring powers—which may have sound historical reasons to question the intentions of the original recipient—thus provoking additional arms transfers into the region and placing the original country at greater rather than lesser risk. . . . It is also risky, as repeatedly demonstrated by events in the Middle East, to assume that today's friendly regime will remain friendly in the future, or that it will successfully resist efforts by hostile political factions to replace it." Furthermore, "nor can we have any confidence that substantial U.S. arms transfers to threatened allies will significantly reduce the need for U.S. intervention, should a key ally come under attack."[39]

In fact, less than two weeks after President Bush announced his initiative, Congress was notified of a $682 million proposed sale of Apache attack helicopters to the United Arab Emirates. Between the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, and September 25, 1992, the Bush administration announced a total of $32.3 billion in new arms transfers to eight Middle Eastern countries: Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. More than $25 billion of this was slated for Saudi Arabia alone. All but two, Morocco and Israel, are within CENTCOM's area of responsibility. About $19.3 billion of these transfers—about 60 percent—was announced after Bush proposed his initiative.[40]

The reality of US arms transfers to Persian Gulf nations reminds one of an old cliché conservatives used to utter about the US-Soviet strategic weapons arms race—only one side was racing and it was not the United States. With respect to the now fashionable cliché that various suppliers are flooding the region with weaponry, it is useful to remember that there is only one top supplier who bears a "Made in the U.S.A." label.

The $5.6 billion of US arms transfer agreements with Saudi Arabia alone in 1991 exceeded the total value of all arms transfer agreements made by the Soviet Union with the entire Third World in the same year.[41] According to the Federation of American Scientists, much of that $5.6 billion consisted of the same top-of-the-line systems used by the United States during the gulf war. Some of these, such as the M1A2 tank, have yet to be fielded with US forces. In contrast, Iran, currently being depicted as the new regional menace, was the fourth largest arms importer in 1991, buying only $1.9 billion of arms compared to Saudi Arabia's total of $7.8 billion from all suppliers. During the period of 1984–1991, Saudi Arabia purchased $67.7 billion of arms while Iran purchased less than $20 billion, and much of that consisted of second-rate equipment from China.[42] It is worth remembering that during most of that period Iran was fighting a war with Iraq while Saudi Arabia was at peace. Nevertheless, it is Iran that is still considered a menace. In a posture statement made in 1993, General Hoar testified that "Iran's expansion in the political, military and economic spheres is also of increased concern. Iran's recent attempt to coerce the UAE on Abu Musa Island is but one example of an increasingly outward directed and aggressive foreign policy."[43]

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[39] Klare, "Conventional Arms Transfers," p. 13. For a detailed exposition of Bush administration arguments supporting the status quo approach of US arms transfers to the Middle East, see House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Conventional Arms Sales Policy in the Middle East: Hearings before the Subcommittees on Arms Control, International Security and Science and on Europe and the Middle East,* 102d Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1992).

[40] Lee Feinstein, "U.S. Arms Transfers to the Middle East since the Invasion of Kuwait," October 8, 1992 (Washington, DC: Arms Control Association).

[41] Congressional Research Service, *Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1984–1991,* by Richard F. Grimmett, Report 92-577 F, p. 8.

Access Agreements

The oil fires were not even out in Kuwait when Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney arrived in Riyadh in May 1991 seeking permission to store military equipment in Saudi Arabia.[44] In September 1991, the Pentagon confirmed that the United States and Kuwait had reached agreement on the outlines of a 10-year security pact. Because the details still remain undisclosed, it is unclear whether the agreement is more than symbolic. It reportedly provides for stockpiling of equipment, joint training, and periodic exercises.[45] Under the agreement, the United States sends a battalion task force to Kuwait three times a year to train with a similar-sized Kuwait force.[46] There were three exercises in the last three months of 1992 alone: Intrinsic Action 93–1, Eager Sentry 93–1, and Eager Archer 93–1. According to detailed but non-authoritative press reports, the stockpiling includes equipment, tanks, and infantry fighting vehicles for up to two mechanized brigades.[47] Although the matter received little attention, highly publicized exercises in Kuwait in 1992, such as Native Fury 1992, were designed to test the unloading of maritime prepositioned equipment.[48]

In October 1991, the United States and Bahrain signed a defense cooperation agreement regarding the prepositioning of matériel and an increase in joint military exercises.[49] This is in addition to the existing US Office of Military

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[42] Lora Lumpe, "Opportunity Lost? U.S. Leadership Lacking: Arms Keep Flowing," *Public Interest Report,* November/December 1992, p. 12.

[43] Department of Defense, *1993 United States Central Command Posture Statement,* Presented by Gen. Joseph P. Hoar, US Central Command, April 20, 1992.

[44] Michael R. Gordon, "Cheney, in Riyadh, Asking for the Rights to Store Arms," *New York Times,* May 7, 1991, p. 16.

[45] Barton Gellman, "U.S., Kuwait Initial Security Accord," *Washington Post,* September 6, 1991.

[46] William Matthews, "Will Saddam Hussein Get the Message?" *Army Times,* January 25, 1993, p. 3.

[47] Philip Finnegan, "Effort to Bolster U.S. Military in Gulf Inches Forward," *Defense News,* December 9, 1991, p. 43.

[48] Barbara Starr, "USA, Kuwait Test Pre-positioning," *Jane's Defense Weekly,* August 8, 1992, p. 6.

[49] William Matthews, "U.S., Bahrain Agree On More Joint Exercises," *Navy Times,* November 11, 1991, p. 31.

Cooperation, which was established in Bahrain in 1986. In June 1992, another agreement was signed with Qatar, providing for the stationing of naval stores and periodic combined military exercises.[50] The United States also has a growing bilateral military exercise program with Qatar. CENTCOM is in the process of concluding a defense agreement with the United Arab Emirates and is continuing discussions on an agreement with Saudi Arabia.

Prepositioning

The army is making preparations, in the event of conflict, to be able to deploy its heavy armor to the Persian Gulf far more rapidly than it did in Operation Desert Shield. Under a new plan, the army will dispatch to the Indian Ocean a permanent floating force of tanks and armored personnel carriers. They would be able to reach Saudi Arabia within two weeks after an order to deploy. When there is no crisis, the floating armor depot would be moored at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.[51] The exact configuration of the equipment has not been finalized, but it would most likely equip approximately two tank battalions and two mechanized infantry battalions.[52] Although the number can vary, depending on the configuration of the deployed unit, there are approximately 58 tanks in a tank battalion and 54 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles in a mechanized infantry battalion. According to the Pentagon, planned sealift acquisitions will give it the capability, almost immediately upon request, to ship two army armor divisions to any point in the world within 30 to 45 days.[53]

The Navy is quietly expanding the capacity and capability of the port in Haifa, Israel, to accommodate ships up to the size of Aegis cruisers for repair and refitting. This type ship displaces more than 9,000 tons and is 566 feet long. It is intended primarily to defend carrier battle groups from attack. Haifa might be able to accommodate aircraft carriers in the future. The port is being improved because of its proximity to the Persian Gulf.[54] The ports in France, Greece, and Italy—used by the Mediterranean Sixth Fleet—are not close enough.

According to a news report, the Pentagon is reportedly planning to deploy air force tactical squadrons to the Persian Gulf for the three months each year that a carrier is not actually forward deployed in the Indian Ocean.[55] According to the General Accounting Office, the air force plans to expand its land prepositioning in Southwest Asia.[56] In his last annual report to Congress in January 1993, Secretary of Defense Cheney noted that the United States prepositions support equipment and initial supplies for 750 aircraft in Southwest Asia.[57] CENTCOM is currently seeking to increase its prepositioned matériel in the theater. According to congressional testimony by General Hoar, the goal is 200,000 short tons afloat or 350,000 short tons ashore, which, in a future war would be the equivalent of approximately 28 shiploads or 24,500 C-141 aircraft loads.[58]

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[50] Phone interview with Lieutenant Commander Joe Grandisher, Department of Defense Public Affairs, February 5, 1993.

[51] Joseph Albright, "Army Plans Floating Depot," *Stars and Stripes* (Europe), May 10, 1992, p. 1.

[52] Barbara Starr, "US Army To Put Stores Afloat," *Jane's Defense Weekly,* August 8, 1992, p. 7.

[53] Department of Defense, *Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and Congress,* January 1993 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office), p. 102.

[54] "Israeli Port Improved for Better Use by U.S. Navy," *JINSA Security Affairs,* October 1991, p. 1 and 5; see also Paul Findley, "Haifa Home-Porting Has High Political, Military Costs," *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs,* April/May 1993, p. 10.

The weaponry being sent with US forces deployed to the gulf is being upgraded to pack more firepower. Targeting devices mounted in housings underneath planes to better enable pilots to fly at night are being installed on F-15Es and F-16s. Such targeting devices greatly increase the probability of successfully delivering precision-guided munitions to their targets. The navy is using far more guided bombs than it did during the gulf war, and the navy and air force are sharing improved command and control networks.[59] Unlike the gulf war, when the daily air tasking order had to be shuttled via aircraft, the order can now be transmitted electronically to aircraft carrier planes. This improved transmission of communications allows for far greater integration of air force and navy aircraft in combat operations, as was demonstrated in the January 1993 air attacks against Iraq.[60]

In accordance with a recently completed mobility requirements study (MRS), the Pentagon plans to increase both its sealift and airlift capability. The navy plans to acquire, either through new construction or conversion, additional sealift capacity equal to 20 large roll-on/roll-off ships. These ships would be maintained in a high state of readiness for rapid deployment of army combat and support unit equipment and supplies. The navy also plans to lease two container ships for prepositioning.[61]

Under the plan, by FY 1997, nine of the prepositioning ships would be carrying approximately 2 million square feet of army combat and combat-support equipment. By FY 1998, the other eleven ships would be retained as fast sealift ships kept at a state of high readiness, carrying another 3 million square feet of equipment to provide for a surge capability of heavy army divisions. The air force also wants to spend about $41 billion to build 120 C-17 cargo aircraft to replace existing C-5 and C-141 aircraft.[62]

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[55] Don Oberdorfer, "U.S., Saudis Agree to Use Old Military Pact for Expanding Cooperation, *Washington Post,* May 31, 1992, p. A10, as cited in Congressional Research Service, *Naval Forward Deployments and the Size of the Navy,* by Ronald O'Rourke, Report 92–803 F, November 13, 1992, p. 45.

[56] General Accounting Office, *Military Afloat Prepositioning: Wartime Use and Issues for the Future,* Report NSIAD-93-39, November 4, 1992, p. 20.

[57] Department of Defense, *Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and Congress,* p. 101.

[58] Senate Armed Forces Committee, *Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1993 and the Future Years Defense Program,* p. 286.

[59] Barbara Opall, "Gulf Weapons Pack More Punch," *Defense News,* January 18–24, 1993, pp. 1, 35.

[60] Tony Capaccio and Eric Rosenberg, "Iraqi Raid Highlighted New Joint Attack Planning," *Defense Week,* January 19, 1993, p. 11.

[61] Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Mobility Requirements Study, Executive Summary,* vol. 1, January 23, 1992, p. 5.

If all the assets envisioned under the MRS are put into place by the end of the decade, the United States could, in the event of another gulf war, deploy five army divisions, along with a marine expeditionary force and tactical air units, within about eight weeks.[63] That would be about twice as fast as it took an equivalent number of forces to deploy during Operation Desert Shield.

CONCLUSION

While politicians may publicly debate ways to avoid another gulf war scenario, military planners consider the prospect of such a war almost inevitable certainty—if not against Iraq, then against Iran. The Pentagon sees future war in the Persian Gulf as its primary raison d'être in terms of overseas conflicts. In fact, one of Secretary of Defense Aspin's first actions was to create the post of assistant secretary of defense for regional security. Analysis of regional contingencies in Southwest Asia, as well as Korea, will serve as the basis for threat planning in a new Pentagon strategy review, according to a plan outlined by Frank Wisner, the undersecretary of defense for policy in the Clinton administration.[64]

Military officials may hope to have some help from other nations, either under the auspices of the United Nations or as part of some loose regional defense structure. To that end they have invited European and Arab countries outside the Persian Gulf to join in exercises.[65] The bottom line, however, is that when war comes they expect that the United States will be fighting essentially alone. The phrase, "together when we can, alone when we must"—used by Bush administration officials—is in vogue with the Clinton administration.

When it comes to the Persian Gulf there is remarkable continuity between the Bush and Clinton administrations. In both cases the emphasis is on regional threats as a danger to US security. When presenting the FY 1994 Pentagon budget to Congress, Secretary of Defense Aspin said, "The thing that really drives the defense budget now is the regional threats. We still have people like Saddam Hussein, we still have bad guys which have military capability, and we need to have the capability in the United States military to be able to deal with those people. There's about a half dozen of them. You all can think of the same people—Libya, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, et cetera. Those are the people you need to have the capability to be able to deal with them as we did in Desert Storm."[66]

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[62] Ibid., pp. 5–6.

[63] Peter Grier, "The Ton-Gap Mile," *Air Force Magazine*, November 1992, p. 32.

[64] "Regional Contingencies in Southwest Asia, Korea, To Form Basis for OSD Planning," *Inside the Air Force*, March 12, 1993, p. 13.

[65] Philip Finnegan, "U.S. Urges Joint Exercises in Egypt," *Defense News*, February 1–7, 1993, pp. 1, 28.

Given President Bill Clinton's support for strikes against Iraq in January, February, and April 1993 and his promise to focus primarily on domestic policy, there is little reason to suppose that he will change the status quo. As General Hoar put it in congressional testimony, "That region of the world assigned to the Central Command has continued to grow in importance, as one of the overseas areas most likely to become the scene of a regional conflict."[67]

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[66] Department of Defense, "Defense Secretary Les Aspin Briefing on the Defense Budget," March 27, 1993, p. 2.

[67] Department of Defense, *1993 U.S. Central Command Posture Statement*, p. 61.

ISRAEL'S 1992 KNESSET ELECTIONS: ARE THEY CRITICAL?

Sammy Smooha and Don Peretz

POLITICAL scientists and political sociologists distinguish between regular and critical elections, the difference being the significance of their overall results. In regular elections, the same government remains in power, or if a new government is installed, it effects only piecemeal or small changes. The changeover of governments in regular elections makes little difference in terms of the redirection of society, economy, politics, or foreign policy. On the other hand, critical elections result not only in a new government, but also in a new era. The new government in critical elections is part of a more comprehensive political, economic, social, and sometimes even international change that is further reinforced by the changing of the guard.[1]

Critical elections are by definition irregular and infrequent. They are not easy to anticipate or to diagnose during the short time before or after the elections. Only when the consequences of the elections unfold with the passage of time is it possible to ascertain whether they were regular or critical. In retropect, certain elections are generally accepted as critical: the 1860 US elections that preceded the outbreak of the Civil War and the abolition of slavery; the 1932 US elections

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[1] The term *critical election* is usually applied to elections in which voters effect changes in government by realigning behind political parties. The term is utilized in this article to refer primarily to election results. On the concept and application of the term, see V.O. Key, "A Theory of Critical Elections," *Journal of Politics* 17, 1 (February 1955); W.D. Burnham, *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics* (New York: Norton, 1970); David Brady, *Critical Elections and Congressional Policy Making* (Stanford: Stanford University, 1988).

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that ushered in the New Deal; the 1933 elections that brought the Nazis to power in Germany; the 1948 elections that resulted in the institutionalization of apartheid in South Africa and the 1989 elections that ended apartheid.

The 1977 national elections in Israel are also critical. The ascendance of the Likud Party bloc to power brought about the end of the Labor Party's hegemony in Israeli society, the transformation of politics from a dominant party system to a bipartisan one, a new Zionism aimed at making Greater Israel an irreversible reality, and a rise in the status of the population groups that were realigned to form the new electoral base of Likud rule—proponents of Greater Israel, religious Zionists, and Oriental Jews.[2] The central question today is whether the 1992 thirteenth Knesset elections will prove to be critical in the history of Israel. How wide and how deep might be the change they effect beyond the replacement of the Likud government by a Labor government? Is the shift of governments a harbinger of peace or a redirection of domestic politics?

The answer to these questions is far from obvious. Analysts today lack the hindsight of a decade needed to determine the exact nature of the 1992 elections. The goal of this article is to examine the evidence, and to set forth the rationale for considering the 1992 elections critical based on an analysis of the structures and processes of the wider political system and electoral behavior.

CHANGING OF THE GUARD

Leon Hadar makes the case forcefully and with much conviction that the 1992 elections were critical. He divides Israeli political history into three eras or republics. The "First Republic," dating from 1948 to 1977, was characterized by Labor rule, while the "Second Republic," 1977–1992, was characterized by Likud rule. The ascendance of Labor to power in 1992, according to Hadar, was "an electoral earthquake" marking the fall of the Second Republic and the beginning of the "Third Republic." This new era is based on "a new coalition of the traditional liberal Ashkenazic voters, secular Russian immigrants, and disgruntled Sephardic voters committed to a more accommodative national consensus." In the 1992 elections, the Israeli voters "chose the Westernized, secular, and progressive vision of Zionism that the new government reflects."[3]

Currently, however, most analysts are reluctant to consider the 1992 elections critical. They conclude that while Likud was defeated, Labor did not "win"; in their view, Labor scored only a technical victory. All emphasize that the Labor bloc received the smallest majority possible—61 seats. All analysts have stressed that counts of the Jewish votes for the various parties show that Jewish public opinion has remained either evenly divided between proponents and opponents of Greater Israel or even in favor of the hawks. It is also argued that, on many counts, the 1992 electoral transformation is less deep and comprehensive than the upheaval occasioned by the 1977 elections. Finally, many analysts perceive the changeover of governments as temporary, and attribute considerable flexibility to the Jewish voter, who probably will vote Labor out of power in the next election if it fails to fulfill its promises. Together these conclusions form a plausible argument of the 1992 elections as non-critical, but, at the same time, imply a new phase in Israeli politics: the completion of the "normalization" process that began in 1977 and ended in 1992 with a routine rotation of the major political parties in power. One might argue that, from this time on, neither political bloc will have an edge in the eyes of pragmatic voters.[4]

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[2] See Asher Arian, *Politics in Israel: The Second Generation,* 2nd ed. (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1989); Abraham Diskin, *Elections and Voters in Israel* (New York: Praeger, 1991). In this article, the term *Oriental Jews* refers to Jews from North Africa and Asia.

[3] Leon T. Hadar, "The 1992 Electoral Earthquake and the Fall of the 'Second Israeli Republic'," *Middle East Journal* 46, no. 4 (Autumn 1992), p. 616.

Israel's thirteenth Knesset elections underscored the continued division of the electorate into two principal blocs: the Labor bloc, which includes Zionist factions to its left plus predominantly Israeli Arab parties; and the national camp led by Likud, allied with several parties to its right and the religious parties. The victorious Labor bloc included the Arab Democratic Party (ADP) with two seats, and the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (HADASH), a largely Arab list led by the New Communist List (RAKAH), with three seats; together their five Knesset votes gave new prime minister Yitzhak Rabin a parliamentary majority. The Labor-led coalition cabinet formed after the elections included MERETZ, which won twelve seats with a list formed just before the elections from three peace-oriented, ideologically secular parties—the United Workers Party (MAPAM), the Citizens Rights Movement (RATZ), and Shinui.[5]

The Election Campaign

The Israeli public's dissatisfaction with governmental instability and gridlock had been evident in ongoing demands for change in the existing multiparty coalition form of government. After years of unsuccessful electoral reform efforts in the Knesset, a beginning was made after the 1988 elections with two new laws—one raising the percentage of votes required for a Knesset seat from 1 to 1.5 percent of the total votes and the other providing for direct election of the prime minister starting after the next national elections.

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[4] These objections and qualifications run as a thread in the following articles: Asher Arian and Michal Shamir, "Two Reversals in Israeli Politics: Why 1992 Was Not 1977," mimeograph, October 1992; Yochanan Peres and Dafna Goldberg, "A Summary Report of Election Polls to the 13th Knesset," mimeograph, July 1992 (Hebrew); Baruch Kimmerling, "Was There a Genuine Counter-Upheaval in Israel?" mimeograph, June 1992.

The Israeli Sociological Society, at its annual meeting at the Hebrew University in February 1993, held a plenary session on the 1992 elections. All the panelists—Kalman Gayer, Michael Lotan, Majid Al-Haj, and Yochanan Peres, with the exception of Sammy Smooha—agreed that the elections are not critical. In a leading commentary in *Ha'aretz*, tellingly entitled "Four Thousandths," Yoel Markus approvingly details Yochanan Peres's various reasons why Labor's victory was so precarious that it could have been overturned by a fluctuation of only "four thousandths" of the votes. *Ha'aretz*, February 23, 1993.

[5] This mix of religious and secular nearly disrupted Rabin's government during its initial months in office. Rabin threatened his two coalition partners that, if they misbehaved, he would invite either or both of their ideological competitors—the ultra-Orthodox Yahadut HaTorah HaMeuhedet and Tzomet—to join the government.

Raising the electoral threshold, however, did not discourage the multiplicity of single-issue lists. As many as 25 lists competed in the elections. They included On Wheels, a taxi drivers' list protesting victimization by local tax and municipal authorities; Law of Nature, pushing transcendental meditation as the answer to Israel's problems; Tsippor (Bird), claiming to be neither hawk nor dove; and Picanti, named after the food manufactured by an industrialist who waged a one-man war against the income tax department.[6]

Although not as much mud was slung as in some previous elections, Likud and Labor each contributed its share of vitriol to the 1992 campaign. One Likud commercial showing a lighted cigarette doused in a whisky glass was intended to fuel the flames of rumors that Rabin was a problem drinker, if not an outright alcoholic. The concealed message: Rabin may appear to be a tough former general, but he has a flawed character likely to crack under pressure. As the campaign progressed, this advertisement became an embarrassment to Likud's senior leaders, and a number of them, including Moshe Arens, David Levy, Binyamin Netanyahu, Yitzhak Shamir, and Ariel Sharon objected to personal attacks on Rabin. Instead, they preferred to focus on Labor's platform of "Land for Peace," and the unilateral implementation of Palestinian autonomy within six to nine months after the elections. Likud also objected to Rabin's promise to suspend construction and development of new Jewish "political" settlements in the occupied territories, charging that Labor "put Eretz Israel on an end-of-season sale" with its defeatist program.[7] In the single televised debate between the leaders of the two major parties, Shamir accused Labor of engaging in "conspiracies with the Arabs" between 1984 and 1990, which, he claimed, led to the collapse of the Likud-Labor coalition government.

Throughout, Likud tried to maintain the considerable popularity it enjoyed before the beginning of the campaign. A national poll, conducted by the Modin Ezrahi organization in November 1991, showed that if elections had been held at that time Likud would have won 44 seats compared to only 29 projected for the Labor Party; the Likud bloc would have obtained 70 seats compared to only 50 forecast for the Labor bloc.[8] Indeed, between March 1990 and January 1992, the narrow Likud government had several achievements. During this period, large numbers of immigrants arrived from the Soviet Union, and most of the newcomers expressed a decided preference for the hard-line, anti-socialist Likud establishment. The Shamir government also received special credit for evacuating Ethiopian Jews to Israel and high marks for the self-restraint, discretion, and moderation it exercised during the Persian Gulf War; Israel's international standing improved appreciably as a passive ally of the US-led coalition against Iraq. Furthermore, Likud gained popular support for its historic role of shaping and actively participating in the Madrid peace conference in October 1991.

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[6] Of the scores of lists that considered running, 30 finally registered with the Central Election Committee, which disqualified 5 of them. Two Kach lists, formed by supporters of deceased rabbi Meir Kahane, were banned because of their anti-democratic platform and racist instigation of Israel's Arab citizens. The other three were barred on technical grounds.

[7] *Jerusalem Post*, June 1, 1992.

[8] *Mabbat*, November 19, 1991.

In order to discredit Likud, Labor focused its campaign on Likud's "mistaken national priorities." Because Rabin was defense minister during the first years of the *intifada,* Labor maintained it was better prepared to deal with terrorism. The party also asserted that its willingness to work for territorial compromise made it more likely than a Shamir government to break the deadlock in the Middle East peace negotiations. Labor also charged that 15 years of Likud dominance had produced government waste and record unemployment. Likud's infatuation with building West Bank settlements had resulted in the neglect of serious economic, educational, and social problems in Israel.

Labor's accusations were reinforced by the April 1992 release of the annual report of the state comptroller, Miriam Ben-Porat, criticizing the pre-election Likud government for extensive waste and bureaucratic bungling. The report charged government officials with using public funds for personal use, favoritism in dispensing appointments, and spending millions on empty buildings in the occupied territories while there was a housing shortage in Israel. "The rules of public administration were flouted, and at times moral scruples were tossed aside," Ben-Porat stated in her report. "A lot of money has gone down the drain, and great suffering has been caused or not spared some of the immigrants, as a result of flaws in the making of decisions and their implementation."[9]

As the elections approached, opinion polls revealed the public's shift toward Labor and the Zionist Left. These later polls showed most Soviet Jewish immigrants disenchanted with Likud's failure to find them adequate housing and jobs. Polls also indicated that some Oriental Jews were abandoning Likud because of their disappointment with its record on the economy. Surveys a few weeks before the election gave the Labor Party a lead over Likud, but they predicted a deadlock in the race between the two political blocs. Pollsters disagreed about the ongoing trend: some assumed that the Labor lead was stable, while others reported a closing gap.[10] Nevertheless, a month before the election, some Likud leaders, including a key advisor to Prime Minister Shamir, envisioned possibilities of the worst—a Rabin-led unity government should Likud be unable to form the next coalition.[11]

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[9] *New York Times,* April 29, 1992.

[10] For a postmortem analysis of the various pre-election polls and disagreements and accusations among pollsters, see Avi Ganor, "The Likud Was More Miserable Than I Published," *Ha'aretz,* July 26, 1992.

[11] *Jerusalem Post,* May 25, 1992.

One reason for Labor's increased attraction was its decision to democratize the party. Until 1992, Labor candidates, like those in most other parties, were chosen by power brokers and bosses in a system based on special interest groups and powerful personalities. One of the most important developments in 1992 was a decision to open the selection process to the 160,000 party members through a primary election that would ensure more genuinely popular and better-known candidates. All but the top two candidates on the Labor list, Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, were chosen by popular vote of the 100,000 who participated in the primary. As a result, 14 of the top 40 candidates on the Labor list were newcomers to national politics.

The Labor list included a number of young politicians, several noted for their dovish inclinations, including supporters of Peace Now. The Labor Knesset delegation also had the largest number of women deputies—four. Paradoxically, Labor, on the one hand, emphasized its internal democracy, youth, and willingness to compromise for peace while, on the other hand, it gave prominence to the party leader, the 70-year-old Rabin, noted for his tough policies during the intifada. Rabin's role was underscored during the campaign when the official name of the Labor list was changed to "Labor under the Leadership of Yitzhak Rabin." Labor campaign posters throughout the country prominently displayed his picture, giving him the aura of a presidential candidate. When one of the religious parties protested to the election committee about the change of name, the committee rejected its complaint. This led Yahadut HaTorah HaMeuhedet (United Torah Judaism), an alliance of Agudat Yisrael and Degel HaTorah, to change its official title to "Yahadut HaTorah—Agudat Yisrael, Degel HaTorah and Rabbi Yitzhak Peretz."[12]

Labor's Double Victory

Of the 3,409,015 eligible voters in June 1992, a total of 2,616,841 persons voted.[13] This 77.4 percent turnout was the second lowest since the 1951 elections of 75.1 percent and below the 80 percent average of the 1970s and 1980s. The main reason for the relatively low percentage was not apathy but a larger proportion of new immigrants—9 percent of the electorate—who were unfamiliar with Israeli politics and abstention among certain groups.[14] Only 10 of the 25 lists that

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[12] *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, June 11, 1992.

[13] Election result figures are as recorded by the Central Elections Committee of the Knesset.

[14] Voter turnout in Israel is among the highest of democratically elected governments. It is actually higher than the official rate because most of the non-voters either live or stay abroad or are otherwise physically unable to vote because of a disability or a move to another town. Except for sailors and diplomats, Israel does not allow absentee votes. If adjusted for persons absent or unable to vote, the national rate would be well over 90 percent, a very high rate for a country where voting is not mandatory. There are many reasons for this exceptionally high rate of turnout: the large and diverse supply of lists to choose from; the lack of need to register for voting; election day is a paid holiday; and the big drives undertaken by all political parties to induce their supporters to vote, including busing them to the voting stations if necessary.

TABLE 1

1992 Knesset Elections Results

List	Votes 1992	Percent of Votes 1992	Seats 1992	Seats 1988	Seats 1984	Seats 1981	Seats 1977
Labor	906,810	34.6	44	39	44	47	32
Likud	651,229	24.9	32	40	41	48	43
MERETZ	250,667	9.6	12	10*	6*	3*	16*
Tzomet	166,366	6.4	8	2	—	—	—
MAFDAL	129,663	5.0	6	5	4	6	12
SHAS	129,347	4.9	6	6	4	—	—
Yahadut HaTorah HaMeuhedet	86,167	3.3	4	7	2	4	4
HADASH	62,546	2.4	3	4	4	4	5
Moledet	62,269	2.4	3	2	—	—	—
Arab Democratic Party	40,788	1.6	2	1	—	—	—
Tehiya	31,957	1.2	—	3	5	3	—
Progressive List for Peace	24,181	1.2	—	1	2	—	—
New Liberal Party (Moda'i)	16,669	0.6	—	—	—	—	—
Geulat Israel (Rabbi Mizrahi)	12,851	0.5	—	—	—	—	—
Democracy and Aliyah	11,697	0.4	—	—	—	—	—
Pensioners and Immigrants	8,327	0.3	—	—	—	—	—
Mortgage Victims	5,962	0.2	—	—	—	—	—
Picanti (Badash)	3,750	0.1	—	—	—	—	—
Torah and Land (Rabbi Levinger)	3,708	0.1	—	—	—	—	—
On Wheels (Taxi Drivers)	3,355	0.1	—	—	—	—	—
Women	2,886	0.1	—	—	—	—	—
The Hope (Bitton and Shakdiel)	2,053	0.1	—	—	—	—	—
Law of Nature	1,734	0.1	—	—	—	—	—
Israeli Renaissance Movement (TALI)	1,336	0.1	—	—	—	—	—
Tsippor (Bird)	523	0.0	—	—	—	—	—
Other lists	—	—	—	—	8	5	8
TOTAL	2,616,841	100	120	120	120	120	120

Source: Central Elections Committee, The Knesset, Jerusalem, 1992.

*Represents the collective votes of the United Workers Party (MAPAM), the Citizens Rights Movement (RATZ), and Shinui—the three parties that joined to form MERETZ in 1992.

competed in the elections crossed the minimum 1.5 percent threshold of the 39,253 votes needed to win a seat in parliament. (See table 1.) This reduction in the number of winning lists—down from 14 in 1988—was due to the increase in the percentage limit. Two established parties failed to win a seat: Tehiya, which obtained only 32,000 votes, and the Progressive List for Peace (PLP), with only 24,000 votes.[15]

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[15] The actual number of votes per seat was 20,715. Of the total of 2,616,841 votes cast, 21,102 were invalid for various reasons (including abstentions) and 130,989 were lost because of the 1.5 percent threshold.

TABLE 2
Divisions into Labor and Likud Parties and Blocs by Knesset Seats

	1977	1981	1984	1988	1992
Parties					
Labor	32	47	44	39	44
Likud	47	48	41	40	32
Seat Advantage	15	1	3	1	12
Blocs					
Labor	41	54	59	55	61
Likud	79*	66	61	65	59
Seat Advantage	38	12	2	10	2
Double Victory	Likud	Likud	None	Likud	Labor
Government	Likud	Likud	Unity	Unity	Labor

Source: Compiled by Sammy Smooha.
*Since the alignment into two political blocs began to form only in 1977, these 79 Knesset seats should be considered as non-Labor rather than Likud bloc.

The elections were not an overwhelming victory for Labor nor a major disaster for Likud. Unlike the "earthquake" in 1977 when Labor lost 19 Knesset seats—more than a third of its parliamentary strength—in 1992, Likud lost 8 of the 40 seats it held in the twelfth Knesset, and Labor gained 5. Overall, the Labor-Left-Arab bloc increased its strength from 55 to 61 seats. The Likud bloc lost 4 of its 47 seats, and the Orthodox religious parties lost 2 of their 18. Labor emerged as both the largest party and the largest bloc. Since the Knesset members from the left of Labor would not support a Likud-led government, they formed a blocking front against a Likud coalition. This was the first time since 1977 that Labor had scored a double victory—as a party and as a bloc—which made it possible to form a narrow Labor government coalition. (See table 2.)

Labor's double victory significantly changed the meaning of gain and loss for some parties depending on their bloc affiliation. The electoral success of certain right-wing parties proved disappointing. Although the National Religious Party (MAFDAL) increased its strength from 5 to 6 seats and Tzomet increased its representation dramatically from 2 to 8, both parties found themselves in the opposition without clout. On the other hand, the influence in Israeli politics of the predominantly Arab parties rose because their support was essential for the formation of a Labor government despite the decline in their combined representation from 6 in 1988 to 5 in 1992. The Arab parties, however, were excluded from the government coalition because their Arab supporters' loyalty to the state is not trusted, especially in terms of sensitive government ministries. Israel's Arab citizens also expressly reject Zionism, the goals of which are the basic principles of any Israeli government, and they advocate the formation of an independent

Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip led by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), a solution unacceptable even to the mainstream of the Labor Party. Thus, the Arab parties played a role in blocking Likud from forming a government, but not in the formation of a Labor government. As outsiders, they support the Rabin government as long as it advances the peace process and improves the conditions of the Arab minority in Israel.

To form a government, Labor had to appeal to parties that formerly belonged in the Likud bloc. To avoid dependence on the Arabs, Rabin invited the Sephardic Torah Guardians (SHAS)—a non-hawkish, *haredi* (pious, or ultra-Orthodox) party—to join his new government, thus excluding any Arabs at the cabinet level. The ultra-Orthodox parties were the most likely partners because they depend heavily on governmental appropriations to their institutions and communities and because they do not have a strong commitment on the central issue of territorial compromise. SHAS was the first to jump on the Labor bandwagon. In breaking its public promise to back a Likud government, SHAS explained that "it is impossible to marry a dead body"—that is, the Likud ceased to exist as the organizer of a coalition government.

Widespread disaffection underlay the serious defeat of Likud in the polls. According to one post-election poll, 40 percent of the Jewish voters decided who they would vote for during the election campaign and 33 percent of the 1988 voters switched to a different party in 1992, a higher percentage than the 25 percent average in earlier elections.[16] Several events acted to turn people away from the Likud. These included in-fighting among Likud factions over the nomination of candidates to the Knesset, the publication of the state comptroller's report, the growing absorption predicament of the Soviet immigrants, the clash with the US administration over loan guarantees, and the rejuvenation of Labor and the Zionist Left. All these factors combined to cause general disillusionment with Likud's performance and defection from its ranks. An examination of the voting behavior of certain key groups shows the effect of these developments.

VOTING BEHAVIOR

The Oriental Vote

Since the 1970s, the backbone of Likud support had come from Oriental Jews, especially those from the working and lower classes. Two-thirds of the voters who switched from Likud to Labor in 1992 were Oriental Jews.[17] Oriental Jews' disaffection was evident throughout the 1980s, but only in 1992 did it register in a significant shift of votes that made a difference in contributing to Likud's defeat. Several factors converged to bring this disaffection to the surface.

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[16] Peres and Goldberg, "Summary Report of Election Polls."

[17] Arian and Shamir, "Two Reversals in Israeli Politics."

From March 1990 to June 1992, the Likud government diverted enormous sums from the country's depleting national budget to settlement of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, causing painful cuts in development projects, a rise in unemployment, and the erosion of social services. Many Oriental Jews also were increasingly alarmed by the influx of highly educated and credentialed Soviet Jews, who were seen as competitors for jobs, housing, and national attention.

Although some Oriental Jews had been ready to reconsider their attitude toward Likud, the March 1992 party election for candidates to the Knesset drove a wedge between Likud and its traditional constituency. The televised contest for nominations displayed deep factionalism, intrigue, and ethnic insensitivity. The faction of predominantly Moroccan Jews, headed by Foreign Minister David Levy, suffered a heavy setback in the face of collusion between the Ashkenazic factions, one led by Shamir and Arens and another led by Sharon. Feeling that his way to the top of Likud was blocked, and his effort to safeguard the peace process with concessions was thwarted, Levy's supporters urged him to break with the party. They complained of ethnic discrimination and non-democratic procedures used to undermine their power, pointing out that while Oriental Jews comprised a majority of the Likud's electorate, they constituted only a minority of the party's Central Committee, Knesset members, and cabinet ministers. This media display appreciably damaged the electorally precious image of Likud as a warm home and an ethnic haven for Oriental Jews.[18]

The ethnic issue was further fueled by in-fighting among the ultra-Orthodox sect. SHAS had emerged in 1984 as an Oriental haredi party to realize the aspirations and needs of the growing Oriental haredi intelligentsia that had become impatient with Ashkenazic hegemony in ultra-Orthodox schools, *yeshivas*, politics, the arrangement of marriages, and distribution of funds. The Ashkenazic rabbi Eliezer Shach, a renowned Torah authority, helped to create SHAS as a weapon against his adversaries—Agudat Yisrael and the Hassidic Jews. Once organized, SHAS gradually institutionalized itself along Ashkenazic lines as a political arm of an autonomous Oriental haredi community. It also became increasingly independent of Shach's authority, enabling Sephardic leaders such as rabbis Ovadia Yosef and Ari Der'i to muster decisive influence.

SHAS's detachment from Shach began in March 1990, when all SHAS Knesset members, with the exception of Yitzhak Peretz, the immigrant absorption minister, ignored his orders not to join a new Labor government. In 1992, Shach formed Yahadut HaTorah HaMeuhedet, consisting of haredi Ashkenazim and an Oriental faction headed by Peretz, that aimed to compete with SHAS for the Oriental Jewish vote. In his effort to shift that vote away from SHAS to Yahadut HaTorah HaMeuhedet, Shach declared that Oriental Jews were not yet qualified to lead Israel and the haredi community; he called on them to vote for Yahadut HaTorah HaMeuhedet, and not for SHAS.[19]

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[18] For an account of the unrest among Oriental Jewish activists of the Likud Party, see Rami Rosen, "Pardon Me for My Grandmother Not Having Known Jabotinski," *Ha'aretz* Weekly Magazine, April 3, 1992. It was charged that the grass-roots Oriental Jewish majority within the Likud's Central Committee was intentionally undermined by coopting, without internal elections, various Ashkenazic groups, including 800 veterans of the Irgun Zvai Leumi and Lohamei Herut Israel (LEHI), 200 "distinguished persons" and 120 former members of La'am, an offshoot of Rishimat Poalei Yisrael (RAFI) which broke from Labor in 1965.

Shach's extraordinary move should be understood against the background of the growing Oriental Jewish challenge to Ashkenazic discrimination against them and influence over the haredi population. By late 1990, Shach and many of his followers began to consider the independent SHAS as a threat, not only to Shach's authority but also to Ashkenazic haredi dominance in general. SHAS represented a distinct haredi Jewish viewpoint between the Zionist religious MAFDAL perspective and the non-Zionist ultra-Orthodox Agudah Yisrael perspective. It took stands on non-haredi issues and vied for power in wider Israeli politics, as demonstrated in the initiative SHAS leaders undertook by negotiating with Peres in the abortive attempt to form a narrow Labor government in 1990.

The Levy setback in Likud and Rabbi Shach's offense combined to anger many Oriental Jews. Both developments demonstrate the Oriental Jews' rise to power in Likud and haredi politics and the Ashkenazic countermeasures to stop them from reaching the top. The Ashkenazic opposition goes beyond a contest for power to fear of institutional change—that is, Oriental Jews capturing party machines and manipulating them for their own interests. Levy threatened the Likud elite's hard-core ideological policies and represented grass-roots pragmatist politics consonant with the preferences of Oriental Jewish constituents. Similarly, SHAS challenged Ashkenazic haredi religious extremism and self-segregation from the Israeli mainstream and promoted a new haredi Oriental Jew who was only partially observant, while also partially modern, less opposed to Zionism and quite involved in Israeli society. It was the double (power and institutional) nature of the challenge that aroused strong Ashkenazic objection.

The attacks against Oriental Jews in Likud and in the haredi community added to Likud's loss of their votes. Some Oriental Jews simply did not vote, contributing to a decline in the national voter turnout. It appears that some Oriental Jews abstained to register their protest against Likud. A more significant Oriental Jewish response, however, was the defection to Labor and to parties to the right of Likud. Under Rabin, the Labor Party was much more attractive personally and politically to Likud voters than it had been in 1988. The labor campaign in favor of "funds to the development towns and poor neighborhoods instead of settlements" also sounded credible. On the Right, Tzomet, under former army chief of staff Rafael Eitan's leadership, offered another appealing alternative by appearing hawkish, simplistic, and clean.

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[19] Shach made this declaration in an address to 200 Sephardic rabbis on June 12, 1992. It was reported in the newspapers on the following day and raised a public storm.

The Soviet Immigrant Vote

About 350,000 new Soviet immigrants arrived in Israel during the two years before the elections.[20] Since Israeli law permits adult immigrants arriving three months before election day to vote, these immigrants constituted 9 percent of eligible voters in 1992. Although polls taken before 1992 found many immigrants leaning toward Likud, only a minority had reported a clear political preference. Most immigrants were undecided, apparently making up their minds only during the election campaign, deciding in favor of bread and butter, and hoping to benefit from the economic growth promised by Labor. The newcomers voted close to 3 to 1 in favor of Labor, making a disproportionate contribution to the double Labor victory.[21]

The new arrivals from the former Soviet Union were dissuaded not only by the Likud's uncompromising ideology of Greater Israel, but also by its religious allies. These immigrants tend to be devoted secularists—lacking knowledge of Jewish heritage, and having weak Jewish identity—and to some extent even intermarried. They felt alienated from the incursions of religious symbols and traditions into the public domain and were concerned by the excessive powers of the religious parties. The decline in religious representation from 18 mandates, or seats, in 1988 to 16 in 1992 was partly caused by lack of support from the Soviet immigrants.

With their emigration from the Soviet Union, the newcomers discovered a new ethnic identity in Israel. In the Soviet Union they had suffered as Jews, even though many were assimilated. In the ethnically diverse Jewish state, however, they were identified as Russians. With this new Russian identity they soon noticed the differences separating them from working class and poor Oriental Jews in the development towns and urban neighborhoods where many of them settled. Some Russians clashed with Ethiopian immigrants in absorption centers and transit sites. With middle class backgrounds and aspirations and a strong Western orientation, the Russians felt much closer to the European Jews. They soon developed an Ashkenazic identity and loyalty. Since the Labor bloc is the political choice and base of the dominant Ashkenazic group, it has also became a preferred option of the new Ashkenazic, that is Russian, immigrants.[22]

The Lost Vote

Another factor in the Likud defeat was its disproportionate share of the lost vote. The fact that 25 lists ran for election shows that many political contenders did not heed the warning of a rise in the threshold of votes needed for a Knesset seat. Lists aligned with the Likud bloc took a greater risk and lost more votes than lists leaning toward the Labor bloc. Of the 2,616,841 votes cast, 130,989—5 percent—were lost as a result of voting for one of the 15 lists receiving fewer than the required 1.5 percent minimum. The excluded lists included three categories: six lists not identified with either political bloc got 24,607 votes; four pro-Labor lists that together polled 37,447 votes; five pro-Likud lists that received 68,935 votes. The proportion of votes lost by the Likud bloc was nearly twice that lost by the Labor bloc.

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[20] See Bernard Reich, Noah Dropkin, and Meyrav Wurmser, "Soviet Jewish Immigration and the 1992 Israeli Knesset Elections," *Middle East Journal* 47, no. 3 (Summer 1993), table 1.

[21] On election day, the Israel Television Authority conducted exit polls of immigrant and veteran voters. The ratio of the Labor to Likud vote was 47 percent to 18 percent among the immigrants as compared to 35 percent to 25 percent nationally.

[22] See Reich, "Soviet Jewish Immigration."

The Labor bloc clearly was less factionalized than Likud. The greater unity of the Labor bloc is demonstrated in the formation of MERETZ, the joint list that assured all three of its Zionist left-wing parties passage of the 1.5 percent barrier. Formation of a joint election list between the two largely Arab parties, the PLP and the ADP, failed at the last moment, causing the bulk of the lost vote in the Labor bloc.

Disunity within the Likud bloc was rampant, and its asymmetrical loss of votes vis-à-vis Labor was a significant factor in its defeat. No serious negotiations for forming a joint list were conducted between the radical right—Tehiya, Tzomet, and Moledet—or the two new super-hawkish lists headed by rabbis Eliezar Mizrahi and Moshe Levinger. Shamir proved to be a weak successor to the charismatic and authoritarian Menachem Begin. In fact, the acrimonious relations between the factions and leaders in the Likud Party continued even after the crisis of nominating candidates to the Knesset had passed. David Levy's threat to resign from the government forced Shamir to sign an agreement ensuring Levy's faction proportional representation in the party and in the next government. Although the accord achieved a détente with the Levy faction, it angered Arens and others in the party.[23]

The Israeli Arab Vote

The 1992 elections marked a substantial boost in the strategic value of the Israeli Arab vote. It was the first time in Israel's record of coalition politics that it had helped decide the changeover of governments. Without the 5 seats of HADASH and the ADP, the Labor bloc would not have obtained the minimum 61 votes required to block Likud. Paradoxically, Arabs played this decisive role despite the fact that they also hurt Labor through the loss of votes caused by their lower voter turnout and failure to establish a joint Arab list. To appreciate the Arab contribution to Likud's defeat, an examination of developments in Arab politics between the 1988 and 1992 elections is useful.

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[23] Arens condemned the Shamir-Levy agreement as "extortion on ethnic grounds." For details on the agreement and reactions to it, see *Hadashot,* April 6, 1992, and *Ha'aretz,* April 12, 1992.

TABLE 3
Israeli Arab Vote
(Percent)

	1984	1988	1992
PREDOMINANTLY ARAB PARTIES			
HADASH	32	34	23
Arab Democratic Party	—	11	15
Progressive List for Peace	18	14	9
JEWISH PARTIES			
Labor	31	17	20
MERETZ	5*	10*	10
Likud	5	7	8
MAFDAL	4	3	5
SHAS	—	0.5	5
Other Lists	5	3.5	5
CLASSIFICATION BY ARAB/JEWISH PARTIES			
Predominantly Arab Parties	50	59	47
Jewish Parties	50	41	53
CLASSIFICATION BY POLITICAL BLOC			
Labor	90	88	81
Likud	10	12	19
VOTER TURNOUT	74	74	70

Source: Compiled by Sammy Smooha.
*Represents the collective votes of the United Workers Party (MAPAM), the Citizens Rights Movement (RATZ), and Shinui—the three parties that joined to form MERETZ in 1992.

Arab voting patterns in the 1988 Knesset elections were typical of Arab parliamentary politics. (See table 3.) First, the Arab turnout was very high—74 percent—but lower than the national average of 80 percent. Second, Arabs voted 88 percent to 12 percent in favor of the Labor bloc. Third, the three predominantly Arab parties polled together a record high of 59 percent of the Arab vote. Arab gains from parliamentary politics, however, were limited because their vote did not decide which political bloc would rule, and their parties remained excluded from the coalition government. Arabs were disappointed, especially in view of widespread speculation that their status would improve significantly as a result of the 1988 elections.

In addition to overall disappointment with parliamentary politics, the popularity of the two predominantly nationalist Arab parties had declined sharply by 1992. The RAKAH faction, which heads HADASH, lost its ideological base, thrust and credibility, as well as its financial support, with the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. It consequently had to cut its paid personnel and publications and cope with a loss of hundreds of fellowships for study in the Soviet bloc, which had been used to lure supporters. Its ideological rigidity, authoritarian internal structure, and depleted resources caused a noticeable drop in its number of activists, rank and file members, and voters. Since RAKAH had succeeded in instituting its ideology—a two-state solution, Arab-Jewish equality, and democratic and peaceful struggle—as an Arab national consensus, it had lost its special appeal to the Arab community, while its distinct communist legacy had been discredited.

The situation of the PLP was not any better. It virtually lost its Jewish wing after 1988 when it was represented in the Knesset only by Muhammad Miari, the PLP's leader, and in 1990 when it followed the PLO in backing Iraq during the Persian Gulf crisis. The PLP failed to build an organizational base and active chapters. Factions emerged that challenged Miari's leadership and broke away when they failed to effect change. The party also fell victim to its success in making Palestinian identity and nationalism cornerstones of the Arab national consensus in Israel, losing its unique representation of these themes in the process. Because of its apparent electoral weakness, the PLP was strongly pressured by the PLO, Palestinian leaders in the territories, the communists, and Arab independents to merge with the ADP to prevent a substantial loss of votes should it fail to pass the 1.5 percent threshold. Miari rejected their appeals, however, and was later singled out for defying the popular will for Arab unity.

The 1988 Arab voters for HADASH and the PLP, along with new Arab voters inclined to vote for these two nationalist lists, faced a difficult dilemma during the 1992 elections. Many Arabs no longer were attracted to these parties, but they had no viable alternatives. Hence, an appreciable number simply abstained while some switched to the ADP. While HADASH received 81,000 Arab votes in 1988, it won only 60,000 in 1992—its share of the Arab vote declined from 34 percent to 23 percent. Support for the PLP shrank from 33,000 to 24,000—from 14 percent to 9 percent. This substantial drop in the number of voters for HADASH and the PLP explains the decline in Arab turnout from 74 percent in 1988 to 70 percent in 1992 despite the PLO appeal that Arabs exercise their right to vote, the shift in the position of the Islamic movement from boycotting the elections to mild endorsement of voting, and a widespread belief that the 1992 elections would be critical for the peace process.

The significant abstention of highly politicized past or potential supporters of HADASH and the PLP caused a rise in support for the ADP, the Labor Party, and SHAS among Arabs. As a result, the ADP polled 15 percent of the Palestinian Arab vote—up from 11 percent in 1988—and increased its Knesset representation from 1 to 2 seats. The Jewish parties raised their proportion of the Arab vote from 41 percent in 1988 to 59 percent in 1992. The Likud bloc, including the religious parties, rose from 12 percent to 19 percent, mostly due to the exceptional success of SHAS—up from 0.5 percent to 5 percent—which used its control of the

Ministry of the Interior to dispense benefits and to make promises to the Arab sector.[24]

The impact of Arab voting in 1992 is open to various interpretations. Some emphasize the decline in the participation rate and the rise in support for the Likud bloc to argue that Arabs were not instrumental in Labor's double victory.[25] Others stress the significant increase in voting for Jewish parties as evidence of Arab desire to integrate into and shape Israeli politics. In the absence of election polling data from the Arab public, there is no way of knowing what percent intended to abstain but finally voted out of an overriding desire to bring about a change of governments. The predicament of Labor among Arab voters could have been much worse without the decision of thousands of politically conscious and non-accommodating Arabs to vote despite their aversion to HADASH and the PLP and disappointment with parliamentary politics.

In the final analysis, Arabs played, willingly or inadvertently, a crucial role in Labor's ascendance to power by supplying the necessary five votes that blocked formation of a Likud government. Thus, they were also a significant beneficiary of the change. The 1992 Labor government is the first in Israel to be dependent on Arab parties for its formation. This new situation provides a certain leverage with the Rabin government and sets a precedent for additional progress in the incorporation of Arabs into coalition politics.

The Peace Process

Behind the massive disaffection with Likud were various factors connected with the peace negotiations begun in October 1991. Likud fell victim to the evolving peace process in which it participated and for which it claimed credit. The bilateral and multilateral component of Israel's peace strategy was fashioned by the Shamir government, in consultation with and under pressure from the Bush administration, in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War of 1991. The strategy was based on a broad concept of direct negotiations and comprehensive peace rather than a gradual and partial approach. Shamir had suggested this innovative and ambitious concept in the hope that the Arab side would reject it; he succeeded, however, in over-selling it. The Labor bloc oscillated between rejection and qualified acceptance of the idea, but the Rabin government ultimately decided to adopt the formula.

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[24] In addition to disaffection with HADASH and the PLP, the significant rise in Arab support for the ADP and Jewish parties in 1992 was also partly due to a special drive by these parties to capture the Arab vote. This was done by dispensation of benefits to communities—such as provision of budgets and separate municipal status—to *hamulas* and to individuals, including appointments as teachers and civil servants, licenses to carry guns, legalization of illegal buildings, and straightforward cash bribes. For an investigative inquiry, see *Globes*, special issue, July 31, 1992. (Hebrew).

[25] As'ad Ghanem, Department of Political Science at the University of Haifa, makes this argument in an unpublished paper on the 1992 elections in the Arab sector.

If Likud was so successful in making its peace strategy acceptable and operational, why was it defeated in the elections? Several factors increased the salience and urgency of the peace issue in the public mind and cast doubt on Likud's suitability to lead the peace process. One was the lingering intifada; the Palestinian uprising that began in December 1987 had become a constant irritant. It had made Israelis feel unsafe, damaged the economy, and deepened internal political rifts. Likud and radical Right politicians placed the blame for the intifada's continuation on the lack of resolve of the national unity governments of 1984 to 1990, but the super-hawkish, narrow Likud government that ruled from March 1990 to June 1992 could not and did not subdue the uprising either. The lesson drawn by at least part of the public was that the Palestinian question could not be settled by force according to Likud's prescription, but only through political negotiation and compromise. The intifada had "a sleeper effect"—a cumulative effect registering only at a later time—on the Israeli public, which reacted to it during the 1992 rather than the 1988 elections. This delayed response hurt Likud in 1992 in the same way that public reaction to the 1973 October War hurt Labor in 1977.

The Persian Gulf War was another important factor. It was the first war in which the civilian sector greatly suffered without the country being involved in combat. It drove home the message of the population's vulnerability to weapons of mass-destruction and the necessity to try a new approach toward comprehensive peace with the Arabs.

Likud's drive since March 1990 to undertake mass construction of settlements in the occupied territories was another factor. Large sums of money were diverted to huge housing projects in the West Bank. The Palestinians feared that if this policy continued at such a rapid pace, Israel's retention of the territories would become irreversible. As a result, their aspiration to obtain a national home would be undermined. The Arab world and the Labor bloc in Israel also were alarmed and warned against Likud's policies.

Finally, it seems that the Bush administration played a key role in sensitizing the Israeli public to these considerations. The US policy of conditioning loan guarantees on suspending new settlements forced the government and the Israeli public to make a choice. One alternative, continuing settlements, also meant continuing the intifada, possible war with the Arabs, the economic crisis, stalled immigration and unabsorbed immigrants, and other social dislocations. The other alternative was to suspend construction of new settlements, follow that with a genuine peace effort, and maintain the continued flow of economic and political support from the West. Forced to make a choice, the hard-line Likud government selected the Greater Israel option. The Israeli public, with the assistance of President George Bush and Secretary of State James Baker, saw the high cost of this ideological option, and the majority decided in 1992 in favor of the peace alternative.

It is no secret that the US administration, the European Community, the Arab states, the PLO and Palestinian leaders from the occupied territories all desired a change of government in Israel. They did not trust the Likud government's intentions and viewed it as an obstacle to peace. Only the United States, however, had sufficient leverage to effect change because of Israel's heavy dependence on US economic and other assistance. The end of the Cold War greatly diminished Israel's strategic value for the United States; the decline of Soviet influence made regional conflicts more salient and troublesome and raised the cost of continued US support for Israel. As a result, US interest in peace between Israel and the Arabs became stronger and US policy more active in pursuing a settlement of the Israeli-Arab conflict.

Public opinion polls revealed both the direct and indirect effects of the peace issue on the Israeli Jewish voter. First, there had been a clear, steady but gradual trend since 1990 in favor of land for peace. Second, foreign and national security considerations loomed prominently in the voters' decisions during 1992, especially in comparison with previous elections.[26] Third, the choices of voters such as new immigrants, economically depressed working class families, industrialists, and many others affected by the economy, were indirectly shaped by peace concerns. The 1992 election was the first electoral campaign in which the linkage between the economy and peace was made so firmly.

CONCLUSION

The 1992 elections exposed the structural weaknesses of the Likud bloc as compared to the Labor bloc. The structural superiority of the Labor bloc gave it a lead over Likud in competition for votes, formation of coalition governments, and stability of narrow coalition governments. This is a relatively new phenomenon that analysts tend to gloss over. The structural advantages of Labor include the following: on the key issue of peacemaking, disagreement within the Labor bloc is more manageable than that within the Likud bloc, whose extremist supporters oppose any halt to settlements, any form of autonomy for Palestinians, or peace negotiations involving territorial concessions; parties in the Labor bloc are unlikely to participate in a narrow Likud government, while those in the Likud bloc are available for a Labor-led coalition; the Arab voters—11 percent of the electorate in 1992—are unlikely to support the Likud bloc; and party-constituency disagreement is significantly less among parties in the Labor bloc than among those in the Likud bloc.

In 1992, party-constituency disagreement played a significant role because the electorate was more disposed toward pragmatic policies. With respect to Likud and Tzomet, there has emerged a noticeable gap between the leaders and rank and file supporters in their commitment to Greater Israel, the centerpiece and driving force of the hard-line politicians in these two parties. Probably less than half of Likud and Tzomet voters were ideologically committed and prepared to pay a high price for a Greater Israel, a position that requires more sacrifice on the part of constituents than does the pragmatic stance of territorial concessions. Since the backbone of Likud's constituency consisted of working class and poor Oriental Jews, who had not been socialized into ideological politics and who seek social mobility in exchange for their votes, Likud cannot depend on their support in crisis situations. This is also true for Tzomet, which gained most of its votes in 1992 not from super-hawks, but from Likud dissidents, persons interested in uncorrupted and efficient government, and secularists wanting to reduce ultra-Orthodox excesses.[27] Many of these transient voters cannot be counted on in future elections.[28]

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[26] See Arian and Shamir, "Two Reversals in Israeli Politics."

These considerations permit us to return to the initial inquiry: Were the 1992 national elections critical? They may prove to be critical for two reasons: the elections started a new era of fairly secure Labor rule, and they cleared the way for a peace settlement. Diverse evidence suggests that Labor's ascendance to power was a response to deep concerns and is likely to last for more than one term. First, a serious crack in Likud's electoral base occurred as part of its Oriental Jewish constituency defected and switched to Labor. Second, the Soviet immigrants demonstrated a decided preference for Labor. Because immigration from the Commonwealth of Independent States continues, the Labor electorate is bound to increase, and the demographic processes that favored Likud in the past have begun to work in favor of Labor.

With respect to the peace process, the Likud elite ideologically is committed to Greater Israel and intransigent in its politics on this matter. In a telling interview after the Likud double defeat, Shamir conceded that the most important question was retention of all of Greater Israel. He proudly revealed his subversion of the peace negotiations: "I would conduct negotiations over autonomy for ten years, so that in the meantime we would reach half a million souls [Jewish settlers] in Judea and Samaria."[29] It is widely believed within Likud that time is on Israel's side, permitting "facts" to be created on the ground that would make Israel's control and eventual annexation of the territories irreversible. Hence the Likud government looked for every opportunity to disengage from the peace talks, inciting rejectionism and counting on Palestinian blunders.

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[27] For this reason the recurrent argument that the hawkish vote was greater than the dovish vote among the Jews in 1992 is dubious. It is argued that the votes for Likud, Tzomet, Moledet, Tehiya, New Liberal, Geulat Israel, Torah and Land, SHAS, MAFDAL and Yahadut HaTorah HaMeuhedet (1,290,226) outnumbered the votes for Labor and MERETZ (1,157,447). It is further maintained that a stalemate and parity between the two blocs is apparent even if the votes cast by Arabs for HADASH, the ADP, and the PLP are added to Labor and MERETZ (1,284,962). These arguments ignore, however, the Jewish voters' intentions and motivations in casting their votes.

[28] Party-constituency agreement is reflected, among other things, in the proportion of loyalist voters, namely, voters supporting, without much wavering, the same party from one election to the next. It has been shown consistently since the 1981 elections that the proportion of Likud loyalists is smaller than that of Labor loyalists. For instance, according to a pre-election poll taken in June 1992, the proportions were 59 percent and 84 percent, respectively. Arian and Shamir, "Two Reversals in Israeli Politics," table 2.

[29] Interview with Yosef Harif, "Only One or Two of My Successors Is OK," *Ma'ariv*, June 26, 1992.

In contrast, Labor supports the pragmatic politics of land for peace. The Rabin government maintains that for Israel's own sake, it should withdraw from most of the territories and dissociate itself from involvement with the Palestinian populations there, if Israel is to remain a Jewish and democratic state. Rabin's approach is clearly pro-Jewish, not pro-Palestinian; he concurs with Likud on rejecting the Palestinians' right to self-determination, Israel's withdrawal to the pre-1967 borders, recognition of the PLO, and the formation of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Within the Labor Party, however, there is an influential faction that is willing to compromise on these issues and has called for direct negotiations with the PLO. Despite tension between Labor's hawks and doves, the party's preparedness to return most of the territories and its commitment to peacemaking are essential for reaching a peace settlement.

The ascendance of a Labor government committed to peacemaking took place at a critical and opportune moment in the historical process, culminating in the convergence of various forces necessary to generate conditions for a peace settlement. These include a dovish shift in Jewish public opinion in Israel, an agreement on a sound peace strategy as found in a two-stage settlement of the Palestinian question and bilateral and multilateral negotiations for comprehensive peace with the Arabs, the serious involvement of the United States, the Arab states' loss of military options and their growing willingness to end the conflict with Israel, a shift in the Palestinian mainstream from rejectionism toward a pragmatic compromise settlement, and the feasibility of Israel's retreat from most of the territories. These factors developed in the late 1980s, gathering momentum as a result of the intifada and the end of the Cold War.

The 1992 elections may prove critical if the Labor government becomes an effective peacemaker; it will, however, need to be secure in power. A Labor government that has more than one term in office not only can reach a peace settlement, but also can begin to implement it, so that it takes root and is not undermined easily by a subsequent Likud government. Once accords between Arabs and Israelis are reached and executed, a new dynamic will set in that can transform the Israeli-Arab conflict from confrontation and adversity to a joint venture of pragmatic problem-solving and conflict-management. There is a plausible basis to believe that the elections may turn out to have been critical in terms of a stable realignment of the Israeli electorate behind the Labor bloc and a significant move toward peace with the Arab world.

SOVIET JEWISH IMMIGRATION AND THE 1992 ISRAELI KNESSET ELECTIONS

Bernard Reich, Noah Dropkin, and Meyrav Wurmser

IMMIGRANTS have played a central role in the political and social life of Israel, and did so in Palestine before 1948. Since independence, Israel's commitment to unlimited and virtually unrestricted Jewish immigration has been enshrined in the Declaration of Independence and the Law of Return; it has been reinforced by successive governments with overwhelming popular support. The commitment to Jewish immigration has been implemented almost without regard to economic costs and social dislocations or to political effects. In the pre-state period, each wave of immigrants was distinctive in its composition and imparted a particular imprint upon Israel.

Immediately after independence, Holocaust survivors arrived in large numbers and soon were followed by hundreds of thousands of Sephardic Jews mostly from Arab countries. By the mid-1970s, Sephardim composed the majority of Israel's Jewish population. After the 1967 war, there was an increase in immigration from the West, as well as tens of thousands of Jews from the Soviet Union. With the disintegration of the Soviet system and its ultimate collapse, hundreds of thousands of Jews began immigrating to Israel in the fall of 1989. The 1992 Knesset elections that returned the Labor Party to power were the first test of the impact of this most recent wave of immigrants on the Israeli body politic.

THE NEW ELECTORATE

Among the more than 3.4 million Israelis eligible to vote in the June 1992 Knesset elections were some 300,000 recent immigrants, the overwhelming

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TABLE 1
Soviet Jewish Immigration to Israel

	1989	1990	1991	1992
January	—	4,591	13,360	6,237
February	—	5,746	7,164	4,233
March	—	7,380	13,336	4,913
April	—	10,641	16,286	4,696
May	—	10,202	16,048	3,361
June	—	11,015	21,372	—
July	—	15,395	10,325	—
August	—	17,484	8,943	—
September	—	18,725	9,877	—
October	—	20,324	9,845	—
November	—	25,186	8,090	—
December	—	35,070	10,359	—
TOTAL	**12,814**	**181,759**	**145,005**	**23,440**

Source: Data provided by Israeli Ministry of Immigration and Absorption.

majority of whom came from the former Soviet Union.[1] (See table 1.) The immigrants of 1989–1992 were different from earlier Soviet immigrants in various respects, including their origins within the former Soviet Union,[2] level of education, age distribution, and degree of Jewish identity. Perhaps the most outstanding feature of this recent wave of arrivals was their level of education. Although only 26 percent of the Israeli population in 1992 had 13 or more years of formal education, 61 percent of the recently arrived Soviet Jews had achieved that level of education. Within that group, more than 42 percent had scientific and academic professional educations, a figure four times the Israeli average. They have added significantly to the number of both medical doctors and holders of doctorate degrees in Israel. In regard to age, although less than 10 percent of the general Israeli population was of retirement or pension age, about 10.3 percent of the Soviet immigrants were in that category. Thirty-eight percent were under 18, and 45 percent were under 24; a total of 51.6 percent of the immigrants were of working age, that is, between the ages of 19 and 64.

While an overwhelming majority—94.5 percent—of the Soviet Jews interviewed in an October 1990 Public Opinion Research of Israel (PORI) poll said that both their parents are or were Jewish, more than 50 percent indicated that their level of Jewish identity was either cultural or a result of family ties.[3] Only 1.7 percent identified themselves as belonging to the category of a "practicing religious believer." When asked about their Jewish identity, 5 percent replied "Zionist."

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[1] According to the Ministry of Immigration and Absorption, about 340,000 *olim* (immigrants) from the former Soviet Union arrived in Israel between 1989 and 1991.

[2] Figures from the Ministry of Immigration and Absorption indicate that the largest number of recent immigrants—38.1 percent—came from Russia, 25.2 percent from Ukraine, and 13.1 percent came from Central Asia. Smaller percentages also arrived from other republics.

This wave of immigration was more of an emigration from the Soviet Union than an immigration to Israel. It consisted overwhelmingly of people who chose to leave the Soviet Union because of various social, political or economic factors that were primarily of a negative nature. Thus, rather than immigrating to Israel for reasons such as ideology or religion, they had opted to leave the Soviet Union, not necessarily by choice, but to ensure their survival; it was not a "Jewish" or "Zionist" immigration in the traditional or usual sense of those terms. The nature of the immigration, however, did not indicate any lack of desire to live in Israel. In the October 1990 PORI study, 84 percent of the immigrants interviewed listed Israel as their first choice of residence even when given the option of choosing any other nation. Nearly 90 percent responded that they were very likely to remain in Israel for at least the next few years, thus discrediting the idea that most Soviet Jews would prefer to settle elsewhere if given the opportunity to do so.

Early Expectations

Initial polls and surveys of the new Soviet immigrants indicated that in elections they would vote for Likud and other right-wing parties. These analyses, together with the widely held perception of much of the political leadership that Soviet Jews would not support a socialist party—such as Labor or the United Workers Party (MAPAM)—reinforced the view that in the 1992 elections Likud would emerge victorious.[4] Other polls offered further support for such views, depicting the immigrants as a relatively hawkish group, unwilling to compromise on issues of peace and security.[5] A Smith Research Institute poll conducted in

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[3] PORI administered a personal interview survey among a representative sample of 401 newly arrived Soviet Jewish heads of household in Israel.

[4] See, for example, *Bamakom*, June 28, 1991, and Bernard Reich, Noah Dropkin, and Meyrav Wurmser, "The Impact of the Soviet Jewish Vote on the Israeli Knesset Elections," *Middle East Insight*, March/April 1992, pp. 48–55.

[5] See, for example, the PORI poll of October 1990 or the Reshet Yediot Tikshoret (News Communication Network) poll of June 1991. In the PORI poll, a majority—55 percent—said that Israel should retain all the West Bank and Gaza "even if it means final peace agreement may not be reached." In the same poll, 85 percent said that population transfer of all Palestinians from Israel and the occupied territories that would make Israel a purely Jewish state was desirable, although 61 percent found it impossible. See United States Information Agency, "Recent Soviet Jewish Immigration to Israel: Hawkish on Issues, Noncommittal on Parties and Leadership," *Research Memorandum*, March 6, 1991.

Similar opinions were expressed in a June 1991 Reshet Yediot Tikshoret poll, according to which 45 percent were either for enforcement of Israeli law or population transfer as their preferred solution to the Palestinian-Israeli problem. Among the people who would like to keep the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Golan Heights, 58.8 percent were willing to go to war over them. See *Bamakom*, June 28, 1991.

March 1992, however, indicated that the views and positions of the immigrants were shifting.[6]

For Israel's political parties the large number of Soviet immigrants presented a challenge and an opportunity because of their voting power and potential to shift the political balance. The activities of the parties indicated some of the conclusions that they had drawn about the perspectives and potential positions of the new immigrants and the factors that they thought would influence their voting behavior. Although most of the political parties engaged in some form of activity among the newcomers before campaigning began, from 1990 to early 1992 it was only of a limited nature. During this period the parties' activities were based on two general and widely held yet contradictory expectations: either anti-communist and anti-socialist sentiments dominated among Soviet voters, and, thus, they would tilt toward the Right; or, since they were a highly educated and cultured group, similar in many respects to the Israeli voters who support the Left, they, too, would support the Left. Among these expectations, the former was thought to be the more determining and widely accepted factor, and it was on this basis that many parties originally believed that the immigrants would support Likud and the parties to its right.

This approach essentially discounted the likelihood that the immigration and absorption process would play a crucial role in determining the Soviet vote. Because the party with the largest number of seats in parliament traditionally has the first opportunity to form a coalition, Likud and Labor—as the two largest parties and the ones with the most realistic chances to form and lead a government—potentially had the most to gain or to lose in wooing the new immigrants.

During 1990 and 1991, Likud believed that it would secure the support of the Soviet Jews and that the newcomers would vote based more on emotion than on political reasoning. From Likud's perspective, immigrants from a failed communist totalitarian state would be reluctant to vote for a socialist party because it evoked images of the tribulations of the Soviet system. Michael Kleiner of Likud, then-chairman of the Knesset Absorption Committee stated as much: "In my opinion, what will decide [the election] is the emotional factor. So it's clear that one who thinks that a Soviet Jew will vote for a party [such as Labor,] which still sings the 'International', does not understand how important emotions are in an election campaign."[7]

According to Uri Gordon of Labor, chairman of the absorption department of the Jewish Agency, Likud assumed that when the absorption process took place in development towns, which were Likud strongholds, part of the political socialization of the immigrants would include the adoption of pro-Likud political attitudes similar to those held by residents in their immediate environment.[8] Additionally, Likud believed that the sons and daughters of immigrants would favorably influence their parents' political beliefs. Children often tend to be absorbed more quickly into Israeli society, and the Soviet newcomers' children initially demonstrated pro-Likud political tendencies.[9]

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[6] The Smith poll, sponsored by the United States Information Agency, indicated that 39 percent of the immigrants supported Labor and 13 percent supported Likud. See United States Information Agency, "Israeli Elections: Soviet Jewish Immigrants Shift toward Labor," Briefing Paper, April 3, 1992.

[7] Interview with Kleiner, Tel Aviv, September 4, 1990.

The newcomers were also seen as patriotic individuals with a basic dislike of the Arabs.[10] Gordon argued that the immigrants' dislike of the Arabs derived primarily from a dislike of the Central Asiatic nationals in the Soviet Union—read as *Muslims*—whom they saw as similar to the Arabs. Because of their "patriotism," it was assumed that the immigrants would, as a consequence, naturally support a party, such as Likud, identified with the "national" camp and with a tough line on Israel's dealings with the Arab world[11]; Likud leaders also felt that the 1991 Persian Gulf War, during which Iraqi missiles struck Israeli cities, strengthened this argument by emphasizing the importance of territory in providing security—in this case, the occupied territories.[12]

Likud believed that because it was the largest of the parties on the right, it would be more attractive to the immigrants than smaller parties with similar positions on questions of peace and security. Because of their small size, the other right-wing parties would be less likely to evolve as the dominant coalition partner and, therefore, less able to pursue their policies. Likud, as the only right-of-center party with the likelihood of leading a government, viewed itself as the only one capable of fulfilling its political agenda.[13]

On the other side of the political spectrum, Labor believed that the immigrants would vote in its favor. In theory, the immigrants would be attracted to the Labor Party because, as a highly educated and cultured group, they would support the stronghold of the "people of culture" in Israel.[14] The immigrants were also seen as "pragmatic and sane" voters. Making Labor's confidence even stronger was Likud's ineffective absorption policies. As "rational" political thinkers, the immigrants would not support what Labor considered Likud's "adventurist" positions on questions of peace and security.[15] Uri Gordon asserted that Labor believed that the immigrants primarily wanted quiet, comfortable lives and that Labor was the only party capable of offering them such because it wanted to achieve peace.[16]

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[8] Interview with Gordon, Tel Aviv, August 30, 1990.

[9] Ibid. See also *Bamakom,* June 28, 1991.

[10] Interview with Gordon, Tel Aviv, August 31, 1990.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Interview with Alex Glassman, head of the immigration department of the Likud Party, Tel Aviv, June 30, 1991.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Interview with Labor's Shimon Alon, head of the immigration department of the Labor Party, Tel Aviv, August 28, 1990. He stated that "they will have a hard time voting for Likud and the right . . . especially [for] cultural reasons . . . because people of culture are not to be found on that side."

[15] Ibid.; also see *Bamakom,* June 28, 1991.

[16] Interview with Gordon, Tel Aviv, August 31, 1990.

Labor began to conceive of its campaign strategy to focus on Likud's absorption policies early on, almost two years before the elections and even before the absorption process began to flounder in a significant and obvious manner.[17] This would become a viable approach, however, only when the dimensions both of the immigration and the problems of absorption became clear. In 1990, and even in the early part of 1991, Likud was optimistic about its capacity to absorb the immigrants efficiently, but it became less confident during 1991.[18] The failures of the absorption process began to affect Likud leaders' confidence in their ability to attract widespread support from the immigrants.

Labor devoted the period before the campaign to overcoming difficulties resulting from the party's socialist origins and essence. It also worked at allaying fears about Labor's perceived softness on security issues by focusing on Yitzhak Rabin's military background and his role as minister of defense in the national unity governments of 1984–1990. An implicit link was made between Israel's economic and immigrant absorption troubles and Likud's security policy, and this became the center of Labor's approach during the campaign. Basically, Labor presented itself as more moderate than Likud in terms of foreign policy, and argued that Likud's settlements policy harmed the economy. Thus, the broad strategies used during the campaign emerged when the size, scope, and significance of the Soviet immigration became clear some two years prior to the election.

POLITICAL RIPENESS AND POLITICAL CHANGE

Whether or not the political parties were ready for the new wave of immigrants, an important question is whether the Soviet Jews were ready for the raucous nature of Israeli electoral politics. In addition to being newcomers from a totalitarian communist system unaccustomed to open political participation, because of their recent arrival, many immigrants were not yet fully aware of the structure of the Israeli political system, the precise nature and programs of the various parties, nor the main issues of the political debate.[19] In an October 1990 poll, 66 percent of the respondents did not express a party preference,[20] although it cannot be said that the immigrants lacked interest in the elections nor did not wish to participate in it.[21]

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[17] Ibid. For example, Gordon noted, "Every newcomer suffers at first from absorption difficulties and loneliness. Who does he think is responsible for this? The state and the establishment. . . . Labor could perform its role as the speaker of the opposition in the next elections, and say [to the voter], 'If I was in power this wouldn't have happened'."

[18] Interview with Alex Glassman, Tel Aviv, June 30, 1991.

[19] According to Uri Gordon, "One has to understand several important psychological factors [about the olim]. This is a population which is unaware of the Yom Kippur blunder. It is a group of people who do not remember, understand and know the Lebanon War, and this is also a population which wasn't present in Israel during the political turnover when [Menachem] Begin came to power. In other words, they don't know Begin. They also don't hate Begin. I will tell you something else—I'm sure that what's true for Begin is also true for [Shimon] Peres. They don't know Peres in depth. . . . Most of them are clean of prejudice and all they ask for as immigrants [is] to improve their economic condition and be absorbed in a new state." Interview, Tel Aviv, August 31, 1990.

[20] United States Information Agency, "Recent Soviet Jewish Immigration to Israel."

In the period before the elections, the immigrants' voting potential influenced the existing trend toward unification among the smaller parties on both the left and the right of the political spectrum. The parties clearly recognized that in the 1992 election the larger pool of eligible first-time voters resulting from immigration, as well as from natural increase, would require a larger absolute number of votes for each Knesset mandate; nearly 62 percent of the Soviet immigrants were of voting age. This factor was compounded by the raising of the parliamentary threshold to 1.5 percent of the vote. For small parties, establishing a larger party by merging with other small parties became a logical solution.

Discussion of unification began in mid-1990 when 10 left-wing members of the Knesset—five from the Citizens Rights Movement (RATZ), three from MAPAM, and two from Shinui—met and decided to act, thereafter, as a unified parliamentary bloc and prepare for formal unification. This eventually resulted in the formation of MERETZ, formally MERETZ Democratic Israel, led by Shulamit Aloni of RATZ.[22] Although there were no major differences among these parties on issues related to peace, their disagreements on economic issues were substantial.[23] The higher representational threshold, and the identified secular orientation of the immigrants, also convinced the religious parties that they needed to combine their efforts. Only hours before the election registration deadline, three religious groupings—Agudat Yisrael, Degel HaTorah, and Moriah—united to form Yahadut HaTorah HaMeuhedet (United Torah Judaism).

A Soviet Political Party?

Discussion about the formation of an independent Soviet political party began as the number of immigrants and their potential political power grew. At first such a formation was thought unlikely, although it remained a matter of constant speculation. In 1990, the discussion was quite theoretical. Likud's Alex Glassman believed that, in principle, most of the immigrants would support the larger parties and not marginal political movements such as an independent Soviet party.[24] Likud's Michael Kleiner, arguing that such a possibility was "not serious," stated, "I hope that Soviet Jewry is no less intelligent . . . than the Moroccan or Yemenite Jews, and will react towards their own communally segregated people the same way Edot HaMizrach [Eastern communities] reacted towards such people, [that is,] with contempt."[25]

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[21] According to the PORI poll conducted in October 1990, 42.9 percent of the newcomers were very likely and 27.9 percent were somewhat likely to vote in the next Israeli elections. See PORI, "Soviet Jewish Immigrant Survey, October 1991."

[22] "The Left Is Unifying without Weizman," *Ma'ariv,* August 16, 1991.

[23] For example, Shinui is a firm believer in free market competition while MAPAM holds strongly leftist, socialist views.

[24] Interview with Glassman, Tel Aviv, August 28, 1990.

[25] Interview with Kleiner, Tel Aviv, September 4, 1990.

Similarly, Labor's Shimon Alon suggested that while there was a possibility that new olim parties would run, such movements would probably get no more than one or two mandates.[26] The Jewish Agency's Uri Gordon thought the olim probably would try to organize an independent party, but that such an attempt was "not meaningful." "What can they say that would be different from Likud or Labor? That they are newcomers? That's not going to be enough. In terms of ideology, what will they say? . . . They have a problem. They don't have anything special to offer."[27] By the summer of 1991, however, most of the parties generally agreed that an immigrant party was likely to run in the Knesset election, and in the spring of 1992 this became a reality. Ultimately, three immigrant-dominated parties contested the election: Democracy and Aliyah (DA), the Israeli Renaissance Movement (TALI), and Pensioners and Immigrants.

Various public opinion polls had suggested that an immigrant party might gain a high level of support among the immigrant newcomers. The June 1991 Reshet Yediot Tikshoret poll reported that 68 percent of the immigrants would support such a party,[28] while 60 percent said that they would not vote for any established Israeli party among the 11 mentioned in the questionnaire.[29]

Before the election, most politicians and observers believed that the success of a Soviet immigrants list would depend to a large extent on the personalities leading it and, as most polls showed, the best known and most popular personality among the newcomers was Natan (Anatoly) Sharansky. A PORI poll conducted in October 1990 suggested that almost 45 percent of the Soviet voters found him either very, or somewhat, favorable.[30] A later poll, conducted in July 1991, showed that of immigrants supporting the establishment of an independent Soviet Jewish party, more than 60 percent considered Sharansky the most popular figure.[31] Nevertheless, Sharansky was not liked nor trusted by all the immigrants, and questions were raised about his reliability and his potential success. Indeed, Sharansky was not as well known among the most recent wave of immigrants as among olim who came during the 1970s because he had not been very active in Jewish causes in the Soviet Union. A core group of people knew him, but his popularity was much greater among Israelis and Jews in the West.

During the course of the campaign, Sharansky vacillated on the question of whether he would run for political office. His ultimate reversal of an earlier decision to participate resulted in part from a lack of time and planning. Sharansky viewed the formation of a party focused on immigrants' issues as a "last resort."[32] Furthermore, he worried that such a party might follow the precedent set in the

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[26] Interview with Alon, Tel Aviv, August 28, 1990.

[27] Interview with Gordon, Tel Aviv, August 31, 1990.

[28] The poll was published in *Bamakom,* June 28, 1991.

[29] Ibid. The question listed Agudat Yisrael, Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (HADASH), Labor, Likud, Kach, MAPAM, Moledet, RATZ, Shinui, Tehiya, and Tzomet.

[30] PORI, "Soviet Jewish Immigrant Survey, October 1990."

[31] Reshet Yediot Tikshoret poll, published in *Bamakom,* July 14, 1991.

[32] *Jerusalem Post,* May 16, 1992.

1977 elections by the Democratic Movement for Change (DMC) when it became the third largest party in the Knesset only to find itself excluded from the coalition. When the DMC joined the government it did so without securing the support it needed to implement its primary demands, and, partly as a result, it eventually splintered and ceased to exist.[33]

THE HOME STRETCH

Polls taken in the weeks before the voting reflected two trends damaging to Likud's prospects: the growing willingness of the immigrants to participate in the balloting, and a basic shift in their views of the Left along with an increasing preference to vote for Labor. Likud leaders, however, refused to accept their inability to garner widespread immigrant support.[34] A Teleseker poll conducted among 800 immigrants during the early weeks of June 1992 showed that 70 percent of the immigrants planned to vote.[35] The poll also showed that Labor and MERETZ stood to gain six mandates from the immigrant vote.[36] Likud and the parties to its right were expected to gain two seats, while the immigrant parties were not likely to secure the essential minimum to achieve representation in the Knesset.

The Teleseker poll also showed that the new immigrants preferred Yitzhak Rabin over Yitzhak Shamir as national leader by a margin of 58 percent to 26 percent.[37] These polls did not, however, reflect a basic shift in the immigrants' specific positions on issues of peace and security, nor did they indicate a clear ideologically "leftist" tilt. A few weeks before the elections, 46 percent of immigrants polled said that Israel should not return any of the occupied territories, while 40 percent were willing to return only some of them.[38]

While these and similar poll results showed that most of the immigrants supported Likud's foreign policy positions, they also demonstrated that the immigrants believed that Likud's absorption process was a failure.[39] The factors reinforcing such feelings included an unemployment rate of 11.5 percent in the first three months of 1992 and the arrival in Israel of only 3,361 immigrants during the month of May. These facts provided Labor with more ammunition for its criticism of Likud, which, in turn, contributed to tension within Likud that grew to the point of divisiveness. During a meeting shortly before the election, Ariel Sharon lashed out at Shamir, claiming that the immigrants were being instigated against Likud by Labor and threatened by the Histadrut with the loss of union protection and support and such material items as medical benefits. Sharon stated that the immigrants were, in fact, uninformed about Israeli politics.[40] These comments, less than two weeks before elections, reflected an increasingly held view that only a low immigrant turnout would save Likud from defeat.[41]

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[33] Ibid., May 16, 1992.

[34] *Ha'aretz,* February 14, 1992.

[35] *Ma'ariv,* June 21, 1992. Similar results were noted by a Tazpit Research Institute poll conducted in April 1992. See *Financial Times,* April 8, 1992.

[36] *Ma'ariv,* June 21, 1992.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Ibid.

[39] See, for example, *New York Times,* May 23, 1992, and June 18, 1992.

To gain last minute support from the immigrants, Likud aired political advertisements in Russian. Because of the new immigrant voters' potentially determining effect on the election results, most of the parties published their platforms in Russian, and some distributed other Russian-language political materials among the immigrants. The National Religious Party (MAFDAL) distributed to the immigrants video cassettes with the party's popular songs and its political message in Russian. Other parties aimed their media campaigns directly at the immigrants. Tehiya emphasized Geula Cohen's role as a member of the Immigration and Absorption Committee of the Knesset, and placed a Soviet immigrant in the sixth slot on its list. The parties with the greatest focus on immigrant-related issues, however, were DA, Pensioners and Immigrants, and TALI. Their media campaign, predominantly in Russian, addressed the specific problems and issues facing immigrants, which were primarily material in nature.

In the first Likud Russian-language commercials, Shamir addressed the immigrants directly, and presented examples of immigrant success stories. The message emphasized optimism about absorption while also negatively portraying Labor as a socialist, "red" party.[42] Likud's approach implied that Labor's campaign against it was succeeding. Labor forced Likud to modify its primary message that it could better ensure the country's security in favor of one countering Labor's charges of ineffective absorption policies. Labor reacted to Likud's commercials by utilizing Russian subtitles in its media efforts, and continuing its hammering of Likud's absorption record, emphasizing that 40 percent of the new immigrants were unemployed.[43]

The Bush administration's opposition to granting loan guarantees sought by the Shamir government to facilitate immigration and absorption was exploited by Labor to illustrate the marked deterioration in the relationship between the United States and Israel. Labor argued that if Shamir had been willing to halt settlement construction to the satisfaction of the United States, he could have secured the loans; that Shamir had not done so demonstrated that his foreign policies were detrimental to Israel's well-being. Likud's settlement policy, pursued at the expense of immigrant absorption, distanced the United States from Israel and further disinclined Washington to guarantee needed loans. Hence, foreign policy and absorption policy were directly related.

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[40] See *Yedi'ot Aharonot,* June 6, 1992, and *New York Times,* June 21, 1992.

[41] Ibid.

[42] See for example, *Ha'aretz,* May 15, 1992.

[43] *Financial Times,* June 11, 1992. Part of the reason the immigrants found it difficult to secure gainful employment was their high level of education and specialization. At the same time, many who came to Israel were not qualified to perform the same tasks they did in the Soviet Union because their levels of expertise did not match Western standards. Of 2,018 immigrants who took physician qualifying examinations, only half passed, and of those who did, only 20 percent were able to secure employment. Compounding the problem, many Israeli employers sought younger workers, bypassing immigrants over 40. Immigrants who were not employed in their professions—such as doctors and musicians—saw themselves as "unemployed" even when working in other sectors. See, *New York Times,* February 4, 1992, and *Washington Post,* May 18, 1992.

In its effort to regain control of the government, Labor made the most dramatic shift in the party since 1988: a change in party leadership and the transformation of the party's socialist character. The change in leadership from Shimon Peres to Yitzhak Rabin in February 1992 allowed Labor to present itself as a transformed party and to shield itself against criticism that it was too dovish. Rabin had a long career in the military and had served as defense minister when the *intifada* began in 1987. During his tenure at the Defense Ministry, Rabin had been perceived as particularly intolerant of violence in the occupied territories.

The downplaying of Labor's socialist origins and past and the attempt to disassociate the party from its socialist ideology and previous symbolism—such as changing the party's color scheme from red and white to blue and white in campaign materials—was intended to combat the perception that the immigrants would not vote for a socialist party. Rabin endorsed economic reform and cutbacks in government spending. Labor also used the tactic of presenting itself as a more democratic party. For example, in 1992 it had instituted a US-style primary election process to select the party leadership and their positions on the election list, while Likud continued to employ the traditional system that involved an "old-boy" network and a political patronage system.

THE RESULTS

The Soviet vote, overwhelmingly for Labor, elicited an almost immediate reaction by Likud. Initially, Shamir focused on "the immigrants' betrayal." He felt that the immigrants had turned their backs on Likud, which had worked hard to secure their emigration from the Soviet Union to Israel, and which was expending great efforts to absorb them.[44] Later, he admitted that Likud had made many mistakes in the campaign in its attempts to gain immigrant support. Nevertheless, he ultimately placed the blame elsewhere. "One cannot ignore the fact that many of the olim have no national or Jewish attachment . . . but here, in Israel, they will change their position after a few years."[45] Shamir implied that it was the character of the immigrants that determined their voting behavior, rather than the choices presented to them by the parties. What Shamir perhaps failed to realize was that between March 1992 and June 1992, the Israeli political map changed with the Labor Party's leadership and image transformation, while Likud remained saddled with rising unemployment, declining immigration rates, and internal dissension.

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[44] See *Yedi'ot Aharonot,* June 25, 1992.

[45] *Ma'ariv,* June 26, 1992.

TABLE 2

1992 Knesset Elections: Exit Poll of Soviet Immigrants

Party	Percentage*
Labor	47.10
Likud	18.00
MERETZ	11.00
Democracy and Aliyah	5.49
Yahadut HaTorah HaMeuhedet	2.11
SHAS	1.60
Moledet	1.57
Tzomet	1.42
MAFDAL	0.62

Source: Dahaf-Israel Television, Israel Television (Channel 1), June 23, 1992.

*The 11.09 percent of the vote not accounted for here are votes cast for parties that did not pass the 1.5 percent threshold and the predominantly Arab parties.

A Dahaf-Israel Television exit poll, which surveyed 20,293 voters, revealed a high percentage of participation among the new immigrants roughly equivalent to that of the general electorate.[46] The olim, who supported the left-of-center parties, contributed significantly to the ability of Labor and MERETZ to gain five critical mandates without which their victory would not have been possible.[47] Forty-seven percent of the immigrants voted for Labor and 13 percent voted for MERETZ. (See table 2.) In contrast, 35 percent of the general Israeli population voted for Labor—an increase over previous years—and 10 percent for MERETZ; the immigrants contributed four mandates to Labor and one to MERETZ.

The immigrant vote was, above all, an economically motivated protest directed at Likud by an electorate with general right-of-center foreign policy positions.[48] Likud's failure at immigrant absorption, as perceived by the immigrants, as well as Labor's and MERETZ's effective campaigns on these and related issues, were among the central factors behind the success of the left-of-center parties. Most of the immigrants were consumed by immediate personal problems, such as employment and housing.[49]

According to Natan Sharansky, "The fact that Likud did not relate to the olim's problems seriously and did not listen to our warnings about the consequences of this, caused the immigrants to vote no-confidence in Likud. Labor needs to understand that it was not their election campaign that drew the votes of the immigrants; it was a protest against the current government and an expression of hope for change in the order of priorities of the next government."[50] The voting behavior of the immigrants reminded some observers of a previous wave of immigrants and their reaction to their absorption. Soviet immigrants' housing in 1992 was reminiscent of that provided to the wave of Sephardic Jews who arrived in Israel in the late 1940s and early 1950s. They had been housed largely in *maabarot* (tent cities) and many remained there for years before moving into permanent accommodations. Labor was in power during that period, and, consequently, many Sephardim blamed Labor for the unsatisfactory conditions. As a result, at least since 1977, most Sephardim have traditionally supported Likud in part to "punish" Labor.[51]

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[46] Dahaf-Israel Television Poll, Israel Television (Channel 1), June 23, 1992.

[47] See *Ha'aretz,* June 25, 1992.

[48] See, for example, ibid.

[49] In a June 1991 poll conducted by Reshet Yediot Tikshoret, 56 percent of respondents said that employment was their most pressing problem. Only 10–15 percent claimed that political questions, such as Arab-Israeli relations, were of the highest importance to them. See *Bamakom,* June 28, 1991.

Perhaps the most telling indicator of the condition and discontent of the new immigrants during the election campaign was the advice they would give to potential immigrants from the former Soviet Union. In February 1992, more than 35 percent of those asked said they would recommend that prospective immigrants wait in the Commonwealth of Independent States for the time being. Another 15 percent would recommend emigrating to some other country. Barely 20 percent would advise moving to Israel immediately.[52]

The number of seats in the Knesset held by the Right declined—dramatically in the case of Likud—partly because those parties did not gain significant support from the new immigrants. The lack of support for the religious parties among the immigrants was not surprising given their overwhelming secular orientation and the inability of the religious parties to craft a message that would alter the immigrants' perceptions of their narrow agendas, which were not focused on immigrants' central concerns. This failure occurred despite extensive and effective activities of religious groups among the Jewish population of the Soviet Union prior to their departure for Israel.

The Soviet Jews did have a noticeable and perhaps important effect on the election, if only because they voted against Likud and for Labor. That among the immigrants Labor held a margin of more than 2.5:1 over Likud suggests not only the level of the immigrants frustration, but also the extent to which Likud was held directly accountable for the absorption failures. The estimated 18 percent Soviet support of Likud was significantly lower than that of the general electorate. It is partly due to the Soviet vote that the elections were soon labeled a "second upheaval."[53] In essence, Shamir had asked the immigrants to ignore their own immediate material interests and to vote on issues of peace and security that were of national concern.

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[50] *Ha'aretz*, June 25, 1992.

[51] "Special Report: Absorption of New Immigrants in Israel," *Soviet Jewry News*, February 25, 1992. It was estimated in February 1992 that 160,000 families had moved to Israel since 1989. Of these, 10,000 families were living in public housing, 6,000 families were placed in trailer parks, and more than 1,000 families resided in hotels. It was anticipated that the number of mobile home units would increase to 21,5000.

[52] Ibid. The survey was of 820 Soviet immigrants who had arrived between September 1989 and September 1991.

[53] The term was first used by an Israel Television announcer while reporting the election results.

The 1992 election provided insights into the phenomenon of special focus parties in the Israeli system. Typically, other than the religious parties, newly organized special focus parties have had only minor and brief effects on the electoral process in Israel. This was the case in 1992 as well, with all the newly established immigrant parties failing to secure representation. All three performed poorly, not even approaching the mandate threshold of 1.5 percent, or about 39,300 votes. DA, the most successful of the three, secured fewer than 12,000 votes.

Natan Sharansky's decision not to run had a definite effect on the lack of immigrant party appeal.[54] It is likely that the failure of the parties to secure mandates and Sharansky's decision to remain on the sidelines were of similar origins—the calculation that they would not obtain more than minimal support and, as a result, would be excluded from the government.[55] The prospects of political marginalization—by casting a ballot for what could be seen as little more than a protest group—were not appealing, so Soviet voters probably calculated that the most dramatic way to change the situation would be if Labor and Rabin replaced Likud and Shamir.

Vladimir Glozman, a candidate on the DA list, explained the failure as a problem of leadership, money, and organization. The fact that there were three overlapping lists, rather than one united immigrant party, clearly diffused whatever voting power the immigrant parties could muster.[56] Aharon Fein of the Tazpit Research Institute argued that since the immigrants eligible to vote in the election had arrived in Israel early on, they had already begun to emulate the voting behavior of the general electorate.[57] The fact that the immigrants sought assimilation into Israeli society and did not want to stand out as a separate group contributed to their support of mainstream rather than special interest parties. The immigrant-dominated parties, in failing to get a mandate, followed the fate of most single-issue parties that have contested past Knesset elections.

CONCLUSION

In contrast to the perceptions of many observers and political figures, the recent group of Soviet immigrants was not homogenous. It was a highly complex group, incorporating numerous subgroups based on differences in education, age, origin within the former Soviet Union, and profession, among other factors. Immigrants who held university-level positions seemed to lean toward supporting

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[54] See, *Ma'ariv*, June 25, 1992.

[55] Sharansky said in an interview that such calculations were, indeed, a factor in his decision not to lead a Soviet immigrant party. *Jerusalem Post*, May 2, 1992.

[56] *Ma'ariv*, June 25, 1992.

[57] *Ha'aretz*, June 25, 1992.

MERETZ in much the same manner as Israelis in similar positions.[58] The immigrants closely reflected the voting behavior of the broader electorate and rejected voting as an ethnic subgroup.

Additional Soviet immigration to Israel will create growing numbers of voters who will increasingly constitute a significant portion of the body politic. The 1992 elections marked the second time in Israel's political history that there has been a significant transfer of power from one side of the political spectrum to the other, and, as in 1977, a reordering of the country's national priorities.

Despite their lopsided support for Labor in 1992, it is not clear if Soviet voters, as they become more integrated into Israeli society, will maintain their expressed loyalties or will shift their allegiances to the Right (in the pattern of the Sephardic Jewish voters who shifted loyalties and supported Likud in 1977). The outcome and patterns of this election are not guarantees of future commitment.[59] Much will depend on Labor's successes and failures in addressing the issues of importance to the new immigrants and on Likud's successes and failures in revitalizing itself and presenting an image to the voters that comports with their perceptions of the requisites for successful governance.

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[58] Ibid., June 22, 1992.

[59] According to Aharon Fein of the Tazpit Research Institute, "The vote created certain loyalty to Labor, the immigrants feel that they were partners in the Labor-MERETZ victory, that their contribution to this was determining. If the wave of immigration continues, this trend may strengthen in future elections, on the condition that the Labor-MERETZ government remains committed to the immigrants." Ibid., June 25, 1992.

Chronology

January 16, 1993-April 15, 1993

ABBREVIATIONS

FBIS, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report—Middle East & North Africa and South Asia; Western Europe; Central Eurasia*
FT, *The Financial Times*
JP, *The Jerusalem Post*
NYT, *The New York Times*
WP, *The Washington Post*
WSJ, *The Wall Street Journal*

Arab-Israeli Conflict

See also, Regional Affairs, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon

1993

Jan. 17: The Israeli High Court of Justice began a hearing on the legality of Israel's December 1992 expulsion of 415 Palestinians to southern Lebanon.

The expelled Palestinians held a protest march in front of the Zumraya crossing point to commemorate the passage of one month since their expulsion. [1/18 NYT]

Jan. 19: The Israeli Knesset—in a vote of 39 to 20—repealed a 1986 law banning contact between Israelis and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) members. [1/20 NYT]

Jan. 20: At a meeting with Israeli leaders, UN envoy Chinmaya Gharekhan warned that the UN Security Council was losing patience regarding Israel's refusal to comply with UN resolution 799 calling for the immediate return of more than 400 Palestinian exiles stranded in southern Lebanon. [1/21 NYT]

Jan. 21: In Jerusalem, UN envoy Gharekhan met with the Palestinian delegation to bilateral peace talks to discuss the issue of the more than 400 exiled Palestinians stranded in southern Lebanon. [1/21 FBIS]

On Israeli television, PLO chairman Yasir Arafat invited Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin to meet with PLO leaders. [1/22 WSJ]

Lebanese prime minister Rafiq al-Hariri reiterated his government's willingness to conclude a peace treaty with Israel. He said his government would confer with the other Arab countries involved in peace talks before deciding to participate in a ninth round of talks in light of the continued exile of more than 400 Palestinians in southern Lebanon. [1/22 NYT]

Jan. 22: In the Gaza Strip, Israeli soldiers wounded 18 Palestinian demonstrators.

Israeli prime minister Rabin rejected PLO chairman Arafat's offer for a meeting between Rabin and PLO leaders, declaring that his government would continue to refuse to negotiate directly with the PLO. [1/23 NYT]

According to a poll conducted by Israel Television, more than half of Israel's cabinet members favored a compromise regarding the more than 400 exiled Palestinians stranded in southern Lebanon. [1/25 NYT]

Edward Djerejian, US assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern Affairs, called on Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen to postpone submitting to the UN Security Council a resolution drafted at a 12 January Arab League meeting. The resolution called for sanctions against Israel for its noncompliance with UN demands regarding its expulsion of more than 400 Palestinians. [1/23 WP]

Israeli forces in southern Lebanon reportedly fired four shells near the camp of the more than 400

Palestinian exiles. Later, the exiles marched toward the Lebanese Army roadblock in Marj al-Zuhur to show support for Lebanon's refusal to allow them entry and to highlight their refusal to accept any offer except their return home.

Lebanese prime minister al-Hariri reportedly agreed to a British initiative to send International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) medical supplies to the Palestinian exiles in southern Lebanon and to return nine Palestinians mistakenly exiled. [1/22 FBIS]

Jan. 23: Near Ramallah, Israeli troops killed 19-year-old Ziyad Salib during a stone-throwing incident. [1/26 FBIS]

ICRC officials evacuated via helicopter to Israel and the occupied territories 17 of the more than 400 Palestinian exiles stranded in southern Lebanon. Four of the 17 were reportedly seriously ill and taken to a hospital in Marj Uyun in the Israeli self-declared "security zone" in Lebanon. Eleven of them were returned home via Haifa, while the remaining 2 were to be imprisoned for alleged "anti-Israeli violence." A contradictory report by Jerusalem Radio said that 2, not 11, of the 13 healthy Palestinians would return home, while the rest would be sent to prison. Two additional erroneously exiled Palestinians refused to return in a show of solidarity with the remaining exiles. Israeli authorities stressed that their stance regarding the remaining Palestinian exiles in southern Lebanon remained firm. [1/24 NYT, 1/25 FBIS]

Jan. 24: Jerusalem Radio reported that B'Tselem, an Israeli human rights group, had conducted an investigation and found that "dozens" of the Palestinians stranded in southern Lebanon had been mistakenly exiled. [1/25 FBIS]

The *New York Times* reported that although the number of Palestinians exiled to southern Lebanon on December 16, 1992, initially had been reported at 415, later inquiries revealed the number to be 413. [1/24 NYT]

Jan. 25: During a meeting with senior officials, Israeli prime minister Rabin criticized the basic structure of the Middle East peace talks, branding them "not successful." [1/26 NYT]

The Israeli government announced that it would establish "elaborate means" for the remaining 394 exiled Palestinians in southern Lebanon to individually appeal their expulsions while remaining at their makeshift campsite; it also promised telephone and mail services. The exiles rejected the offers. [1/26 FT, FBIS]

Jan. 26: Following a recommendation by UN secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali to take "whatever measures are necessary" to impel Israel to comply with UN Security Council demands for the immediate return of the remaining 394 Palestinians exiled in southern Lebanon, the PLO circulated a draft resolution calling for a ban on Israel's participation in human rights meetings and for an embargo by foreign firms against Israeli businesses in the occupied territories that had violated the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. The US government threatened to veto such a resolution while Israeli officials entreated those supporting the resolution to wait until the Israeli High Court of Justice's verdict on the legality of the expulsions before submitting the resolution to the Security Council. Israeli prime minister Rabin accused Boutros-Ghali of a double standard, alleging that he ignored the "extremist Islamic terrorism" that Rabin claimed necessitated the expulsion order. [1/27 NYT, FT]

Jan. 27: In Gaza City, Israeli soldiers shot and killed a reported member of Islamic Jihad who had attempted to fire on the soldiers. [1/27 FBIS]

Jan. 28: The Israeli High Court of Justice ruled unanimously to validate the expulsion of more than 400 Palestinians to southern Lebanon. It also ruled that "mass deportation" was illegal, but that "individual exile" was permissible. Israeli government officials claimed they had reviewed all of the Palestinians' cases individually, but admitted that in some cases they had spent only a few minutes doing so. The court also ruled that the exiles had the right to appeal their expulsions from within Israel, and gave the Israeli military the authority to decide how the exiles could appeal. The Palestinian exiles denounced the court's decision and pledged not to make appeals, suggesting that doing so would legitimize the expulsion.

According to Israeli radio, the Israeli army had begun setting up an area in the Israeli self-declared "security zone" in Lebanon where lawyers and exiles could meet to discuss appeals. [1/28 WP, 1/29 NYT]

The 394 Palestinians exiled in southern Lebanon began a hunger strike to protest Israel's alleged brutality in the occupied territories. [1/28 FBIS]

The United Arab Emirates Economy Ministry announced a series of measures to tighten the country's boycott of Israel, requiring banks and businesses to adhere strictly to boycott rules on certificates of origin and other documentation. [1/29 FBIS]

Jan. 29: In spite of calls of support from the PLO and several Arab UN members for a draft resolution calling for action against Israel for its noncompliance with UN resolution 799, UN General Assembly representatives from Brazil, Cape Verde, Djibouti, Morocco, Pakistan, and Venezuela, as well as the Security Council's Third World members, rejected the measure on the grounds that it would lead to a US veto and the end of the peace process. Israeli prime minister Rabin warned that passage of the resolution would curtail the chances for peace, giving Arab members the message that "they can use the Security Council to coerce Israel to do as they wish."

In a letter to Rabin, US secretary of state Warren Christopher urged Israel to make an immediate and dramatic move to allay the situation of the 394 Palestinians exiled to southern Lebanon in order to redeem the peace process. [1/30 NYT]

In Tunis, PLO chairman Arafat met with Israeli Knesset member Yael Dayan. It was the first meeting between Arafat and a Knesset member since the 19 January rescission of the 1968 ban on Israeli contact with PLO members. The visit received harsh criticism from several Knesset members. [2/1 FBIS]

Jan. 30: Gunmen shot to death Arik Arafi, 31, and another Israeli soldier as they patrolled near the Ganei Tal settlement near Khan Yunis. The assailants reportedly were members of an armed wing of the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS). The Israeli army placed Khan Yunis under curfew. The army also imposed a curfew on Jabalya after gunmen fired on an army installation there. [1/31 NYT, WP]

Jan. 31: The Israeli government made known the 25 January arrest of Muhammad Juma Jarad, 36, and Muhammad Abd al-Hamid Salah, 39, two Palestinian-Americans accused of distributing more than $200,000 to HAMAS in the occupied territories. Muhammad Tawfik Hijjah, another Palestinian-American suspected of involvement in HAMAS, was also reported arrested. The three were being held under military law, allowing them to be detained for as long as two weeks without being charged. [2/1 NYT, WP]

Near the village of Fahmah in the Janin area, Israeli soldiers shot and killed Muhammad Abusi and Nasir Sarusi when the driver of the car in which they rode refused to stop at a roadblock. The Israeli army sealed off the area to conduct a search for the driver. [2/2 FBIS]

Feb. 1: The Israeli government announced a decision to allow about 100 of the Palestinians stranded in southern Lebanon having terms of exile of 18 months or less to return home immediately; the terms of all others were reduced to a year. Israeli officials added that nearly all of those allowed to return immediately would be sent to detention camps or prisons.

After hearing unofficial news of the Israeli decision to allow the immediate return of some of the Palestinian exiles, Abd al-Aziz al-Rantisi, the exiles' spokesperson, along with PLO leaders, dismissed the measure because it fell short of their demands for the immediate return of all the Palestinians. [2/2 NYT, WP, WSJ, FBIS]

Feb. 2: In response to Israel's offer to return about 100 of the 394 Palestinians exiled in southern Lebanon and to shorten the term of exile for the remainder, several Arab countries continued to demand the immediate return of all the exiles and push for the acceptance of a UN resolution penalizing Israel for ignoring resolution 799. The countries dropped a measure from their proposed resolution stipulating that Israel be banned from UN human rights meetings and requested instead that the Security Council require all countries to end any preferential economic policies toward Israel. [2/3 NYT]

Israeli forces prevented six British Parliament members from entering Lebanon through the Rosh Haniqra border crossing on the grounds that they did not have proper visas. The parliamentarians sought to deliver medicine and other supplies to the exiled Palestinians. [2/3 FBIS]

An Israeli military court extended the detention of Palestinian-Americans Muhammad Jarad and Muhammad Salah by two weeks. The two, arrested on 25 January, had not yet been charged with a crime. [2/8 WP]

Israeli foreign minister Shimon Peres announced that Israel and the European Community had agreed to remove barriers to direct EC investment in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. [2/3 FT]

Feb. 3: In a speech to the Knesset, Israeli prime minister Rabin asserted that in spite of his agreement to allow the return of about 100 of the Palestinians in exile in southern Lebanon, "the principle of our ability to remove for a limited time hundreds of inciters, leaders, organizers remains." [2/4 NYT]

US secretary of state Christopher asserted that the US government considered Israel's offer to return some 100 of the exiled Palestinians stranded in southern Lebanon a sufficient solution to the problem and claimed that no further UN action against Israel was needed. [2/4 WP, FT]

Unidentified diplomats announced that the United States had postponed two sessions of peace talks scheduled to begin on 9 February—one in Rome on regional economic issues and another in Washington on arms control—because of the issue of the Palestinian exiles. Another session scheduled to begin the following week in Ottawa on refugee affairs was also postponed. [2/4 FT]

Israel Television reported that 50 Palestinians in the occupied territories had been arrested since the 25 January detention of three Palestinian-Americans accused of aiding HAMAS, and that Israeli authorities had ordered the closure of seven mosques that allegedly had distributed HAMAS and Islamic Jihad literature in the occupied territories. [2/4 FBIS]

Feb. 4: The *Wall Street Journal* reported that France had drafted a second resolution calling for the immediate return of the exiled Palestinians stranded in southern Lebanon. [2/4 WSJ]

Agence France-Presse (AFP) reported that during an interview with Swiss Radio, Bassam Abu Sharif, adviser to PLO chairman Arafat, had said that Middle East peace talks would resume after Ramadan regardless of the degree of Israel's implementation of UN resolution 799. Later, Abu Sharif denied the AFP version of his interview and threatened to sue the agency. [2/8 FBIS]

US president Bill Clinton announced that Secretary of State Christopher would leave 17 February for a week-long trip to the Middle East to attempt to revitalize the peace process. [2/5 WP]

Feb. 5: The Israeli government released to the ICRC and families of exiles the names of 101

Palestinians stranded in southern Lebanon who were granted permission to return immediately to the occupied territories or to detention centers in Israel. In response, the exiled Palestinians vowed that none would return unless all of them were permitted to do so. The list of 101 exiles reportedly included 13 ill men, 5 of whom had been evacuated previously. [2/5 FBIS, 2/6 NYT]

According to Radio Monte Carlo, the Palestinian News Agency cited an official PLO spokesperson as stating that remarks made the previous day by PLO advisor Bassam Abu Sharif did not represent PLO policy or that of its leadership. [2/8 FBIS]

Israeli soldiers on patrol near the Burayj camp in the Gaza Strip opened fire on a group of armed Palestinians, killing three people. During a clash with Palestinian stone throwers in Nusayrat, Israeli troops shot dead Khalil Atawneh, 17, and wounded six others. In a similar incident in Rafah, Israeli soldiers killed Sa'id Ajaili, 22, and wounded seven others. The army imposed curfews on the Jabalya, Nusayrat, and Burayj camps. [2/6 NYT, 2/8 FBIS]

Yasir Abd Rabbuh announced the dissolution of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and its replacement by the Palestinian Democratic Union (FIDA). The organization would seek to end the Israeli occupation and win Palestinian independence; it would seek negotiations as a complement to the *intifada*. The DFLP outside of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip would remain the DFLP. [2/10 FBIS]

Feb. 6: In the Gaza Strip, Israeli soldiers shot to death three Palestinians taking part in a protest against the army's killing of three Palestinians the preceding day. [2/7 NYT]

Feb. 7: Israeli authorities moved Amjad Zamil, Wail Hindiyah, Husayn Quwayq, Zuhdi al-Tabliyah, and Zuhayr Libbadah—five of the three hundred ninety-four exiled Palestinians in southern Lebanon—to a prison in northern Israel. The five were previously recuperating at a hospital in Lebanon. [2/8 FBIS]

A spokesperson for the US embassy in Tel Aviv disclosed that US diplomats had lodged a complaint with Israeli authorities regarding the physical and procedural treatment given to the three Palestinian-Americans arrested on 25 January on suspicion of ties to HAMAS. [2/8 WP]

The mufti of Jerusalem, Sa'd al-Din al-Alami, died at age 82. [2/8 FBIS]

At the Shufat camp near Jerusalem, Israeli soldiers opened fire on a group of stone-throwing youths, killing a 16-year-old Palestinian boy. In the West Bank village of Tubas, Israeli troops shot to death Yusuf Tajanah, 17, when he refused to hand over "a suspicious object." [2/8 WP, 2/9 FBIS]

Feb. 8: The Israeli army released Palestinian journalists Taher Shriteh and Marwan al-Ghol along with al-Ghol's brother Ashraf. They had been detained the preceding day for covering street clashes in the Gaza Strip that, according to Israeli army sources, had occurred in a closed military area. [2/9 NYT]

In the West Bank, Israeli soldiers reportedly clothed as Palestinians shot and killed at least two Palestinians. Israeli army officials claimed that the incident occurred during a stone-throwing protest that had begun following the arrest of a man suspected of attacking Israelis. Israeli authorities refused to comment on the soldiers' garb. [2/9 WP, FT]

Feb. 9: The Israeli Foreign Ministry announced that the government would permit US representatives to visit three Palestinian-American prisoners arrested 25 January on suspicion of association with HAMAS. The announcement followed US complaints concerning the treatment of the three.

In the Shabura area of Rafah, Samih al-Ajuz, 32, and Sabr Astari were shot to death by three masked persons reportedly belonging to Fatah's Hawks. [2/10 FBIS]

West of Khan Yunis, Palestinian gunmen shot to death a Jewish merchant. [2/10 NYT]

Feb. 10: The *Washington Post* reported that the Israeli Foreign Ministry had announced plans for a "comprehensive examination" of the treatment of the three Palestinian-Americans arrested on 25 January on suspicion of involvement with HAMAS. [2/10 WP]

In the Jabalya camp, Israeli soldiers killed two Palestinians when they opened fire on a group of youths allegedly dressed in military uniforms and armed with axes and hatchets. Residents said that the Israelis were disguised in "Arab clothes"; the army refused to comment. [2/11 NYT, FT]

Feb. 11: In Khan Yunis, Israeli troops armed with anti-tank rockets and explosives destroyed ten houses and damaged another nine in search of alleged criminals. During the raids, the army seized four suspected members of the Qassam wing of HAMAS and ten others who had allegedly helped them. As many as 26 families were left homeless as a result of the raids. [2/16 NYT, WP]

Israeli officials released Muhammad Tawfik Hijjah, one of the Palestinian-Americans arrested on 25 January, due to a lack of evidence that he had aided HAMAS. Hijjah claimed in an interview that during his 20-day detention, Israeli army personnel tortured him. Israeli officials refused to comment on the claim. [2/12 NYT, FT]

Feb. 12: The UN Security Council commended the Israeli government's decision to allow the immediate return of 101 Palestinian exiles stranded in southern Lebanon, but urged it to comply fully with UN resolution 799 calling for the immediate return of all of the 394 exiles. The council also decided not to consider a PLO request to impose sanctions on Israel for noncompliance. In reaction to the UN statement, Israel asserted that all of the expulsions would be reviewed regardless of whether an individual exile made an appeal. [2/13 NYT]

Feb. 14: The *New York Times* reported that while a spokesperson for Israeli prime minister Rabin considered the UN action of the preceding day a "formal conclusion" to the Palestinian exile crisis, Palestinian delegation member Hanan Ashrawi asserted that the decision had "no validity." [2/14 NYT]

In Nablus, Israeli soldiers shot to death a Palestinian youth during a stone-throwing incident. [2/16 NYT]

Feb. 15: In Jerusalem, a Palestinian man stabbed and killed Israeli Yehezkeel Misrachi, 35, while he stood at a bus stop. Israeli authorities imposed a curfew on two Palestinian neighborhoods in Jerusalem and detained 19 Palestinians for questioning. [2/16 NYT]

The Israeli High Court of Justice ruled that the house of a "terrorist convicted of murder" should not be totally destroyed during a search because of the danger of harming his or her family. If it was impossible to demolish only the part of the house in which the suspect lived, the court ordered that his or her personal quarters be sealed. [2/16 FBIS]

Feb. 17: A Ramallah military court extended the detention of Palestinian-Americans Muhammad Salah by 16 days and Muhammad Jarad by 15 days. They had been in custody since 25 January. [2/18 FBIS]

The *New York Times* reported Israeli officials as having claimed that Muhammad Salah had admitted that he was a large donor to HAMAS and had disclosed names of people and organizations in the United States that had strong ties to HAMAS. Ahlam Haddad, Salah's lawyer, maintained that Salah was not affiliated with HAMAS and that he was coerced into signing a false confession in Hebrew. [2/17 NYT]

During a stone-throwing clash at the Askar refugee camp near Nablus, Israeli soldiers shot and killed Salam Hasan Jazir, 18. During separate clashes in the West Bank, Israeli soldiers shot and killed a 13-year-old Palestinian. [2/19 NYT, FBIS]

Israeli troops shot to death Khalid Abu al-Komsan, 27, as he walked down a street in Gaza City 10 minutes after curfew. Israeli officials said he was shot while fleeing from them. [2/19 NYT]

Feb. 18: In Gaza City, a clash between Palestinians and the Israeli army resulted in the killing of a suspected HAMAS member. [2/19 FBIS]

During a raid on the West Bank village of Illar, Israeli soldiers shot dead Jaafar Muhammad Asrawi, 17, as he allegedly attempted to flee from them. [2/19 NYT]

Feb. 19: In Cairo on a week-long trip to the Middle East aimed at rekindling peace negotiations, US secretary of state Christopher met with Egyptian president Husni Mubarak and Foreign Minister Amr Musa. The Egyptians proposed that they urge Israel to speed up the process of military review for the Palestinian exiles stranded in southern Lebanon and attempt to convince the Palestinians that it was in their interest to return to the peace talks. Agreeing with the proposal, Christopher promised to present it to Israeli leaders during his upcoming visit with them. [2/20 NYT]

In Tulkarm, Israeli soldiers shot and killed a reportedly masked and armed person. [2/20 WP]

Feb. 20: During a visit with US secretary of state Christopher in Amman, Jordan's King Hussein emphasized that although the exile of Palestinians to southern Lebanon was an obstacle to peace, peace talks could resume without their return. [2/21 NYT]

Feb. 21: At a press conference in Damascus following a meeting with US secretary of state Christopher, Syrian foreign minister Faruq al-Sharaa said that Syria no longer would link the return of the 394 Palestinians exiled by Israel to the renewal of peace negotiations because a peace settlement was more important. [2/22 NYT]

Feb. 22: US secretary of state Christopher visited leaders in Riyadh, Kuwait City, and Beirut. Lebanese foreign minister Faris Buwayz said that peace talks could begin without the return of the 394 Palestinians exiled and stranded in southern Lebanon.

Palestinian delegation leaders said that their participation in further peace talks depended not on the immediate return of all the exiled Palestinians, but on an Israeli promise to cease expulsions altogether. [2/23 NYT]

Feb. 23: In Jerusalem, US secretary of state Christopher met with Israeli prime minister Rabin and Foreign Minister Peres, informing them of the Egyptian proposal of 19 February for rejuvenating peace talks. The Israelis replied that Israel was interested in speeding up the process of review for the exiles' cases.

Later in Jerusalem, Christopher met with a Palestinian delegation during which the Palestinians said they would not return to the talks until the exiles were allowed to return. They also presented Christopher with a letter from PLO chairman Arafat and a detailed report of Israel's abuses in the occupied territories. [2/24 NYT]

In Rafah's Shabura camp, Israeli soldiers shot dead Awad Surdi, a UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) clinic employee, during a stone-throwing clash. [2/24 FBIS]

Feb. 24: The Israeli army announced a one-week closure of the Islamic and al-Azhar colleges in the Gaza Strip in response to demonstrations by "armed, masked youths" there. During the closure, the army planned to search the sites. [2/25 FBIS]

Feb. 25: Palestinian delegation spokesperson Hanan Ashrawi said that although there were still obstacles to returning to the peace talks, the Palestinian delegation hoped for their resolution so that they could participate in the negotiations. [2/26 NYT]

Mar. 1: *Yedi'ot Aharonot* reported that about two weeks prior, Dani Yatom, the commander of Israeli forces in the occupied territories, signed an order granting Jewish settlers in the West Bank limited policing powers during settlement watch duty, including permission to stop for inspection, conduct body searches, detain, and arrest a Palestinian if they considered him or her to be dangerous or suspected that he or she had committed a crime worthy of more than three years in prison. [3/3 FBIS]

In Tel Aviv, Gazan Ziyad Silmi, 19, stabbed to death Israelis Natan Azarya, 35, and Gregory Abramov, 27, and wounded eight others. Police said the attack was motivated by crazed anger, but Fathi al-Shukaki, an Islamic Jihad leader in Syria, claimed that the incident was a political act against "Zionist occupation." Al-Shukaki threatened more attacks unless Israel returned the Palestinians exiled in southern Lebanon.

Later, the Israeli army announced that effective 2 March it would seal off the Gaza Strip indefinitely. [3/2 NYT]

Mar. 2: In Rafah, a crowd stoned and shot to death Yehoshua Weissbrod, an Israeli motorist. Israeli military authorities imposed a curfew on Rafah. [3/8 NYT]

Mar. 3: Israeli troops sealed the home of brothers Iman and Amin Shaat of Rafah for their alleged involvement in the murder the preceding day of Yehoshua Weissbrod. [3/5 JP]

Mar. 7: Israeli officials said they were considering lodging a complaint with the United Nations about UNRWA official Katherine Striker for failing to notify soldiers during the 2 March killing of Yehoshua Weissbrod in Rafah. UNRWA officials claimed that although Striker had not notified soldiers, she had attempted in other ways to alleviate the situation.

The Israeli army lifted its curfew in Rafah.

Israeli officials announced the arrest several days before of a fourth Arab-American on suspicion of connections with HAMAS. Some media reports identified the man as Anwar Hamdan, 33. [3/8 NYT]

Mar. 8: Two Palestinian workers from Khan Yunis stabbed to death Uri Magadish, 39, as he took them to work at his greenhouse in the settlement of Gan Or. After Magadish's funeral, settlers threw stones and fired guns at Gazans returning to work from Israel. During the clashes, settlers near the Erez crossing shot dead Na'im Mahmud al-Madhun, 22, of Jabalya. [3/9 NYT, WP]

In Jabalya, masked gunmen shot and killed Muhammad Ali Abu Shabak, a 24-year-old brother of an advisor to PLO chairman Arafat. According to *Yedi'ot Aharonot,* Abu Shabak's murder was to avenge orders issued by Shabak's brother to kill local residents. [3/9 FBIS]

Near Tulkarm, Israeli soldiers traveling in a bus shot to death Taysir Juma Abu Ghalyun, 16, who had been among a group throwing stones at the bus. [3/9 NYT, WP]

The Israeli army reopened the Gaza Strip. [3/8 Jerusalem Press Daily Report]

Mar. 10: Following the issuance of a US-Russian invitation to a ninth round of peace talks to begin on 20 April in Washington, the Palestinian delegation declined on the grounds that Israel had failed to resolve the issue of the 394 Palestinian exiles stranded in southern Lebanon. Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria did not give an immediate response. Israeli officials agreed to return to the talks. [3/11 NYT]

Near Nablus, Israeli troops shot dead Majid Hajat, 17, during a stone-throwing clash. [3/10 FBIS]

Mar. 11: An Israeli military court charged Palestinian-American Muhammad Jarad with participation in a "hostile organization." Jarad was arrested on 25 January. [3/12 FBIS]

Mar. 12: New York City police announced that they were reopening the investigation of the November 5, 1990, murder of Rabbi Meir Kahane to determine if the killing was a conspiracy involving others in addition to El Sayyid Nosair, who was convicted of the murder, and if the case would provide information on the February 26, 1993, bombing of the World Trade Center in New York.

In Hebron, Israeli soldiers shot and killed Musa al-Haimouni, 17, who had reportedly disregarded an order to stop during a stone-throwing clash.

Along a highway 9 miles west of Jerusalem, the body of Israeli soldier Yehoshua Friedberg, 24, was found. He had been shot to death.

Outside Khan Yunis, Simcha Levy, 45, was stabbed to death by Palestinian laborers as she transported them to work in Israel. [3/13 NYT]

Mar. 13: In Hebron, an Israeli soldier shot and killed 4-year-old Huda Siyaj as she and her father were driving to a hospital after curfew. [3/21 NYT]

Mar. 14: The Israeli Knesset announced that it would increase the number of police throughout Israel by 2,000, strengthen the civil guard, and give incentives to Israeli employers to hire Jews instead of Palestinians. [3/15 FT]

Mar. 15: In the West Bank, a Palestinian motorist struck and killed two settlers. Israeli authorities were unsure if the incident was politically motivated. [3/16 WSJ]

Mar. 16: In Washington, Israeli prime minister Rabin announced that he would cut short his visit to the United States—leaving on 18 March rather than 21 March—to deal with rising violence in Israel and the occupied territories. Rabin had arrived in the United States the preceding day. [3/17 NYT]

According to an Israeli army report, Israeli soldiers in Khan Yunis shot to death Sa'id Salmi, 17, and Fayiz al-Buyuk, 18, during a clash that reportedly began after a home-made bomb was thrown at troops. More than 70 people were wounded. [3/17 WP, FBIS]

In the Golan Heights, thousands of Druze demonstrated at the site where an Israeli shot and wounded a Druze whom he mistook for a "guerrilla." [3/17 WP]

In Tulkarm, the Israeli army recovered the bullet-wounded body of Nasir Ali Ahmad, 24. Tulkarm residents claimed that Israeli settlers had killed him, but, according to a settler from Har Brakha, it was settlers who initially had found the body.

In Ramallah, the Israeli army found the bullet-wounded body of Salim Mahmud Salim al-Din, 30. Palestinian sources said the death may have been motivated by suspicions of collaboration. [3/19 FBIS]

In the West Bank, Jewish settlers smashed cars in several Palestinian villages in retaliation for the 15 March deaths of two settlers struck by a car. [3/17 WSJ]

Mar. 17: In the Gaza Strip, Israeli soldiers wounded some 87 Palestinians during clashes.

During a West Bank demonstration, Jewish settlers set fire to a Palestinian-owned gas station near Nablus. [3/18 NYT]

Mar. 18: In a speech to Muslim clerics in Damascus, Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad said that Syria would not sign a separate peace agreement with Israel. His statement was in response to statements from Israeli prime minister Rabin that Israel was ready to compromise to achieve peace with Syria. [3/19 NYT]

In Rafah, the Israeli army claimed that Palestinians, reportedly members of the Red Eagle Squad of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), fired shots at Haidar Abd al-Shafi, head of the Palestinian delegation to peace talks. Abd al-Shafi countered that the shots had come from Israeli soldiers in a nearby clash with stone throwers. Yusuf Ibrahim Garib, a 52-year-old bystander, was shot and killed during the incident.

In Khan Yunis, Israeli soldiers shot to death Ra'id Muhammad al-Shanna, 19, and wounded 45 others during clashes. [3/19 NYT, FT]

Mar. 19: In Jerusalem, Israeli prime minister Rabin declared that Israeli forces would put tighter controls on Palestinian laborers from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip working in Israel in response to the rise in violence in Israel and the occupied territories. He said that he "would be very happy" if fewer Palestinians entered Israel each day and that "to the extent that their numbers are reduced, the level of danger will be reduced." He stressed also that the solution to the situation ultimately rested in peace talks. [3/20 NYT]

Abd al-Rahim Mullah, a member of the PFLP's political bureau, denied Israeli accusations that the PFLP had attempted to assassinate Haidar Abd al-Shafi on 18 March and accused Israeli soldiers of attempting to assassinate him instead. Israeli army sources claimed that there were no soldiers present in the area of the attack. [3/22 FBIS]

Mar. 20: In Khan Yunis, Israeli soldiers shot to death a 10-year-old Palestinian boy and a 16-year-old Palestinian boy in separate incidents. [3/21 NYT, 3/22 WSJ, FBIS]

Gunmen shot and killed Israeli soldier Yosef Shabtai, 21, during an ambush on an Israeli patrol in Jabalya. A statement from Hizballah–Palestine claimed responsibility. [3/22 FBIS]

In other incidents in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, two Israeli soldiers were killed in ambushes. [3/21 NYT, 3/22 WSJ, FBIS]

Mar. 21: In Khan Yunis, Israeli troops killed Salim Shurab, 12, and another Palestinian youth. [3/22 WSJ, FBIS]

Mar. 22: Nasir Ali Shukayrat, a 22-year-old Palestinian from Jabal Mukabir, broke into a Jewish high school in Jerusalem and stabbed five students and the principal before being overtaken and badly beaten. [3/23 NYT, FT]

Israeli soldiers in Rafah shot dead Muhammad Jarbua, 11, during a stone-throwing clash after he had been seen carrying a plastic rifle. According to Palestinian reports, Israeli troops shot and killed at least another three people, including a 10-year-old boy. [3/23 NYT, FT, FBIS]

HAMAS claimed responsibility for the 20 March killing of Israeli soldier Yosef Shabtai. Hizballah-Palestine had also claimed responsibility. [3/22 FBIS]

Mar. 23: At the site of a sheep theft near the Susia settlement in the West Bank, two Jewish settlers stopped and questioned Palestinian Musa Sulayman Abu Sabha, 19, then put him in their jeep. Abu Sabha reportedly stabbed the driver, injuring him slightly. After the two settlers had bound Abu Sabha's hands and feet, a resident from a neighboring settlement shot him dead. [3/24 NYT]

Mar. 24: In separate incidents, Israeli troops shot and killed three Palestinians. [3/25 NYT]

Mar. 27: In Tulkarm, a gunman fired on an Israeli border police jeep, killing one person. [3/28 NYT]

Mar. 28: The foreign ministers of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, and PLO representatives met in Damascus to discuss their possible participation in the ninth round of bilateral peace talks scheduled to begin in Washington on 20 April.

After evaluating talks between Palestinian delegates and US officials 26–27 March, PLO chairman Arafat said the Palestinians would wait until 8 April to announce whether they would return to the peace talks. [3/29 NYT, FT]

In Gaza City, Israeli troops shot dead a Palestinian after he and two companions had fired on the soldiers.

In the Gazan settlement of Nisanit, Yehuda Gawi, 49, was stabbed to death by two Palestinian workers whom he was said to have hired to build a house in the settlement. The Israeli army later announced the closure of the Gaza Strip effective 29 March. [3/29 NYT, WP]

Mar. 29: In the Gaza Strip, a Palestinian stabbed to death Shaya Deutch, 40, a Jewish settler.

In the West Bank's Jalazone camp, Israeli soldiers shot dead Ahmad Muhammad Yusif Ilyan, 22, during a stone-throwing clash. [3/30 WP]

Egyptian president Mubarak, speaking in Cairo after a meeting with Syrian president al-Asad and PLO chairman Arafat, stressed the importance of "good contact" with the Israeli government for the resumption of peace talks and praised Israeli prime minister Rabin for taking "some good steps" toward peace. [3/30 FT]

Mar. 30: During an emergency session, the Israeli Knesset decided to seal off the West Bank and continue the closure of the Gaza Strip indefinitely.

On national television, Israeli prime minister Rabin urged Israelis to remain steadfast in "an all out war against terrorism" in order to curtail rising violence in Israel and the occupied territories.

In Hadera, 25 miles north of Tel Aviv, gunmen shot and killed two Israeli policemen in their patrol car. An armed wing of HAMAS later claimed responsibility. [3/31 NYT]

Mar. 31: Israeli police detained at least 500 Palestinians for entering Israel in violation of the closure of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. [4/1 WSJ]

Apr. 1: A US court indicted Palestinians Zein Isa, Saij Nijmah, Luie Nijmah, and Tawfiq Musa, alleged members of Abu Nidal's Fatah–Revolutionary Council living in the United States, on charges that included plotting to kill Jews and blow up the Israeli embassy in Washington, in addition to conspiring in the murder of Isa's daughter Palestina in 1989, for which Isa was already facing a death sentence. [4/2 NYT]

Apr. 4: During its weekly meeting, the Israeli Knesset decided to establish a special committee to develop ideas for the replacement of Palestinian laborers with Jews. Israeli prime minister Rabin told the Knesset members that he wanted to curtail employment opportunities for Palestinians in Israel and added that such a change would necessitate the creation of jobs in the occupied territories.

The closure of the West Bank and Gaza Strip continued, but Israeli authorities allowed some 1,200 Palestinian workers into Israel to perform emergency farm work. To further fill the labor gap caused by the closure, the Israeli army sent 1,500 soldiers to work on farms. [4/5 NYT, WSJ]

Apr. 11: The Israeli Knesset decided to extend indefinitely the 12-day-old closure of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, subject to weekly review, but allowed an additional 7,000 Palestinians into Israel to provide emergency farm help. The Knesset resolved to reduce drastically the number of Palestinians working in Israel once the closure was lifted. According to Labor Minister Ora Namir, the number of Palestinians permitted to work in Israel would be reduced from 120,000 to 70,000. The Knesset also decided to provide financial assistance to unemployed Palestinians and look into ways of stimulating job growth in the occupied territories. [4/12 NYT]

Apr. 13: In Cairo, PLO chairman Arafat met with Egyptian president Mubarak to present Palestinian demands for peace and to request that Mubarak press Israeli prime minister Rabin during a scheduled meeting with him on 14 April in Egypt to speed up the return of the 394 Palestinians exiled in southern Lebanon and to allow the movement of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and West Bank. [4/14 NYT]

Apr. 14: Following a meeting with Egyptian president Mubarak in Ismailiyya, Israeli prime minister Rabin announced that if the Palestinians agreed to return to peace negotiations, he would allow Faisal al-Husseini to head the Palestinian delegation to bilateral peace talks. Al-Husseini had previously been denied participation in the talks because he lives in East Jerusalem. [4/15 NYT]

Apr. 15: The Israeli government announced that it had almost quadrupled its budget for development projects in the occupied territories in an effort aimed at increasing employment opportunities for Palestinians. [4/16 WSJ]

The *Washington Post* reported that Israeli prime minister Rabin had agreed to a list of concessions proposed by US secretary of state Christopher that would encourage the Palestinians to return to peace talks, including allowing Faisal al-Husseini to head the Palestinian delegation to bilateral talks, the return of some of those Palestinians expelled between 1967 and 1987, and a pledge not to expel Palestinians in the future except in extraordinary conditions. [4/15 WP]

Central Asia and Transcaucasia

See also, Regional Affairs

1993

Jan. 19: The Uzbek supreme court outlawed Birlik, an opposition movement, for three months on charges of intent to organize demonstrations, an illegal activity in Uzbekistan. [1/26 FT]

Jan. 23: A bomb blast ruptured a pipeline carrying gas from Georgia to Armenia. The pipeline had been Armenia's only source of fuel. [1/27 NYT]

The Interfax News Agency (Moscow) reported that Afghan authorities had moved some 15,000 Tajik refugees from the border to camps in the Afghan interior. [1/27 FBIS]

Jan. 24: Tajik president Imamali Rakhmonov announced that the Commonwealth of Independent States was sending an additional 2,000 troops to Tajikistan within 10 days to help Tajikistan control its border with Afghanistan, where, Tajik government officials claimed, Islamist rebels trained in Afghanistan were crossing into Tajikistan to cause unrest. [1/25 FT]

Jan. 26: The *Financial Times* reported that during the preceding week, Alim Karamov, a leader of the Tajik opposition movement Birlik, was kidnapped. [1/26 FT]

Jan. 29: An Uzbek court sentenced Abdumannob Pulatov, the 41-year-old leader of Birlik and chairman of the Uzbek Human Rights Committee, to three years in prison for "offending the honor and dignity of the president." The judge immediately pardoned him on the basis of an earlier presidential amnesty. [2/13 NYT]
Jan. 30: Armenia's gas supply was restored a week after the country's only gas pipeline was bombed. Armenia accused Azeri militants in Georgia of the blast; Azerbaijan denied the claim. Armenian officials announced that electricity, fuel, and housing costs were to be increased on 1 February by as much as 900 percent. [1/31 NYT, WP]
Jan. 31: Turkish prime minister Suleyman Demirel said Turkey would send to Armenia 100 tons of wheat provided by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the United States. According to Demirel, 35 tons had already been sent. [2/3 FBIS]
Feb. 2: Armenian president Levon Ter-Petrosyan appointed Grant Bagratyan prime minister. He replaced Khosrov Artyunyan, who was removed because he sought greater state control over economic reforms. [2/3 FT]

Turkish president Turgut Ozal agreed to allow the transport of food, medicine, oil, and other supplies to Armenia via Turkey, although all shipments would be subject to inspections for weapons. [2/6 WP]
Feb. 5: The *Washington Post* reported that during the preceding week, Tajik president Rakhmonov had imposed a state of emergency along the Tajik-Afghan border to prevent the shipment of arms from Afghanistan to anti-government forces in Tajikistan. [2/5 WP]
Feb. 7: The *New York Times* reported that during the preceding two days, Armenian forces had begun an offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh, taking control of eleven Azeri settlements that included the villages of Chldran and Syrkhavend. The Armenian news agency, SNARK, reported that Azeri forces had begun to retreat. The preceding week in the Armenian capital of Yerevan, between 50,000 and 100,000 Armenians demonstrated, calling for the resignation of President Ter-Petrosyan. [2/7 NYT]
Feb. 18: The *Financial Times* reported that Islamist groups in northern Afghanistan were detaining Tajik refugees against their will. In a protest to the United Nations over the situation, the Tajik government also complained of frequent Afghan attacks on Tajik border patrols. [2/18 FT]
Feb. 19: In Geneva, Armenian and Azeri officials met for a two-day round of peace talks on Nagorno-Karabakh. [4/2 NYT]
Feb. 21: A Tajik security official reportedly said that government forces had taken three Islamist strongholds in central Tajikistan: Garm, Komsomolabad, and Navabad. [2/22 NYT]

Nakhichevan officials announced the closure of the Hasret Bridge to protest Turkey's transport of aid to Armenia. [3/2 FBIS]
Mar. 24: The UN High Commissioner for Refugees said that some 8,000 Tajiks had been expelled from Dushanbe the preceding week by the Tajik government to the towns of Shartuz and Gabodian near the Afghan border where they were to resettle, but because of meager supplies of food, water, and shelter, many were close to starvation. [3/24 NYT]
Mar. 31: The Tajik government imposed a state of emergency on the Kurgan-Tyube province. [4/1 WSJ]
Apr. 2: The *New York Times* reported that a new round of fighting between Azeri and Armenian forces over control of Nagorno-Karabakh had broken out in western Azerbaijan, where Armenian forces had encircled the town of Kalbajan. Both sides were in disagreement concerning who initiated the fighting. [4/2 NYT]
Apr. 3: The Azeri Defense Ministry announced that Armenian forces had captured Kalbajan and most of the surrounding area in an attempt to gain control of Nagorno-Karabakh. According to Armenian sources, at least eight Armenians and dozens of Azeris had died during that day's fighting. Iskander Gamidov, the Azeri interior minister, accused Russian troops based in Armenia of participating in the attack. Azeri president Abulfaz Elchibey declared a two-month nation-wide state of emergency.

The Interfax News Agency (Moscow) reported that while some 15,000 people were in Kalbajan when it had been captured, Avet Demuryan, an Armenian reporter who had visited the town after the attack, said that many had fled to surrounding areas and that the 5,000 people who had remained were permitted to leave after the town fell. Separately, some 80 Azeris were taken to Stepanakert, Nagorno-Karabakh's capital, to be exchanged for Armenians held by Azerbaijan. At least 150 other Azeris were taken captive along with military equipment. [4/5 WP]
Apr. 4: Azeri authorities said that Armenian troops supported by tanks and artillery were attempting to seize the town of Fuzuli, just south of Nagorno-Karabakh, and asserted that some 15,000 civilians were trapped by the attack. They claimed that one-tenth of Azeri territory had been taken by Armenia during the previous several days.

Seyran Bogdasaryan, chairman of Armenia's parliamentary committee on Nagorno-Karabakh, said that no regular Armenian troops were involved in the offensive, only local forces from Nagorno-Karabakh. He added that the enclave's forces had initiated the attack because Azeri forces were using the town of Kalbajan as a base for shelling Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. An Azeri presidential spokesperson denied the claims.

According to the Turkish daily *Milliyet*, Turkish planes had flown reconnaissance missions along the Turkish border with Armenia. [4/5 NYT]

Apr. 5: Turkish foreign minister Hikmet Cetin met with the five permanent members of the UN Security Council to press for a UN resolution condemning the latest Armenian offensive against Azerbaijan and demanding Armenian withdrawal from territory taken during the attack. Also, the Turkish government announced it was banning all flights to Armenia passing over Turkish airspace.

Azeri authorities said that its forces had repulsed an attempted Armenian attack on the town of Fuzuli. All but some 500 of the town's 20,000 residents reportedly had fled during the attack. [4/6 FT, WSJ]

Apr. 6: The *Financial Times* reported that the preceding week, Turkey had ended all aid convoys to Armenia. [4/6 FT]

Apr. 7: The *New York Times* reported that during the 3–4 April Armenian offensive in southern Azerbaijan, some 39,000 people had reportedly fled the attack while, according to International Committee of the Red Cross officials, as many as 15,000 were considered missing. [4/7 NYT]

Apr. 8: In response to increasing Armenian gains in Azerbaijan, Turkish foreign minister Cetin sent a message to the Ankara embassies of the five permanent UN Security Council countries suggesting that "Turkey should not be forced into a situation similar to that in Cyprus regarding the Armenian-Azerbaijani problem." During a press conference, Turkish president Ozal said that "if they [the Armenians] go too far, they will be facing us. [4/13 FBIS]

Apr. 11: The Azeri Defense Ministry reported that Armenian forces had penetrated 10 miles into Azeri territory during the previous two days and had captured 18 villages in the triangle of land between Armenia, Iran, and Nagorno-Karabakh. According to the ministry, Armenian forces continued to bombard the outskirts of Fuzuli and had advanced to within one mile of town. The Armenian Defense Ministry announced that Azeri forces had captured two villages in southeastern Armenia near Iran. In continued fighting, Armenian troops shelled villages between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia.

Former Tajik president Rakhman Nabiyev died of natural causes at age 62. [4/12 NYT]

Apr. 12: During a meeting with a senior Azeri envoy in Tehran, Iranian president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani warned that unless Azerbaijan and Armenia curtailed their fighting, "Iran would have to adopt a more serious stance." [4/13 NYT]

Apr. 14: During a joint press conference with Azeri president Elchibey, Turkish president Ozal said that Turkish intelligence reports had indicated substantial Russian aid flowing to Armenia for its fighting with Azerbaijan. Ozal said that Russian transport planes had increased their flights to Yerevan substantially before and after the attack on Kalbajan, adding that he believed the planes were carrying more than just humanitarian aid. Supporting his allegations were recordings of radio transmissions between Armenian forces in the Kalbajan area. Ozal announced the suspension of all communication and transport links between Turkey and Armenia, to remain in effect until Armenian withdrawal from Azeri territory. [4/15 NYT]

Petroleum Affairs

See also, Regional Affairs, Iran, Iraq

1993

Feb. 10: During a speech at a conference of oil executives in Houston, Saudi oil minister Hisham Nazir warned the Clinton administration that there would be unwanted consequences if the United States imposed a tax on oil imports. [2/11 NYT]

Feb. 16: At the conclusion of a three-day meeting in Vienna, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) ministers announced that they had agreed to cut output by more than 1.5 million barrels per day to 23.5 million barrels per day effective 1 March. Iraqi officials refused to sign onto the agreement, maintaining that it was intended to reduce Iraq's influence when UN sanctions were lifted. The Iraqis declared Baghdad would produce as much oil as it desired. [2/17 NYT, WSJ]

Mar. 16: The *Wall Street Journal* reported that Saudi Arabia had announced the discovery of a new oil and gas field along its northwest coast. [3/16 WSJ]

Apr. 13: In Muscat, OPEC ministers ended two days of informal talks during which they discussed a Kuwaiti threat to increase its production in response to "quota busting" by Iran and other OPEC members. The ministers satisfied all parties with an agreement to eliminate some 300,000 barrels per day to boost prices. [4/14 FBIS]

Regional Affairs

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Central Asia, Lebanon

1993

Jan. 19: In Damascus, Turkish prime minister Suleyman Demirel met with Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad to encourage Syria to end its support of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK). [1/20 NYT]

Jan. 20: The prime ministers of Syria and Turkey agreed to renegotiate a 1987 convention regulating the control of the Euphrates River's waters and produce a more satisfactory agreement by the end of the year. Syria, which lies downstream from Turkey, claimed it was not receiving enough water to meet its basic needs. Turkey dismissed Syrian concerns. Turkey planned to launch a large irrigation project in May 1993 that would further reduce the Euphrates waters downstream. [1/21 FBIS, 1/22 WP]

Jan. 29: Two special envoys of Armenian president Levon Ter-Petrosyan met with Turkish officials in Ankara to discuss mutual concerns. [2/1 FBIS]

Feb. 2: Palestine Liberation Organization chairman Yasir Arafat met with Iraqi president Saddam Hussein for the first time since January 1992. [2/3 FT]

Feb. 6: In a speech to parliament, United Arab Emirates (UAE) president Zayid Bin Sultan Al Nuhayyan declared that Iran's presence on the greater and lesser Tunbs and Abu Musa Island was a "violation of the sovereignty and integrity" of the country and only served to destabilize the region. He also said that the UAE was determined to utilize all possible peaceful means to regain sovereignty over the islands. [2/8 FBIS]

Feb. 8: Jalal Talabani, leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, met in Kuwait with Kuwaiti officials to discuss cooperation in regard to issues involving Iraq. [3/8 FBIS, 3/9 WSJ]

Feb. 9: An official message from the Iranian Foreign Ministry said UAE statements concerning the emirates' claims to Abu Musa and the greater and lesser Tunbs were "detrimental" to the region and warned against attempts to alter the situation. [2/10 FBIS]

Feb. 10: Foreign ministers Ali Akbar Velayati of Iran, Faruq al-Sharaa of Syria, and Hikmet Cetin of Turkey met in Damascus to discuss regional issues and the situation in northern Iraq. [2/10 FBIS]

Mar. 4: US police arrested Muhammad Salamah, a Jordanian-born resident of New Jersey, after determining that a van he had rented was used in the 26 February bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City. US authorities said that Salamah was a follower of Shaykh Umar Abd al-Rahman, an Egyptian Muslim cleric and spiritual leader of the Islamic Group living and preaching in New Jersey. [3/5 NYT, WP]

US police also searched the Brooklyn apartment of Ibrahim Elgabrowny and arrested him after he had attempted to prevent the search. Elgabrowny was a cousin of El Sayyid Nosair, the Egyptian-born American serving seven to twenty-three years in a US prison for the November 1990 murder of Rabbi Meir Kahane, leader of the Kakh movement. Elgabrowny was also a follower of Shaykh Umar Abd al-Rahman. [3/5 NYT, WP, 3/6 NYT]

Mar. 5: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) officials found bomb-making materials during a search of the address given by Muhammad Salamah on a truck rental form. [3/6 NYT]

Shaykh Abd al-Rahman, the Egyptian cleric, issued a statement condemning the World Trade Center bombing, adding that such an act "could not have been done by a true Muslim." [3/6 WP]

Mar. 6: A Jordanian government spokesperson promised that the Jordanian government would provide help in the investigation of Muhammad Salamah if necessary. [3/8 FBIS]

Mar. 8: The Islamic Group issued a statement from Peshawar, Pakistan, denying involvement in the 26 February World Trade Center bombing and warning that accusations of Islamic Group leader Shaykh Abd al-Rahman's involvement in the bombing would bring retaliation. It was unclear if the statement was from an individual Islamic Group member or was issued as a general policy statement. [3/9 WP]

Mar. 10: During its annual meeting, the UN Human Rights Commission condemned the Iraqi and Sudanese governments for their widespread summary executions and violence, and ordered a public investigation of the Sudanese violations. It also passed a resolution expressing concern over the Iranian government's *fatwa* against British author Salman Rushdie.

US police arrested Nidal Ayyad on charges of aiding the 26 February World Trade Center explosion. They said that Ayyad, a Palestinian-American chemical engineer with knowledge of explosives, was a friend of Muhammad Salamah. Salamah had made several calls to Ayyad from a pay phone near the location where explosives had been found on 5 February. [3/11 NYT, WP]

Mar. 15: US officials said that an $8,000 wire transfer into a joint account belonging to Nidal Ayyad and Muhammad Salamah had not come from a suspect organization, but was of innocent origins. [3/16 WP]

Mar. 17: US authorities formally indicted Nidal Ayyad and Muhammad Salamah for participation in the World Trade Center bombing as well as aiding and abetting it. They also indicted Ibrahim Elgabrowny for obstructing justice, resisting arrest, and assault on police. [3/18 WP, WSJ]

Mar. 18: During an interview with the Cable News Network (CNN), Shaykh Abd al-Rahman reiterated that he was not involved in the World Trade Center bombing and condemned the media for portraying him as a suspect. He claimed that he did not know any of the three men charged in connection with the bombing. [3/19 NYT]

Mar. 19: US investigators searched the New Jersey home of Egyptian-American Mahmud Abu Halima on suspicions that he was the leader of the 26 February World Trade Center bombing. They suspected that Abu Halima, also a suspect in other "terrorism" cases, had fled with his family to Egypt since the incident. Abu Halima had been a member of a group in the United States that during the 1980s had supported Afghan rebels; he had also fought beside the rebels several times in Afghanistan. Mustafa Shalabi, a founder of the group, had been a supporter of Islamic Group leader Shaykh Abd al-Rahman, and in the past, Abu Halima had worked closely with both Shalabi and Abd al-Rahman until relations between Shalabi and Abd al-Rahman soured. Authorities suspected that Abu

Halima might have been involved in the 1991 murder of Shalabi. [3/20 NYT]

A seven-member Arab League committee charged with following up on the Libyan government's conflict with Western European and US officials over the bombing of December 1988 Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, concluded a two-day meeting in Tunis. The committee decided to send Arab League secretary general Ismat Abd al-Majid to speak with UN secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali and the UN Security Council about finding a peaceful solution to the matter. [3/22 FBIS]

Mar. 23: During an interview in Egypt, Muhammad Abu Halima said that his brother Mahmud, a suspect in the 26 February World Trade Center bombing, had been arrested on 14 March in Alexandria by Egyptian police. Egyptian authorities claimed they were not holding anyone involved with the bombing. An FBI spokesperson neither confirmed nor denied the arrest. [3/24 WP]

Mar. 24: US authorities took custody of Mahmud Abu Halima from Egyptian officials who had been holding him in Egypt; he was then brought to New York. Because of the Egyptian government's fear of retaliation by Islamists, it had negotiated a pledge of secrecy with US officials. Abu Halima accused the Egyptian government of torturing him during his detention. [3/25 NYT, 3/26 WP]

Mar. 25: During a news conference, US authorities said that from evidence already collected, the World Trade Center bombing was carried out by a poorly trained local group of individuals who were not under the auspices of a foreign government or international network. [3/26 NYT]

After turning himself in to FBI officials the preceding night, Bilal Alkaisi of New York was arrested on charges of aiding and abetting the World Trade Center bombing. FBI officials refused to specify Alkaisi's role in the incident. [3/25 NYT]

Mar. 27: The Algerian government broke diplomatic ties with Iran. It also recalled its ambassador from Sudan because of that country's alleged support of terrorism. [3/28 NYT]

According to the *New York Times,* US law enforcement officials claimed that a letter allegedly written by members of the Liberation Army Fifth Battalion—in which the group claimed responsibility for the 26 February World Trade Center bombing—had been written by one of the five men in custody for the bombing. The letter, delivered to the *New York Times* four days after the bombing, stated that this and possible future acts were in revenge for US policies in the Middle East. [3/28 NYT, WP]

Mar. 28: FBI officials refused to confirm a report published in the 27 March *New York Times* that the letter the newspaper received from the supposed perpetrators of the World Trade Center bombing had been written by one of the five suspects arrested in connection with the explosion. The lawyers of suspects Nidal Ayyad and Mahmud Abu Halima said their clients denied any connection to the letter. [3/29 WP, WSJ]

Mar. 30: US secretary of state Warren Christopher said before a senate committee that the United States would seek a global oil embargo against Libya because of the Libyan government's refusal to turn over two people accused of the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. [3/31 WP]

Mar. 31: US investigators indicted a sixth suspect in the World Trade Center bombing, Ramzi Ahmad Yusif of New Jersey, who reportedly had fled to Egypt. [4/1 WP]

Apr. 2: During an interview with *al-Hayat* (London), Egyptian president Mubarak claimed that Mahmud Abu Halima, an Egyptian-American charged in the 26 February bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City, had revealed "a great deal of information" about the bombing during his detention in Egypt, describing how it was executed and who was involved. Abu Halima also suggested that the Islamic Group was involved. Abu Halima's lawyer claimed that all information obtained during his detention by Egyptian authorities was obtained through torture and, therefore, was not reliable. [4/3 NYT]

Apr. 4: During an interview on the second day of a four-day visit to Washington, Egyptian president Mubarak said that if the United States had heeded information on the activities of Islamists in the United States provided by Egypt, it could have prevented the 26 February World Trade Center bombing. [4/5 NYT, 4/6 WP]

Apr. 8: The UN Security Council renewed its year-old sanctions against Libya banning arms sales and air travel to Libya and limiting diplomatic relations. [4/9 WP]

Western Sahara

1993

Feb. 23: Amnesty International issued a report condemning the Polisario for its imprisonment, torture, and killing of opponents at the Tindouf camps. [2/25 FBIS]

Feb. 26: During a press interview, Polisario secretary general Muhammad Abd al-Aziz vowed that if the United Nations acceded to Morocco's demands regarding the Western Sahara referendum, the Polisario was prepared to wage war. [3/4 FBIS]

Mar. 3: The UN Security Council passed resolution 809, calling for a referendum in Western Sahara to be held before the end of 1993. [3/8 FBIS]

Afghanistan

See also, Central Asia, Egypt, Pakistan

1993

Jan. 16: Clashes erupted between Hezb-e-Islami/Hekmatyar and Ittehad-e-Islami forces in western

Kabul, with some involvement by government forces. The Hekmatyar group reportedly captured a military airport formerly under the control of Ittehad-e-Islami.

According to the Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Hezb-e-Islami/Hekmatyar and government forces agreed to release each other's prisoners according to a previously established list. [1/19 FBIS]

Jan. 17: In Kabul, "dissident Muslim guerrillas" fired up to 30 rockets at two civilian airplanes, but failed to hit them. Rockets were also launched against the vicinity of the presidential palace in downtown Kabul. The government accused Hekmatyar forces of the attacks. [1/18 NYT, 1/19 FBIS]

Hezb-e-Islami/Hekmatyar demanded that the current government hand over power to a six-month interim government chosen by all battling parties, after which elections would be held. [1/19 FBIS]

Jan. 18: Hezb-e-Islami/Hekmatyar fired as many as 21 missiles into downtown Kabul. [1/19 FBIS]

Jan. 21: In continued fighting between government forces and Hezb-e-Islami/Hekmatyar in Kabul, at least 100 people were injured. [1/22 NYT]

Jan. 22: Agence France-Presse (AFP) reported that about 80 people had died during a week-long battle between Jamiat-e-Islami, Hezb-e-Islami/Hekmatyar, and General Abdul Rashid Dostam's forces for control of the northern town of Baglan. [1/22 FBIS]

Jan. 28: AFP reported that former king Zahir Shah, in exile in Rome, proposed a peace plan under which a committee of influential Afghans would establish a national assembly that would act as a transitional authority until UN-sponsored elections could be held. [1/29 FBIS]

Jan. 31: AFP reported that rebel leaders Sayyed Ahmad Gaylani of the National Salvation Front of Afghanistan, Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi of Harakat-e Inquilab-e Islami, Asif Mohseni of Harakat-e-Islami, Mohammad Fazli of Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami, Sibghatullah Mojaddedi of the Afghan National Liberation Front, and Amin Waqad of Hezb-e-Islami/Hekmatyar accepted in principle an invitation extended to all the warring Afghan parties by Saudi king Fahd to a peace conference in Saudi Arabia. [2/1 FBIS]

Feb. 1: UN workers Tony Bullard and J.A. van Hoeflaken and their two drivers were killed when unidentified gunmen ambushed a UN aid convoy along the highway extending from Jalalabad to northern Pakistan. [2/3 NYT, FT, FBIS]

Feb. 2: Following the ambush of a UN convoy the previous day, UN officials ordered all non-Afghan workers to vacate the province of Nangarhar and suspended UN travel on the roads from Peshawar to Kabul and from Quetta to Qandahar. [2/3 NYT, FT, FBIS]

Hezb-e-Islami/Hekmatyar forces escalated their attack on Kabul, firing more than 75 rockets and killing at least 75 people. [2/3 NYT, FT]

Feb. 3: Saudi king Fahd met with Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif in Riyadh. The two leaders made a joint appeal for a cease-fire to end all fighting in Afghanistan and for a peaceful solution to the country's difficulties. [2/4 FBIS]

The Pakistani Foreign Office announced the withdrawal of most of its diplomatic staff from Kabul in response to a rocket blast the preceding day that badly damaged the Pakistani embassy.

Hezb-e-Islami/Hekmatyar continued to bombard Kabul, leaving at least 14 people dead. [2/4 FT]

Feb. 6: The Indian embassy closed in Kabul. [2/10 WP]

President Burhanuddin Rabbani appointed Abdul Rashid Dostam deputy defense minister. [2/8 FBIS]

Feb. 8: Hezb-e-Islami/Hekmatyar bombarded Kabul with more than 200 rockets, killing 54 people and wounding more than 100. Government forces shelled Hekmatyar's headquarters south of Kabul. [2/9 FT]

Feb. 9: The *Financial Times* reported that Afghan opposition groups stipulated that they would not attend peace talks proposed by Saudi king Fahd if Burhanuddin Rabbani attended as president rather than as head of his party, Jamiat-e-Islami. [2/9 FT]

Near Gardez, 60 miles south of Kabul, a car-bomb explosion killed Nasrullah Mansouri, the governor of Paktia Province, Zabto Khan, a senior member of the Islamic Revolutionary Party, and three bodyguards. [2/10 WP, FBIS]

The Turkish embassy closed in Kabul. [2/10 WP]

Feb. 10: Pakistani retired general Hamid Gul and Pakistani labor minister Ejaz ul-Haq arrived in Kabul to negotiate a cease-fire. They met with President Rabbani. [2/11 FBIS]

Feb. 11: According to government reports, government forces advanced against Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami fighters in western Kabul, leaving at least 24 people dead. [2/11 FBIS, 2/12 WSJ]

Feb. 14: With the mediation of Pakistani general Gul, the government, Hezb-e-Islami/Hekmatyar, and Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami agreed on a cease-fire halting artillery battles. Hezb-e-Islami leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar said he was ready to negotiate with any party. [2/15 FT, 2/16 FBIS]

Feb. 17: Talks between Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami and government officials resulted in an agreement to use General Dostam's forces as a buffer between the two groups, and for the withdrawal of Ittehad-e-Islami from Shi'i areas in western Kabul. [2/18 FBIS]

Feb. 22: The United Nations sent a convoy of trucks carrying 16 tons of blankets and medicine to Kabul. [2/23 FT]

Feb. 23: In violation of the 14 February cease-fire pledge, Hezb-e-Islami/Hekmatyar and Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami staged a joint attack on a district of Kabul housing grain silos. Government forces returned fire. [2/23 FBIS]

Feb. 25: The Pakistani government invited representatives of the main warring Afghan factions to Islamabad for peace talks. [2/26 FBIS]
Feb. 26: Hezb-e-Islami/Hekmatyar and government forces skirmished in southern Kabul. [2/26 FBIS]
Feb. 28: In a heavy shell and rocket attack on downtown Kabul, more than 60 people were killed and 100 injured. The Defense Ministry blamed the attack on Hezb-e-Islami/Hekmatyar. [3/1 NYT]
Mar. 1: In Islamabad, Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif met with President Rabbani, Sibghatullah Mojaddedi, Sayyed Ahmad Gaylani, Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi, and other Afghan leaders to begin talks on the restoration of peace to Afghanistan. [3/2 FBIS]
Mar. 2: Meeting in Islamabad with the mediation of Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif, President Rabbani and Hezb-e-Islami leader Hekmatyar agreed to a cease-fire but did not decide how or when it would be put into effect. [3/4 NYT]

Prince Turki al-Faysal, special envoy of Saudi king Fahd, met in Islamabad with the warring Afghan parties that had agreed to participate in the Saudi-sponsored peace talks. [3/4 FBIS]
Mar. 4: In southern and eastern Kabul, battles broke out between government forces and Hezb-e-Islami and Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami forces. [3/8 FBIS]
Mar. 7: In Islamabad, Afghan president Rabbani and Hezb-e-Islami leader Hekmatyar signed a cease-fire agreement after six days of talks mediated by Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif. The agreement, endorsed by eight mujahidin factions, designated Organization of the Islamic Conference and mujahidin representatives as monitors of the cease-fire and designated Hekmatyar prime minister and Rabbani president. Hekmatyar and Rabbani were to jointly appoint the cabinet, but because Rabbani sought to keep Ahmad Shah Massoud as defense minister and Hekmatyar refused on the grounds that one group would "control both the presidency and the defense ministry," it was decided to postpone the appointments for 15 days. The agreement also called for the return of all prisoners, the opening of all roads, the establishment of an organization to deliver basic supplies, and the withdrawal of heavy weapons within of range of Kabul. Yunis Khalis of Hezb-e-Islami/Khalis refused to sign the pact on the grounds that it was so hastily and sloppily drafted that it would only lead to more conflict. [3/8 NYT, FT, FBIS, 3/9 WP]

In Kabul, government forces continued to clash with Hezb-e-Islami/Hekmatyar and Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami. [3/8 NYT, FT]
Mar. 8: Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and leaders of nine other factions flew to Mecca to swear allegiance to the peace pact signed in Islamabad the preceding day. [3/9 WP]
Mar. 9: Skirmishes continued in Kabul. [3/10 WSJ]
Mar. 11: Clashes recommenced between the government, Hezb-e-Islami/Hekmatyar, and Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami. [3/12 FBIS]
Mar. 20: At the conclusion of a two-day meeting in Jalalabad, members of eight mujahidin factions, Prime Minister-designate Hekmatyar, and representatives of President Rabbani met to discuss the formation of the cabinet. They decided to postpone a final settlement on the cabinet list until 29 March.

During fighting between Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami and Ittehad-e-Islami forces in Kabul, 15 people were killed. [3/22 FBIS]
Mar. 30: The announcement of the cabinet was postponed again for further discussion between representatives of Prime Minister-designate Hekmatyar and President Rabbani. [3/31 FBIS]
Apr. 2: Following Prime Minister-designate Hekmatyar's submission of his cabinet list to President Rabbani, a presidential spokesperson declared that the list was in need of review by the president, mujahidin leaders, and other officials, and was subject to change. The former cabinet would remain in place until the final decisions were made. [4/5 FBIS]

Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami and the government signed a peace agreement calling for a cease-fire, the release of captives, financial aid to war-damaged areas, the safe return of refugees, and the formation of joint committees to oversee the implementation of these points. [4/2 FBIS]
Apr. 5: Prime Minister-designate Hekmatyar condemned President Rabbani's decision to review and change his proposed cabinet list, saying that "the other side is trying to violate the [7 March] Islamabad Accords and gradually make them null and void." He accused some of the parties involved of attempting to reignite fighting. [4/6 FBIS]
Apr. 10: Clashes between government and Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami forces broke out in Kabul in violation of the 7 March cease-fire. [4/12 FBIS]
Apr. 15: Prime Minister-designate Hekmatyar announced that he had drawn up a cabinet list that included Ahmad Shah Massoud, the defense minister under President Rabbani whom he earlier had refused to include. In the new list, Massoud was slated to head the Foreign Ministry. [4/16 FT]

A spokesperson for President Rabbani announced his rejection of the cabinet list proposed by Prime Minister-designate Hekmatyar, reportedly because most of the mujahidin groups involved in the peace negotiations sought changes to the list. Rabbani believed that both he and all the mujahidin groups had to approve the list before its acceptance. [4/16 FBIS]

Algeria

See also, Regional Affairs

1993

Feb. 3: Redha Malek replaced Lakhdar Ibrahimi as foreign minister. Belkacem Benlarbi was appointed minister of industries and mines, Tahar Hamdi became minister of labor and social affairs, and

Muhammad Arezki Isli was appointed to transport. [2/4 FT, FBIS, 2/5 FT]

Feb. 6: Three gunmen shot dead Muhammad Abdaoui, commander of the gendarmerie unit in the Lazharia municipality of Tissemsilt Province. [2/8 FBIS]

Feb. 7: The High State Council extended the state of emergency begun in February 1992 to quell the activities of Islamists against the government. [2/8 FBIS, 2/9 FT]

Feb. 12: In Jijel Province, police killed five suspected "terrorists" during a raid there. [2/17 FBIS]

Feb. 13: In Algiers during an ambush, gunmen killed four policemen, Khaledi Sa'id, 53, Khlifi Muhammad, 29, Sidan-Ouzan Muhammad, 50, and Akli Abd al-Kader, 51. [2/17 FBIS]

Feb. 14: A school bus carrying children of members of the security forces was attacked, wounding the driver. Islamists were allegedly behind the attack. [2/15 FT]

In Blida, army troops killed three people, including Massaaoudi Rabeh, 25. The army alleged that the three had been wanted for army desertion and murder. [2/17 FBIS]

Feb. 19: In Blida, two persons said to be armed "terrorists" were shot dead by soldiers. [2/22 FBIS]

Feb. 25: A military court sentenced seven military men to death *in absentia* for their failure to report crimes against the government. [2/26 FBIS]

Mar. 1: Police announced the arrest of Ikhlef Cherrati, said to be a top deputy of Islamist leader Abd al-Kader Chebouti. [3/3 FBIS]

Amnesty International reported that since the government's establishment of a state of emergency in Algeria, human rights abuses had increased substantially, with more than 9,000 suspected Islamists held in internment camps without charge or trial and some 300 people killed by government forces. [3/2 FT]

Mar. 2: The government denied allegations by Amnesty International of increased state-imposed torture. [3/3 WP]

In Damous, police killed nine suspected Islamists during a shootout. [3/3 FBIS]

Near Tipaza west of Algiers, police shot and killed nine suspected Islamists after they had attempted to shoot at and flee from police in a stolen van. [3/3 NYT]

In the Port Said area of Algiers, police killed Amir Kamal, 26.

Unidentified gunmen killed policeman Kebaili Lakhdar, 38, in the town of Medea. [3/5 FBIS]

Mar. 3: In El Biar, police captured and killed Lahrani Sid Ahmed, 24, who had been previously sentenced to death *in absentia* in connection with an attack on "the Admiralty."

Unidentified gunmen shot and killed Aleg Muhammad, the head of the executive delegation in Maghoura. [3/5 FBIS]

Mar. 4: Outside Algiers, police killed a person said to be a "terrorist." [3/5 FBIS]

Mar. 6: In Blida Province, three gunmen shot and killed Sa'id Haouas, a provincial government employee. [3/8 FBIS]

Mar. 8: In Algiers, two unidentified gunmen shot and killed Lormani Abd al-Majid. [3/10 FBIS]

Mar. 9: Near Sidi bel Abbes, army forces shot and killed six people suspected of being Islamists. [3/10 FBIS]

Mar. 10: Radio Algiers Network reported that the government of Setif had suspended the activities of 409 religious, social, and cultural organizations on the grounds that they had not respected the law on associations and had practiced "activities of incitement." [3/11 FBIS]

Mar. 14: Algerian forces launched a raid on a suspected Islamist hideout near Ksar al-Boukhari, killing eight people and arresting sixty-one.

In Algiers, police killed three persons after they had tried to disarm the police following their arrests.

In L'Arbaa, gunmen shot and killed policeman Darwish Ahmad. [3/16 FBIS]

Mar. 16: In Ben Umar, near Kouba, gunmen shot and killed Djilali Liabis, a former cabinet minister and member of a policy-making group. Government officials blamed Islamists for the incident. [3/17 NYT, FT]

Mar. 17: In Algiers, a gunman shot and killed Hedi Flissi, a member of the National Consultative Committee. In a separate incident in Algiers, police shot and killed two alleged Islamists during a shootout. [3/18 WP]

Mar. 18: Hafid Senhardri, a member of the National Consultative Committee, died of gunshot wounds inflicted 14 March. [3/19 FBIS]

Police charged John Baggaley, a Reuter correspondent detained since 16 March, with spreading false information after he allegedly filed an incorrect report about the death of sports minister Abdelkader Khamri. [3/19 FT]

Police killed two "terrorists" as they reportedly attempted to flee during a search of hideouts in Meftah, Blida Province. [3/22 FBIS]

Mar. 20: At the Algérie Presse Service (APS) broadcasting tower in Algiers, an unidentified group shot and killed two people before setting fire to the tower. APS blamed the attack on Islamists dressed as police.

In Djelfa Province, police killed a person who reportedly had pulled a gun on them during his arrest. [3/22 FBIS]

Mar. 22: Some 80,000 Algerians demonstrated in downtown Algiers to protest the growing wave of violence in the country. Similar protests were staged throughout Algeria. [3/23 FT, FBIS]

Sixty miles south of Algiers, an unidentified group of alleged Islamists attacked the Bougzoul barracks, killing 18 soldiers. [3/31 NYT]

Mar. 23: According to a national gendarmerie communiqué, during an ambush on police in Jijel Province, gunmen shot and killed two policemen. [3/24 FBIS]

Mar. 30: The official press reported that the government had located and killed 20 alleged Islamists believed to be involved in the 22 March raid on the Bougzoul barracks. [3/31 NYT]

Bahrain

See also, Iraq

1993

Mar. 21: Amir Isa bin Salman Al Khalifah issued a decree appointing Ali bin Khalifah bin Salman Al Khalifa minister of communications. [3/22 FBIS]

Cyprus

1993

Jan. 16: Takis Nemistas, Greek Cypriot minister of commerce and industry, resigned following a dispute over remarks he made about Glavkos Kliridhis, leader of the Democratic Rally Party (DISI) and presidential candidate. [1/21 FBIS]

Jan. 18: Greek Cypriot president Yeoryios Vassiliou appointed Yeoryios Sirimis as finance minister. [1/21 FBIS]

Feb. 7: In the first round of Greek Cypriot presidential elections, President Vassiliou won 44.2 percent of the vote, Glavkos Kliridhis of DISI won 36.7 percent, and Paschalis Paschalides, backed by the Democratic Party (DIKO) and the Socialist Party, received 18.6 percent. Because no candidate received an absolute majority, a second round of elections would be required. [2/8, 2/9 FT]

Feb. 8: DIKO decided to support Glavkos Kliridhis and DISI in the second round of presidential elections. [2/10 FBIS]

Feb. 14: Glavkos Kliridhis defeated President Vassiliou in the Greek Cypriot presidential race after receiving 50.28 percent of the vote in the second round of elections. Vassiliou, receiving 49.72 percent of the vote, requested a recount, but his request was denied by the chief election officer. [2/15 WP, FT]

Feb. 15: Greek Cypriot president-elect Kliridhis said that he would seek a postponement of UN-sponsored peace talks with Turkish Cypriot president Rauf Denktas in order to first consult with Greek and Greek Cypriot political leaders. [2/16 FT]

Feb. 25: Greek Cypriot president-elect Kliridhis and DIKO president Spiros Kiprianou selected the new Council of Ministers:

Alexandros Mikhailidhis, *Foreign Affairs*
Faidhros Oikonomidhis, *Finance*
Konstandinos Mikhailidhis, *Interior*
Klairi Angelidhou, *Education*
Stilianos Koiliaris, *Commerce and Industry*
Andreas Moushioutas, *Labor and Social Insurance*
Alexandros Evangelou, *Justice and Public Order*
Konstandinos Iliadhis, *Defense*
Adhamos Adhamidhis, *Communications and Works*
Emmanouil Khristofidhis, *Health*
Konstandinos Petridhis, *Agriculture and Natural Resources* [2/26 FBIS]

Mar. 8: UN secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali issued an invitation to Turkish Cypriot president Denktas and Greek Cypriot president Kliridhis to come to New York the following week to discuss peace negotiations. [3/9 FBIS]

Mar. 10: The United Nations announced that both Greek Cypriot president Kliridhis and Turkish Cypriot president Denktas had agreed to meet with UN secretary-general Boutros-Ghali on 30 March in New York to determine the content and date of resumption of peace negotiations. Denktas agreed to attend on the condition that the "essence" of the Cyprus problem not be discussed because he was not prepared to conduct negotiations. [3/10 FBIS]

Mar. 30: Greek Cypriot president Kliridhis and Turkish Cypriot president Denktas met at the United Nations along with Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali. A UN statement issued after the meeting announced that before the resumption of joint negotiations scheduled for 24 May, UN envoys would meet with the two Cypriot leaders in Nicosia to prepare. It also disclosed that the two leaders had decided to meet informally in Cyprus before the 24 May talks. [3/31 FBIS]

Apr. 8: Along the Attila line dividing Cyprus, a Turkish Cypriot soldier shot and killed Athanasios Kleovoulu, a Greek Cypriot soldier. [4/9 FBIS]

Apr. 9: The Greek Cypriot government threatened to lodge a protest with the United Nations concerning the murder of Greek Cypriot soldier Athanasios Kleovoulu the preceding day by a Turkish Cypriot soldier. Turkish Cypriot president Denktas said he regretted the murder, but hoped that the Greek Cypriot government would not blow the incident out of proportion. Denktas also claimed that the killing was in self defense, while the Greek Cypriot government contended that it was premeditated. [4/9, 4/12 FBIS]

Egypt

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Regional Affairs, Saudi Arabia, Sudan

1993

Jan. 23: Police in al-Fayyum Governate arrested Sayyid Abd al-Fattah Muhammad, the leader of the banned al-Shawqiyun group. [1/25 FBIS]

Jan. 24: In Cairo's Bulaq district, gunmen shot and killed two policemen, Mahmud Abd al-Hadi, 22, and Muhammad Abd al-Munim, 21. Police alleged the gunmen were Islamists. [1/25 FBIS]

Jan. 29: Interior Minister Abd al-Halim Musa declared that police had detained some 85 percent of

Islamists active in Egypt. He also denied reports that the government had sought the extradition from the United States of Shaykh Umar Abd al-Rahman, the Islamic Group's spiritual leader. [2/1 FBIS]

Jan. 31: The Higher Administrative Court rejected the establishment of the Awakening Party on the grounds that its program allowed for donations from outside the country in violation of Egyptian law. [2/3 FBIS]

During a shootout in the Imbabah district of Cairo, police shot and killed an allegedly dangerous criminal. [2/1 FBIS]

Feb. 4: Three South Korean tourists were injured when a bomb exploded outside their hotel in Giza. The Islamic Group claimed responsibility. [2/5 FBIS]

Al-Ahram reported that Shaykh Abd al-Rahman, leader of the Islamic Group, had applied for political asylum in the United States after US immigration authorities had withdrawn his green card for giving them incorrect information about his marital status and criminal record. [2/8 FBIS]

Feb. 6: Police killed Khalid Abd al-Warith Muhammad, 20, during an exchange of fire in Cairo's Imbabah district. Muhammad and two others allegedly had thrown bombs at police cars. [2/9 FBIS]

Feb. 9: In Cairo, police arrested Khuwaylid Muhammad Barakat who, police claimed, was "commander of the Imbabah terrorists' military wing." [2/9 FBIS]

Feb. 11: During an ambush in Cairo's Misr al-Qadimah district, police shot and killed Sa'd Id Diyab after he fired on police. [2/12 FBIS]

Feb. 14: Police arrested 74 Islamists during a two-day sweep of Cairo's Misr al-Qadimah district, the southern village of Bani Suwayf, and the province of Buhayrah. The operation had begun the preceding day. [2/17 FBIS]

Feb. 15: Tourism Minister Fuad Sultan disclosed that Islamist attacks on foreign tourists had cost the country $700 million since the preceding year, a 20 percent reduction in revenues. He claimed that the country was losing at least $60 million per month. [2/16 WP, FT, WSJ]

Feb. 17: President Husni Mubarak enacted a law declaring that during union leadership elections, unless a minimum of 50 percent of eligible voters turned out in the first round and 33 percent in the second round, a magistrate would be appointed to manage the union for a six-month period, at the end of which a new election would be held. The law was aimed at curbing the influence of Islamists, who had taken advantage of low turnouts to gain control of unions. [2/19 FBIS]

Feb. 19: Some 5,000 people, led by Construction Minister Hasaballah al-Kafrawi, demonstrated in Cairo against the new union leadership election law. According to Muhammad Bishr, secretary general of the engineers association, government forces had prevented many others outside of Cairo from attending the rally. [2/22 FBIS]

Feb. 26: In Cairo's al-Tahrir Square, a Swede, a Turk, and two Egyptians were killed in an explosion at a coffee shop frequented by foreign tourists. [2/27 NYT, WP]

Feb. 27: An alleged member of the Islamic Group told reporters that the group was responsible for the preceding day's explosion at al-Tahrir Square, adding that it was in revenge for a government crackdown on the group. [2/28 NYT]

Mar. 4: A policeman and his son were killed in Upper Egypt. [3/6 FT]

Mar. 5: The Islamic Group delivered a statement to the British Broadcasting Corporation in Cairo warning foreigners to leave the country and suggesting that foreign investments could also become a target. The statement also claimed responsibility for the 4 March killing of a policeman and his son. [3/6 FT]

In Upper Egypt, Egyptian forces shot a member of the Islamic Group during clashes and police detained 70 Islamic Group members as suspects in the 4 March killing in Upper Egypt. Mansur al-Isawi, deputy interior minister for central Upper Egypt, said four people were involved in the crime. [3/8 FBIS]

Mar. 6: In Aswan, policeman Ahmad Sabir Husayn, 20, was killed in an attack. [3/7 NYT, 3/8 FBIS]

Mar. 9: The scheduled trials were to begin of 49 members of the Islamic Group charged with involvement in attacks on foreign tourists. Four were to be tried *in absentia*. [3/9 FT]

Mar. 10: In nine raids that had begun the preceding night, Egyptian forces killed at least 21 people. In a single attack at Aswan's al-Rahman mosque, police killed 8 people and arrested 78, including 10 children under age 13. [3/11 NYT, WP, 3/12 WP]

Mar. 11: In Suhaj, a town midway between Aswan and Cairo, gunmen shot and killed Abu al-Fadl Isa, a traffic policeman. Officials suspected that the gunmen were Islamists seeking retaliation for government raids against them. Around the country, police arrested 150 suspected Islamists. [3/12 NYT, FBIS]

The *New York Times* reported that the People's Assembly had passed a law imposing the death sentence upon anyone found guilty of links to "terrorist" groups. [3/11 NYT]

Mar. 12: In the Abu Tij township of Asyut Governate, police and members of al-Jihad clashed. Ahmad Sayyid Farghali, an al-Jihad member, was killed. [3/16 FBIS]

Mar. 14: According to Agence France-Presse, in Qalyub, about 22 miles outside of Cairo, a clash between police and residents left 52 people injured; 87 people were arrested. The incident occurred after police sealed off the town to search for suspected Islamists who had firebombed a Coptic church earlier that day. An Interior Ministry official denied that any clashes had occurred. [3/15 FBIS]

The *Washington Post* reported that authorities had detained Americans Robert Cunningham, Brian Eckheart, and Righard Dugan, New Zealander Thomas Martin, and Egyptian Abd al-Halim Adel-Nefa, all employees of a US firm, on suspicion of "exploiting religion to debase Islam and to foment sectarian sedition" after they reportedly had attempted to proselytize on behalf of Christianity. [3/14 WP, 3/15 NYT]

Mar. 15: Police killed two people during a sweep for Islamists in the Badari area of Asyut Governate. [3/16 FBIS]

Mar. 16: In Cairo, a bomb explosion damaged at least four buses outside of the Egyptian Museum in al-Tahrir Square, one of Cairo's most visited tourist attractions. The Islamic Group claimed responsibility. [3/17 NYT, WP]

Mar. 17: In Asyut, about 350 police stormed two buildings believed to be controlled by Islamists. During the raid, suspected Islamists Ahmad Zaki al-Sharif, Anwar Mahmud Abd al-Rajjal and his brother Mustafa, Sulayman Abd al-Jawwad Abd al-Hafiz, Mahmud Khalfan al-Maghribi, Ahmad Sayyid Hasan Bakhati, and two policemen were killed. Police arrested at least 25 suspected Islamists. [3/18 NYT, FBIS]

Mar. 18: The French Foreign Ministry issued a statement proclaiming France's support of the Egyptian government during its confrontation with rising Islamist violence. [3/22 FBIS]

Mar. 20: During a raid on a suspected Islamist hideout in Asyut, police killed Ahmad Khalaf Mahmud, 21, when he resisted arrest, according to police reports. Residents said that police had simply broken into his house and killed him. Police also arrested 42 people. [3/21 NYT, 3/22 FBIS]

Mar. 21: The government ordered the retrial *in absentia* of Shaykh Abd al-Rahman, leader of the Islamic Group, and 49 of his followers. Abd al-Rahman had been acquitted in 1990 of a charge of inciting anti-government violence. The 47 others were charged with anti-government activities, illegal possession of weapons, and attempted murder. [3/22 WP, WSJ]

Mar. 22: The *Washington Post* reported that a US judge had ordered Shaykh Abd al-Rahman deported on the grounds that he had not informed immigration authorities that he was a polygamist and had been convicted of falsifying a check. [3/22 WP]

Amnesty International issued a statement condemning both Egyptian and Islamist forces for arbitrary killings and declaring that human rights standards in the country had deteriorated seriously during the previous year. [3/23 FT]

Mar. 23: The *Wall Street Journal* reported that Shaykh Abd al-Rahman's lawyers had announced they would boycott his retrial. [3/23 WSJ]

Mar. 24: During a prayer gathering in Asyut, some 2,500 Islamists protested, shouting anti-government slogans. A similar incident involving about 3,000 people occurred in nearby Manflut. [3/28 WP]

Mar. 25: Abd al-Rahim Hasan and another person were killed during a clash with police in Abu Tij, south of Asyut. [3/25, 3/26 FBIS]

More than 9,000 Islamic Group sympathizers attended Hasan's funeral in Abu Tij. Later, Egyptian forces placed a curfew on the town. [3/26 FBIS]

Mar. 27: In the Civil Defense Building in Cairo, a bomb explosion killed a policeman and wounded several others as they attempted to defuse the bomb. Police suspected that Islamists were behind the explosion. [3/28 NYT]

Mar. 28: In Aswan, bombs exploded under a police car, in a government building, and in a public square. [3/29 WP]

Mar. 29: In an interview with the *Financial Times*, President Mubarak explicitly accused the Iranian government of sponsoring bombings and attacks on tourists in Egypt. [3/30 FT]

Mar. 30: During an interview with CNN, President Mubarak claimed that "an association in New Jersey collecting a lot of money for the refugees in Afghanistan" had been supporting Islamists in Egypt—possibly referring to a group involving Mahmud Abu Halima, a suspect arrested in connection to the 26 February World Trade Center bombing—and Shaykh Abd al-Rahman and some of his followers. [3/31 WSJ]

The Islamic Group issued a last call for all foreigners to leave Egypt "because the time for warnings has ended."

An explosion occurred inside one of the three pyramids in Giza. Authorities claimed that the explosion was accidental. [3/31 NYT]

Mar. 31: The Islamic Group issued a statement claiming responsibility for the preceding day's explosion in one of the Giza pyramids. The government detained some 35 suspects in connection with the incident. [4/1 WP]

Apr. 6: The Supreme State Security Court postponed the retrial of Shaykh Abd al-Rahman until 8 June in order to provide time for his extradition. [4/7 FBIS]

Apr. 8: Near Qusiya, south of Cairo, gunmen fired on a Nile cruise boat carrying 41 Germans.

A bomb exploded outside a bakery in a town east of Aswan. [4/10 WP]

Apr. 10: A bomb exploded on a public bus in Cairo. [4/12 NYT]

Apr. 11: Two members of the Islamic Group speaking on the condition of anonymity disclosed that officials from the US embassy in Cairo had initiated a series of meetings with them and other Islamic Group representatives to investigate alleged human rights abuses by the Egyptian government. The sessions were held in Egypt and elsewhere, and were suspended after the 26 February World Trade Center bombing. The US embassy denied that it had initiated the meetings but did not deny that embassy officials had met on several occasions with "militant leaders" in Cairo.

According to police reports, outside the Citadel in Cairo, Islamists planted five fire bombs on a bus carrying some 50 German tourists. The bombs were successfully defused.

In Abu Tij, about 250 miles south of Cairo, gunmen shot and killed Muhammad al-Sharimi, deputy head of security in Asyut Governate, his driver, and an assistant. [4/12 NYT]

Apr. 13: A member of the Islamic Group sent a message to a reporter claiming responsibility for the 11 April killing of security official Muhammad al-Sharimi, and threatening further attacks. An additional 5,000 police were sent to Asyut to help in the investigation of the killing. [4/14 NYT, WP]

Iran

See also, Central Asia, Petroleum Affairs, Regional Affairs, Egypt, Iraq, Pakistan, Sudan, Turkey

1993

Jan. 20: Spiritual leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenehi declared amnesty for some 1,780 prisoners. [1/21 FBIS]

Jan. 22: Afghan officials reported that Iran had reinforced its positions in the area of Jabil Robat where, the previous day, a battle between heroin smugglers and Iranian troops had left 20 Iranian soldiers dead and many others wounded and captured. [2/4 FBIS]

Jan. 31: President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani declared his intention to run for a second presidential term in elections scheduled for June. He also declared that it was the responsibility of the United States to ameliorate relations with Iran. [2/1 NYT]

Feb. 6: Ayatollah Khamenehi pardoned 116 convicted clerics. [2/9 FBIS]

Feb. 8: Near the Tehran airport, a military jet collided with an Iran Air passenger plane headed for Mashhad. All 132 people aboard the airliner were killed. An Iran Air official blamed the accident on antiquated radar systems. [2/9 NYT]

Feb. 13: Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati denied US press reports that Mir Aimal Kansi, the key suspect in a 26 January shooting incident outside US Central Intelligence Agency headquarters, had entered Iran after fleeing the United States and stopping briefly at his home in Pakistan. [2/16 FBIS]

Feb. 14: On the fourth anniversary of the *fatwa* calling for the death of author Salman Rushdie, Iranian religious leaders reiterated the edict and denounced Britain and other countries for their rejection of the decree. The British government said it would continue to fight against the fatwa and declared that the edict was an obstacle to friendly relations between the two countries. [2/15 NYT]

Feb. 15: According to a report from exiled former president Abol Hassan Bani Sadr, Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri was arrested after denouncing the country's spiritual leader. [2/16 FT]

Feb. 17: Iranian officials informed the International Committee of the Red Cross that 1,000 Iraqi soldiers would be returned to Iraq 18 February. The Iraqis allegedly had entered Iran during the 1990–91 Persian Gulf War. [2/18 FBIS]

Feb. 26: The *Financial Times* reported that the Iranian government had requested international aid after floods killed some 500 people and caused an estimated $1 billion in damage. [2/26 FT]

Mar. 3: National police chief Reza Seifollahi disclosed that security officials were investigating three bomb explosions that had occurred during the preceding month near Ahraz, the capital of Khuzestan. [3/4 FT]

Mar. 5: During Friday prayers in Tehran, Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati urged the government to break Iran's trade agreements with Great Britain because of its increased pressure on Iran to revoke the fatwa against author Salman Rushdie. [3/6 FT]

The US State Department issued a statement labeling Iran the world's "most dangerous state sponsor of terrorism." [3/7 NYT]

Mar. 10: In the Majlis, Speaker Ali Akbar Nateq-Nuri accused the United States of waging a psychological war against Iran, as evinced in a series of US accusations and condemnations for alleged Iranian involvement in terrorism. [3/11 FT]

Mar. 16: In Rome, gunmen shot and killed Mohammad Hossein Nagdi, a 42-year-old former Iranian diplomat who defected to Italy and was the head of the National Council of Iranian Resistance. The Iranian state press suggested that the incident was motivated by internal differences among exiled Iranian opposition. The People's Mojahedin of Iran blamed the Iranian government for the killing. [3/17 NYT]

Mar. 17: According to a spokesperson for exiled former president Bani Sadr, a blast at the home of Iranian spiritual leader Ayatollah Khamenehi killed several people. The official Iranian news agency denied the report. [3/18 FT]

Mar. 28: The *Washington Post* reported that the preceding week, the US government secretly issued a protest to the Iranian government concerning its taking a large shipment of oil from Iraq in violation of UN trade sanctions. The accusation was based on US intelligence reports that claimed the shipment was too large to be unknown to the government. Iranian officials denied the charge. [3/28 WP]

Mar. 30: Before the Senate Appropriations Committee, US secretary of state Warren Christopher dubbed the Iranian government an "international outlaw" for its alleged support of international violence and nuclear weapons development. [3/31 NYT]

Iraq

See also, Petroleum Affairs, Regional Affairs, Iran

1993

Jan. 16: During a news conference, UN ambassador Nizar Hamdun announced that Iraq would guarantee the safety of UN weapons inspection flights only if the planes did not enter the northern and southern "no-fly" zones, and threatened that "any military action will trigger a response." The United Nations rejected the proposition on the grounds that it violated UN stipulations that UN planes be allowed unrestricted movement within Iraqi territory.

US sources confirmed Iraqi claims that Iraqi antiaircraft artillery had fired at two US planes in the northern "no-fly" zone. [1/17 NYT, WP]

A UN official reported that some 50 Iraqi policemen remained inside Kuwait near the border in violation of a UN demand that they leave. [1/19 FBIS]

Jan. 17: US naval ships in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea fired some 40 cruise missiles at the Djilah industrial park in Zafaraniyya, about 8 miles southeast of Baghdad. US officials declared that the attack was in response to Iraq's restrictions on UN weapons inspection flights and asserted that further attacks were possible if Iraqi noncompliance continued. [1/18 NYT, WP, 1/19 NYT]

Five times before the strike, Iraqi antiaircraft radar locked onto US and allied planes in the northern "no-fly" zone. In one instance, a US plane blew up an antiaircraft battery in response. Later, an allied plane shot down an Iraqi aircraft that had entered the northern "no-fly" zone. [1/18 NYT, WP, 1/19 FBIS]

US military sources did not make public any damage assessment of the attack, but admitted that an explosion at the Rashid Hotel in Baghdad that killed at least one person, Amira Uyal, may have been caused by a US missile, and that several US missiles had been shot down. Press reports from Baghdad claimed that three people had been killed and as many as thirty had been wounded during the attack either by US missiles or falling Iraqi antiaircraft shells. The Iraqi News Agency reported that several civilian, cultural, and tourist sites had been hit, and that the industrial complex was not involved in nuclear weapons production, but was a factory producing molds. The Iraqi government also accused the United States of firing a missile at the northern town of Nineveh; the United States did not respond to the accusation. [1/18 NYT, WP, 1/19 WP]

A senior US official asserted that the Djilah complex was chosen as a target because such an attack was permissible according to UN cease-fire regulations. Also, US presidential spokesperson Marlin Fitzwater claimed the complex continued to be utilized in Iraq's nuclear weapons program. Diplomatic officials, however, said that Iraqi authorities had already removed and destroyed equipment that was directly related to nuclear weapons construction. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the site housed machinery that may have been used in the nuclear weapons program, but was not significant enough to be among those sites to be destroyed according to UN cease-fire provisions. [1/18 WP]

The Kuwaiti government announced that after the strike, Iraq began to dismantle six Iraqi police posts that marked the old Iraq-Kuwait border, in observance of UN resolutions. [1/18 NYT]

Kuwaiti and US soldiers guarding the border with Iraq killed an Iraqi who, according to the Kuwaiti Interior Ministry, had fired at the soldiers. [1/18 NYT, WP, 1/19 FBIS]

Jan. 18: The US Department of Defense issued a damage assessment of the 17 January US attack on Iraq. Of 45 missiles fired, 38 struck their targets, destroying four targeted buildings and damaging another three. Officials confirmed that during the attack, a US missile had struck the Rashid Hotel.

In the southern "no-fly" zone, about 70 British, French, and US planes flying from Saudi Arabia attacked air defense command posts at Najaf, Samawah, and Tallil in an attempt to destroy Iraq's southern air defense capability. [1/19 WP]

Also, an Iraqi plane entered the southern "no-fly" zone, prompting a US plane to fire at it.

US military officials reported that Iraqi forces either had targeted with radar or fired antiaircraft artillery at all allied planes patrolling the northern "no-fly" zone. Iraqi planes entered the zone several times. In response, US planes fired missiles at Iraqi missile sites near Mosul and dropped cluster bombs on antiaircraft artillery at Bashiquah airfield. [1/19 WP, WSJ]

Bush administration statements threatened further strikes against Iraq unless it ceased targeting US and allied planes in the "no-fly" zones with antiaircraft radar and artillery, dismantled surface-to-air missile sites in the southern "no-fly" zone, and satisfied UN demands regarding UN weapons inspection flights.

Russian officials announced the withdrawal of two warships it sent to the Persian Gulf in October to support the efforts of Britain, France, and the United States in regulating Iraqi actions. They also issued an official statement expressing concern regarding civilian casualties in, and continued allied attacks on, Iraq. [1/19 WP]

Jan. 19: During a meeting with reporters, US national security advisor Brent Scowcroft said that during the previous summer an almost successful ouster of Iraqi president Saddam Hussein ultimately failed because of Iraq's tough security system. He stressed that it was not a US effort. Another US official claimed that the US administration had offered support to those arranging the coup, but added that the support was not military, logistical, or financial in nature. [1/20 WP]

Following the disclosure of US plans to send additional forces to the Persian Gulf, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) ordered a cease-fire against allied planes and guaranteed the security of UN weapons inspection flights into Baghdad as a goodwill gesture toward US president-elect Bill Clinton. According to Iraqi UN ambassador Hamdun, the agreement to guarantee UN weapons inspection flights was contingent upon the end of allied strikes.

Iraqi officials claimed that a total of 42 people had been killed in the preceding week's allied raids. [1/20 NYT]

During a patrol of the northern "no-fly" zone, a US plane fired missiles at an Iraqi surface-to-air missile radar system near Mosul after the radar locked onto the plane.

Later, in the northern "no-fly" zone near the Saddam hydroelectric dam, an Iraqi antiaircraft battery fired at a US plane. In the southern "no-fly" zone near Mosul, an Iraqi antiaircraft battery fired at two US planes. The planes dropped cluster bombs in response. [1/20 NYT, WP]

On several occasions, Iraqi planes entered the northern "no-fly" zone. [1/20 NYT]

Jan. 20: French foreign minister Roland Dumas announced that French forces had not participated in the 17 January strike against Iraq because the action went beyond UN Security Council resolutions. [1/21 WP]

Jan. 21: Near Mosul in the northern "no-fly" zone, two US planes under orders from the Bush administration fired a missile and dropped cluster bombs on an Iraqi surface-to-air missile battery after it reportedly had locked on to the planes and fired antiaircraft artillery at them. An Iraqi Foreign Ministry spokesperson asserted that the United States had initiated the attack and that Iraq was committed to the cease-fire. The spokesperson also claimed that the cluster bomb had missed its target and hit a civilian area.

A 52-member UN weapons inspection team that included aerial inspectors and a chemical destruction group flew into Baghdad from Bahrain. [1/22 NYT, WP]

Jan. 22: US military officials reported that east of Mosul in the northern "no-fly" zone, a US plane had fired two missiles at an Iraqi air defense battery after its radar had been directed at the plane and another accompanying it. The Iraqi Foreign Ministry accused the United States of fabricating the incident and asserted that Iraq had no air defense batteries east of Mosul. The Clinton administration vowed to maintain a firm approach toward Iraq. [1/23 NYT]

The *Washington Post* reported that according to US officials, Iraq had deployed four surface-to-air missile batteries in the northern "no-fly" zone and one just south of the zone's border. [1/22 WP]

In Irbil, a car-bomb explosion left at least 10 people dead and some 120 wounded. [1/24 WP]

Jan. 23: According to US Department of Defense officials, Iraqi forces fired antiaircraft artillery at three US planes patrolling the southern "no-fly" zone. None of the planes was struck and one of them bombed the antiaircraft site. [1/24 WP]

Jan. 24: US secretary of defense Les Aspin disclosed that there were indications that Iraq had begun to deploy new surface-to-air missiles in the "no-fly" zones.

Iraqi officials denied US claims that its forces had fired on three US planes patrolling the southern "no-fly" zone the preceding day. [1/25 NYT]

Jan. 25: A UN weapons inspection team in Baghdad informed the Iraqi government that, effective immediately, UN inspectors would begin daily inspections of the Ibn al-Haytham research facility just outside Baghdad, where the Iraqi government had placed almost all of its top engineers and rocket scientists. [1/27 WP]

Two UN teams inspecting Iraq's nuclear and ballistic weapons operations arrived in Baghdad. Maurizio Zifferero of Italy led the eight-member nuclear weapons team and Nikita Smidovich of Russia led the seven-member ballistic weapons team. [1/26 NYT, WP, FT]

Jan. 27: The *Washington Post* reported that during the preceding week, Iraqi officials had submitted to UN nuclear weapons inspection team leader Zifferero a list of companies that had provided nuclear weapons-related materials. Zifferero claimed that the list was incomplete. [1/27 WP]

Ahmad al-Hamud, the Kuwaiti interior minister, claimed that armed Iraqi police dressed as civilians had crossed the border three times during the preceding week and had robbed Kuwaiti farmers and their employees of money and belongings. [1/28 FT]

Jan. 30: The UN nuclear weapons inspection team completed its week-long mission during which they made routine inspections of twelve weapons sites. [1/31 NYT]

Feb. 1: A senior Iraqi official announced that the government had shut down all of its surveillance radar in order to show its commitment to the cease-fire. The official also disclosed that the radar had been turned on during the 10–21 January allied attacks on Iraqi missile and radar installations. US officials announced that the 23 January US attack on a military site had not been provoked, but was a mistake; the pilot thought he had been targeted by antiaircraft fire. [2/2 WP]

Babil reported that the RCC had issued an amendment to the Iraqi constitution allowing the president to "issue resolutions carrying the force of law." [2/11 FBIS]

Feb. 5: The UN Security Council unanimously agreed to replace 350 unarmed observers stationed along the Iraq-Kuwait border with an international peacekeeping force of as many as 3,600 soldiers for a six-month period. [2/6 FT, 2/8 FBIS]

Feb. 6: Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, chairman of the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI), announced that the opposition movements in the south had withdrawn from the Iraqi opposition government established in November 1992 to protest the inadequate level of representation in the opposition government given to the Shi'i majority. [2/8 FBIS]

Feb. 8: The *Wall Street Journal* reported that Iraqi authorities had presented a formal protest to the Iranian government for two alleged shooting attacks by Iranians the preceding month. [2/8 WSJ]

The families of Paul Ride and Michael Wainwright, two Britons arrested and imprisoned in 1992 for illegally entering Iraq, arrived in Baghdad to negotiate their release.

In an interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation, Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz said that Iraq was still detaining Britons Paul Ride and Michael Wainwright because the British government had not "shown any understanding toward the plight, the hardship of the Iraqi people." He added that if Britain released frozen Iraqi assets, Iraq might be willing to free the men, and that the government would spend the assets in Britain for food and medicine. [2/9 NYT]

Feb. 10: According to Voice of the People of Kurdistan (clandestine), SAIRI officials denied reports of their withdrawal from the Iraqi opposition government. [2/12 FBIS]

According to Voice of the People of Kurdistan, the Kurdish Workers Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan reunited as the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. [2/11 FBIS]

Following a meeting with Deputy Prime Minister Aziz, Michael Whitman, director general of the British Red Cross, reported that Aziz had refused to free Britons Paul Ride and Michael Wainwright until Britain released frozen Iraqi assets. The British government had said previously that it would not release the assets until Iraq complied with all UN resolutions. [2/11 NYT]

Feb. 13: The *Washington Post* reported that a 13-member UN team, headed by Patrice Palanque of France, had arrived in Baghdad to conduct inspections of Iraq's ballistic missile production capabilities. [2/13 WP]

In an interview with a US official, President Hussein called on US president Bill Clinton to renew relations between the two countries "based on mutual respect and the exchange of legitimate interests regardless of what has happened." It was reportedly the first personal appeal made by Hussein to Clinton. [2/15 NYT]

In al-Sulaymaniyya, several bombs exploded in buildings belonging to the Red Crescent, killing two people. [2/16 FBIS]

Feb. 15: The Iraqi government sent a letter to the United Nations protesting UN sanctions, claiming that they prevented Iraqis from obtaining basic necessities. [2/16 WP]

UN officials announced that UN arms inspectors planned to inform the Iraqi government of their intention to take aerial photographs of Baghdad following the discovery of a weapons installation in the city. The Iraqi government had banned flights over the city. [2/16 NYT]

A bomb explosion in al-Sulaymaniyya left 10 people dead. Kurdish groups blamed the government for the blast. [2/16 FBIS]

Feb. 21: The United Nations announced a surprise weapons inspection for the following morning involving a team led by Nikita Smidovich. A UN ballistic weapons inspection team already in Iraq extended its stay in Baghdad because of newly discovered information. Smidovich insisted that the two inspections were not linked, although the reason for the surprise inspection was not made clear. [2/22 FT]

Feb. 22: As a pair of UN helicopters approached a site to take aerial photographs during a search for Scud missiles, Iraqi forces fixed their antiaircraft guns on them and warned them to halt their mission. After the incident, team leader Smidovich said that there had been "no crisis." [2/24 NYT]

Feb. 24: The UN Security Council summoned Iraqi UN ambassador Hamdun to protest the 22 February incident in which Iraqi antiaircraft guns had been trained on two UN weapons inspections helicopters. Hamdun said the incident was isolated and assured the council that Iraq would continue to guarantee the inspectors' safety. [2/25 WP]

Mar. 1: A UN investigator reported that the Iraqi government had executed hundreds of Shi'a from the southern marshes in the preceding months. [3/2 WSJ]

Mar. 3: A UN nuclear weapons inspection team headed by Dhimitrios Perrikos of Greece arrived in Baghdad. [3/8 FBIS]

The Turkish embassy in Baghdad reopened at the level of chargé d'affaires. [3/3 FBIS]

Mar. 11: UN weapons inspection team leader Perrikos said that the Iraqi government had promised to hand over a list of its nuclear weapons suppliers in two weeks. [3/11 FBIS]

Mar. 12: The *Wall Street Journal* reported that according to UN weapons inspector Perrikos, the Iraqi government had rebuilt an engineering plant that US navy missiles had destroyed 17 January. [3/12 WSJ]

According to reports from the Kurdistan Front group, an attack by Iraqi forces on the Kurdish village of Aweina just south of the northern "no-fly" zone had left more than 30 Kurds dead, including 7 children. [3/14 NYT]

Mar. 13: The Iranian military issued a communiqué stating that in response to repeated incursions by Iranian opposition groups from Iraq, Iranian forces had carried out an air strike in Iraq near the Iranian border town of Sar Dasht against a Kurdish group calling itself the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan. [3/15 NYT]

The human rights organization France-Libertés reported that during the Iranian air raids, a French-run hospital at Raniya was attacked and at least six Kurds were killed. [3/16 FT]

Mar. 15: According to an "official Kuwaiti source," troops at the Iraqi border post at Safwan fired on the Kuwaiti border post of al-Abdali. [3/16 FBIS]

Mar. 19: The US Department of Defense released a report contending that during the Persian Gulf War, the Iraqi government had committed serious war crimes in its seizure, torture, and killing of Kuwaitis and that it had damaged the environment by releasing oil into the gulf and burning Kuwaiti oil wells. [3/20 NYT]

Mar. 29: The UN Security Council decided to maintain its ban on Iraqi oil exports in response to Iraq's continued violations of UN resolutions. [3/30 WSJ]

A Kuwaiti government spokesperson, speaking before the UN Compensation Commission, called for international pressure on Iraq to sell its oil for cash in order to compensate those individuals and institutions that suffered losses during the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. [3/30 FT]

Mar. 30: According to the *Washington Post,* the Clinton administration issued a policy statement that attempted to "depersonalize" US policy toward the Iraqi conflict by omitting language linking the ouster of President Hussein to the lifting of international sanctions against Iraq. The statement followed a discussion between UN and US officials about policy toward Iraq on the occasion of a UN Security Council sanctions review. [3/30 WP]

Apr. 9: Four US fighter planes bombed Iraqi antiaircraft batteries that, according to US military authorities, had fired on the planes during a routine surveillance mission in the northern "no-fly" zone. [4/10 NYT, WP]

Apr. 14: According to the *Financial Times,* "travelers" from Iraq reported that senior Iraqi officials had been arrested and executed and that Iraqi forces had taken control of part of Baghdad following an attempt to kidnap the interior minister. [4/15 FT]

Israel

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Lebanon, Pakistan

1993

Jan. 18: The Knesset rejected two no-confidence motions introduced by Likud and Tzomet concerning political party funding. [1/21 FBIS]

Jan. 24: Yeshayahu Leibowitz, a prominent Israeli intellectual and critic of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Golan Heights, withdrew his nomination for the Israel Prize for Lifetime Achievement after Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin informed the cabinet that he would boycott the award ceremony to protest Leibowitz's nomination. Nominees for the prize were chosen by a committee appointed by Education Minister Shulamit Aloni. [1/25 WP]

Jan. 25: The *New York Times* reported that a cabinet committee refused to extend automatic immigration rights to Ethiopians of Jewish background who had converted to Christianity, and instead decided to allow entrance only to those with family in Israel. [1/25 NYT]

Feb. 1: The Knesset defeated no-confidence motions submitted by Likud and the National Religious Party. [2/2 FBIS]

Feb. 21: Yisrael Meir Lau, the 56-year-old chief rabbi of Tel Aviv, was chosen head rabbi of the Ashkenazic Jews, and Eliahu Bakshi-Doran, a 51-year-old rabbi from Haifa, was elected head rabbi of the Sephardic Jews. [2/22 NYT]

Mar. 15: During a meeting with Prime Minister Rabin in Washington, US president Bill Clinton promised to fight any congressional cuts in military and economic aid to Israel. They did not discuss the issue of the Palestinians exiled in southern Lebanon. [3/16 NYT]

Mar. 22: The Knesset rejected a no-confidence motion sponsored by Likud, Tzomet, and the National Religious Party brought in response to heightened violence in Israel and the occupied territories. [3/23 FT, FBIS]

Mar. 24: The Knesset chose Ezer Weizmann over former parliamentary speaker Dov Shilansky by a vote of 66 to 53 to succeed Haim Herzog as president. The five-year term would begin on 13 May. [3/25 NYT]

Mar. 25: Benjamin Netanyahu was elected to head the Likud Party. He automatically became the party's prime ministerial candidate for national elections scheduled for 1996. Netanyahu won with 52.1 percent of the vote, beating David Levy with 26.3 percent, Benjamin Begin with 15.1 percent, and Moshe Katsav with 6.5 percent. [3/26 NYT]

Jordan

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Regional Affairs

1993

Jan. 16: The Interior Ministry licensed the Democratic Party for Progress in Jordan. It reportedly was the first "leftist" party to gain governmental recognition. [1/22 FBIS]

Jan. 17: The Interior Ministry licensed the Jordanian Communist Party. [1/22 FBIS]

Jan. 18: The Interior Ministry licensed the Baath Arab Socialist Party. [1/22 FBIS]

Jan. 24: The Interior Ministry granted a license to the Jordan's People's Democratic Party. The ministry had refused to license the party in December 1992 on the grounds that the party was linked to the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. [1/26 FBIS]

Jan. 27: The Interior Ministry licensed the Progress and Justice Party. [1/28 FBIS]
Jan. 31: The Interior Ministry licensed the Jordanian Socialist Democratic Party. [2/4 FBIS]
Feb. 8: A royal decree was issued establishing a commission to form a center in Amman for the study of human rights. Najib al-Rahman was to head the center.

The Interior Ministry licensed the Vigilance Party. [2/10 FBIS]
Feb. 9: The Interior Ministry licensed the Jordanian Democratic Popular Unity Party. [2/10 FBIS]
Feb. 17: Hundreds of students calling themselves the Islamic Trend at the University of Jordan demonstrated at the university to protest the Middle East visit of US secretary of state Warren Christopher. [2/18 FBIS]

The Interior Ministry licensed the Unionist Arab Democratic Party. [2/25 FBIS]
Mar. 10: Parliament rejected a bill introduced by Islamist members calling for the segregation of sexes in high schools and colleges. [3/11 WSJ]

Kuwait

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Petroleum Affairs, Regional Affairs, Iraq

1993

Jan. 26: A Madrid court refused an application by Grupo Torras, the Spanish holding company of the Kuwait Investment Office (KIO), to file a criminal suit against seven former KIO directors who allegedly diverted more than $800 million of Kuwaiti investments during their directorship. The court ruled that the suit did not give any indication that the accused had committed the crime. [1/27 FT]
Feb. 1: Muhammad al-Banai, the public prosecutor leading the investigations of two financial scandals at the KIO and the Kuwait Oil Tankers Company, issued an order banning media reports about the scandals without his written consent. He had not sought parliamentary approval for the order, which he hoped would prevent publicity that could damage his investigations. [2/2 WSJ, 2/4 FT]
Feb. 3: Parliament promised to study the legality of a prohibition of media reports about the KIO and the Kuwait Oil Tankers Company imposed the previous day by public prosecutor Muhammad al-Banai. Some parliamentarians denounced the ban as illegal and many journalists said they would defy it. [2/4 FT]
Feb. 8: Three members of parliament led by Ismail al-Shatte, the chairman of the Economic and Financial Committee, arrived in London to begin a two-week investigation into Kuwait's foreign investments and suspected fraud in the management of Kuwait's Spanish holdings. The team also planned to visit Madrid. [2/9 FT]
Feb. 19: The *Financial Times* reported that during the preceding week, the parliament passed a law compelling all state-owned companies and investment groups to render their accounts to the auditor general, who would then pass them on to a parliamentary review committee. The law also toughened penalties for the misuse of public funds, affecting in particular the KIO and its investments. [2/19 FT]
Mar. 31: The *Wall Street Journal* reported that the Kuwaiti government had frozen the assets of Abdullah al-Mulla and stopped sales of any real estate owned by his family. The government accused him of embezzling $3.3 million from a government-owned company and from his relatives. [3/31 WSJ]

Lebanon

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Israel

1993

Jan. 21: In an interview, Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri declared that Lebanese hostage-taking and plane hijacking were "something of the past" and urged the Clinton administration to lift a seven-year-old ban on travel to Lebanon and on Middle East Airlines flights into New York. [1/22 NYT]
Jan. 23: A roadside bomb exploded in the Israeli self-declared "security zone," killing an Israeli soldier and wounding two others who were patrolling the zone. In retaliation, Israeli forces shelled an area allegedly controlled by Hizballah 25 miles south of Beirut. [1/24 NYT]
Jan. 24: In Majd al-Jun, an Israeli tank shelled a house reportedly after armed men had been seen in the house. [1/25 FBIS]
Jan. 25: In Iqlim al-Tuffah, an Israeli tank shelled a home in which alleged armed "fundamentalists" were hiding.

In the Biqa, two gunmen killed Milhim Suayfan, a Progressive Socialist Party official. [1/25 FBIS]
Jan. 26: A Lebanese Army communiqué announced that the army had confiscated large supplies of heavy arms during overnight raids on warehouses and offices of the Popular Nasirite Organization in Sidon. The city observed a one-day strike to protest the raids. Mustafa Saad, leader of the organization, threatened to retaliate if the army did not leave the city. [1/27 NYT]
Jan. 29: Hizballah forces fired mortar shells on Israeli troops in the Sujud area of the Israeli self-declared "security zone." Israeli forces bombarded the Iqlim al-Tuffah area. [2/2 FBIS]
Feb. 1: The Phalangist Party Political Bureau voted to suspend the membership of Georgette Antun, Khalil Basil, Emile Farah, Farid Habib, Ibrahim Haddad, George Kassab, Alfred Madi, Adil Saqr, Joe Sarkis, and Samir Zaghrini, all of whom had formed the Salvation Committee, a group opposed to George Saadah and others' leadership of the party. [2/2 FBIS]
Feb. 13: The Israeli army and the South Lebanon Army (SLA) shelled targets north of the Israeli

self-declared "security zone" after a rocket fired by Hizballah hit an SLA military vehicle, killing one person near the SLA post of Alman in the Israeli self-declared "security zone." [2/16, 2/17 FBIS]

Feb. 15: Near Bint Jubayl in the Israeli self-declared "security zone," Israeli soldiers killed two people allegedly preparing to carry out an attack. [2/16 WP, 2/17 FBIS]

Feb. 16: Four hundred Lebanese Army soldiers replaced the Ghanaian battalion of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in the villages of Maarakah, Janata, and Yanuh in southern Lebanon.

Israeli and SLA forces bombarded villages in southern Lebanon north of the Israeli self-declared "security zone" after Hizballah forces attacked an SLA base. [2/17 NYT]

Feb. 17: At least two people died near Nabatiyya in a clash between Hizballah and Israeli forces that reportedly followed a Hizballah attack. [2/17 FBIS, 2/18 WP]

The Lebanese Army reportedly fired on Sujud, al-Zaffatah, and Bir Kallab in response to Israeli shelling of south Lebanese villages.

During a clash near the village of Shaqra in the Israeli self-declared "security zone," Israeli forces killed two gunmen said to be members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). [2/17 FBIS]

Feb. 22: Civilian Musa Qadduh was killed during Israeli bombardment of Yatar, Kafra, and Sribbin in southern Lebanon. A Nepalese UNIFIL soldier was killed at his post during the Yatar attack. [2/23 FBIS]

Feb. 23: UNIFIL submitted a complaint to the Israeli army and the SLA regarding the death of a Nepalese soldier the preceding day. [2/23 FBIS]

Mar. 3: In the Aramtah area in the Israeli self-declared "security zone," SLA soldiers opened fire on a group of people said to be associated with Hizballah, killing one person. [3/4 FBIS]

Mar. 6: In southern Beirut, a disagreement between Hizballah and Amal members escalated into a clash involving light weapons. [3/8 FBIS]

Gunmen shot and killed Ali Abd al-Rahman, chief of Fatah's training camp in Ayn al-Hilwa. Security officials ascribed the attack to Fatah–Revolutionary Council.

Two Israeli helicopters fired rockets at a building in Ayn al-Hilwa that was reportedly a Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command (PFLP-GC) base. [3/7 NYT]

Mar. 18: The government introduced a $10 billion reconstruction plan to rebuild the war-damaged country. [3/19 NYT]

Mar. 19: Walid Junblat was appointed minister of refugee affairs and Sulayman Franjiyah appointed minister of municipal affairs. [3/23 FBIS]

Apr. 1: Six Israeli gunboats and two helicopters bombarded two bases belonging to Islamic Jihad and the PFLP–GC located in the Nahr al-Barid refugee area. Palestinian sources claimed that Israeli troops had attempted to land at the bases but were repulsed by gunfire. [4/2 NYT]

In Beirut, Yunis Awwad, the Fatah chief for the Beirut region, was assassinated. Fatah officials blamed the Syrian government, charging that it sought the elimination of Fatah members to coerce the Palestinians to return to peace talks. [4/1 FBIS, 4/2 NYT]

Apr. 13: Near the village of Qantara in southern Lebanon, members of the Islamic Resistance detonated a bomb that killed three Israeli soldiers. Israeli forces retaliated with a missile and artillery attack on several villages in the south. Hizballah forces in the Qantara area also fired rockets into Israeli-controlled territory. [4/14 NYT, WP]

Apr. 15: In Sidon, gunmen shot and killed Faisal Saleh, a Fatah–Revolutionary Council member, and his nine-year-old daughter. Lebanese authorities claimed the attack was motivated by Abu Nidal's feud with Fatah. [4/16 NYT]

Libya

See also, Regional Affairs, Pakistan

1993

Feb. 5: Hossein Alikhani, a Cypriot businessman who claimed that he was illegally kidnapped by US customs agents in the Bahamas in October 1992, pleaded guilty to one count of violating a trade embargo against Libya in exchange for the dropping of twelve other counts against him. He also pledged to sue the US agents for illegal conduct. [2/6 WP]

Feb. 20: The Libyan government denied allegations made in the US media and intelligence reports the preceding week that it was constructing a chemical weapons plant near Tripoli. It invited any neutral international group to inspect the area in question. [2/21 NYT]

Feb. 23: According to a "Western ambassador," the Libyan government had begun to make plans for moving foreign embassies, as well as its foreign and oil ministries, to Ra's Lanuf, a semidesert region 400 miles southeast of Tripoli. [2/24 FBIS]

Morocco

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Regional Affairs

1993

Feb. 7: The four Democratic Bloc parties—al-Istiqlal, the Socialist Union of Popular Forces, Progress and Socialism, and the Organization of Democratic Action—announced that they were suspending their participation in Morocco's national election committee to protest its slowness and rescission of important rules. [2/8 FBIS]

Mar. 2: King Hassan pardoned 155 imprisoned criminals and reduced the sentences of 304 others in celebration of Throne Day. [3/3 FBIS]

Pakistan

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Afghanistan

1993

Jan. 22: In areas bordering Afghanistan and Iran, some 20 Iranian border guards and 3 Afghan drug smugglers were killed during a shootout. [1/25 FBIS]
Jan. 23: In Hyderbad and Latifabad, two bombs exploded, killing at least 15 people and wounding more than 100. [1/24 NYT, 1/25 FBIS]
Jan. 31: The government imposed a ban on the entry of US Peace Corps workers into Pakistan and asked all those working there to leave the country at the end of their designated tenures. [2/2 FBIS]
Feb. 2: Police arrested 40 members of the Pakistan Anjuman Sipah e Sahaba (PASS) Party, an anti-Shi'i Islamist group, to curtail the party's plans for a mass protest caravan from Multan to Islamabad to demand the establishment of laws punishing "sacrilege against holy men" and requiring religious affiliation to be included on Pakistani identity cards. [2/3 FBIS]
Feb. 5: Citizens in Pakistan, along with those in Jammu and Kashmir, observed a national strike to protest India's presence in Kashmir. [2/5 FBIS]
Feb. 6: Authorities released from custody Asif Ali Zardari, the husband of Pakistan People's Party (PPP) leader Benazir Bhutto. He had been detained for more than two years on charges that included extortion and kidnapping. Although authorities previously had acquitted him of nine of twelve charges and granted bail on the last three charges in late 1992, the government had invoked a law preventing his release. [2/7 NYT, WP]
Feb. 7: During a speech broadcast on Pakistani television and radio, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif announced an agrarian reform program in which landless peasants in Sindh would become owners of 16-acre tracts of land and in which the government would provide loans for the purchase of basic farming necessities. [2/9 FBIS]
Feb. 9: The US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) announced that it was conducting an international search for Mir Aimal Kansi, a 28-year-old Pakistani living in the United States who was charged with murder in the 25 January shooting deaths of two people outside the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) headquarters in Langley, Virginia. [2/10 NYT, WP]
Feb. 10: US authorities announced that Mir Aimal Kansi, the leading suspect in the 25 January CIA shooting, may have returned to Pakistan after the incident. Malik Zahoor, a spokesperson for the Pakistani embassy in Washington, said that the Pakistani government would honor any existing extradition agreement between the two countries in order to aid the investigation. US investigators disclosed that Kansi had the same last name and same home town, Quetta, as a Pakistani politician assassinated in 1984, and suspected that Kansi's action might have been politically motivated. [2/11 WP]
Feb. 11: The Pakistani government began a nationwide search for Mir Aimal Kansi and promised to return him to the United States for trial. [2/12 NYT, WP]

The *Washington Post* reported that the Pakistani government had refused an informal US request to extradite Agha Hasan Abedi, the founder of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), and Ghaith Pharaoun, a Saudi businessman who, according to US officials, was BCCI's front man. [2/11 WP]
Feb. 25: In Virginia, prosecuting attorney Robert Horan disclosed during a hearing that Zahed Ahmad Mir, roommate of Mir Aimal Kansi, had said that he knew Kansi was troubled by the situation of the Muslims in Bosnia and had heard Kansi threaten to "make a big statement" by attacking the White House, CIA, or Israeli embassy. [2/26 WP]
Feb. 28: Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif claimed in a news conference that in order for the parliamentary system to be strengthened, the eighth constitutional amendment should be repealed. The amendment endows the president with the power to dissolve parliament and appoint senior judicial and military officers. [3/12 FBIS]
Mar. 1: The *Financial Times* reported that Pakistan had discovered 80 billion tons of coal reserves in Sindh. [3/1 FT]
Mar. 21: As a goodwill gesture in celebration of Id al-Fitr, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Sindh chief minister Syed Muzaffar Hussain Shah decided to drop charges against 835 people arrested during a "clean-up operation" in Sindh. [3/22 FBIS]
Mar. 27: Leaders of the Pakistan Muslim League nominated Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif as its candidate for the league's presidency. [3/29 FBIS]
Mar. 28: Anwar Saifullah, the minister for environment and son-in-law of President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, and Hamid Nasir Chath, minister for planning and development, resigned from their posts to protest the nomination of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif as candidate for the presidency of the Pakistan Muslim League, condemning the "indecent haste" of the nomination. The resignations were related to an ongoing dispute within the government over the powers of the prime minister. [3/29 FBIS]

The *New York Times* reported that during the preceding two days, Pakistani police had arrested five Libyans after finding guns, ammunition, and false passports in their vehicle. In a separate incident, police arrested another Libyan after he threw a grenade at police conducting a raid of his home. [3/29 NYT]

Mar. 31: Gulsher Khan, minister of state for *zakat*, resigned because of his open support of President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, and his unwillingness to follow an order issued by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to government ministers not to discuss the presidential election. [4/1 FT]

Apr. 1: Interior Minister Shujaat Hussain announced a government crackdown on Islamist groups in Pakistan, declaring that authorities would expel foreigners not employed by recognized organizations. [4/2 WP]

Apr. 5: Pakistani forces arrested Mumtaz Hussain Rathore, leader of the Kashmiri branch of the PPP, and 102 followers as they threatened to charge a police barricade during the second day of a march near the edge of Indian-controlled Kashmir. The march was to show support for the Kashmiri independence movement. [4/6 FT]

Apr. 6: Sardar Asif Ahmad Ali, minister of state for economic affairs, resigned, accusing Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of incompetence in economic and foreign affairs. [4/7 FT]

Apr. 10: Since the beginning of a crackdown on illegal aliens in the North West Frontier Province four days prior, the government had arrested at least 200 "Arabs" and ordered the expulsion of 98 others on charges ranging from illegal residence in Pakistan to complicity in international terrorism. [4/12 FBIS]

Apr. 14: President Ishaq Khan issued a warning to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to solve the political strife destabilizing the government. [4/15 FT]

Apr. 15: The *Financial Times* reported that during the preceding week, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, in a conciliatory gesture toward President Ishaq Khan, had renominated him for a second term. [4/15 FT]

Saudi Arabia

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Petroleum Affairs, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan

1993

Jan. 22: In an attempt to counteract legal proceedings filed against him by the liquidators of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), Khalid bin Mahfouz and his lawyers filed papers in court asserting that the liquidator's allegations were false and Mahfouz's case had been improperly handled by the Saudi judicial system. Mahfouz, the head of the National Commercial Bank of Saudi Arabia and a former BCCI director and shareholder, had been charged in 1992 of fraud and racketeering. [1/25 WP, WSJ]

Feb. 15: Khalid Maeena left his position as editor of the Saudi English-language *Arab News* following publication of a report about a *Wall Street Journal* interview with Shaykh Umar Abd al-Rahman, spiritual leader of Egypt's Islamic Group, in which Rahman criticized Egyptian president Husni Mubarak. While some sources said Maeena left for health reasons, others claimed that the Saudi government had pressured him to resign because of its embarrassment over the article. [2/16 WP]

Mar. 16: The *Financial Times* reported that according to Islamic Jihad leader Asad Bayyud al-Tamimi, Saudi authorities had arrested Fayiz al-Aswad, leader of the Islamic Jihad Movement for the Liberation of Palestine, and three of his aides in Jiddah the preceding week. [3/16 FT]

Sudan

See also, Regional Affairs

1993

Jan. 19: Lt. Gen. Umar Hasan al-Bashir and the Council of Ministers issued a series of decrees that abolished the ministries of construction, public works and utilities, welfare and social development, and coordination of states' affairs, and established a Ministry of Labor and Administrative Reforms and a Ministry of Economic Planning and Investment. New ministers were also announced:

Dominic Kassiano Bakhit, *Labor and Administrative Reform*
Salah al-Din Muhammad Ahmad Karrar, *Energy and Mining*
Abd al-Rahim Muhammad Hussein, *Interior*
Abd al-Aziz Shiddu, *Justice; Attorney General*
Uthman Abd al-Qadir Abd al-Latif, *Transport, Communications, and Tourism*
Galwak Deng Garang, *Health*
Ali al-Haj Muhammad, *Economic Planning and Investment* [1/19 FBIS]

Jan. 23: The Nasir faction of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) reported that in Kajo-Kaji fighting had broken out within the SPLA's Torit faction between those members loyal to and those opposed to SPLA leader John Garang. Garang's spokesperson denied the report. [1/25 FBIS]

Jan. 28: Egyptian military officials completed a week-long visit to the Hala'ib region during which they issued Egyptian birth certificates and identity cards to members of the Ababidah and Bashariyya tribes to further Egyptian claims to the disputed area. [1/29 FBIS]

Intelligence service forces stormed the Khartoum office of *al-Sharq al-Awsat* and arrested correspondent Muhammad Abd al-Sayyid. [2/4 FBIS]

Jan. 29: During a press interview, a senior Sudanese official threatened that Sudan would respond "violently" to the "Egyptianization" of the Ababidah and Bashariyya tribes residing in the Hala'ib region and claimed that the Sudanese government viewed the issuance of Egyptian identity cards and birth certificates to the tribes as a sign of Egypt's intention to annex the disputed area. [2/1 FBIS]

Jan. 31: Acting Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Qutbi al-Mahdi announced that the Sudanese government no longer demanded Egyptian withdrawal from the Hala'ib area as a pretext for a meeting of the Joint Egyptian-Sudanese Committee. [2/3 FBIS]

Feb. 1: Al-Mahbub Abd al-Salam al-Mahbub, director of the Sudanese Foreign Media Department, informed *al-Sharq al-Awsat* officials that the government was closing the paper's Khartoum office on the grounds that the publication had "fabricated lies and pure propaganda" about the Sudanese government. [2/4 FBIS]

Feb. 3: In al-Qadarif in Kassala Province, government forces opened fire on a group demonstrating against the rising prices of basic necessities. At least one person was killed.

Hasaballah al-Kafrawi, the Egyptian minister of housing, utilities, and new urban communities, declared the establishment of a comprehensive development plan for the area encompassing Hala'ib, Abu Ramad, and Shalatayn that would create jobs for the Bashariyya and Ababidah tribes. The plan encouraged development of the fishing industry and local government services, and the construction of homes, schools, and water desalination plants. [2/4 FBIS]

Feb. 6: The state-owned weekly *Darfur al-Jadidah* reported that Egypt had begun to prospect for manganese in the disputed Hala'ib region. [2/10 FBIS]

Feb. 10: Pope John Paul II arrived in Khartoum where, during several speeches to political and religious leaders and citizens, he argued that "rigorous respect for the right to religious freedom is a major source and foundation of peaceful coexistence." He also spoke privately with Lt. Gen. al-Bashir. [2/11 NYT]

Feb. 11: In Wad Madani and al-Qadarif, demonstrations were held to protest the high cost of living and deteriorating living standards. Police opened fire on the protestors, leaving one person dead and about forty injured. [2/12 FBIS]

Feb. 13: Lt. Gen. al-Bashir removed Ali Ahmad Sahlul from his post as foreign minister and replaced him with Hussein Sulayman Abu Salih. [2/16 FBIS]

Feb. 26: At the end of a four-day meeting of the Joint Egyptian-Sudanese Committee, the two sides announced that they had agreed to hold another round of talks at a yet undecided date. [2/26 FBIS]

Mar. 3: The government accused Egypt of reinforcing its troops in the Wadi Halfa area of the disputed Hala'ib region. [3/9 FBIS]

Mar. 9: The Ministry of Higher Education revoked the license of Cairo University's Khartoum branch. Lt. Gen. al-Bashir decreed that the branch be renamed the University of the Two Niles and appointed the former president of Sudan's al-Fatih University to head the renamed school. [3/10 FBIS]

Mar. 10: In response to reports of the possible use of Port Sudan by Iranian ships, Egyptian president Husni Mubarak warned the Sudanese government that if it allowed the ships to use the port, Egypt would attack immediately. [3/12 FBIS]

Mar. 11: The Egyptian Foreign Ministry called upon Sudan's ambassador in Cairo to lodge a formal protest over Sudan's decision to take over Cairo University's Khartoum branch. The ministry also recalled all Egyptian professors and administrators back to Egypt. [3/11 FBIS]

Mar. 14: Paul Reth Kwang, governor of the Bentin province, said that more than 300 SPLA troops had surrendered to the government. [3/15 FBIS]

Mar. 15: Iranian diplomatic sources said that the Sudanese government had made an appeal for emergency aid to combat "an imminent US aggression." The Iranian navy would not confirm Egyptian reports that one or more Iranian battleships had anchored at Port Sudan. [3/18 FBIS]

Mar. 18: Foreign Minister Hussein Sulayman Abu Salih denied Egyptian allegations that Iranian ships had anchored at Port Sudan.

In a communiqué, SPLA leader Garang announced a unilateral cease-fire to begin that day. [3/19 FBIS]

Mar. 21: In Khartoum, representatives of the government and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) signed an agreement authorizing the ICRC to resume delivery of aid to the south following a year-long suspension of the authorization. [3/22 FBIS]

Mar. 27: According to UN sources, fighting erupted for control of Kongor between an SPLA breakaway faction led by Riak Machar and forces loyal to John Garang. [3/29 FBIS]

Apr. 5: The SPLA factions led by William Nyon Bany, Kerubino Kuanyin Bol, and Riak Machar agreed to a cease-fire and united under Machar's command. [4/6 FBIS]

Syria

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Regional Affairs, Lebanon

Turkey

See also, Central Asia, Regional Affairs, Afghanistan, Iraq

1993

Jan. 24: In Ankara, Ugur Mumcu, 50, was killed when a bomb planted in his car exploded. Mumcu was a prominent columnist for *Cumhuriyet*. The Islamic Salvation and the Islamic Great East Raiders Front claimed responsibility. [1/25 WP, FT, 1/27 NYT]

The Nationalist Labor Party took the name of the previously dissolved Nationalist Action Party. [1/29 FBIS]

Jan. 27: In Ankara, more than 200,000 people marched in the funeral of journalist Ugur Mumcu, killed 24 January. [1/28 NYT]

Jan. 29: Reports in the *Turkish Daily News* and *al-Hayat* (London) implicated Iran in the death of journalist Ugur Mumcu. [2/10, 2/11 FBIS]

The Iranian embassy in Turkey issued a statement disclaiming allegations made in the Turkish press that groups associated with the Iranian government had a hand in the death of Mumcu. [2/11 FBIS]

The Great Unity Party was established. [2/8 FBIS]

Jan. 30: A statement issued after a meeting between Turkish and EC officials in Brussels declared that all EC countries—except Britain, Denmark, and Ireland—would issue "joint visas" to Turkish citizens and would allow Turks employed in those countries to travel without visas. [2/2 FBIS]

Jan. 31: Turkish Radio and Television (TRT) reported that the Interior Ministry had sent a message to the nation's governors ordering all private radio and television transmissions to be suspended because the government had given the radio and television monopoly to the TRT network. [2/3 FBIS]

Feb. 2: The Interior Ministry issued a directive permitting all radio and television stations broadcasting into Turkey from abroad to continue their transmissions. [2/4 FBIS]

Feb. 6: Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin met with Iranian foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati during an Economic Cooperation Organization meeting in Pakistan to give him documents concerning recent murders in Turkey and to discuss the incidents with him. [2/11 FBIS]

Feb. 9: Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel said that members of Islamic Action, the group claiming responsibility for the death of journalist Ugur Mumcu and others, had been trained in Iran and traveled to Turkey frequently. [2/10 FBIS]

Feb. 22: Turkish authorities decided to extend the state of emergency in Batman, Bingol, Diyarbakir, Hakkari, Mardin, Siirt, Sirnak, Tunceli, and Van, to lift the state of emergency in Elazig, and to impose a state of emergency in Bitlis, effective 19 March. [2/23 FBIS]

Mar. 8: The Turkish army continued a large-scale air and ground attack on Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) bases near the Armenian border in an apparent attempt to thwart Kurdish rebel attacks believed to be planned for the 21 March new year's festival of Now Ruz. Government reports claimed that 50 Kurds had died in five days of attacks. [3/9 FT]

Mar. 15: Foreign Minister Cetin said that in spite of a new PKK willingness to negotiate, the group was a "terror organization" and deserved no recognition through negotiations with the government. [3/16 FBIS]

Mar. 17: PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan declared a 25-day cease-fire to begin 20 March, saying that he wanted to end the Kurds' nine-year separatist struggle. He added that the PKK's 10,000 fighters would not disarm until a peace accord was reached with the government. [3/18 WP]

Mar. 21: During a Kurdish demonstration in Adana on Now Ruz, police shot and killed a 15-year-old boy and arrested 200 people. [3/22, 3/23 FT]

Apr. 3: In Ankara, Jalal Talabani, leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, met with President Turgut Ozal to relay information from the PKK and to discuss matters relating to the party. [4/5 FBIS]

UAE

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Regional Affairs

Yemen

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict

1993

Jan. 24: Members of the Hada tribe kidnapped Mike Schmitz, a Canadian businessman, and took him to the village of Zarajah, demanding that authorities turn over two Yemeni army officers whom the tribe accused of murdering a tribal member. [2/8 FT, FBIS]

Feb. 3: Radio Monte Carlo reported that Rashid al-Umayshi, believed to head the Yemeni Islamic Jihad movement, was killed the preceding day during a clash with the army in Lahij. [2/3 FBIS]

Feb. 6: Koichiro Katsurai, a Japanese irrigation expert, escaped from a Dhinn region tribe that had kidnapped him four days before and had threatened to hold him until the Yemeni government met their demand to include their region in an irrigation project with which Katsurai was involved. [2/8, 2/9 FBIS]

Feb. 8: The *Financial Times* reported that Oil Minister Salih Abu Bakr bin Hussainoun had encouraged the Hunt Oil Company to shut down operations for the safety of its foreign staff, following a series of assaults on expatriates and foreigners by Yemeni tribes. [2/8 FT]

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EA3

Book Reviews

October Reprise: A Critical Review of the "October Surprise" Scenario and Its Critics

Review Article by Joe Stork

October Surprise: America's Hostages in Iran and the Election of Ronald Reagan, by Gary Sick. New York: Times Books, 1991. 228 pages. Notes to p. 270. Index to p. 277. $23.00.
The "October Surprise" Allegations and the Circumstances Surrounding the Release of the American Hostages Held in Iran: Report of the Special Counsel to Senator Terry Sanford and Senator James M. Jeffords of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, November 19, 1992. vii + 121 pages. Appends. to p. 310. n.p. paper.
Joint Report of the Task Force to Investigate Certain Allegations Concerning the Holding of American Hostages by Iran in 1980, Lee H. Hamilton, Chairman, Henry J. Hyde, Ranking Republican Member, United States House of Representatives. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, January 3, 1993. xiii + 249 pages. Append. to p. 968. n.p. paper.

October Surprise is no ordinary book. Gary Sick, who served in the Carter administration as the National Security Council (NSC) staff person responsible for Iran, charges that William Casey and other key persons in the Reagan-Bush campaign of 1980 collaborated with Iranian and Israeli officials and entrepreneurs, and with persons in the Carter administration national security apparatus, to subvert Carter's efforts to negotiate the release of 52 US hostages held in Iran and "to concoct an alternative and private foreign policy" (p. 12). The aim was to prevent Carter from achieving a successful resolution of the hostage crisis and using this achievement to win the November 1980 presidential election. The perpetrators, Sick charges, "were engaged in nothing less than a political coup" (p. 12).

October Surprise itself amounts to an overt act of political intervention. Its production paralleled a Public Broadcast System (PBS) *Frontline* investigation of the same events, and Sick's efforts led, as they were intended, to congressional staff investigations of the charges. Both the Senate and House "October surprise" task forces have now issued their reports, making it no longer possible to assess Sick's book as a self-contained entity.

Joe Stork is the editor of Middle East Report *in Washington, DC.*

October Surprise is an eminently readable brief for the case against Casey and his cohorts. Sick's intimate involvement in Iran policy under Carter is used to good account. Persons familiar with the basic outline of the thesis, and who have followed the controversy through the press, will find here an artfully constructed narrative, rich in detail. Sick reconstructs the arms-seeking agenda of the new revolutionary government in Tehran, for instance, by recounting the experience of hostage Charles Wesley Scott—a US Army colonel who had been responsible for overseeing US-Iranian military supply relations—with Iranian leaders who visited him in captivity (pp. 37–43). Sick's account draws not only on the investigation he and others conducted into the trans-Atlantic itineraries of Casey in the summer of 1980, but also on the author's familiarity with the negotiations and attempted negotiations conducted by the Carter administration over the course of that year. A case in point is whether the secret September 1980 negotiations between Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Sadeqh Tabatabai may have been rendered unproductive by the fact that more favorable terms had already been broached by the Republican campaign (pp. 94–102). Even more intriguing was Tehran's sudden silence between October 15 and 20, 1980, and Prime Minister Mohammad Raja'i's unexpected and categorical insistence as of October 21 that the hostages would not be released under Carter's tenure (pp. 156–73). In his earlier book, *All Fall Down*, Sick plausibly ascribed this to factional struggles within the revolutionary regime.[1] *October Surprise* makes the case for adding the element of factional power politics in the United States as well.

The special counsel's report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee concluded that there is "not sufficient credible evidence" to support the key components of the "October surprise" thesis (p. 114). The House report refers more strenuously to "wholly insufficient credible evidence" (p. 7). Critics of the "October surprise" thesis quickly declared the matter definitively closed. The more meanspirited among them have charged that Sick pursued the story for personal financial gain—book sales and even film rights. One of these, Steven Emerson, has urged that Sick's earnings be attached to help defray the $1.35 million cost of the House investigation and to dissuade others from bringing "false charges to Congress."[2]

The Senate and House reports differ from one another, and are not particularly redundant. The Senate investigation cost a mere $75,000—Senator Jesse Helms, the ranking minority member of the Foreign Relations Committee, refused to authorize foreign travel. The Senate investigation also had no independent subpoena power, and budget and staffing constraints forced it to rely on other federal agencies to search their respective files for pertinent documents.

DAMAGE DONE

Because the House task force operated under none of these constraints, one would expect its report to provide the more definitive verdict. The House report declares itself to be the last word on the "October surprise," and recommends that perjury charges be considered against some unnamed witnesses.

The report in fact deals devastating blows to the thesis and scenario advanced by Sick. At the same time, it proclaims to have done much more than this. If the particular scenario posited by Sick now appears distinctly less plausible, the same cannot be said for the general propositions that Casey engaged in dealings with Iranians in the months leading up to the US elections, that US government officials colluded with the Republican campaign in its efforts to prevent the Carter administration from gaining any political advantage from attempts to release the hostages, and that the United States colluded with Israel over arms deliveries to Iran in this period.

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[1] *All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter with Iran* (New York: Random House, 1985).

[2] "No October Surprise," in *Wall Street Journal*, January 14, 1993.

The key element in the "October surprise" thesis is that an understanding was reached between the Reagan-Bush campaign and the clerical leadership in Tehran, whereby the US hostages would not be released prior to the US presidential election. In return, the new Republican administration would allow the shipment of US military spare parts and equipment to Iran, through Israel. Such an understanding would, on the face of it, require the participation of someone on the US side with the authority of Casey. Sick's book lays out what has come to be the dominant "October surprise" scenario, which insists that such meetings occurred in Madrid in late July and early August of 1980, and in Paris that October.

Central to Sick's account is the presence of a purported participant in the Madrid meetings, Jamshid Hashemi, an Iranian arms dealer and political fixer. The key middleman was Jamshid's brother Cyrus, an arms dealer and financier who died in somewhat mysterious circumstances in 1986 while under US indictment for violating the embargo on arms sales to Iran. Both brothers had been known to Sick at the time of the hostage crisis. Indeed, the Senate report reveals that the CIA had paid Cyrus Hashemi $500,000 in January 1980 for an unspecified "sensitive covert operation in Iran" (Senate, p. 39). Neither enjoyed a reputation for unblemished integrity. Sick attempts to corroborate Jamshid's account with the testimony of others who claimed to be present or to have independent knowledge of the meetings, most of whom were themselves operating in the semiclandestine world of intelligence operations and arms dealing.

The exception was Admiral Ahmed Madani, a minister of defense and presidential candidate in the first years of the Islamic republic. Sick spoke with Madani during his investigation and writes that Madani "was aware of the Hashemis' contacts with William Casey starting in early 1980 and of the Madrid meetings" (p. 85). In sworn depositions to the House task force, however, Madani and two other persons whose corroboration Sick cites—Pakistani arms dealer Arif Durrani and contract pilot Henrich Rupp—all deny independent knowledge of these events (House, pp. 95–7).

The damage done by these recantations to Sick's case is magnified by inconsistent testimony from Jamshid Hashemi himself. The evidence supports Jamshid's contention that he was in Madrid at the time of the meetings there, but the task force makes a plausible case that he was in fact trying to broker Iraqi financial support for Madani's presidential candidacy (House, pp. 100–2).

A second crucial piece of the task force investigation is even more damaging to Sick's scenario. The now deceased Cyrus Hashemi was, through much of 1980, under FBI surveillance for suspected arms smuggling to Iran. The report asserts that task force investigators reviewed more than 21,000 tapped phone conversations spanning nearly 1,800 hours, and found "not a single indication" that Casey had contact with either Hashemi brother, or that any of them had any contact with Mehdi or Hasan Karrubi, the alleged Iranian interlocutors in Madrid (House, p. 123).

In this reviewer's opinion, the recantations and absence of probative references in the surveillance tapes of Cyrus Hashemi make one conclusion inescapable: there is no proof that the Madrid and Paris meetings occurred as alleged. Nor is there any hard evidence that the Republican campaign made a deal with leading Iranians to delay the release of the hostages in return for delivery of US weapons and military spares. This is the reasonable conclusion of the Senate special counsel report.

The House task force report, however, attempts to prove that any such dealings by Casey could not have occurred. The evidence it has assembled in fact suggests the opposite. In attempting to prove this negative, moreover, the task force adopts an exceedingly protective stance toward the third state under investigation, Israel, and consistently displays a disturbing deference toward the political authority that it is supposed to be investigating. Here the task force's approach resembles the congressional investigations of the Iran-Contra affair, which involved the same three governments—Iran, Israel, and the United States—and some of the same *dramatis personae*, including task force chair Lee H. Hamilton (D-Indiana). Representative Hamilton seems to have made a specialty of insuring that such inquiries strictly adhere to a "smoking gun" standard as a way of deflecting attention from high level US government responsibility for policies steeped in deceit. The task force bends so far over backward to exonerate Casey and others, and to minimize the secret arms dealings of the United States and Israel, as to call its own integrity into question.

WILLIAM CASEY'S WHEREABOUTS

By all accounts Casey was at Bohemian Grove—an exclusive rich male-only encampment outside of San Francisco—either on the weekend of July 25–27 or August 1–3, 1980. He made a scheduled appearance at a conference in London late on Monday, July 28. If Casey was at Bohemian Grove from July 25 to July 27, a trip to Madrid in this period would appear quite implausible. If Casey's weekend at Bohemian Grove was in August, however, a two-day meeting in Madrid prior to London becomes a distinct possibility. The Senate report judiciously if inelegantly concludes that the evidence on this point "is essentially in equipoise" (Senate, p. 62). The House task force boldly insists that Casey was at Bohemian Grove on the July dates, but to do so the investigators have to go against the circumstantial evidence they have assembled, which places him there in August. These include an August 3 diary entry of another Bohemian Grove attendee and an August 1 Casey charge on the club's books; Casey's presence in Washington on July 25 but in Los Angeles on August 1, which corresponds to the travel logistics (if not the dates) recalled by Casey's host at Bohemian Grove, Darrell Trent; and a Casey ticket on Eastern Airlines' Washington-New York shuttle on Friday, July 25. The House report simply notes this last item in a freestanding paragraph, with no comment or explanation as to the complications this poses for its favored scenario. In the place of this circumstantial but documentary evidence, the task force offers the uncorroborated and for the most part vague recollections of Trent and two other guests. These then assume "the great weight of evidence" (pp. 85–8).

The task force, in attaching importance to appointments posted in available Casey calendars and notes, also ignores the circumstantial testimony to the Senate special counsel of Reagan campaign aide Edwin Meese. Casey's hectic pace, Meese said, made firm appointments impossible. Meese further testified that Casey had "kept a little satchel . . . so that he could go anywhere" (Senate, pp. 58–9). The task force posits that Casey's invitation to the London conference on July 28–29 was long standing, and was thus not a sudden ruse to go to Europe, but chooses not to mention that his decision on whether or not to go was in fact a last-minute one. The Senate report notes that "Casey handled the arrangements himself (not the usual procedure) and apparently informed very few people of the fact that he was going to England. This behavior was, according to his secretary, somewhat out of character for Casey" (p. 63).

The task force's theory against Casey's presence at a Madrid meeting in late July is then blithely used to dismiss the possibility of a second meeting a few weeks later. Investigators are unable to ascertain Casey's whereabouts on August 9 or the weekend of August 16–17, but

> Casey's attendance at meetings in Madrid on those dates would make sense in the context of the allegations only if such meetings were the alleged follow-up meetings to the first round of alleged meetings in Madrid. Given the Task Force's conclusion that there

is no credible evidence that the first round of meetings took place, there is no credible basis to believe that follow-up meetings occurred (House, p. 103).

This conclusion is offered despite the fact that, whereas there is circumstantial evidence from Cyrus Hashemi's home phone logs that he was not abroad July 26–27, there is no evidence whatsoever of Cyrus's whereabouts on August 16–17 (p. 92).

The sleight-of-hand by which Casey becomes ineligible for the Madrid meetings is made even more suspect by the evidence that neither investigation was able to locate—Casey's passport covering the 1980 period; and the pages from his 1980 calendar for July 26–27, October 21 and 29, November 3–11, and November 13. Both reports note that Casey's widow, daughter, and son-in-law were distinctly uncooperative in the efforts to locate these documents. CIA staff reported that they had turned over the deceased director's expired passports to Mrs. Casey in 1987. On the basis of the accounts of the Casey family's behavior contained in these documents, the reader can be excused for concluding that they were acting as if they had something to hide (House pp. 20–3, 27; Senate, pp. 13–15). In addition, it seems that CIA staff, in the summer of 1991, reviewed a box of Casey's documents stored there and sent a file marked "WJC Personal, January 1980 to December 1980" to Mrs. Casey—a delivery that totalled 624 pages. Mrs. Casey subsequently sent 45 pages to Representative Henry Hyde. The task force writes that it "has reviewed and identified approximately 240 pages that relate to the Iranian hostages from among those provided to the Casey family." It is not clear if the task force or the FBI had access to the complete file or whether these pages were selected for review by the Casey family (House, p. 22). Finally, Casey had kept a file marked "Hostages," which the family finally provided to investigators, but which almost certainly did not contain pages Casey himself had removed in late February 1984 in the course of the congressional investigation of the theft of the Carter debate briefing book during the 1980 campaign (pp. 21–2).

Another instance of missing documents and a similar pattern of family obstruction concerns calendars, passport, and notebook belonging to the late John Shaheen, a close personal friend of Casey and a business partner of Cyrus Hashemi at the time in question (House pp. 23–4; Senate, p. 15). A number of persons claiming to have knowledge of the "October surprise" events identify Shaheen as the person who brought Casey and Hashemi together (pp. 119–23).[3]

PROTECTIVE READINGS

Despite the strength of the case against Sick based on Madani's recantation and the lack of evidence in the surveillance of Cyrus Hashemi, the task force repeatedly indulges in argumentation so specious as to raise questions about the validity of the entire report. For instance, in arguing that Mehdi Karrubi could not have represented Khomeini and Iran's radical clerical faction in Madrid, the task force cites CIA Iran expert George Cave's opinion that "it was his recollection that Mehdi Karrubi did not travel outside Iran for the first time until at least 1982" (House, p. 93). It cites as "circumstantial evidence" the fact that the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) carried no reports of such a Karrubi visit—as if it would have been broadcast on Radio Tehran! Completely ignored is Sick's point that

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[3] Shaheen's interest in resolving the hostage crisis was manifest—an oil refinery he had constructed in Newfoundland was in bankruptcy, and Cyrus Hashemi was a potential broker of new loans and Iranian crude oil. Shaheen was subsequently a bridge between Casey and Cyrus Hashemi in 1984, in the initial stages of what would become known as the Iran-Contra affair, a point that is not made in these reports. See Theodore Draper, *A Very Thin Line* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), pp. 134–5.

Madrid was the site for these meetings precisely because there were direct Iran Air flights from Tehran and because Spain did not require visas of visiting Iranians (pp. 81–2). On the question of whether Donald Gregg—then one of Sick's colleagues on the National Security Council—attended any of the alleged meetings with the Iranians, the task force is content to assure readers that "Gregg gave credible sworn testimony that he has never met Cyrus or Jamshid Hashemi, and Mrs. Gregg testified that her husband has never mentioned the names of Cyrus or Jamshid Hashemi to her" (p. 93). That their subsequent involvement in the Iran-Contra affair raised no questions about Cave's judgment or Gregg's veracity is secondary to the transparent inadequacy of their testimony to the task force.

A second task force technique is simply to dismiss evidence inconvenient to its thesis. The various accounts of an alleged meeting in Paris in October 1980 to conclude Casey's supposed deal with the Iranians are riddled with enough inconsistencies and improbabilities as to cast reasonable doubt on the "October surprise" thesis. The House report, though, is a political document, intended to demolish the very idea that high US officials might engage in such nefarious behavior. Consider how the task force deals with testimony relating to the contention of Sick and others that Alexandre de Marenches—the head of French intelligence at the time, and a close friend of Casey from World War II—provided assistance and cover for just such a meeting. US journalist David Andelman, de Marenches's biographer, told investigators that, during the course of 90 hours of interviews, de Marenches had acknowledged this role, but insisted that this acknowledgement be off the record and not included in Andelman's book. The task force dismisses Andelman's statement as "cryptic" and rather preposterously presumes that de Marenches' well-known ego compelled him to make such a statement as proof of his close ties with Casey (House, pp. 167–8). Casey's acknowledged meeting with de Marenches during a visit to Paris in early July—at the same time when Cyrus Hashemi was arranging meetings with Iranians in Madrid for the Carter administration—is deemed not worthy of notation.[4]

The third technique deployed by the task force is to discredit those corroborators who did not recant, and who repeated their claims to the task force, as "totally lacking in credibility." Sick's citation of arms dealer Richard Babyan is poorly sourced (pp. 85–6, 251), and many of the other corroborators spin fantastic tales of meetings and conspiracies that are enough to undermine any particular allegation. At some point, moreover, it is clear that those alleging the various versions of an "October surprise" began feeding off of one another.[5]

Here the task force reserves some of its strongest invective for Ari Ben-Menashe, a former Israeli intelligence operative and arms dealer. Every journalist or investigator who has had any contact with Ben-Menashe acknowledges that he is exceedingly capable of telling lies and tall tales, especially ones that place himself at the heart of a sensitive and far-reaching covert operation on the scale of an "October surprise." He is, moreover, the source of unique segments of the "October surprise" hypothesis, such as a trip to Iran early in 1980 by Robert McFarlane, then an aide to Senator John Tower on the Senate Armed Services Committee. But the task force, in savaging Ben-Menashe's credibility, does serious damage to its own.

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4. The July 2 Madrid meeting is mentioned by Sick, pp. 80–1, 111, and 249–50. Questions surrounding the meeting, involving Cyrus Hashemi; Reza Passindideh, a nephew of Ayatollah Khomeini; and Stanley Pottinger, Cyrus' lawyer and a former Justice Department official; are noted in Senate, p. 112.

5. Sick makes the point several times that one of the factors that eventually persuaded him of the plausibility of an "October surprise" was the cumulative coherence of different sources, most of whom "did not know one another" (p. 222). Frank Snepp, a former CIA officer and now an investigative journalist, initially advanced the "October surprise" thesis and even testified at the perjury trial of an early "source," Richard Brenneke. Snepp later discovered Brenneke was lying, at least about the latter's own direct knowledge of the meetings, and has made the most extensive case for the proposition that most of the sources did in fact have some measure of contact with one another. See his "October Surmise," in *Village Voice*, February 25, 1992, pp. 29–41.

"Aside from early biographical details," writes the task force, "virtually everything Ben-Menashe told the Task Force has been found to be false" (House, p. 97). The task force asserts it "has investigated Ben-Menashe's claims about his own background and his purported participation in alleged Israeli intelligence operations involving Iran and the United States" (p. 97). Israel, however, refused to allow the task force to conduct an independent investigation, and instead insisted on carrying out its own investigation and relaying the results to the task force (pp. 25–6). It is on the basis of documents, interviews, and conclusions relayed by the Israeli government that readers are assured of Ben-Menashe's "relative insignificance and low levels of classification" (p. 97). On the same basis readers are asked to believe former top Israeli intelligence officers, such as David Kimche and Rafael Eitan, that they never "met, knew, or heard of Ben-Menashe until he began making his allegations in the American media" (p. 98).

The House report never once alludes to Israel's possible self-interest in seeing such a conclusion enter the history books. Ben-Menashe's dubious bonafides have also been used to discredit Seymour Hersh's *The Samson Option*, an account of Israel's acquisition of nuclear weapons.[6] In his epilogue to the paperback edition of *The Samson Option*, Hersh cites an investigation by the Israeli newspaper *Davar* into Ben-Menashe's status with Israeli intelligence, which found that, on this point at least, Ben-Menashe was telling the truth. The task force and its Israeli appendage, however, somehow felt no need to include mention of the *Davar* inquiry.[7] Neither does the report bother to follow up the assertion of Moshe Hebroni, chief-of-staff of Israeli military intelligence, that "Ben-Menashe served directly under me . . . he had access to very, very sensitive material."[8] In fact, Ben-Menashe was a source for a *Time* magazine investigation of Israeli sales of US arms to Iran beginning in 1980. The story was never published, but the *Time* correspondent, Rajai Samghabadi, testified at Ben-Menashe's arms smuggling trial in 1989 that "Mr. Ben-Menashe consistently tried to get a story in print purporting, claiming, saying that as of 1980 there was a huge conspiracy between the United States government and Israel to supply Iran with billions of dollars in weapons off the books, without legal channels . . . and it was still continuing . . . "[9] The fact that Ben-Menashe was making allegations back in 1986 that subsequently proved true does not, of course, make his "October surprise" claims true, but it should lead to some pause in dismissing him as "totally lacking in credibility."

DAMAGE CONTROL

An unstated aspect of the task force's agenda, it seems, was to minimize and sanitize the Israeli arms connection, and, by implication, the Israeli role in helping to promote the seamless set of arms-dealing scams that characterized US-Israeli-Iranian relations from 1980 at least through the Iran-Contra episodes. One of the virtues of Sick's book is that it provides an extensive context for understanding the Israeli-Iranian connection, and the Israeli interest in maintaining a military supply relationship with the new revolutionary regime. Another virtue is that in stimulating these investigations Sick helped push into publicly accessible form a wealth of new detail about this relationship and how it fit with US policy toward Iran and the region. Both chapter 10 of the task force report, "Alleged Quid Pro Quo Deliveries of Arms," and chapter 11 of the Senate special counsel report, "Transshipment of American-Made Arms to Iran," will certainly be cited in future accounts of the triangular US-Israeli-Iranian relationship.

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[6] New York: Random House, 1991.

[7] It would be rather astounding if Ben-Menashe—an Iraqi Jew who grew up in Tehran, was fluent in Persian and Arabic, and could pass for an Iranian—had not been recruited by one or another Israeli intelligence agency.

[8] *Village Voice*, July 7, 1992; cited by Joel Bleifuss, "For the Record," in *In These Times*, March 8, 1993.

[9] Bleifuss, "For the Record." Sick also mentions Samghabadi, p. 219.

The "October surprise" thesis holds that the Republican *quid* for the Iranian *quo* of releasing the hostages after the election was an authorization for the supply through Israel of US military equipment and spare parts for US weapons already in the Iranian inventory. Proof of such an arrangement would require precisely the kind of documentary evidence that does not turn up in the course of these investigations.

It would also require, the task force argues, that Israeli sales of US-origin military goods be substantial. The report cites approvingly the testimony of Nicholas Veliotes, then assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs, that "the amounts are so small, compared to the need, I just can't see how it could be seen as a payoff of any kind" (House, p. 214). Exactly what that amount was is not clear from the discussion—the authors of the report write that "from 1980 through the beginning of 1983, Israeli sales of military and military-related equipment to Iran totalled just over $180 million" (p. 213). Veliotes, on the next page, talks of $23 million ("it just seems too piddly")—this is presumably the value of US-manufactured arms. What is clear is that despite a formal US insistence that Washington approve any Israeli sales of US-origin material or spare parts for US-origin material, Secretary of State Alexander Haig, in a meeting with then-foreign minister Yitzhak Shamir in February 1981, left the impression that the United States would not object to Israeli sales of arms and spare parts that were not of US origin. The documents reproduced by the task force do not indicate that either the State Department or US ambassador Samuel Lewis tried very hard to change that impression (pp. 205–9).

By the fall of 1981, according to the Israeli report provided to the task force, Haig had proposed to the Israelis that the United States would approve Israeli military sales to Iran if Israel would raise no objection to a US sale of weapons to Iraq, as an inducement for the Iraqis to ship Soviet military equipment to the United States (House, p. 211). By December, Washington had dropped the idea of selling weapons to Iraq, and within the administration Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger opposed authorization of Israeli military sales to Iran. The Israelis continued to submit lists for authorization that exceeded US guidelines for type and amount of supplies. The task force then refers, in what may be the most disingenuous line in the report, to the fact that "press reports that the Israelis were selling arms to Iran had raised serious doubts" in Washington "about the wisdom of proceeding with the Israeli initiative" (p. 212). The task force refers to "an ongoing dialogue" within the Pentagon regarding US arms policy toward Iran, and cites "a proposed National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) that would permit transfers of non-United States arms to Iran by European allies and other countries," and yet one paragraph later writes that its review of the documents "underscored the strong anti-Khomeini sentiments within the Reagan administration" (p. 215).

Amazingly, the task force indicates no awareness of the 1991 investigative report by Seymour Hersh, which indicated that Israeli arms sales to Iran in the early 1980s approached $2 billion per year, and that the Reagan administration not only made no move to interfere but continued to replenish Israel's weapons stockpiles.[10] Hersh, in this report, also says he found no documentary link between these sales and the "October surprise" allegations, but certainly the sums involved cannot be dismissed as being too insignificant to support the hypothesis.

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[10] *New York Times*, December 8, 1991.

In comparing the two congressional reports, this reviewer finds the more modestly funded Senate special counsel report to be not only appropriately cautious in its conclusions but also considerably more forthcoming in its analysis. It is only in the Senate report, for instance, that readers are told that "a review of the relevant information located by the NSA (National Security Agency) indicates that there may have been several meetings in various western European cities including Paris in October 1980, involving American and Iranian officials and private citizens and concerning hostages and arms" (p. 83), and that CIA files indicate the same (p. 84).

The Senate report represents a serious effort, under politically imposed constraints, to arrive at a sustainable judgment on the "October surprise" allegations raised most coherently and thoroughly by Gary Sick. That judgment is, fairly enough, that there is not sufficient evidence to document the charge. The House report, with its subpoena power and its review of the Hashemi surveillance tapes, indicates that such evidence probably does not exist, or no longer exists. But the tone and thrust of the House report betrays an eagerness to squelch efforts to expose the underside of US policymaking in the Middle East. It is a transparent exercise in damage control, and does not seriously try to comprehend the issues of accountability that are involved. Serious students of US policy in the region will find all three volumes to provide valuable information and documentation. This reviewer would welcome "October Surprise: The Movie." Perhaps the medium of the cinema could effectively dramatize the personalities, issues, dilemmas, and, not least, the uncertainties that remain concerning US relations with Iran and Israel in the years immediately following Iran's revolution.

ALGERIA

Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation, by John Ruedy. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992. x + 256 pages. Append. to p. 257. Bibl. Essay to p. 273. Bibl. to p. 284. Index to p. 290. $39.95 cloth. $16.95 paper.

Reviewed by Allan Christelow

Modern Algeria is a survey of that country's history from the beginning of the Ottoman era up to the military intervention of January 1992, which brought an end to the democratic experiment initiated in the late 1980s. Its publication is timely and should be welcomed by Maghrib specialists long handicapped in their teaching by the dearth of English-language studies suitable for classroom use. John Ruedy presents his analysis in a clear and readable fashion, and makes the subject accessible to the nonspecialist.

Ruedy's central thesis is that, until the colonial era, the Algerian region was fragmented by regional, tribal, sectarian, and linguistic divisions. The Ottomans, although creating a unified polity, played on these divisions to maintain their dominance. French colonial rule shattered those fragmented structures, eventually making it possible for new nationwide institutions to emerge. In brief, Ruedy presents a dialectic of political progress.

The author also keeps a careful eye on continuing economic problems, however, making the persistence of agrarian poverty into an effective counterpoint to the theme of political progress. Agrarian poverty contributed to revolts in the late Ottoman years, as well as against the French, and helped spark the outbreak of revolution in 1954. Ruedy shows how, during the revolution, the colonial state's imperative of political and military control undermined its efforts to promote rural development. Houari Boumedienne's ambitious agrarian revolution, launched in 1972, also failed to improve productivity or alleviate rural poverty. This failure contributed to unabated urban growth, and, for many Algerians, deteriorating living standards starting in the mid-1970s, setting the stage for the recent crisis.

Ruedy's long-term framework and his dual focus on politics and the agrarian economy qualify this work as both an important scholarly contribution and a valuable teaching resource. The limitations stem from a reliance on mainly French-language sources, which tend to treat Algeria and the French presence during the colonial era as if the country were hermetically sealed from the outside world. These sources consider Islam only in terms of the contribution of the reformist movement to the emergence of nationalism in the period 1925–1940, and they look at the development of nationalism as a process of structural change and ideological ferment within Algeria, stimulated and provoked by France. This literature misses the important external dimension of both the Algerian national struggle and the evolution of Islamic thought and organization.

One element of this external dimension that would be particularly appropriate to an English-language text is a persistent tendency of Algerians to look to the English-speaking world as a counterbalance, initially to French political power, and later to French cultural hegemony. Abd al-Qadir cultivated links with the British, as a resistance leader and in exile. Amir Khalid and Farhat Abbas both sought US support for Algerian rights. This background may help explain the great impact of John F. Kennedy's speech on Algeria in 1957. Independent Algeria has stressed the teaching of English in secondary schools, a policy that led Abbasi Madani, later leader of the Islamic Salvation Front (usually known by its French acronym, FIS), to attend the University of London for his postgraduate studies in education.

Full understanding of the FIS requires a long-term study of Algeria's links with the wider Islamic world. These have received attention mainly from Algerian scholars writing in Arabic. Algerian exiles were deeply involved in the pan-Islamic movement up until 1918. In the early 1950s, Algerian Islamic reformists in exile in the Middle East forged links with the Muslim Brotherhood, and then with Saudi leaders. To be certain, the popularity of the FIS owes much, as Ruedy contends, to Algeria's economic woes. But to understand its existence, and the diverse intellectual and political tendencies within it, one needs to do as much justice to its historical lineage as *Modern Algeria* has done to Algerian nationalism and economic problems.

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EGYPT

The State and Public Policies in Egypt since Sadat, by Nazih N. Ayubi. Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 1991. Distrib. Paul and Company, Concord, MA. xiii + 342 pages. Index to p. 352. $70.00.

Reviewed by Robert Vitalis

Nazih Ayubi, a political scientist who directs the Middle East politics program at the University of Exeter, has recast some of his previously published work on *infitah*-era policies and policymaking to produce a book-length manuscript about Egypt in the 1980s. Fourteen chapters long, the book ranges across the contemporary Egyptian landscape, discussing such subjects as the origins of Egypt's liberalization program, the bureaucracy, science and technology policy, civil-military relations, and the Mubarak government's general foreign policy orientation. Although there is no overarching argument that weaves these subjects together into a coherent whole, the mild version of the nationalist critique of liberalization that Ayubi adopts at least gives his text a consistent tone.

The book begins with three chapters rehearsing the origins of Egypt's "open door" policy (*al-infitah*), its implementation during the 1970s and its consequences, framed as a metaphorical "cost-benefit analysis." Ayubi's criticisms focus on what he views as an overly broad assault on public sector industry, an alleged rise in corruption under infitah, along with the rise of "commercialism"—whether in terms of wasteful consumption and spending habits, through migration in search of higher wages, or investment in "parasitic" economic activities. These arguments are well known.

Parts two and three of the book, which focus on aspects of bureaucracy and administration, and on public policies (such as technology policy, education, and agriculture), include brief descriptions and assessments of institutions that are generally not discussed in other English-language volumes on Egypt. Along these same lines, Ayubi throughout his book generously draws on and cites many more works of Egyptian scholars and Arabic-language sources than are found in such "reference" works as those of John Waterbury, Raymond Hinnebusch, and Robert Springborg, published in the United States.[1] The text is thus a useful resource for graduate students beginning research on Egyptian public policy.

The author's discussion of domestic politics, such as elections, and foreign policy, in parts four and five, follows his preference for description over engaging critically with the existing scholarship and making clear what is new in his reading of the Egyptian case. Here, the limitations of the text, in comparison with the 1989 studies of the Mubarak regime by Springborg and Robert Bianchi, or with the engrossing account of agricultural policymaking by Yahya Sadowski,[2] are made most palpable.

In light of its modest virtues, and considering its high cost, the tendency to repetition—virtually the same account of recent electoral history is given in parts two and four—that stems from the book's origin as a collection of articles, and its lack of any unifying focus, the book is not easily recommended to either the specialist or nonspecialist reader.

Robert Vitalis, Department of Government and International Relations, Clark University

ISRAEL AND ZIONISM

Despair and Deliverance: Private Salvation in Contemporary Israel, by Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992. vii + 194 pages. Refs. to p. 217. Index to p. 221. $17.95 paper.
Tradition, Innovation, Conflict: Jewishness and Judaism in Contemporary Israel, ed. by Zvi Sobel and Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991. viii + 304 pages. Contribs. to p. 307. Index to p. 316. $17.95 paper.
Ethnicity, Religion, and Class in Israeli Society, by Eliezer Ben-Rafael and Stephen Sharot. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991. x + 253 pages. Appends. to p. 258. Gloss. to p. 261. Notes to p. 267. Refs. to p. 281. Index to p. 287. $39.50.

Reviewed by Leon T. Hadar

Contrary to some expectations, the end of the Cold War has not ushered in the "end of history." If anything, it has produced explosive national, ethnic, and religious tensions around the world, including the Middle East. There, in the most dramatic example of the pressure toward disunity and chaos, the political status quo is being challenged by forces of political Islam. Israel is certainly not immune to the influence of these centrifugal forces. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in its present bloody stage, reflects the kind of national, ethnic, and religious animosities that are emerging in places like the former Yugoslavia.

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[1] John Waterbury, *The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: A Political Economy of Two Regimes* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983); Raymond A. Hinnebusch, Jr., *Egyptian Politics under Sadat: The Post-Populist Development of an Authoritarian-Modernizing State* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988); and Robert Springborg, *Mubarak's Egypt: Fragmentation of the Political Order* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989).

[2] Robert Bianchi, *Unruly Corporatism: Associational Life in 20th-Century Egypt* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); and Yahya Sadowski, *Political Vegetables? Businessman and Bureaucrat in the Development of Egyptian Agriculture* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1991).

According to some of the contributors to the three volumes under review, however, the long-term threat to the Jewish state comes not only from the long-standing conflict with the Arabs. The Arab threat, they argue, tends to aggravate tensions that already exist beneath the facade of an Israeli national consensus. Cleavages between secular and orthodox Jews, the subject of *Tradition, Innovation, Conflict*; the rift between Sephardi and Ashkenazi Jews, the focus of *Ethnicity, Religion, and Class in Israeli Society*; and the rise of new forms of religious expression, discussed in *Despair and Deliverance*; serve as major challenges to the Zionist foundations of Israel. As Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi writes in *Despair and Deliverance*, they reflect a crisis of "identity, belonging and loyalty" (p. 185) that Israeli Jews are facing today. All three books suggest that the ability of the Israeli political system and culture to address and contain this crisis will be no less critical to the survival of the Jewish state than a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

On the surface, *Despair and Deliverance* has the quality of a *Time* magazine cover story on the latest social trend or cultural fad. At first, the story of the emergence of cults and new-age religions in Israel does not seem to be the stuff of serious social science research. Beit-Hallahmi, a member of the Department of Psychology at the University of Haifa and a political analyst, frequently slides into lengthy gossip on the exotic characters involved in the development of the new sects. The strength of the study, however, lies in its ability to integrate the arcane and mysterious world of the occult into the larger context of Israel's identity crisis, where the level of personal psychological despair intersects with the level of national political and social upheaval. This is also the point where Beit-Hallahmi the social psychologist and Beit-Hallahmi the political critic join to produce a readable and interesting book.

Drawing on interviews, field observations, clinical data, and media reports collected over ten years, Beit-Hallahmi surveys four directions to private salvation in Israel—the "Return to Judaism," "new religions" (sects and cults), psychotherapy movements such as EST, and occultism. The author's analysis of the varieties of religious and secular salvation is presented as evidence of Israelis' willingness to accept private salvation in the face of major political tremors—in particular, the 1973 war—which suggest that the survival of the state and the whole culture are filled with growing threats.

Beit-Hallahmi rejects the notion that these movements are nothing more than a pale reflection in the Israeli province of similar phenomena that have occurred in the West. "The new salvation movements in Israel are a rebellion against the seeming rationality and the real irrationality and inhumanity of an oppressive social system," he writes. They are "innovative and revolutionary" and "an active and passive rebellion against Zionism." The price of Zionism is getting too high, "so the reactions range from leaving the field altogether, by emigration, or by changing the psychological field through individual salvation" (p. 186). Growing doubts about the Zionist dream and the Israeli future have created a certain openness to new answers and ideologies of the religious, occult, or secular-individualistic variety. But these open challenges to the dominant secular Jewish identity of the culture are still opposed and suppressed in Israel, in forms ranging from public ostracism to religious persecution.

Beit-Hallahmi's portrayal of the salvation movements as a response to the crisis in secular Zionism, and the latter's inability to energize in the face of the crises facing Israel, is convincing. One may question his attempt, however, to give equal weight in his discussion to marginal groups such as EST and the Unification Church, and socially powerful movements such as the "Return to Judaism" and Gush Emunim. The former have served as a way for individuals to cope with personal problems in the context of Israel's crises, but they have had virtually no impact on Israeli politics and culture. The Return to Judaism movement, which "converted" thousands of young and secular Israelis into the ranks of pre-Zionist and even anti-Zionist orthodoxy, and the rise of the messianic Zionist settler movement (the latter receives only a brief and superficial treatment in the book) have had major political and cultural repercussions. Both have challenged effectively the dominant secular Zionist ethos and are highly active.

Tradition, Innovation, Conflict lacks the sweeping conclusions of *Despair and Deliverance*. It is also less esoteric in its focus, devoting less attention to marginal cults and expanding the discussion to the larger issue of the relation between politics and religion in Israel. Moreover, while *Despair and Deliverance* is obsessed with the alleged inevitable demise of Zionism, *Tradition, Innovation, Conflict* presents a more complex picture in which religion, in particular, orthodoxy, serves as a means of reviving Jewish nationalism, even if it does not correspond to the concept of classical Zionism.

Despair and Deliverance focuses on the way some religious forces are eroding the status quo and dominant ideology. *Tradition, Innovation, Conflict*, edited by Beit-Hallahmi and sociologist Zvi Sobel, turns the religion-politics coin on its head. It looks at religion as a powerful component of the current status quo and a nucleus of a new Jewish identity. It asks how religious orthodoxy is able to maintain and even extend its power while representing only a small minority of the population, why the majority of nonorthodox citizens accept this state of affairs as legitimate, and what are the sources of the new orthodox confidence.

The reasons why orthodoxy—which seemed to be on the defensive in the aftermath of secular Zionism's victory in 1948—is emerging as a critical force in Israel are offered in several of the book's essays. Hana Ayalon of Tel Aviv University observes that most secular Israelis see the religious-secular cleavage as more divisive than those of ethnicity and class only on the cognitive level. At the affective and evaluative level, ethnicity and class prove to be more important than one's religious and secular position. Similarly, in the case study analyzed by Sobel, one finds the potentially divisive role of religion tempered by growing concern with the Arab threat.

Peri Kedem of Bar-Ilan University demonstrates that the traditional religious context provides a dimension of legitimation and anchored continuity—a Jewish identity—for secular Israelis. Hence, 70 percent of a student sample expressed religious emotions tied to national events, and large numbers favored religious legislation and education. The willingness of the nonobservants to have the observants define the ritual parameters of their lives is not only a function of political pressure by the religious parties. Henry Abramovitch of Tel Aviv University suggests that the defensive attitude of secular Jews toward the observants results from a sense of legitimacy that hangs like an aura above orthodox practices in most phases of collective life.

Sociologist Leonard Weller's research suggests that the less observant tend to be more "liberal" and dovish, whereas the more observant tend toward the illiberal and chauvinistic. It seems that orthodoxy, with its current muscular politicization, is becoming for Israelis a framework for justification, continuity, unity, and identification, especially with regard to the "other." The fact that some Arabs are adopting a Muslim religious identity leads one to ponder whether the Arab-Israeli conflict might be replaced by a Jewish-Muslim one.

The editors suggest that religion is a source of energy for Zionism. Yet the return to religion and the growing sense of religious identity, even among secular Israelis, is seen as the only answer to the crisis of justification that Zionism has been undergoing. "Only two generations ago Judaism seemed doomed and Zionism was full of vitality," they write. "Now the tide has turned and religion offers hope and justification while Zionism appears on the decline" (p. 12).

In *Ethnicity, Religion, and Class in Israeli Society*, two sociologists, Eliezer Ben-Rafael of Tel Aviv University and Stephen Sharot of Ben Gurion University, add another dimension to the discussion, by linking the religious revival to two other variables—ethnicity and class. Their study is based on data collected from four groups of Jewish origin in Israel—Jews from Iraq, Morocco, Poland, and Rumania. Their research argues that the ethnic conflict between Ashkenazi Jews and Sephardi, or Middle Eastern Jews, is "largely a consequence of the contradiction between the Ashkenazi vision of Israeli-Jewish solidarity, based on secularized nationalism, and the religiously informed vision of Israeli-Jewish solidarity among Middle Easterners" (p. 222).

The ethnic conflict is intertwined strongly with religious and political sources of identification that do not correspond to the traditional left-right dichotomy. The professional middle class and upper-middle class identifies with the Ashkenazi political culture, which is equated with the "left," a secular vision of Zionism whose sources are in Europe. The mostly lower-middle class Middle Eastern Jews identify with the Sephardi political culture, which is equated with the "right," a messianic and religious vision of Zionism.

The Sephardi political orientation reflects a rebellion by a politically marginalized group against the Ashkenazi Jews who have controlled Israel's centers of power. Indeed, the majority of the former have voted for the Likud-religious party bloc, which ruled Israel from 1977 to 1992. "Israel has become a country where the middle and upper strata are more often supporters of the left and the lower strata are more often supporters of the right" (p. 226). The fact that the majority of Jews in Israel today are of Middle Eastern origin may explain the fact that the political culture of the state has been dominated by a nonsecularist, "traditionalist" identity, emphasizing a xenophobic orientation.

The conclusions presented in the book do not project any new insights on the subject of ethnicity in Israeli politics, however. The authors, despite their promise to move beyond the simplistic categories of ethnicity—by trying, for example, to study intraethnic differences between Moroccan and Iraqi Jews, or between lower and middle class Ashkenazi Jews—do not uncover any new ground. An observation pointing to a more culturally and politically salient sense of ethnic identity among the Moroccan-Jewish community than among Iraqi Jews would probably come as no surprise even to an Israeli taxi driver, let alone a social scientist.

Moreover, this study, like the other two, was written before the large immigration from the former Soviet Union, and thus has been overtaken by events. As the results of the 1992 Knesset elections suggest, the immigration of hundreds of thousands of secular Jews from Russia and other republics to Israel has already tipped the balance in Israeli politics toward the Ashkenazi communities, the secularists, and the left. The long-term impact of this new infusion of secular Jews on Israeli political culture or its sense of identity is not yet clear, but it seems to run counter to the fatalistic view of Israeli politics shared by the contributors to these three volumes.

Indeed, the wave of new immigrants, combined with a possible move under the Labor-led coalition toward peace with the Palestinians and other Arabs, could be critical in halting the transformation of Israel into a Jewish ghetto. These developments could gradually help turn Israel into a more open and "normal" state, where new and more pluralistic notions of Israeli identity could flourish. This in turn suggests a brighter sense of Israel's future than the one presented in these three books.

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OMAN

Oman: Politics and Development, by Ian Skeet. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992. xvii + 163 pages. Append. to p. 164. Notes to p. 183. Bibl. to p. 186. Index to p. 195. $49.95.

Reviewed by Robert G. Landen

Some 20 years ago Ian Skeet wrote a brief but highly perceptive account of Oman as it appeared in the late 1960s, during the last days of Sultan Sa'id bin Taymur (reigned 1932–

1970).[1] Skeet's latest work is an equally sentient, sympathetic, and colorful opus, and a worthy sequel to the earlier volume.

The book consists of three distinct parts. It begins engagingly in a well-titled descriptive section, "Scenes, Oman 1990." Composed of several revealing vignettes, this section provides a vivid impression of how contemporary Oman looks, feels, and operates. The second part, "Behind the Scenes: The Creation of Oman, 1970–90," interprets the sultanate's post-1970 history. Between 1970 and the end of the Dhofar war in 1976, the somewhat haphazard maneuverings that ultimately created a government apparatus capable of stimulating rapid social and economic modernization resulted in the country's once separately administered districts—coastal Muscat, interior Oman, and the southern province of Dhofar—being consolidated into a unified state.

This was not an easy process. In 1975, for instance, although government forces had gained the upper hand in the Dhofar war, the continuing progress of infrastructure development seemed about to be overwhelmed by lapses in financial decision making. Happily for Oman, however, restraint eventually was imposed and, since 1976, the country's development, in the main, has proceeded steadily.

The story of Oman's socioeconomic transformation is especially well told, thanks to Skeet's unusual skill in laying out and interpreting statistical information and trends. He is equally adept at explaining the evolving nature of Oman's external geopolitical relations—particularly with other Gulf countries and with the United States and Britain—as well as the salient role that security considerations have played in forging Sultan Qabus' nonideological attitude toward foreign relations.

The book's third part, "Toward 2000," is a combination of trenchant observation and prudent advice. Skeet focuses on four problems that he believes Oman must address as it enters the 21st century—how to perpetuate socioeconomic advance, provide jobs for Omanis, and cope with growing pressure on its limited water resources; how to build on its recent foreign policy successes; how to develop an even more effective governance process; and how to nurture continuing internal integration, in particular, between Oman's northern and southern halves.

Few Westerners (or Middle Easterners for that matter) can match Skeet's knowledge of Oman and its people. This awareness, combined with the author's obvious sympathy for Oman, analytical acumen, and writing proficiency, has produced an admirable book that can be read both for edification and pleasure by specialists and general readers alike.

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PALESTINE AND PALESTINIANS

Politics in Palestine: Arab Factionalism and Social Disintegration, 1939–1948, by Issa Khalaf. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991. xix + 248 pages. Notes to p. 282. Chron. to p. 292. Bibl. to p. 304. Index to p. 318. $57.50 cloth. $18.95 paper.

Reviewed by Fouad Moughrabi

This is the first book that tries in a systematic manner to examine the reaction of Palestinians to the events that impinged on their lives during the critical years of the British Mandate and in the course of Zionist settlement of their land. Issa Khalaf's immediate focus is the period that preceded the final destruction and disintegration of Palestinian society. He examines a host of factors internal to Palestinian politics that may shed some light on the reasons for total collapse.

Khalaf argues that factionalist politics, which characterize traditional, largely agrarian societies—dominated by vertical cleavages, identities, and divisions—continued to hold sway until 1948. The author uses two levels of analysis to study factionalism: he examines changes in the political and social structure of Palestinian society, and he tries to understand the conflict among the elite over power and leadership.

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[1] Ian Skeet, *Muscat and Oman: The End of an Era* (London: Faber and Faber, 1974); reissued in paperback as *Oman before 1970: The End of an Era* (London: Faber and Faber, 1985).

The book is divided into three parts. In part one, Khalaf examines the erosion of the urban notables' socioeconomic base and argues that they maintained their position of influence "through tireless nationalist appeals" (p. 59). The growth of a professional middle class does not seem to have had a measurable influence on this dialectic. In part two, the author shows how the urban notables helped intensify fragmentation in their society, especially as the external challenges from Zionist settlement became more severe. Khalaf also shows how the notables resisted pressures to broaden the scope of political participation by including new elites. Part three examines the factors and events that led to the fall of Palestine in 1948, including inter-Arab rivalries, and the failure of the nationalist movement to produce a concrete program of action.

There is a body of literature, of which Khalaf seems totally unaware, that addresses the process by which native societies respond to intrusions from a settler society. Howard Lamar and Leonard Thompson's *The Frontier in History*[1] is a comparative study of the effect of settlement on native populations in North America, southern Africa, and elsewhere. This work inspired some important studies by Israeli scholars Baruch Kimmerling and Gershon Shafir. No comparable work has been done by a Palestinian scholar. This book represents a good beginning for such an enterprise.

Khalaf's work raises more questions than it answers. Although factionalism has been and remains a constant feature of Palestinian politics, Palestinians have been able to maintain their sense of identity and a strong attachment to their cause. What accounts for this phenomenon? At crucial moments they have been able to overcome the negative effects of their divisions and mount coherent and systematic action, unlike other societies in the region. This book does not enlighten readers about these matters. It does show, however, that the traditional leadership, faced with severe pressures from the outside, failed to meet the grave dangers facing the Palestinian people.

Fouad Moughrabi teaches political science and Middle East studies at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga.

SYRIA

Syria and the Middle East Peace Process, by Alasdair Drysdale and Raymond A. Hinnebusch. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991. x + 219 pages. Append. to p. 221. Notes to p. 232. Bibl. to p. 236. Index to p. 244. $16.95 paper.

Reviewed by Michael H. Van Dusen

This book is an important primer on a critical aspect of the current Middle East peace talks aimed at negotiating agreements on the road to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement. Written by two of the leading experts on contemporary Syria, its political economy, and its regional and international policies, this book is based in part on the discussions of a study group on Syria that convened at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York in the winter of 1989–1990.

The central theses of the book are that there can be no comprehensive or lasting Middle East peace without a Syrian-Israeli peace; that Syrian policies on peace are evolving in a way that enhances the prospects for agreements; that Hafiz al-Asad, despite his principal and narrow Alawi minority base of support, his questionable legitimacy, and his regime's denial of basic human rights for most Syrians, can make an agreement and then honor it; and that changes in the world, including the 1991 Gulf war and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, help create an environment in which progress toward peace is possible.

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[1] New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981.

Alasdair Drysdale and Raymond Hinnebusch inform their readers about a country that remains an enigma to many Americans. This book is not an apologia for Syria. The authors state clearly why Syria cannot be ignored, why Syria is a relevant regional player, and why Syria can be dealt with, but they also give a candid assessment of Syria's domestic policies, its often troublesome regional role, its tortured policies on the Arab-Israeli peace process, and its checkered relationship with the United States. Their analysis is based on the reality of what Syria is, not on what some Americans might like to think or might wish Syria to be or to do.

A principal frustration with this book is that it appears to have been completed in late 1991, before the start of the Madrid talks. A year later, with several rounds of bilateral peace talks having been concluded and a few rounds of multilateral talks completed—though Syria is yet to participate in the multilateral talks—many issues discussed look slightly different. Some of those issues would have been framed differently if this book went to press at the end of 1992, rather than 1991. This reviewer would have liked much more discussion of how to address the Golan Heights issue in the current talks. But the book's utility for understanding the current situation is not diminished significantly. It is a question of a good book that could have been more relevant to current policy debates in the Middle East peace talks.

In 1993, these talks are at a critical juncture. Progress has occurred, albeit slowly, and although there may be stops, starts, and detours in the talks, the Syrian-Israeli discussions thus far appear focused squarely on the issues. A treaty or an agreement will necessitate considerable further movement on all sides, however. Just as Syrian policies on a peace treaty with Israel need further evolution, so do some Israeli views on the territorial issue. Given the key problem the Golan Heights represents, progress in the talks will have to be accompanied by creative new thinking on the Golan issue. Some concepts used in the Sinai may be relevant, but a more solemn United States guarantee of a Syrian-Israeli border agreement may be essential to progress.

The policy debate on a future US role on the Golan Heights, as well as on whether any such US offer should be made as a catalyst to helping Syria and Israel reach an agreement or as a capstone of progress the parties themselves have made, are among the difficult policy debates that need defining. This book helps by providing essential background in such debates, even if indications of the sentiments of the authors on these questions are not provided.

Michael H. Van Dusen is staff director of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the US House of Representatives.

MODERN HISTORY AND POLITICS

Algerian Reflections on Arab Crises, by Ali El-Kenz, tr. by Robert W. Stookey. Austin: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, University of Texas, 1991. Distrib. University of Texas Press, Austin. xvii + 116 pages. $8.95 paper.

Reviewed by Dirk Vandewalle

Such is the paucity of serious studies of the Arab world by Maghribi scholars that their translation and publication inevitably causes keen anticipation among observers of North Africa in this country. This is particularly the case when the author has previously written a critical and highly acclaimed study of the rise and fall of a state enterprise in his native Algeria.[1] In the book under review, Ali El-Kenz, in a series of five short chapters that were originally delivered at scholarly conferences, asks himself "Where are we [the Arabs] going?" (p. ix).

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[1] Ali El-Kenz, *Le complexe sidérurgique d'El Hadjar: une experience industrielle en Algérie* (Paris: Editions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique, 1987).

In answering that question the author touches on several important topics that are meant to provide, in their totality, a coherent picture of Arab society. He investigates the role and shortcomings of the Arab intelligentsia, the different crises to which his native Algeria is now subjected, the failure of nationalism, the nature of social scientific inquiry in the Arab world, and, finally, Islam. All of these topics are examined in a framework that allows El-Kenz to telescope many of his arguments into this short volume.

Although in this reviewer's opinion El-Kenz restricts himself too much to Algeria in trying to explain what malaise has befallen the region at large—and often in a jargon-driven style that could easily have been avoided without loss of precision or understanding—this is a valuable set of essays by an astute Maghribi observer that specialists will enjoy. It is not meant, however, for those who have little knowledge of the region. The author repeatedly draws on details from recent Algerian and Arab history without providing further background.

In light of the comments above, it is therefore unfortunate for El-Kenz—and ultimately for the reader—that the five unintegrated essays included here have been published in this form. The author has important points to make and has not been well served in his intellectual endeavor, neither by the lamentable translation nor by his publishing house. At a minimum, the latter should have insisted on a redrafting of some of the chapters (avoiding, for example, the rather sloppy "Marx says somewhere . . . " on page 68), excised some of the overlapping passages, and insisted on a much better integration of the different chapters, which would have given greater integrity and unity to El-Kenz's ideas. The author's decision, after "mature reflection" (p. ix), not to revise his manuscript is hardly convincing and should not have been tolerated, for the result is a monograph that shows all the signs of having been somewhat hurriedly put together. Not even Clement Henry Moore's solid introduction can counter that impression.

Despite these drawbacks there is much here to recommend this monograph to seasoned observers of Arab countries, but they will undoubtedly await with anticipation a fuller, intellectually integrated, and better-edited version of El-Kenz's ideas.

Dirk Vandewalle, Department of Government, Dartmouth College

The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis, by Diane B. Kunz. Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1991. xii + 194 pages. Appends. to p. 206. Notes to p. 279. Bibl. to p. 288. Index to p. 295. $39.95.

Reviewed by Howard Dooley

Since World War II economic sanctions have been employed frequently, but often ineffectively, in international affairs. A substantial literature has developed, yet curiously the one postwar conflict when economic sanctions proved effective in halting a war has been neglected—the Suez crisis. Diane Kunz, an historian at Yale University, has remedied this oversight with a model case study of how the United States employed economic sanctions as a coercive mechanism against Britain, France, Israel, and Egypt during the dramatic events of 1956–57.

Impeccably researched and engagingly written, *The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis* represents true historical discovery. Kunz, formerly a Wall Street lawyer specializing in international financial transactions, has boldly gone where no historian of Suez has gone before: into the financial records, including the files of the US Federal Reserve and the Bank of England. The result is a genuinely new perspective on the Suez crisis that uncovers hidden drama in its financial aspects and provides a corrective to the many inaccurate and incomplete accounts of the United States' use of its economic clout during the crisis.

There is no doubt about Kunz's basic thesis—the importance of having money. In 1956 the US government possessed financial reserves in excess of $22 billion, while Britain attempted to play the role of a great power, run its economy, and maintain the sterling area with reserves of only $2 billion. Britain needed US assistance to maintain its pretensions, but admitting dependency would disqualify it as a great power. When US and British policy diverged, Britain's determination to go it alone at Suez gave the United States an opportunity to employ its financial superiority to humiliate and defeat Britain "in a fashion that Germany in two world wars had not been able to do" (p. 194).

Economic diplomacy, the author makes clear, shaped the course of the Suez crisis from start to finish. The Anglo-American offer to finance the Aswan High Dam showed just how threadbare Britain's imperial cloak was. Impoverished Egypt, Kunz reveals, had enough sterling to pay all of the foreign currency costs of the project, yet Britain could not afford to release these funds because they constituted one-fifth of its reserves. After Britain offered to assist Egypt to meet the costs, London had to go to the World Bank to avoid tapping any of its precious reserves. When the United States agreed to pick up 80 percent of the costs, Britain sought to award construction contracts to British firms without competitive bidding. The Aswan negotiations starkly demonstrated that Britain "could not afford to conduct foreign relations on its own" (p. 46), well before John Foster Dulles reneged on the US commitment, triggering Gamal Abd al-Nasir's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company.

Prime Minister Anthony Eden never realized these financial constraints, but his chancellor of the exchequer, Harold Macmillan, did, or certainly should have. Though knowing full well Britain's financial weakness and US ambivalence about using force against Egypt, Macmillan did nothing to ensure US support at the crucial moment, assuring the cabinet that "Ike will lie doggo" with a complacency that Kunz finds "incomprehensible and perhaps even discreditable" (p. 108). Although he was the leading "hawk," Macmillan made no plans to defend sterling in the event of war, nor did he develop contingency plans in case of an oil embargo. On the eve of battle, when France fortified itself with a timely draw from the International Monetary Fund, Britain exhibited no such forethought. Then, with the Anglo-French invasion underway, Macmillan misled the cabinet by exaggerating reserve losses, stampeding it into a decision to accept a ceasefire. His bungling, and perhaps deliberate falsehoods, deceived his colleagues, ruined Eden, and split the Atlantic alliance. Kunz is unequivocal in her verdict: "At the least, Macmillan's performance as Chancellor during the Suez crisis must be assessed as incompetent" (p. 107).

Kunz debunks as myth the often-repeated claim that the Eisenhower administration waged economic war on its recalcitrant ally by engineering a run on sterling. There was no concerted US campaign against the pound, she states, but the oil companies did unload their sterling, which was sufficient to threaten Britain with devaluation. The New York money market was not mentioned in the cabinet until November 20, two weeks after the ceasefire. Then Washington offered assistance to prop up the pound, but the *quid pro quo* was Anglo-French withdrawal from Egypt. In the end Suez was lost, but sterling was saved.

Kunz also coolly evaluates US efforts to bring about Israeli withdrawal from its conquests in Sinai and Gaza. The threat of economic sanctions did not determine the issue, she argues, because Israel was not yet an economic dependency. "The importance of economic sanctions was symbolic," Kunz writes. Rather, Israel withdrew because it could not afford to earn "the Eisenhower administration's lasting enmity" when it needed a superpower to balance the Arabs and their Soviet backer (p. 193).

Suez, Kunz concludes, provides a comprehensive illustration of the "utility and limitations of economic diplomacy." US financial pressure was applied against Britain, France, Israel, and Egypt with "varying degrees of success" (p. 192). A developing nation, Egypt proved the least susceptible to economic pressure, which was halfhearted in any case. France, willing to risk its economy to keep Algeria, immunized itself with a timely IMF draw. Israel did yield to the threat of sanctions, but for geopolitical rather than economic calculations. It was British vulnerabilities that were cruelly exposed by economic diplomacy—"a nation that was forced to recant an action, which it had labeled in its vital interest, at the command of another country because it had run out of money was, at least temporarily, a client state, not a superpower" (p. 189).

The first-rate text is supplemented by photographs of the *dramatis personae*, and supported by 72 pages of chapter notes; the bibliography and index are equally good. Kunz's study of the economic diplomacy of the 1956 crisis makes not only a fascinating historical read, but a timely one, for, as the author notes, "given the relative decline of American economic potency during the three and a half decades succeeding the Suez crisis, this study also provides instructive lessons for a country that might someday be on the receiving end of economic pressure" (p. 4). As Macmillan told Dulles, "the British action [at Suez] was the last gasp of declining power . . . perhaps in 200 years the United States [will] know how we felt" (p. 186). The spectacle of Washington going hat in hand to Tokyo in 1991, seeking financing for Desert Storm, suggests that the time frame may be much shorter.

Howard Dooley is professor of history and senior advisor to the president for international affairs (acting) at Western Michigan University.

In the Service of Peace in the Middle East, 1967–1979, by Ensio Siilasvuo. London: Hurst; and New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992. xii + 360 pages. Appends. to p. 381. Index to p. 388. $45.00.

Reviewed by C. William Kontos

Ensio Siilasvuo's book of memoirs covers the 12 eventful years from 1967 to the end of 1979. The author began as deputy chief of staff for the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and, in 1970, became chief of staff. He is fair in his judgments of the people involved and describes well the sometimes awkward interaction between the military and civilian parts of the United Nations.

Siilasvuo's observations of UNTSO's constructive role are shrewd and balanced. He examines UNTSO's geographic spread, including Israel and its four Arab neighbors, its various international contingents, and the cast of characters the author met. Siilasvuo has a fresh eye for the telling detail and revealing anecdote. The short opening chapter, "Getting Acquainted with the Middle East," is a good summary and, even for the uninitiated reader, an admirable basic introduction to the area. The author developed friendly, cordial relations with Arabs and Israelis alike. He is critical of the Israeli government, however—though more in sorrow than in anger—and quotes Jimmy Carter's view that "the continued deprivation of Palestinian rights is contrary to the basic moral and ethical principles of both our countries" (p. 62).

From his vantage point as UNTSO chief of staff in May 1970, he credits Jordan for quelling the "Black September" Palestinian challenge by countering "the Syrian attack without the help of the US and Israel" (p. 100). Presumably this means without direct military intervention, for he later cites Israel's deployment of armored troops on the Golan Heights as a move that "expedited the Syrian withdrawal" (p. 101), along with US actions—leaning heavily on the Soviets to pressure the Syrians out of Irbid, alerting US troops in Germany, and moving naval forces into the area.

The author's account of the 1973 war—the initial Egyptian/Syrian success and Israel's counterthrust—is described in clear terms, made vivid by drawing on reports from UNTSO observers caught in the crossfire. The Security Council authorized the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) operation to supervise the ceasefire and to prevent a recurrence of hostilities. Siilasvuo was appointed commander of this force. His support from New York, however, was minimal, characterized by *ad hoc* policies and lack of forward planning. Even so, drawing on

UNTSO staff, he was quickly able to cobble together an organization capable of coping with the chaotic conditions along the front and achieving a separation of the parties, despite poor planning and muddled communications between UN headquarters, UNEF, and the countries contributing troops. One piece of advice still has currency today: "If a UN force never strikes back, it cannot gain the respect of the parties" (p. 208).

Siilasvuo relates his absorbing story in fluent, straightforward prose. After two years at UNEF, he moved from Ismailia to Jerusalem in 1975 to take on the job of chief coordinator of UN peacekeeping operations in the Middle East. This new arrangement worked out reasonably well, largely because of the author's familiarity with those political leaders engaged. Two men, for whom Siilasvuo reserves his most acute criticism, are Kurt Waldheim, UN secretary general, and, in particular, his principal administrative officer, George Lansky. Both operated on short-sighted agendas. The author holds that their engaged egos and lack of good judgment impeded UN field operations.

After the 1975 Sinai disengagement agreement, the Israelis insisted, as a *quid pro quo* for their withdrawal beyond the Mitla and Giddi passes, that they retain their strategic early warning surveillance station near Mitla, and that the United States deploy a tactical early warning system to cover both passes. The author faults this restricted US coverage, noting that had it been broader "it might perhaps have seen too much of the Israeli side" (p. 310). He also claims that the US equipment "was surprisingly modest and old fashioned" (p. 310). On both counts he is wrong. The agreement that brought US civilians into the Sinai was not intended to conduct surveillance on either Egypt or Israel, but to concentrate on the limited areas of the passes. For this purpose, the surveillance equipment—which included unattended ground sensors, remotely monitored and direct view night vision devices—was the best equipment of that day. Neither Egypt nor Israel had more technically advanced devices. The Sinai field mission worked well with the UNEF units that were deployed outside its area of operations, although some incidents occurred when the United Nations fell short of providing adequate security for the US mission.

The concluding chapter, on UN peacekeeping in Lebanon, contains the depressing story of conflict between Israel's surrogate, Major Sa'ad Haddad, "a Lebanese renegade and his ragtag band" (p. 353), and the soldiers of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in the so-called Israeli security zone of south Lebanon.

Siilasvuo's book should be rewarding for every observer of Middle Eastern politics. He shows that some conflicts would have been more violent and intractable without UN peacekeeping. He describes in his epilogue the failures of vision and ineptitude of all the major parties, from the sympathetic view of a realistic observer whose 12 years spent on issues of war and peace have not left him entirely bereft of hope for peace in the future.

C. William Kontos, former director of the US Sinai Support Mission, 1976–1980; and US ambassador to Sudan, 1980–83

Le Sahara Occidental: enjeu maghrébin,

by Abdelkhaleq Berramdane. Paris: Editions Karthala, 1992. 345 pages. Bibl. to p. 350. Contents to p. 357. n.p. paper.

Reviewed by Robert Mortimer

Abdelkhaleq Berramdane, the author of a previous work on Morocco's relations with the West,[1] organizes this study around the notion of the various international actors' stakes in the conflict over Western Sahara. "To defend the West is to defend 'Moroccan' Sahara" (p. 252) is Berramdane's succinct formula for the conception underlying Moroccan foreign policy since the conflict erupted in the mid-1970s. Morocco's stake in incorporating the former Spanish colony drove the kingdom into a strategic alliance with France and the United States, an outcome harmful to any prospects of Maghribi unity. Berramdane provides a good review of the various states' policies, while moving toward an argument for a settlement that would allow Morocco to disengage from the West and commit itself to a project of regional development.

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[1] Abdelkhaleq Berramdane, *Le Maroc et l'Occident* (Paris: Karthala, 1987).

Part one focuses on "The Maghrib Divided," including such subheadings as "The Broken Maghrib" and "The Torn Maghrib." The author views the basic causes of the rupture between Algeria and Morocco as deriving from the former's geopolitical interests and the latter's quest for "legitimization of a threatened throne" (p. 13). This section also analyzes the shifting policies of Libya and Mauritania over the course of the dispute; relatively little attention is devoted to the Polisario Front, manifestly a lesser actor in Berramdane's interpretation of events.

Part two is a close study of the stakes as perceived in Paris, Washington, Madrid, and Moscow, complemented by a portrayal of Morocco's shrewd maneuvers to render itself indispensable to France and the United States. During the late 1970s, under the administration of Jimmy Carter—described by Berramdane as a "choirboy president" (p. 107)—Morocco operated as "France's arm in Africa" (p. 126), notably in Zaire. When socialists came to power in France and fervent anticommunists in the United States, King Hassan deftly cultivated the Reagan administration. The author utilizes US congressional hearings opportunely to discuss US policy, although there is some tendency to exaggerate the coherence of its purpose. A mode of analysis that focuses on bureaucratic politics, emphasizing the differences between the subcommittee on Africa and the White House, would have better captured the internal debate over US aid to Morocco. Although the names of some policymakers are garbled, the overall accounts of major power policy are ably set forth. The focus in chapters 4–10 is on external powers, yet the reader is most struck—thanks to a liberal use of Hassan's speeches and press interviews—by the lucidity of Berramdane's handling of Moroccan diplomacy toward these powers.

Part three explores in greater depth Morocco's role in the defense of Western interests in the Middle East, the Muslim world, and Africa. If there is perhaps some redundancy, there is also plenty of good documentation. Berramdane suggests that Algeria became embroiled in the Western Sahara conflict as a result of its search for renewed political legitimacy, which seems less apt when applied to Algeria than to Morocco. Yet in Algeria's contemporary crisis, Berramdane may well be right in concluding that both Algeria and Morocco now share an interest "in a referendum favorable to Morocco" (p. 344). This careful study from a Maghribi perspective is a welcome addition to the literature on this conflict.

Robert Mortimer, Department of Political Science, Haverford College

US Intervention in Lebanon, 1958 and 1982: Presidential Decisionmaking, by Agnes G. Korbani. New York: Praeger, 1991. xii + 124 pages. Refs. to p. 136. Index to p. 142. $39.95.

Who's at the Helm? Lessons of Lebanon, by Raymond Tanter. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990. x + 227 pages. Notes to p. 241. Bibl. to p. 252. Index to p. 262. $24.95.

Reviewed by As'ad AbuKhalil

These two books examine US intervention in Lebanon as case studies in international relations theory.

Agnes Korbani's work is well below the standard of books usually reviewed in this journal. It is casually written and researched, and the author's analysis is often derived from other sources. In many instances these sources are popular magazines, such as *US News and World Report* (see, for example, p. 40). The author's own analysis also takes an approach unworthy of scholarship, as when she blames the civil war in Lebanon on the "xenophobic influence of Islamic culture throughout the Middle East" (p. 12). Korbani writes of "rampant communism" (p. 37) in Lebanon in 1958, when in fact the Lebanese communist party was an insignificant actor in that country's politics.

At times the author makes no effort to disguise her hostility to the Palestinians and Syria. She insists that "the Christians" (in reference to rightwing militias) were all Lebanese, while "leftists were a coalition of Lebanese, Palestinians, volunteers, and mercenaries from other countries" (p. 60). In fact, the rightwing militias relied more heavily than any other group on mercenaries, some recruited through the pages of *Soldier of Fortune*. Korbani's bibliography is unacceptable; she relies exclusively on a small body of English-language books and articles in popular journals. The author makes no use of the vast body of literature on the subject in Arabic and French.

Raymond Tanter's book is a more serious work that will be useful for international relations specialists. Tanter served on the National Security Council from 1981 to 1982, working on Middle East issues. *Who's at the Helm?* shows the author to be a fine political analyst, although his Middle East expertise is quite modest. The author begins his book by pompously (and quite inaccurately) comparing it to the works of Zbigniew Brzezinski, Henry Kissinger, William Quandt, and Gary Sick, among others (p. ix). Tanter has sharp analytical skills and is at his best when detailing the interdepartmental infighting in the US foreign-policy and military establishments.

Tanter belongs to the Alexander Haig school of "globalism" (to use the author's term), which is a fancy title for Reagan administration advisors who were obsessed with the specter of international communism and who saw benefits for US foreign policy in Israeli military actions in the Middle East. The author's pro-Israeli sympathies are clear, and he faults the United States for not taking full political advantage of Israel's military activities. Yet, even those who disagree with the author's political outlook have to recognize the seriousness of the work and its value for international relations theory. Tanter believes in marrying diplomacy with force (massive force in the case of Israel). The book also contributes to understanding the crippling infighting that went on during the Reagan years in the area of foreign policy, although Tanter tends to focus his blame on Robert McFarlane, sometimes in too personal a tone. The author is at his best when analyzing the various currents in US foreign policy and the outcome of interdepartmental feuds. He also provides an excellent treatment of the subject of credibility in the issuance of threats by a superpower.

Tanter is weaker when he tries to focus on the Middle East, as opposed to the US, dimension. He assumes, for example, a political continuity between the Baathist regimes of Salah Jadid and Hafiz al-Asad, although the two had different visions for Syria's role in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Asad vehemently opposed Jadid's obsession with the doctrine of "people's war." Tanter's attribution of the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon to the personality of Ariel Sharon and the latter's "hijacking" of the government—an analysis based on a book by Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari[1]—remains a dubious argument that is not well substantiated. The argument fits nicely with Israeli propaganda interests in the United States, as it attempts to distance Israel (as a people and government) from Israeli military actions in Lebanon, even though public opinion surveys published in Israel during the 1982 invasion showed overwhelming support for the army's actions, up until the massacres at the Sabra and Shatila camps. Tanter's argument that US official support for Israel mirrors popular support for that country—the author cites various opinion polls—cannot be taken seriously. Deep popular ignorance of foreign policy issues in the United States, and the fact that less than 3 percent of the public follows closely Middle East developments renders the public factor in foreign policy making almost irrelevant. This lack of knowledge also makes it possible for the US government—regardless of whether it is Republican or Democratic—to manipulate the public in support of its foreign policy objectives.

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1. *Israel's Lebanon War*, by Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, tr. by Ina Friedman (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984).

Tanter's book is an analytically rich work that should be read by all interested in international relations theory. It should also be read by Middle East specialists for its insights on the making of US Middle East policy. One wishes that Tanter had worked harder on his research, particularly to learn more about Middle Eastern politics. The list of scholarly books on the Middle East that the author cites is short, and his constant reference to the rarely useful *Middle East Policy Survey* appears annoyingly like an advertisement.

As'ad AbuKhalil is a scholar-in-residence at the Middle East Institute.

ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

Plans for Peace: Negotiation and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, by Karen A. Feste. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1991. xxix + 166 pages. Bibl. to p. 175. Index to p. 179. $47.95 cloth. $15.95 paper.
International Conflict Resolution: The US-USSR and Middle East Cases, by Louis Kriesberg. New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1992. xii + 236 pages. Notes to p. 258. Index to p. 275. $35.00.

Reviewed by William Mark Habeeb

The fields of conflict resolution and negotiation analysis are steadily expanding, in terms of both their theoretical foundations and their increasingly frequent use by scholars seeking to explain political interaction. In the two books under review, the authors attempt to use conflict resolution and negotiation theory to shed light on the Arab-Israeli conflict and its apparent intractability.

Karen Feste describes her book as "a study about negotiation potential." The first half of this short book is devoted to what Feste labels "the conflict frame," an analysis of the roots of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the reasons for its sustainability. She offers nothing new here; any good Middle Eastern studies undergraduate could have written this section. More disturbing, she reveals a weak grasp of the history of the conflict or the region, resulting in such baffling statements as "the weaker Palestinians have moved around a lot—from mandated Palestine to Jordan to Lebanon to the West Bank" (p. 34). She uses no first-hand sources.

The second half of the book presents the "negotiation frame," an analysis of the parties' attitudes toward compromise, negotiation strategies, and bargaining positions. She also reviews, in tabular form, the various peace plans and proposals that have been advanced to date. Finally, Feste addresses how the parties might move from the rigidities of "positional bargaining" to the more promising strategy of "principled negotiation." The foundation and terminology of this section derive largely from *Getting to Yes*,[1] a book that was written more for the mass market than for the scholarly community.

Unfortunately, Feste's arguments are not particularly innovative, enlightening, or even controversial (yes, all agree that Arabs and Israelis should talk more constructively). The book features tiresome conflict-resolution jargon, extensive quotations from mostly second-hand sources, and far too many self-evident aphorisms, such as "genuine peace will probably require a lengthy period of calm for building up trust" (p. 15), and "surely proposal generation represents a prelude to peace" (p. 68). The author struggles to build a framework by cutting and pasting various negotiation theories; the result is flimsy, unfocused, and not especially persuasive.

Louis Kriesberg's book is an interesting comparative analysis of efforts taken to resolve conflicts between the United States and the former Soviet Union, and the Arab-Israeli conflict. He develops a framework to explain the process of conflict de-escalation. Using the two disparate cases, he explains why and how peace initiatives are taken—including the important role of domestic considerations—and why some initiatives lead to negotiations while others die on the vine; the strategic and tactical factors that determine why some negotiations lead to successful agreements and others do not; and why some agreements become the first step in a broad-based peace while others fail to endure.

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[1] *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement without Giving In*, by Roger Fisher and William Ury (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1981).

The fact that the two conflicts he studies are so fundamentally different makes his framework all the more impressive, for the reader is able to see clearly how it explains a relatively successful example of de-escalation (US-USSR) as well as a considerably less-successful example (Arab-Israeli).

Kriesberg's final chapter on policy implications is somewhat disappointing, less because of its substance than because of its sparseness. The epilogue, which addresses the Gulf war from a conflict-resolution perspective, seems out of place, as it is only indirectly related to the two cases on which the author focuses. Perhaps some final, updated comments on Arab-Israeli peace would have been more appropriate. On the whole, however, this is a solid and theoretically well-grounded work that should find a wide readership.

William Mark Habeeb is an international consultant in Washington, DC; and is the author of Power and Tactics in International Negotiation *(Baltimore, MD and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988) and co-editor of* Polity and Society in Contemporary North Africa *(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993 [forthcoming]).*

LITERATURE

In Forbidden Time: Love Poems, by Henri Zoghaib, tr. by Adnan Haydar and Michael Beard. Washington, DC: New Pen Bond Publishers, 1991. 87 pages. $15.00 paper.

Reviewed by George N. Atiyeh

Henri Zoghaib is a Lebanese poet and writer with many accomplishments in the fields of literary criticism and literary journalism. He is the founder of a poetry magazine, *L'Odyssée* (1982), that unfortunately did not live long in war-torn Lebanon. In 1989 Zoghaib immigrated to the United States and since has been engaged in a variety of cultural and literary endeavors, which remind one of the innovative early Arab-American poets who created the distinctive and influential movement of *al-adab al-mahjari* (immigrant literature).

The present volume under review consists of poems selected from the poet's works, *Rhythms, Love Poems in Forbidden Time, Pulses in the Rhythms of Her Heart, The Dialogue of Sea and Wind,* and *The Swallow's Glad Tidings.* There is also a foreword by the translators, which introduces and analyzes the poetry of Zoghaib in its philosophical and stylistic aspects.

The first two parts, addressed to a female, consist of short poems, each called a "rhythm" or "pulse" that summon forth emotional vibrations through images and metaphors that are forceful and transcendental. Knowing the author's Lebanese background and patriotism, one wonders whether the addressed female is not his beloved Lebanon. Whether or not it is so, the poetry offers a sense of human exhilaration in a "forbidden time," standing firm in the face of cosmic circumstances that engulf us but cannot destroy us. What is significant here is the emanation of songs of love from a country seemingly immersed in the quagmire of a violent war.

The last poem, "Diogenes/Pillar of Salt," which is long compared to the other poems in the book, invokes the memory of the "other shore" that lingers in the solitude and the strangeness of the poet's new surroundings. There is a nostalgic longing and a fruitless search for the forbidden, the shore to which he wishes to return.

The translation, though not literal, succeeds in capturing the ideas and the emotions embedded in an Arabic style that is not spontaneous, but every word is carefully chosen and placed to produce the lofty images or ideas the poet intended to convey.

George N. Atiyeh, Head, Near East Section, Library of Congress

PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

Eternal Garden: Mysticism, History, and Politics at a South Asian Sufi Center, by Carl W. Ernst. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992. xxxi + 247 pages. Appends. to p. 280. Notes to p. 340. Bibl. to p. 360. Indices to p. 381. $19.95 paper.

Reviewed by John Alden Williams

In 1329 Sultan Muhammad ibn Tughluq moved many of the Muslim elite of Delhi to his new secondary capital of Dawlatabad in the Deccan, built on the site of the old Yadava capital of Deogir. As a result, the important Chishti Sufi *tariqa* set up a new center at the nearby site of Khuldabad, near some of the earliest Hindu, Jain, and Buddhist monuments in the region. It was destined to become a major shrine center of Islam in the Deccan, where not only saints—beginning with Burhan al-Din Gharib, the disciple of Shaykh Nizam al-Din Chishti of Delhi, and his successors—but also kings of Ahmadnagar and Golconda, the Mughal emperor Awrangzib, and the nizams of the Deccan would be buried.

This is a book about the interaction of Sufi mysticism, politics, and history at Khuldabad, written, as its author notes, in the hope that it will tell readers more about how to understand Islam in South Asia, and the history of Sufism as well. In this reviewer's opinion, it succeeds remarkably well in these aims, and is a many faceted, abundantly informative, and richly suggestive work.

Part one surveys the early Sufi tradition in Islam and analyzes the major religious and political historiographical problems that underlie the medieval texts. Part two is an account of the establishment of the Chishti Sufi tradition in the Deccan, and what the earliest sources reveal of its principle religious practices. Part three discusses the political involvements of the Chishti masters of Khuldabad, and the role of the shrines in Indian politics up until the 19th century. Part four draws conclusions and part five appends a Sufi bibliography of religious and mystical texts current in the Delhi Sultanate, a 15th-century revenue document, and various royal and imperial decrees found in the shrines. All this makes the book a reference work of considerable value, which should identify, better than prior works, the role of the Sufis in the spread of Islam in India. They were not the Muslim counterparts of British Protestant missionaries, nor were they *ghazi* warriors for the faith. They created in the subcontinent centers of Islamic authority and power that attracted converts, ministered to both commoners and elites, challenged authority, and had to be taken into account by kings.

The Chishtis were notable for their fondness for *sama'*, the controversial practice of listening to mystical poetry recited or sung to music as an aid to devotion, an occasion for mystical dance, and a path to ecstasy. This receives an excellent discussion. The author uncovered invaluable new manuscript sources at the shrines of Khuldabad and has woven these together in an exciting way with historical, oral, ritual, legendary, and anthropological data, in an exemplary mixture of scholarly caution, empathy, and affection for the subject. He acknowledges his debts to Annemarie Schimmel of Harvard University and K.A. Nizami of Aligarh University. This engagingly written and pleasantly erudite book emerges as one of the most exciting and readable contributions to the study of Islam in India to appear in years.

John Alden Williams, Department of Religion, College of William and Mary

Ethical Theories in Islam, by Majid Fakhry. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1991. x + 206 pages. Appends. to p. 223. Bibl. to p. 228. Index to p. 230. NLG120.00.

Reviewed by James W. Morris

This book is an important supplement to the author's widely used *History of Islamic Phi-*

losophy,[1] following a similar approach and focusing on the ethical theories of key Islamic philosophers and a few religious authors—including al-Ghazali, Ibn Hazm, and Fakhr al-Razi—whose theoretical ethical writings were especially influenced by the philosophical tradition. The writings discussed in detail here—almost all in Arabic—are entirely drawn from premodern thinkers, ranging from al-Kindi (d. 866) to al-Dawwani (d. 1501). As explained in the introduction, the focus of this work on abstract ethical theory required leaving out many influential forms of more "applied" ethical teaching in Islamic cultures, including such vast fields as Islamic law, learned and vernacular Islamic literatures (*adabiyat*), and the many forms of spiritual teaching associated with Sufism. Although some of those broader Islamic ethical traditions are briefly touched on in the treatment of religious writers, interested readers eventually will have to turn to more detailed individual studies in order to discover the actual political and social contexts and intentions, and the wider influences, of each of the ethical theories summarized here.

The discussion of philosophic ethical theories, beginning with al-Kindi, is preceded by two shorter sections summarizing major ethical issues in the religious traditions that so strongly influenced the expression (if less often the underlying problematic) of these Islamic thinkers. These traditions include the scriptural sources of the Quran and prophetic *hadith*, and the ethical positions of the Mutazilite and Asharite theological schools. The broader ethical issues highlighted in these opening chapters raise fundamental questions of metaphysics, psychology, and political philosophy, and nonspecialist students unfamiliar with these complex traditions may need to refer to more specialized studies to fill in that wider philosophic context for each thinker. Fortunately, the author has provided a helpful selective bibliography for this purpose, including available translations of primary sources. A fifth background chapter surveys the "Greek Sources of Philosophical Ethics," stressing the importance of popular Stoic and nomological materials, as well as the translations of actual Platonic and Aristotelean texts available to these writers.

The central section on philosophic ethics covers the ethical writings of ten Islamicate philosophers, briefly summarizing the ethical teachings of major thinkers (such as al-Farabi, Avicenna, and Averroes), while providing detailed paraphrases of ethical works by lesser-known figures such as Yahya ibn Adi, Miskawayh, Tusi, and al-Dawwani. Here the problematic linkages between ethics and political philosophy and psychology provide the major connecting themes. The final section on religious ethics, after an introductory chapter on the "traditionalism" and ascetic ethics of early Islam, summarizes the ethical writings of five religious thinkers from the 11th and 12th centuries. In these discussions the author alludes more directly to the broader legal (with al-Mawardi) and spiritual (with al-Ghazali) dimensions of Islamic ethical teaching. The textual summaries are generally accurate and reliable, although the narrow focus on ethical writings means that inquiring readers must turn to more comprehensive studies for deeper interpretation.

James W. Morris, Department of Religion, Oberlin College

SOCIAL CONDITIONS

Bâtisseurs et bureaucrates: ingénieurs et société au Maghreb et au Moyen-Orient. Lyon, France: Maison de l'Orient Méditerranéen, 1990. 320 pages. Append. to p. 425. Bibl. to p. 436. n.p. paper.

Reviewed by Joseph Szyliowicz

Although many countries in the Middle East have invested considerable resources in producing scientific and technical manpower, none has yet achieved a high level of technological mastery. Relatively few scholars have carried out research on this phenomenon in general, or on the role of the key actors. The engineering profession has been particularly ignored, even though it has grown steadily in size and has achieved prominence in many Middle Eastern societies with its own educational institutions, professional associations, and communication channels. Apart from pioneering research on Egypt[1] and Turkey,[2] one is hard pressed to find significant scholarly studies. This book, which explicitly addresses the emergence of engineers as new sociopolitical actors and their role in the developmental process, is, therefore, especially welcome.

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[1] New York: Columbia University Press, 1983 (2nd ed.).

The volume consists of papers presented at a conference held in Lyon in 1989, primarily by French scholars, and augmented by several additional contributions. It includes such topics as the organization of the profession: its recruitment, training, and ideology; and its role in technology transfer and choice of development strategies.

The work begins with an introductory section consisting of two chapters. The first, written by the conference organizer, Elisabeth Longuenesse (who is also the author of a chapter on engineers in Jordan) attempts to identify general themes and to integrate the diverse contributions that comprise the rest of the volume. The latter vary in quality but generally are of high calibre. The second chapter by André Grelon compares the evolution of the engineering profession in the Middle East and Europe. Antoine Zahlan offers a knowledgeable overview of the situation in the Arab states.

The other authors focus on the engineering profession in specific countries and their contributions are organized in four sections: historical development, employment and training, engineers and rural development, and the issue of professional identity and its relation to political power. This last section is quite limited, for it consists only of chapters examining Lebanon; Aleppo, Syria; and Turkey.

Overall the geographic coverage is rather uneven. Five authors treat Syria (two focus on Aleppo), three view Algeria, and two examine Jordan and Turkey. The remaining authors address Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia. Some information on Iraq and the countries of the Arabian Peninsula is contained in a valuable appendix, which summarizes the available data on the profession in each country and also provides comparative perspectives.

Although national differences are significant, one important generalization emerges from this work. The major constraint on the achievement of technological mastery is not to be found in the number or types of engineers—despite weaknesses in preparation, a surplus exists in several countries—but in a general failure to adopt and implement appropriate policies.

A bibliography of relevant works is also included, the brevity of which highlights the significance of this volume and the opportunities for further research on important but largely neglected topics.

Joseph Szyliowicz, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver

Recent Publications

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCE

The Oxford Companion to the Politics of the World, ed. by Joel Krieger *et al.* Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. xxxi + 1,056 pages. Maps. Index: $49.95. Contains 650 signed articles; entries are crossreferenced and provide short bibliographies. Alphabetically ordered listings include countries, biographies, historical events, treaties and conventions, concepts, and international organizations. (SG)

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[1] Clement H. Moore, *Images of Development: Egyptian Engineers in Search of Industry* (Boston, MA: MIT Press, 1980).

[2] Nilufer Göle, "Ingénieurs en Turquie: avant-garde révolutionnaire ou élite modernisatrice" (Paris: thèse de 3ème cycle, Centre d'analyse et d'Intervention sociologiques, 1982).

Annotations have been prepared by the book review editor, with the assistance of **Eleni Eleftheriou, Pinar Taşkin, Stacy L. Tobin, and Roxanne Varzi.**

GEOGRAPHY

The Changing Geography of Africa and the Middle East, ed. by Graham P. Chapman and Kathleen M. Baker. London and New York: Routledge, 1992. xvii + 252 pages. Index. $18.95 paper. A collection of 10 articles, including "The Changing Geography of North Africa: Development, Migration, and the Demographic Time Bomb" by George Joffé, "The Changing Geography of the Lower Nile: Egypt and Sudan as Riparian States" by J. Anthony Allan, "The Troubled Arab Middle East" by St John B. Gould, "The Non-Arab Middle East: Iran, Turkey, and Israel" by Keith McLachlan, and "A Growing Sense of Urgency" by Graham P. Chapman and Kathleen M. Baker. (SG)

CYPRUS

Cyprus: A Country Study. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1993. 4th ed. xxxii + 302 pages. Append. Gloss. Index. $18.00. Provides a synopsis of the island's history from 5800 BCE to the present, including Byzantine, Lusignan, Venetian, Ottoman, and British rule; and detailed accounts of the economy, government and politics, and social conditions for both the Greek and Turkish communities. Includes 23 tables and 10 maps. (EE)

HORN OF AFRICA

Ethiopia—Power and Protest: Peasant Revolts in the Twentieth Century, by Gebru Tareke. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991. xxi + 272 pages. Notes. Bibl. Index. $49.50. This study is divided into two parts—"Society and History" and "Resistance and Repression." The work provides a social and historical background to popular protest and rural resistance in Ethiopia as well as several case studies; focuses primarily on three major insurrections that occurred between 1941 and 1970. (PT)

IRAN

Iran and the Arab World, ed. by Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993. ix + 264 pages. Index. $49.95. A collection of 12 essays, including "Iranian-Arab Relations in Transition" by Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar, "The Impact of American Policies on Iranian-Arab Relations" by Joseph Kechichian, "The Lion and the Sphinx: Iranian-Egyptian Relations in Perspective" by Nader Entessar, "Iran and Syria: From Hostility to Limited Alliance" by Shireen T. Hunter, and "Iran and Iraq: Changing Relations and Future Prospects" by Andrew T. Parasiliti. (SG)

The Iranian Mojahedin, by Ervand Abrahamian. New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1992. ix + 307 pages. Notes. Bibl. Index. $17.00 paper. A paperback edition of a book originally published in 1989 and reviewed in MEJ vol. 44, no. 2 (1990), pp. 314–15. It was praised there as "a valuable addition to the literature on the Left." (SG)

The Political History of Modern Iran: From Tribalism to Theocracy, by Mehran Kamrava. Westport, CT and London: Praeger, 1992. x + 177 pages. Bibl. Index. $42.95. Argues that three dominant features historically have characterized Iranian political life—autocracy, the intervention of outside forces, and revolution. These three elements are examined in the context of Qajar and Pahlavi rule; the author views the Islamic republic as influenced by autocracy, factionalism, and patrimonial populism. A final chapter on "Iranian Political Culture" stresses tribalism, feudalism, religion, inequality, illiteracy, and personality. (RV)

Rūyārū'ī-ye zan veh mard dar 'asr-e qājār: Dū resāleh—Tādīb al-nesvān veh m'āyib al-rejal (Confrontation of Men and Women in the Qajar Period: Two Treatises—*Disciplining of Women* and *Vices of Men*), ed. by Hasan Javadi *et al*. Evanston, IL: Historical Society of Iranian Women; and Bethesda, MD: Jahan Books, 1992. 206 pages. Notes. n.p. paper. The first essay is by an anonymous late 19th-century Iranian prince who admonishes women to behave demurely in front of men. The second essay is a reply by Bībī Khanom, who uses verses from the Quran to refute the prince and calls for more freedom for women. (EH)

IRAQ

Saddam Hussein's Gulf Wars: Ambivalent Stakes in the Middle East, by Miron Rezun. Westport, CT and London: Praeger, 1992. xxi + 140 pages. Appends. Bibl. Index. $39.95. An examination of Iraq under the rule of Saddam Hussein, discussing historical, political, and cultural events and misinterpretations that led ultimately to Iraq's war with the West. The author also examines the US role in the Gulf region, the 1991 war, and the war's aftermath. (PT)

ISRAEL AND ZIONISM

Israel: A Concise Political History, by Yossi Beilin. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992. xi + 276 pages. Bibl. Index. $35.00. An historical overview, beginning with the origins of Zionism and concluding with current conditions. Examines composition of various governments, national security, religious pressures, and changing political agendas.

An epilogue concludes that "the years between 1957 and 1967 were [Israel's] finest years" (p. 263), and that "Israel's sensational victory of 1967 became a curse" (p. 265). (SLT)

National Security and Democracy in Israel, ed. by Avner Yaniv. Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993. xii + 225 pages. Bibl. Contribs. Index. $35.00 cloth. $15.95 paper. A collection of 10 articles, including "The Israeli Concept of National Security" by Dan Horowitz, "Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution: National Security and the Arab Minority" by Sammy Smooha, "National Security and the Rule of Law: A Critique of the Landau Commission's Report" by Mordechai Kremnitzer, and "Nuclear Weapons, Opacity, and Israeli Democracy" by Avner Cohen. (SG)

Population and Social Change in Israel, ed. by Calvin Goldscheider. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992. xvi + 193 pages. Contribs. $30.00 paper. Contains eight articles that examine demographic trends and transformations. Includes "Israel and World Jewish Population: A Core-Periphery Perspective" by Sergio Della Pergola, "Migration and Urbanization: Patterns of Population Redistribution and Urban Growth" by Alan Kirschenbaum, "Soviet Immigration as Viewed by Jews and Arabs: Divided Attitudes in a Divided Country" by Majid Al-Haj, "Marriage and Fertility in the Process of Integration: Intermarriage among Origin Groups in Israel" by Zvi Eisenbach, and "Jewish Fertility Patterns: Norms, Differentials, and Policy Implications" by Shlomo Kupinsky. (PT)

Who's the Boss in Israel: Israel at the Polls, 1988–89, ed. by Daniel J. Elazar and Shmuel Sandler. Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1992. 313 pages. Index. $39.95. Contains 12 articles in three parts: "The Parties," "Election Campaign and Issues," and "The 1989 Municipal and Histadrut Elections." Chapters include "The Likud: Moving toward the Center" by Giora Goldberg, "Religion, Social Cleavages, and Political Behavior: The Religious Parties in the Elections" by Eliezer Don-Yehiya, "War and Peace, Hopes and Fears in the 1988 Elections" by Efraim Inbar, and "The Financing of Elections and Parties" by Chaim Kalcheim and Shimon Rosevitch. (SG)

KURDS AND KURDISTAN

Hidden Death: Land Mines and Civilian Casualties in Iraqi Kurdistan. New York: Middle East Watch, 1992. iv + 67 pages. $7.00 paper. Reports that the Iraqi army laid and then abandoned millions of mines to make large areas of Iraqi Kurdistan permanently unusable; assigns partial blame to the Italian manufacturer that sold mines to Iraq; describes effect of land mines on livestock herding, firewood gathering; offers recommendations for education, marking of minefields, land mine eradication, and medical treatment; and calls for the unconditional ban on the manufacture, possession, transfer, and sale of antipersonnel land mines, as well as an investigation of the Italian government and the EC for allowing the massive export of land mines to Iraq. (RV)

PAKISTAN

Culture, Class, and Development in Pakistan: The Emergence of an Industrial Bourgeoisie in the Punjab, by Anita M. Weiss. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991. x + 207 pages. Appends. Gloss. Refs. Index. $29.50 paper. A study of social changes in Punjab due to industrial development and economic transformations. Examines the traditional basis of social life and the emergence of a middle class. Chapters provide case studies of "The Pharmaceutical Industry," "The Steel Re-Rolling Industry," and "The Sialkot Sporting Goods Industry." Includes numerous tables and photographs. (EE)

A Taste of Power: The Uneasy Reign of Benazir Bhutto, 1988–1990, by Jan van Heugten and Olivier Immig. Amsterdam: Middle East Research Associates, 1992. Occasional Paper no. 13. 25 pages. Bibl. $8.00 paper.

PALESTINE AND PALESTINIANS

Behind the Intifada: Labor and Women's Movements in the Occupied Territories, by Joost R. Hiltermann. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992. xvii + 265 pages. Notes. Bibl. Index. $14.95 paper. A paperback edition of a book originally published in 1991 and reviewed in MEJ vol. 46, no. 4 (1992), pp. 691–2. It was hailed there as "essential reading for scholars and policymakers who seek to understand the dynamics of Palestinian society." (SG)

Faith and the Intifada: Palestinian Christian Voices, ed. by Naim S. Ateek *et al.* Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1992. xv + 207 pages. Contribs. $13.95 paper. A collection of 27 essays, based on papers given at the "First International Symposium on Palestinian Liberation Theology," held in March 1990. The essays are grouped in five parts—"The Palestinian Reality;" "Palestinian Christian Identity;" "Power, Justice, and the Bible;" "Women, Faith, and the Intifada;" and "International Responses to the Quest for Palestinian Theology." Contributors include Naim S. Ateek, Hanan Ashrawi, Salim Tamari, Jad Isaac, Riah Abu El-Assal, Jonathan Kuttab, and Marc Ellis. (SG)

Let Us Be Free: A Narrative Before and During the Intifada, by Patrick White. Clifton, NJ: Kingston Press, 1989. 134 pages. $19.95 cloth. $12.95 paper.

SYRIA

Throwing Away the Key: Indefinite Political Detention in Syria. Washington, DC and New York: Middle East Watch, 1992. vii + 64 pages. Appends. $8.40 paper. Emphasizes the severity of administrative detention; examines continuing abuses by Syrian security services, including torture. The report, written on the eve of the 30th anniversary of the imposition of martial law, also draws attention to various civil liberties suspended under the state of emergency laws. (RV)

TURKEY

Istanbul Households: Marriage, Family, and Fertility, 1880–1940, by Alan Duben and Cem Behar. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991. xviii + 276 pages. Gloss. Bibl. Index. $59.50.

Turkey Faces East: New Orientations toward the Middle East and the Old Soviet Union, by Graham E. Fuller. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992. ix + 70 pages. Refs. n.p. paper. Reviews Turkey's historic political and economic direction westward; argues that the collapse of the Soviet Union offers Turkey the opportunity for influence as a regional power among the newly independent republics; surveys Turkey's relations with its eastern neighbors. (PT)

Turkey: Walls of Glass. New York: Amnesty International, 1992. 20 pages. $4.00 paper. Examines the extent to which the government of Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel has kept its promise to reform human rights abuses; addresses torture, death in custody, extrajudicial executions; proposes reform of police practices and the establishment of independent commissions of inquiry. (RV)

YEMEN

The Yemen Arab Republic: Development and Change in an Ancient Land, by Manfred W. Wenner. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991. x + 194 pages. Bibl. Chron. About the Author. Index. $34.95. An introduction to the former Yemen Arab Republic. Discusses political history from the pre-Islamic period through Ottoman rule to revolution and independence in 1962; also explores socio-economic conditions through an examination of population data, economic sectors, development programs, and governmental institution building. Numerous tables, figures, and photographs accompany the text. (SLT)

MODERN HISTORY AND POLITICS

Britain and the Middle East in the 1930s: Security Problems, 1935–39, ed. by Michael J. Cohen and Martin Kolinsky. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992. xvii + 231 pages. Index. $45.00. A collection of 12 articles, including "British Strategy in the Middle East in the Wake of the Abyssinian Crisis, 1936–39" by Michael J. Cohen, "Egyptian Regional Policy in the Wake of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936: Arab Alliance or Islamic Caliphate?" by James Jankowski, "A Breakthrough in Zionist Military Conceptions, 1936–39" by Meir Pa'il, and "The Palestine Problem in the Context of Colonial Policy on the Eve of the Second World War" by Ronald W. Zweig. (SG)

Human Rights Watch World Report, 1993: Events of 1992. Washington, DC and New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993. **vol. 1:** xxii + 184 pages. **vol. 2:** pp. 185–402. n.p. paper. Reports of human rights violations compiled by divisions of Human Rights Watch—Africa Watch, Americas Watch, Asia Watch, Helsinki Watch, and Middle East Watch. Each country entry describes human rights developments, ability of various human rights organizations to carry out monitoring, US policy toward the country, and the division's work there. The Middle East Watch section addresses Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen; Helsinki Watch addresses Turkey and the former Soviet Union; Africa Watch addresses Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan; Asia Watch addresses Afghanistan and India. (EE)

Intervention into the 1990s: US Foreign Policy in the Third World, ed. by Peter J. Schraeder. 2nd ed. Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992. xii + 498 pages. Abbrevs. Notes. Bibl. Contribs. Index. $18.95 paper. A revised edition of a book originally published in 1989 as *Intervention in the 1980s*. The 21 chapters are in six parts: "Introduction," "Origins of Intervention," "Tools of Intervention," "Constraints on Intervention," "Case Studies," and "Conclusion." Case studies include "Iran" and "The Persian Gulf" by Eric Hooglund and "The Arab-Israeli Conflict" by Deborah J. Gerner. "Tools of Intervention" considers economic and military aid, economic sanctions, covert intervention, paramilitary intervention, and direct military intervention; "Constraints on Intervention" considers the domestic environment, government and the military establishment, the structure of the international system, and international law. Also includes "The Evolution of the Interventionist Impulse" by Lloyd C. Gardner and "The Development of Low-Intensity-Conflict Doctrine" by Michael T. Klare. (SG)

Japan in the Contemporary Middle East, ed. by Kaoru Sugihara and J.A. Allen. London and New York: Routledge, 1993. xv + 191 pages. Notes. Index. $55.00. Contains chapters based on a 1990 conference held at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, entitled "The Japanese Approach to the Contemporary Middle East." Chapters include "Japan and the

Middle East: Trade, International Assistance, and International Relations" by J.A. Allan, "The Iran-Japan Petrochemical Project: A Complex Issue" by Kazuo Takahashi, "Japan and the Middle East in the 1970s and Early 1980s: A Japanese Diplomat's View" by Kazuo Chiba, and "Japan's Relations with Israel" by Akifumi Ikeda. (SG)

The Many Faces of National Security in the Arab World, ed. by Bahgat Korany *et al.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993. xxv + 322 pages. Append. Index. $49.95 cloth. $19.95 paper. Contains 13 articles, including "Unravelling the Concept: 'National Security' in the Third World" by Mohammed Ayoob, "The Security Dilemma in the Middle East: A Prognosis for the Decade Ahead" by Janice Gross Stein, "Neglected Aspects of the Security Dilemma" by Fred H. Lawson, "Does Food Security Make a Difference? Algeria, Egypt, and Turkey in Comparative Perspective" by Karen Pfeifer, "Arab Military Industrialization: Security Incentives and Economic Impact" by Yezid Sayigh, and "State and Security in the Arab World: Towards a New Role for the Security Services?" by Elizabeth Picard. (SG)

Méditerranée occidentale: sécurité et coopération, ed. by Marie-Lucy Dumas. Paris: Fondation pour les études de défense nationale, 1992. 262 pages. Appends. Contribs. Bibl. FF140.00 paper. Contains 18 chapters, including "La tradition contestataire de l'Islam maghrébin" by Paul Balta, "Coopération industrielle et transferts de technologie au Maghreb: entre développement et sécurité" by Jean-François Daguzan, "Les politiques de défense des états du Maghreb" by Marie-Lucy Dumas, and "Sahara occidental: un conflit résiduel au Maghreb" by Claude Le Borgne. (SG)

The Multinational Force in Beirut, 1982–1984, ed. by Anthony McDermott and Kjell Skjelsbaek. Miami: Florida International University Press, 1991. xii + 293 pages. Chron. Gloss. Contribs. Index. $29.95. Contains 17 articles, based on a 1985 meeting held at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs in Oslo. The chapters are in three parts—"Theory and Practice," "The MNF Players," and "Other Interested Parties." Includes "The Demise of the MNF" and "The Shiites and the MNF" by Augustus Richard Norton, "The American Peacekeeping Role in Lebanon" by Geoffrey Kemp, " 'If We Take Fire . . . We're Gonna Return It': How a Peacekeeping Force Took Sides" by Robert Fisk, "A Tragic Experiment in the Diplomacy of Misunderstandings" by Ghassan Tueni, and "External Interventions and Internal Wars in Lebanon, 1770–1982" by Marwan Buheiry. (SG)

Nature of the Islamic Community, ed. by Toshio Kuroda and Richard I. Lawless. Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 1991. xii + 237 pages. Index. n.p. A collection of nine articles, based on two symposia sponsored by the Institute of Middle Eastern Studies of the International University of Japan, Niigata. Contains "On the Nature of Community in the Arab-Muslim World" by Toshio Kuroda, "Restructuring Islamic Political Theories: Basic Concepts in a Contemporary Framework" by Yasushi Kosugi, "The Relevance of the Idea of a 'Nation State' in the Middle East in Light of the Palestine Issue" by Miyoko Kuroda, "The Concept of Greater Syria and Its Relationship with Identity and Nationality" by Ahmad Tarabein, "The Palestinian Uprising: The Intifadah" by Ramadan A. Shallah, "A Survey on the Concept '*Velāyat*' of '*Velāyat-e Faqīh*' " by Akiro Matsumoto, "*Wilāyah* and State in the Case of the Islamic Republic of Iran" by Hideko Iwai, "The Middle East: Aspects of Ecological and Structural Change" by Richard I. Lawless, and "The Nature of Community in the Middle East: A Case Study of Sudan" by Tim Niblock. (SG)

The North Caucasus Barrier: The Russian Advance towards the Muslim World, by Marie Bennigsen Broxup *et al.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992. xvii + 252 pages. Bibl. Index. $39.95. A collection of eight chapters, based on a 1988 symposium held in London. Includes "Cooptation of the Elites of Kabarda and Daghestan in the 16th Century" by Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, "Russian Strategies in the Conquest of Chechnia and Daghestan, 1825–1859" by Moshe Gammer, "The Last *Ghazawat*: The 1920–1921 Uprising" by Marie Bennigsen Broxup, and "Internationalism, Nationalism, and Islam before 1990" by Fanny E.B. Bryan. (SG)

Reconstruction and Regional Diplomacy in the Persian Gulf, ed. by Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar. London and New York: Routledge, 1992. xiv + 306 pages. Index. $59.95. A collection of ten articles, including "Why Has Iran Been Revolutionary?" by Nikki R. Keddie, "A Counter-Sensational Perspective on the Shi'a of Lebanon" by Augustus Richard Norton, "Wheels within Wheels: Iran's Foreign Policy towards the Arab World" by Anoushiravan Ehteshami, "Non-Provocative Defense in the Persian Gulf" by Nader Entessar, and "US Foreign Policy and the Islamic Revolution" by Mohsen M. Milani. (SG)

Religious Perspectives on War: Christian, Muslim, and Jewish Attitudes toward Force after the Gulf War, by David R. Smock. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1992. xviii + 63 pages. Gloss. Bibl. Contribs. $6.95 paper. A report on an interfaith symposium convened at the US Institute of Peace. Uses the 1991 Gulf war as a point of departure for discussing just war doctrine; stresses that mutual understanding among adherents of the three faiths will contribute significantly to the establishment of world peace. (EE)

The Turks of Bulgaria: The History, Culture, and Political Fate of a Minority, ed. by Kemal H. Karpat. Istanbul: Isis Press, 1990. Distrib. University of Wisconsin, Madison. 257 pages. $15.00 paper. A collection of nine articles: "The Bulgarian Way of Nation Building and the Turkish Minority" by Kemal H. Karpat, "Turkish Settlements in Rumelia (Bulgaria) in the 15th and 16th Centuries: Town and Village Population" by Ilhan Şahin *et* *al.*, "The Turks in Bulgaria, 1878–1944" by R.J. Crampton, "Urban Development in Bulgaria in the Turkish Period: The Place of Turkish Architecture in the Process" by Machiel Kiel, "The Turkish Minority in Bulgaria: History and Culture" by Bilal N. Şimşir, "Ahmed Aga Tămrašlijata: The Last Derebey of the Rhodopes" by Bernard Lory, "There are No Turks in Bulgaria: Rewriting History by Administrative Fiat" by Ali Eminov, "Turkish Influence on [the] Bulgarian [Language]" by Alf Grannes, and "The Rights of Minorities in International Law and Treaties: The Case of the Turkish Minority in the People's Republic of Bulgaria" by A. Mete Tuncoku. (SG)

US-Israeli Strategic Cooperation in the Post-Cold War Era: An American Perspective, by Karen L. Puschel. Boulder, CO: Westview Press; and Jerusalem, Israel: Jerusalem Post, 1992. Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Study no. 20. 183 pages. Notes. Appends. $26.00 paper. Part one examines how the US-Israeli strategic relationship came into existence and was strengthened after the 1967 war; part two examines the implementation of a closer relationship beginning with the Reagan administration's second term; the third part, "Looking to the Future," evaluates the prospects for continued US-Israeli cooperation in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf war and the demise of the Soviet Union. (SLT)

Violence, Terrorism, and Justice, ed. by R.G. Frey and Christopher W. Morris. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991. x + 319 pages. $54.50 cloth. $17.95 paper. Contains 12 chapters, based on a 1988 conference held at Bowling Green State University, Ohio. Includes "What Purposes Can 'International Terrorism' Serve?" by Thomas C. Schelling, "Terrorism and Morality" by Jan Narveson, "Nuclear Hostages" by Gregory S. Kavka, and "Rape as a Terrorist Institution" by Claudia Card. (SG)

ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel: A Quest in Human Understanding, by John E. Hofman *et al.* Bristol, IN: Wyndham Hall Press, 1988. vi + 335 pages. Contribs. $34.95 cloth. $24.95 paper.

Direct Government Housing Assistance: The Preference for Settlements beyond the Green Line, by David Pines. Tel Aviv: Lavetah, 1992. 22 pages. Appends. Notes. n.p. paper. Argues that subsidies provided by the Israeli ministry of housing and Treasury provide a "preference of over 50 percent to the residents of settlements beyond the Green Line" over those within the line (p. 7). Holds that government policy does nothing to solve housing problems of the underprivileged, but rather improves the lives of the middle class. (SLT)

Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, by Charles D. Smith. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992. 2nd ed. xvii + 343 pages. Chron. Bibl. Index. $45.00. A revised edition of a book originally published in 1988 and reviewed in MEJ vol. 45, no. 3 (1991), pp. 529–30. The new edition includes an extended final chapter, with coverage of the *intifada* and the 1990–91 Gulf crisis and war, and an expanded bibliography. (SG)

PRE-20TH CENTURY HISTORY

The Byzantine and Early Islamic Near East, vol. 1: Problems in the Literary Source Material, ed. by Averil Cameron and Lawrence I. Conrad. Princeton, NJ: Darwin Press, 1992. xiv + 428 pages. Index. $29.95. Contains eight articles, based on a 1989 "Workshop of the Late Antiquity and Early Islam Project," held in London. Contains "Greek Historical Writing after Procopius: Variety and Vitality" by Michael Whitby, "New Themes and Styles in Greek Literature, 7th-8th Centuries" by Averil Cameron, "The Works of Anastasius of Sinai: A Key Source for the History of 7th-Century East Mediterranean Society and Belief" by John Haldon, "Ps-Methodius: A Concept of History in Response to the Rise of Islam" by G.J. Reinink, "The Gospel of the Twelve Apostles: A Syriac Apocalypse from the Early Islamic Period" by Han J.W. Drijvers, "Early Islamic State Letters: The Question of Authenticity" by Wadad al-Qadi, "The Literary Use of the *Khabar*: A Basic Form of Historical Writing" by Stefan Leder, and "The Conquest of Arwad: A Source-Critical Study in the Historiography of the Early Medieval Near East" by Lawrence I. Conrad. (SG)

The Intimate Life of an Ottoman Statesman: Melek Ahmed Pasha, 1588–1662, as Portrayed in Evliya Çelebi's *Book of Travels (Seyahat-Name)*, tr. by Robert Dankoff. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991. xiii + 304 pages. Gloss. Index. $14.95 paper. Offers a translation of passages drawn from the *Book of Travels*, a 10-volume account and narrative by Evliya Çelebi, servant and confidant of Melek Ahmed Pasha. Also includes a commentary on "The Author and His Subject" by the translator as well as an historical introduction by Rhodes Murphey. (PT)

Life of the Ancient Egyptians, by Eugen Strouhal. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992. 279 pages. Chron. Bibl. Index. Maps. $42.50. Focuses on the lives of ordinary ancient Egyptians, covering activities from birth, through education, courtship, and marriage, to death and the afterworld. Includes chapters on entertainment, the role of women, homes and communities, craftsmanship, boats and pyramids, royal tombs, war, temples, and medicine. The text is accompanied by 290 illustrations, including 200 color plates; also contains a chronology from 500 BCE to 641 CE. (EE)

The Middle East on the Eve of Modernity: Aleppo in the 18th Century, by Abraham Marcus. New York:

Columbia University Press, 1992. xiv + 418 pages. Append. Notes. Gloss. Bibl. Index. $14.50 paper. A paperback edition of a book originally published in 1989 and reviewed in MEJ vol. 44, no. 2 (1990), pp. 326–7. The work was praised there as an "exciting and innovative work . . . accessible and interesting to students and professors, to specialists and nonspecialists." (SG)

Turkish Athens: The Forgotten Centuries, 1456–1832, by Molly Mackenzie. Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 1992. Distrib. Paul and Company, Concord, MA. 148 pages. Notes. Bibl. Index. $39.95 cloth. $25.00 paper. An historical account of Ottoman rule from the conquest of Athens through the Greek war of independence. Describes changes in social and political conditions; relations between ethnic Greeks and Turks, and Christians and Muslims; and the role of the Orthodox patriarch under Ottoman rule. Also contains accounts of the destruction of Athenian sculptures and their removal by western Europeans, and a portrayal of the city at the time of Byron's stay there. (EE)

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

The Politics of Economic Reform in the Middle East, ed. by Henri J. Barkey. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992. ix + 262 pages. Refs. Index. $49.95. Contains three parts, "Economic Reform and Political Continuity," "Economic Reform and the Politics of Controlled Change," and "Economic Reform and the Politics of Regime Transformation." Includes case studies of Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey. (SG)

SOCIAL CONDITIONS

Chādorha-ye sīyāh: Parzhūheshī pīrāmūn jām'aeh veh eqtesād-e 'ashā'irī īl-e qashqā'ī (Black Tents: A Socioeconomic Study of the Qashqa'is), by Fazlullah Rohani. Stockholm: Arash Publications; and Bethesda, MD: Jahan Books, 1992. 346 pages. n.p. paper. A study of the kinship relations, migration patterns, herding activities, and social customs among the Qashqa'i tribes of southern Iran. Research was undertaken in the early 1960s for the author's dissertation. Includes over 30 black-and-white photographs. (EH)

Labor Migration to the Middle East: From Sri Lanka to the Gulf, ed. by J.D. Speckmann *et al.* London and New York: Kegan Paul International, 1992. Distrib. Routledge, Chapman and Hall, New York. xi + 259 pages. Contribs. Index. $79.95. A collection of 12 articles, including "Recruitment of Labor Migrants for the Middle East," "Labor Migration and the Policy of the Gulf States," "Middle East Migration at the Micro Level: A Village Case Study," "The Socio-Economic Position and Religious Status of Sri Lankan Muslim Women Migrating to the Gulf," and "Sri Lankan Housemaids in the Middle East: An Avenue for Social and Economic Improvement?" (SG)

PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

The Political Aspects of Islamic Philosophy: Essays in Honor of Muhsin S. Mahdi, ed. by Charles E. Butterworth. Cambridge, MA: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University, 1992. Distrib. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. vi + 406 pages. Contribs. Bibl. Index. $14.95 paper. Contains nine essays: "Al-Kindi and the Beginnings of Islamic Political Philosophy" by Charles E. Butterworth, "The Political Implications of al-Razi's Philosophy" by Paul E. Walker, "The Theoretical and Practical Dimensions of Happiness as Portrayed in the Political Treatises of al-Farabi" by Miriam Galston, "The Philosopher-Prophet in Avicenna's Political Philosophy" by James W. Morris, "The Place of the Philosopher in the City According to Ibn Bajjah" by Stephen Harvey, "The Political Thought of Ibn Tufayl" by Hillel Fradkin, "The Scope and Methods of Rhetoric in Averroes' *Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Rhetoric*" by Michael Blaustein, "The Source and Nature of Authority: A Study of al-Suhrawardi's Illuminationist Political Doctrine" by Hossein Ziai, and "The Political Thought of Qutb al-Din al-Shirazi" by John Walbridge. The volume also contains a listing of Mahdi's publications, arranged by year of publication. (SG)

LANGUAGE, LITERATURE, ARTS

Fantasies of Violence and Blackmail: The Palestinian Conflict in Popular Literature, by Toine van Teeffelen. Amsterdam: Middle East Research Associates, 1992. Occasional Paper no. 14. 38 pages. Bibl. Append. $8.00 paper.

Modern Arabic Literature, ed. by M.M. Badawi. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992. xiii + 571 pages. Bibl. Index. $125.00. This volume in the *Cambridge History of Arabic Literature* series contains 14 chapters, including "The Beginnings of the Arabic Novel" and "The Mature Arabic Novel outside Egypt" by Roger Allen, "Arabic Drama: Early Developments" by M.M. Badawi, "The Prose Stylists" and "The Critics" by Pierre Cachia, "Arab Women Writers" by Miriam Cooke, and "Poetry in the Vernacular" by Marilyn Booth. (SG)

Stories by Iranian Women since the Revolution, tr. by Soraya Paknazar Sullivan. Austin: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, University of Texas, 1991. Distrib. University of Texas Press, Austin. xii + 184 pages. $8.95 paper. A diverse compilation of 13 short stories by Iranian women writers from the period immediately before the 1979 revolution to the present. The writers represent a cross section of socioeconomic and generational backgrounds, and range from such well-known authors as Simin Daneshvar to newer, younger writers; the stories contain a wide variety of themes. (RV)

WOMEN

Expanding the Boundaries of Women's History: Essays on Women in the Third World, ed. by Cheryl Johnson-Odim and Margaret Stobel. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992. xiv + 333 pages. Contribs. $35.00 cloth. $14.95 paper. A collection of 15 chapters, divided into four parts: "Cross-Cultural Contact and the Issues of Discourse," "Women as Activists," "Women as Workers," and "Issues in Methodology and Analysis." Contributions include "The Debate on Women's Liberation in the Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906–1911" by Janet Afary, "The Voices of Doria Shafik: Feminist Consciousness in Egypt, 1940–1960" by Cynthia Nelson, and "What's So Feminist about Doing Women's Oral History?" by Susan Geiger. (SG)

Images of Women: The Portrayal of Women in Photography of the Middle East, 1860–1950, by Sarah Graham-Brown. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992. xi + 274 pages. Notes. Bibl. Credits. Index. $22.00 paper. A paperback edition of a book originally published in 1988 and reviewed in MEJ vol. 43, no. 3 (1989), pp. 546–7. The book was praised for combining "four topics of current interest in a lively and provocative way: women, Orientalism, the Middle East, and photography." (SG)

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1992. 152 pages. $30.00. Six chapters focus on ethnic identity, history, the arts, tolerance, daily life, and contemporary culture. Each chapter is divided into three sections, including social studies, literature, and art. A looseleaf format allows for removal and classroom use of handouts, a bibliography, and 20 slides. (MNS)

NEW JOURNALS

Kurdistan Times is a new journal addressing the politics, language, culture, and ancient and modern history of the Kurdish people. Articles in the first two issues include "Origin of the Kurdish Language" and "Political Analysis of the Current Situation of the Kurdish Nation" by Mustafa Al-Karadaghi, "The Tragedy of Iraqi Kurdistan" by Peter W. Galbraith, "Testimony before the Congressional Human Rights Caucus" by David A. Korn, "The Name Kurd and its Philological Connections" by G.R. Driver, "A Lost Heritage and an Ancient Religion of the Kurds: Zerdushti 'Zoroastrianism' " by Ali Tamsen and Luri Tamsen, and "Trends in the Dynamics of the Geopolitical Environment of Kurdistan after World War II" by Omar Sheikmons. For further information, contact Mustafa Al-Karadaghi, Editor and Publisher, *Kurdistan Times*, PO Box 1354, Fairfax, VA 22030. (SG)

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Send copies of such articles to: Bibliography Editor, Middle East Journal, 1761 N Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036.

Abbreviations

A./a., Asia, Asian, Asiatic, Asie, asiatique, etc.
Acad., Academy
Admin., Administration, Administrative
Aff., Affairs
Afr./afr., Africa, African, Afrique, africain, etc.
Amer., America, American, etc.
Ann., Annals, Annales
Annu., Annuaire
Anthrop./anthrop., Anthropology, Anthropological, Anthropologie, anthropologique, etc.
Assoc., Association
B., Bulletin
BSOAS, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies
C., Central
Cah., Cahiers
Comp., Comparative
Contemp./contemp., Contemporary, contemporain, etc.
Cult., Culture, Cultural
Cur., Current
D., Deutsch, etc.
Dept., Department
Dev., Developing
Develop., Development
East., Eastern
Econ./écon., Economics Economie, économique, etc.
For., Foreign
Fr./fr., France, French, français, etc.
Geog./géog., Geography, Geographic, Geographical, Géographie, géographique, etc.
Hist./hist., History, Historical, Histoire, historique
IBLA, Institut des Belles Lettres Arabes
IJMES, International Journal of Middle East Studies
Inst., Institute, Institut, etc.
internac., internacional
Internat./internat., International, international, Internationale, etc.
internaz., internazionale
J., Journal
JPS, Journal of Palestine Studies
Lit., Literature, Literary
Lab., Labor, Labour
Mag., Magazine
Maj., Majallah, Majallat
Med./Méd., Mediterranean, Méditerranée, etc.
MEJ, Middle East Journal
MERIP, Middle East Research and Information Project
MESA, Middle East Studies Association
Mid., Middle
Mod./mod., Modern, moderne, moderno
Nr., Near
O., Orient, Oriental, Orientalia, oriental, oriente, etc.
Org., Organization
Pak., Pakistan
Polit./polit., Politics, Political, Politique, politique, Politica, etc.
Probs., Problems
Quart., Quarterly
Rel., Relations
Rep., Report
Res., Research
Rev., Review, Revue, Revista
Riv., Rivista
S., School, Schools
Sci., Science, Sciences, Scienze, etc.
Soc./soc., Society, Social, Société, social, etc.
Sociol./sociol., Sociology, Sociological, Sociologica, Sociologie, sociologique, etc.
Stud., Studies, Studia
Supp., Supplement
Univ., University, Université, etc.
US, United States
Z., Zeitschrift

The Bibliography of Periodical Literature has been prepared by the book review editor, with the assistance of **Eleni Eleftheriou, Lea-Rachel Kosnik, Holly A. Newby, Pinar Taşkin, Stacy L. Tobin, Roxanne Varzi, and Nancy Wood.**

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Communications

The JOURNAL *welcomes comments from its readers. All communications should be addressed to the Editor and bear the full name and address of the writer. A selection of those received will be published periodically in these columns. When a comment is received regarding an article or review published in the* JOURNAL, *and we feel it merits serious consideration, the author will be given the option to respond in kind. As a matter of policy, such exchanges are normally limited to one round. In addition to letters of comment, communications on other information of interest will be printed as space is available.*

To the Editor:

I read Amir Hassanpour's vitriolic attacks against me and my book on *Kurdish Ethnonationalism* (vol. 47, no. 1, Winter 1993). Space limitations do not allow me to respond to all of his objections to the contents of my book. I will limit my comments to two types of criticism he has made throughout his review.

First, Hassanpour faults the book for including factual and analytical errors. Much of what Hassanpour considers errors are indeed reflections of his own ethnocentric interpretation of facts. There exists a great deal of disagreement among experts on the Kurdish language, its genesis, and its development. Besides, the discussion of the Kurdish language is a minor part of my book. Hassanpour's apparent animosity toward the existence of a unified and non-Balkanized Iran leads him to other interesting interpretations of "facts." He faults me for stating that the Jaf family's land holdings remained essentially untouched by the shah's land reform program. This was a method by which the shah obtained the allegiance of the Jaf family to his regime. The locations of these land holdings are irrelevant to my discussion of shah-Jaf relations. Ahmad Moftizadeh, whom Hassanpour identifies as a Sunni Kurd, was in fact the Islamic republic's religious representative among the Shi'a Kurds of Kermanshah. The Iranian media at the time referred to him, rightly or wrongly, as if he had been given clerical authority by the office of Ayatollah Khomeini. Despite his family's Sunni background, Ahmad Moftizadeh, according to some accounts, had practiced Shi'a Islam while studying as a theological student in Tehran. Also, Hassanpour's reading of my analysis of various Kurdish forces in Iran is so inappropriate that I will not even begin to respond to his criticisms.

Secondly, and more importantly, Hassanpour seriously questions my "theoretical and ideological commitments." His statements here reflect not only his own rigidity, but also his own very ideological motives behind writing the *ad hominem* attacks on me. I do not wish to pass his ideological litmus test before daring to write anything on the Middle East. And I certainly do not believe anything worth investigating must be done within the framework of "critical social theory." It is the height of intellectual arrogance to dismiss the utility of other perspectives in social science analysis.

I am certain that Hassanpour does not know me personally, nor has he read any of my writings on Iranian politics and US-Iran relations. Nevertheless, he feels no compunction in accusing me of harboring monarchical sentiments and supporting "US cold war propaganda." One does not have to be a cold warrior or an apologist for US foreign policy in the Middle East to argue that the Soviet Union had expansionist designs on Iranian Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. Moscow indeed supported the Mahabad movement as well as other protest movements that supported its overall foreign policy goals in Iran. The literature on this topic is exhaustive and I do not need to belabor the point here. Hassanpour's rudimentary knowledge of foreign policy decision making and legal terminology also hampers his evaluation of the last two chapters of my book. His criticism of my use of the universally accepted international law term "secessionism" is a good case in point. Hassanpour's "critical social theory" perspective also leads him to challenge me for using such terms as "Iranian nation" and "Iranian culture," as if these terms are figments of my imagination. All in all, one could only hope that as a teacher of communication studies, Hassanpour is more open-minded and less doctrinaire than his harangues against me indicate.

—*NADER ENTESSAR*
Department of Politics and Law
Spring Hill College
Mobile, AL

To the Editor:

Dr. Entessar's response is disappointing. Instead of engaging in a creative dialogue, he carefully avoids addressing the points I raised in my review of his book.

Those who have not read the review may wonder why the *Middle East Journal* has published "harangues" and "vitriolic," "*ad hominem* attacks" against his work. In the review, I tried to demonstrate the weaknesses of his research by pointing out that he has conceptualized the Kurds and their nationalist movement from the perspective of the states that rule over Kurdistan. Thus, instead of treating the Kurds as a nonstate nation with legitimate rights to nationhood, Entessar depicts them as "prime examples of nonassimilating minorities" (p. 159) that must be integrated into "the mainstream of sociopolitical life" (p. 168). Although numerous factual errors undermine his research, the main problem, as I emphasized, is the selection and interpretation of evidence within the framework of Persian nationalism and positivist political theory.

The study of Kurdish nationalism offers researchers both challenges and opportunities. While this case is interesting in its own right, its study also sheds considerable light on the complex relationships between nationalism and language, and religion and nationalism. Regrettably, Entessar has not met the challenge. He claims that the Kurds lack a single language and, as a result, the Kurdish language is not an important "symbol of ethnic identity" (p. 4). Instead of addressing my critique of this view, he dismisses it by relegating it to "disagreement among experts" and my [Kurdish] "ethnocentric interpretation of facts."

It is well known that language is an important symbol of Kurdishness. In order to destroy the national identity of the Kurds, the Turkish, Iranian, and Syrian states have consistently denied the existence of the Kurdish language. Academics, government agencies, journalists, and military personnel have produced hundreds of articles, radio talks, books, and pamphlets portraying Kurdish as a conglomeration of Turkish, Arabic, and Persian dialects. Researchers like Entessar find ready support for this view in the work of Western philologists who have discovered, to the amazement of the Kurds, that Hawrami (Gorani) and Dimili (Zaza) are closer to Persian than to the two principal dialects of

Kurdish, Kurmanji and Sorani. It is true that there are considerable structural differences between these varieties. Moreover, mutual intelligibility is certainly limited. This is, however, only a minor part of the full picture, which Entessar fails to provide.

If "expert" in this context means someone who is quite familiar with the language, one of them, C.J. Edmonds, notes that "European authorities generally maintain that Gorani is not Kurdish and the people who speak it are not Kurds; but the people themselves feel themselves as Kurds in every way."[1] Another linguist, Terry Todd, notes that "Dimili speakers today consider themselves to be Kurds and resent scholarly conclusions which indicate their language is not Kurdish. Speakers of Dimili are Kurds psychologically, socially, culturally, economically and politically."[2] If Entessar had faithfully reported these facts, instead of looking at the relationship between language and nationalism as a one-way process,[3] he would have arrived at the conclusion (of interest to theories of nationalism) that this relationship is complex, dynamic, and dialectical; that in the case under study, the power of nationalism has turned linguistic disunity into linguistic unity. This type of analysis is expected in a book on ethnonationalism. Had Entessar written a treatise on structural linguistics or philology, which examine language independent of the social and cultural life of the speakers, I could hardly have raised any criticism.[4]

Citing a nonlinguist, Entessar claims that there are no "standard linguistic criteria" to warrant the classification of Kurdish "tongues as simply dialects of the same language" (p. 4). Linguists argue, however, that there are no clear-cut or "standard" *linguistic* criteria to distinguish between dialect and language. They readily cite the example of Swedish, Norwegian, and Danish, whose speakers "can understand each other's speech, to a greater or lesser extent," although each is considered a distinct and separate language. Conversely, the eight main dialect groups of Chinese, "which are mutually unintelligible to various degrees," are considered by its speakers to form a single language.[5]

I cite these sources in order to emphasize that I am not playing the reviewer's familiar I-know-better-than-the-author game. Entessar had easy access to this literature. It is, therefore, appropriate to conclude that his omission and commission of facts about the Kurdish language is due to an unsatisfactory review of the literature, a lack of analytical skills and absence of adequate theoretical frameworks, or his Persian nationalist perspective, which denies the Kurds the status and rights of a nation. He writes that "the discussion of the Kurdish language is a minor part of my book." In fact, there are 11 references (amounting to a total of 16 cited pages) to "language and education" in the index of *Kurdish Ethnonationalism*. Moreover, it is the quality of discussion that is at issue, although quantity is also significant in a book about a nationalist movement that raises language rights as one of its major demands.

Entessar's treatment of religion is equally inadequate. He has defended his factual errors and introduced new ones. Ahmad Moftizadeh was never given "clerical authority by the office of Ayatollah Khomeini." While many unknown Shiʿi clerics who declared allegiance to the regime were quickly dignified with titles such as *hojattulislām* or *āyat-*

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[1] *Kurds, Turks and Arabs* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 10.

[2] Terry L. Todd, "A Grammar of Dimili (also known as Zaza)" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1985), p. vi.

[3] Entessar concludes that "the very existence of linguistic differences has had an inhibiting impact on the development of a common Kurdish identity" (p. 5).

[4] Frederick Newmeyer demonstrates the limitations of "autonomous linguistics," which studies "languages without considering the culture, society, or beliefs of the speakers." See *The Politics of Linguistics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).

[5] David Crystal, *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 284–5.

ullāh, Moftizadeh was only referred to by the nonclerical title *'allāmah* (savant). He was not "the Islamic republic's religious representative among the Shi'a Kurds of Kermanshah." For quite a long time, Kermanshah has been a predominantly Shi'i city with a Sunni minority, and had a well-established progovernment Shi'i leadership in 1979. Because of his alliance with Tehran, Moftizadeh was armed to the teeth, and his armed vigilante groups terrorized the people of Sanandaj and Kordestan province. He was consequently denounced as a *jāsh* (pejorative word for collaborator) by the Kurds, and had to take refuge in Kermanshah, where the government organized a "Muslim *peshmarga*" group under his leadership. Moreover, there is no evidence to indicate that he ever practiced Shi'ism. To the contrary, he adamantly insisted on his Sunnism. In an open letter addressed to Khomeini, (published in *Inqilābi Islāmī*) during the drafting of the Islamic constitution, he strongly protested declaring Twelver Imam Shi'ism the official religion, and argued that Islam, not Shi'ism, should be recognized as Iran's state creed.

In the wake of Iran's "Islamic revolution," many students of Middle Eastern society have come to view religion as the engine of social change. Entessar fails to note that Kurdish nationalism offers a serious challenge to this simplistic theory, which treats religion ahistorically and assigns it an autonomous and determining role. Although the two ideologues of Kurdish nationalism, Ahmadi Khani (1650–1706) and Haji Qadir Koyi (1817–1897), were both *mullas*, their nationalism was secular. More recently, the emergence of an Islamic leadership in the Iranian revolution of 1978–79 encouraged the religious element in the Kurdish nationalist movement of Iran, but Islam failed to displace secular nationalism. Moftizadeh, a religious nationalist, was fatally defeated in his showdown with the secular left in Sanandaj in the spring and summer of 1979. Shaykh Izzaddin Hoseini, a radical and very popular nationalist, had to compete with leftist and secular forces (such as Komala and the Kurdistan Democratic Party) and was not able to maintain his influence. Equally significant is the failure of the Islamic government's extensive efforts to set up a viable and popular Islamic leadership for the Kurds of Iran, Iraq, and Turkey. In Turkey, the secular government has been supporting religious groups against leftist and secular Kurdish nationalism.

Entessar misquotes me on shah-Jaf relations. The shah did not need to obtain "the allegiance of the Jaf family to his regime." I wrote that the family, once the largest landowners in Iraq, escaped to Iran following the July 1958 coup, and "did not possess any land in Iran when the land reform began . . . much later the shah gave them land outside Kurdistan." Entessar simply ignores the point and, instead, finds the location of the lands irrelevant.[6]

I have not objected to the use of the term "secessionism." What I find questionable is Entessar's *conceptualization* of Kurdish demands for national rights as "secessionism" or "separatism." Kurdish aspirations for national rights are based on their historical claims to ancestral land, their homeland, Kurdistan. A Kurdish woman who was interviewed recently in Turkey put it simply: "The [Turkish] government says we are all separatists even if we are not . . . This is our country. Let them get out."[7] From the Kurdish perspective, the Iranian, Turkish, Iraqi, and Syrian states have illegally and offensively seized Kurdish lands, claiming them as part of Iran, Turkey, Iraq, and Syria.

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[6] This is another example of linear and Aristotelian logic characteristic of positivist thinking. Entessar is not willing to accept the conclusion that the family served the shah not because he spared their landholdings but because he gave them land and office. The head of the family passed away in the early 1960s and, by the early 1970s, two of his sons were appointed by the shah to the royal court and *Majlis*. Soon after the downfall of the shah, one of them was executed for involvement in the suppression of the anti-shah struggle by the people of southern Kurdistan during 1978. Apparently, all of Entessar's information is based on the brief accounts published in the Iranian press after his execution.

[7] Bob Hepburn, " 'It's Our Duty' to Help Rebels," in *Toronto Star*, November 8, 1992.

Entessar fails to see that his "legal" concepts are politically loaded in favor of the existing states. Thus, "secessionism" is not "universally accepted" by Kurds, Palestinians, East Timorians, Tamils, Aboriginal peoples, and other nonstate nations. These peoples have never been allowed to participate in the codification of "international law," which is the creation of the most powerful Western sovereign states. In fact, "secessionism" is a lethal weapon used against the Kurds: it is the ultimate crime a Kurd can commit in Iran, Turkey, Iraq, and Syria, and automatically leads to capital punishment. During this century, unceasing acts of violence—genocide, ethnocide, and linguicide—have been perpetrated on the Kurds, all in the name of secessionism. Entessar himself accuses me of secessionism, although, for obvious reasons, he uses the alternative term, "Balkanization" of Iran.

I argued that critical social theory is a more adequate but ignored perspective in Middle Eastern studies. I did not "dismiss the utility" of Orientalist and positivist approaches. On the contrary, I emphasized the utility of these approaches for both Western domination over the Middle East and the maintenance of despotic regimes throughout the region.[8] Much of this body of knowledge has taken sides against the struggle for freedom, democracy, and independence in the region. In the case of Iran, for example, it has either censored or vilified the labor movement, the women's movement, and other social movements.

I do not know Entessar personally but I know well that monarchist or dynastic historians do not necessarily entertain promonarchist sentiments. Like Kemalism in republican Turkey, the monarchist *weltanschauung* in Iran looms large in interpretations of the past and present, even among some nonmonarchists. This historiography reduces the process of social change to the succession of dynasties, and ignores or denounces peasant movements as *ghā'ilah* (disturbance), national movements as "secessionism" and "foreign intrigue," student movements as "deviant" and "communistic," workers and socialist movements as "a Soviet conspiracy," and totally ignores the women's movement.

Even in its more serious academic form, this worldview conceives the multicultural, multilingual, and multinational country of Iran as a monolithic "Iranian culture" or "Iranian nation." If the culture, language, and history of the Kurds, Baluches, Turkmans, Arabs, and Azeris are examined at all, they are consistently treated as "local" variants of the "Iranian," that is, Persian, entity, although the latter constitutes no more than 50 percent of the population. The center—the Persian language and culture—totally dominates the periphery. Kurdish, Baluch, and Turkman peoples are viewed as no more than valiant Iranian tribes, appointed by majestic kings to guard the center of the empire.

A thread that runs through Entessar's response is his firm belief in the universality and objectivity of his social science concepts. He fails to realize that believing in the neutrality and universality of (social) science is itself an ideological and theoretical position, albeit a very discredited one.[9] In a world characterized by the unequal distribution of power, the production, dissemination, and utilization of knowledge—by positivists and nonpositivists alike—cannot be but partisan. Objectivity is possible only within the constraints imposed by methodology, theory, politics, and ideology. The relevant question is not the detachment of researchers but, rather, the nature of their commitments. Whose side are they on?

I wrote my review and this response in the spirit of a "paradigm dialogue" that has been going on in the social sciences. I have tried to point out that Middle Eastern studies, especially the Iranian branch, historically have lagged behind advances made in social theory. It is no accident of history that monarchist views of Iranian society have so conveniently blended with positivist philosophy and its offshoots—modernization theory, functionalism, behaviorism, and empiricism. Nor is it surprising that the introduction of critical perspectives—including feminism, cultural history, political economy, cultural studies, (neo)Marxism, and political economy—often meets opposition. The picture is not totally bleak, however.

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[8] For a brief discussion of the connection between the Pahlavi regime and Iranian studies (in the United States), see James Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations* (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1988), pp. 372–4.

[9] For a liberal critique of the "antidemocratic character" of positive sciences, see James Carey, "Overcoming Resistance to Cultural Studies," in *Mass Communication Review Yearbook* vol. 5, (1985), pp. 27–40. It should be emphasized that the exact sciences are also partisan; see, among others, *Science and Liberation*, ed. by Rita Arditti *et al.* (Montreal, Canada: Black Rose Books, 1980).

There is resistance to the monopoly of knowledge and, since the 1970s, we have witnessed a struggle for the democratization of Middle Eastern studies. New frameworks, ranging from critical theory to postmodernism, are slowly but steadily being introduced. Much of this effort is done by individuals, without institutional support. The publication of the feminist journal *Nimeye Digar* (The Other Half) and, more recently, *Critique: Journal of Critical Studies of Iran and the Middle East* is but one indication of changing times. No doubt, positivist and Orientalist approaches, supported by traditional sources of funding, will continue to be present, but the democratization trend—including a broadening of the social base of researchers and audiences, diversification of perspectives, and incorporation of new or excluded topics—is irreversible.

As for Kurdish studies, the field runs against heavy odds—the limitations of Kurdish nationalism itself, the Orientalist heritage, and the combined forces of Arab, Persian, and Turkish national chauvinism. Even here, the Turkish sociologist Ismail Beşikçi has set new standards for liberating knowledge from the fetters of despotism. He spent many years in prison for his sociological studies, which reject Kemalism and its denial of the existence of the Kurdish people.[10]

Compromising truth for fear, real or imaginary, of Balkanizing Iran is not in the spirit of true scholarship. It is exactly this type of nationalist approach that contributes to the further division of the oppressed peoples of the Middle East. Forging unity can be achieved only through the type of internationalism that has been advocated by Beşikçi. Once in the grip of Orientalism, Kurdish studies are now being invigorated by politically conscious and academically competent researchers like Beşikçi, Tove Skutnabb-Kangas,[11] and Martin van Bruinessen.[12] Entessar is not the only one being challenged. All of us are.

—AMIR HASSANPOUR
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To the Editor:

You may wish to publish a correction of the figures regarding the December 1991 Algerian parliamentary election that appeared in Saad Eddin Ibrahim's report in the Spring 1993 (vol. 47, no. 2) *Middle East Journal* ("Crises, Elites, and Democratization in the Arab World"). On p. 300, Ibrahim writes, "Out of the 599 contested seats, FIS won more than 300." In fact the FIS won 188 seats out of 430 in the newly redistricted assembly.[1] Thus it is also inaccurate to say that the "FIS would have had a large enough majority to form the government without winning more seats in the second round." The Islamists needed 28 more seats to gain an absolute majority. Although there is very little doubt that the FIS would have won considerably more than 28 seats if the second round had taken place, they did not gain a parliamentary majority in the first round.

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[10] For a brief introduction to the life and work of Ismail Beşikçi, see *Kurdish Times* 1, no. 2 (Fall 1986), pp. 3–44.

[11] Tove Skutnabb-Kangas and Robert Phillipson conduct research on Kurdish language rights. See their edited work, *Linguistic Human Rights* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

[12] Martin van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan* (London: Zed Books, 1992).

[1] See Jacques Fontaine, "Les élections législatives algériennes: résultats du premier tour," in *Maghreb-Machrek*, no. 135 (1992), pp. 155–65.

As an aside, I wonder sometimes how useful it is to refer to public figures using unfamiliar transliterations of their names. Mauritania's president Ould Taya is already little enough known not to complicate matters by calling him "Wild Tay'i" (p. 297), however consistent that may be with some method of transliteration. If we can talk about "Bourguiba" (p. 295), rather than Bu Rugaiba, let's give Ould Taya a break.

—*ROBERT MORTIMER*
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

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Editor's Note

ALTHOUGH the summer of 1993 witnessed some historic political developments in the Middle East—such as the accession to power of Turkey's first woman prime minister, Tansu Ciller, and the Israeli-Palestine Liberation Organization secret talks—these significant events were eclipsed by the specter of war and violence. The most dramatic incident was Israel's week-long bombing and shelling of more than 90 villages and towns in southern and eastern Lebanon in July, attacks that caused hundreds of civilian casualties, destroyed thousands of homes, and forced more than 300,000 persons to flee. Less dramatic in terms of overall impact, but certainly no less traumatic for the victims, was the expansion of the conflict between Azerbaijan's Armenian separatists and government forces, with fighting spreading south of the contested Nagorno-Karabakh district and into the Azerbaijani region along the Aras River border with Iran. Meanwhile, the seemingly endless civil wars continued in Afghanistan and Sudan as did periodic violent clashes between government security forces and armed opposition groups in Algeria, Egypt, Tajikistan, Turkey, and the Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Two years ago, few people anticipated the unsettling political events that currently seem to dominate the region extending from the Atlantic coast of Morocco to the Pamir and Tien Shan mountain ranges that form the southeastern most borders of Central Asia. Because these developments inevitably affect both the domestic and international politics of Middle Eastern countries, it is essential to try to understand some of the complex factors that have contributed to their evolution. The articles in our autumn issue greatly assist in this process by providing critical reassessments of diverse but important issues that are likely to influence economic, political, and social trends throughout the Middle East.

The lead article, by Philip Robins, examines Turkey's role in Azerbaijan and Central Asia. When it became obvious in late 1991 that the Soviet Union was collapsing, analysts in the West forecast a competition between Turkey and Iran for influence in the former Soviet republics of Central Asia. Robins argues that many Turkish political leaders not only welcomed the projected rivalry, but even expressed confidence in "beating" Iran because most of the populations of the new states speak Turkic languages. Turkey's expectations, however, clashed with the sober realities in the new Central Asian states, where the political elites did not perceive their countries as backwards and were not enthusiastic about embracing Turkey—or any other country—as a developmental model. In addition, the inadequacy of economic and intellectual resources, the lack of common borders with Central Asian states, and a concern not to antagonize Russia combined to limit Turkey's role in the region. After eighteen months of a sometimes disillusioning experience, Robins proffers that Ankara reluctantly has accepted the inevitability of pursuing a less activist policy in Central Asia.

In the second article, Muhammad Muslih examines the evolution of Israeli and Syrian perspectives on their territorial dispute vis-à-vis past and present negotiations. Muslih argues that it is essential to understand the importance Syria attaches to the territorial dimension of its conflict with Israel in order to appreciate the position Damascus has adopted in the current peace process. Analyzing UN and recently declassified Israeli documents, Muslih demonstrates how Israeli violations of the spirit of the 1949 armistice agreement with respect to the pre-1967 demilitarized zone—and not Arab nationalist ideology—helped form a strong Syrian distrust of Israel's territorial ambitions. Since the June 1967 War, Israel's occupation of Syria's Golan region has reinforced historical suspicions in Damascus about Tel Aviv's ultimate objectives. This 40-year-old perception of an expansionist Israel reinforces domestic political factors that make it difficult for Damascus to accept any agreement that fails to recognize Syria's full sovereign rights over the Golan Heights.

The third article, by Gil Feiler, deals with an economic problem that has serious social and political implications: the contraction of employment opportunities for Palestinians living in the Israeli-occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Feiler demonstrates how Kuwait's 1991 expulsion of tens of thousands of Palestinian expatriate workers and the continuing reluctance of other Arab labor-importing states to hire Palestinians has resulted in an unemployment crisis throughout the dispersed Palestinian community. In the West Bank and Gaza, thousands of families who had depended on remittances from relatives previously residing in the oil-producing countries have experienced dramatic declines in incomes and living standards. Aggravating this situation has been a reduction of both available jobs and total work hours for Palestinians commuting into Israel to day jobs. Palestinians in skilled labor, albeit a minority of Palestinians working in Israel, are being replaced by Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union. Feiler recognizes the political obstacles to initiating job-creating development programs inside the occupied territories in the absence of an agreement providing autonomy or independence to the Palestinians. He argues, however, that the economic situation will worsen unless a concerted investment program is undertaken and suggests that this effort should not be held hostage to a political solution.

Our final article deals with the important but sensitive issue of family planning. Unexpectedly, and contrary to the assumptions in developmental literature, anthropologist Christine Eickelman's research among women in Oman reveals that more than a decade of continuously improving living standards and expanding educational opportunities has not led to decisions to have fewer children. Fertility among Omani women of child-bearing age actually has increased dramatically since the early 1980s. Eickelman examines the social factors that motivate Omani women to want many and closely spaced children. Although the fertility rate currently is not an economic burden for Oman, a continuing high number of births eventually will pose major problems for the country's development plans. Eickelman argues that if population control policies are to be effective, they must recognize and accommodate the social values women associate with giving birth.

I would like to take the occasion of our autumn issue to welcome As'ad AbuKhalil as a member of the Board of Advisory Editors. As a scholar-in-residence at the Middle East Institute during 1992–93, As'ad was an invaluable intellectual resource. I am pleased that he has accepted our invitation to join the board, and look forward to benefiting from his sage advice and insights. His past contributions to the journal have included "A New Arab Ideology?: The Rejuvenation of Arab Nationalism," in the winter 1992 issue, and several book reviews. Readers will find in this issue his most recent contribution, "Arab Intellectuals on Trial," a book review article on Kanan Makiya's *Cruelty and Silence: War, Tyranny, Uprising, and the Arab World.*

Helping put together this issue were our volunteer, Nancy Wood, and seven summer interns: Joanna Dubois, James Madison University, class of 1994; Eleni Eleftheriou, University of Michigan, 1990; Amy Ezrin, University of Chicago, 1993; Elissa Goldman, Tufts University, class of 1994; Lea-Rachel Kosnik, University of Michigan, class of 1994; Michelle Tadros, Colby College, class of 1994; and Pinar Taşkin, Connecticut College, 1991. On behalf of the entire staff, I thank all of them for their valuable assistance.

Eric Hooglund

BETWEEN SENTIMENT AND SELF-INTEREST: TURKEY'S POLICY TOWARD AZERBAIJAN AND THE CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

Philip Robins

WHEN the new republics of Central Asia and Azerbaijan began declaring their independence from Moscow near the end of 1991, there was great excitement in certain Western circles about Turkey's future role in their development. Their common Turkic cultural-linguistic bond was frequently mentioned, and Turkey was seen as an economic and political model for these new states. Some enthusiasts even advanced grandiose notions of resurgent pan-Turkism. In order to limit any possible growth of Iranian-inspired political Islam in these new republics, Western political leaders generally regarded Turkey as the country to support in its approaches toward these states.[1]

Two years later, there are signs of disillusionment.[2] Turkey's shortcomings, particularly in the provision of economic aid, are being noted. The relative strengths of these republics in comparison to Turkey are being accentuated, as is the desire of these new states to establish direct links with the West, rather than indirectly via Ankara.[3] Impatience is being expressed at the slow rate of progress in the forging of close ties between Turkey and the republics. Some commentators

---

[1] This latter view came to the fore around the time of the visit to Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan of US secretary of state James Baker in February 1992. See, for instance, the *Times*, February 17, 1992, which stated that the "fear of fundamentalism spreading [to Central Asia] has in turn prompted Washington to encourage Turkey in its bid for a leading role in the region's politics." The *Daily Telegraph* of February 22, 1993, refers to Baker urging Turkmenistan "to follow Turkey, rather than Iran."

[2] See *Le Monde*, January 9, 1993. An article on Turkey and the republics contains a section titled "Le fin de l'euphorie."

[3] Shirin Akiner, a Central Asia expert at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, was one of the first commentators to challenge the notion of the emergence of a cozy, close, and uncomplicated relationship between Turkey and the Central Asian states.

Philip Robins is head of the Middle East Programme at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London.


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Map courtesy the Centre for Arab Gulf Studies, University of Exeter, UK.

are beginning to suggest that it was all an empty sham, that Turkey is too weak to have more than a marginal impact on these republics.[4]

There are problems with both these views, not least that they fail to distinguish among the six republics. The exaggerated expectations were, in part, Western creations. Many Turks from Turkey, beginning with President Turgut Ozal,[5] were also guilty of speaking about Central Asia with a "dreamy voice."[6] Given the complete absence of interaction between the modern state of Turkey and these former Soviet republics until their independence, Turkish and Western expectations appear to have been born of ignorance. The paucity of Turkish officials with the intellectual skills and knowledge necessary to develop intimate ties with these new states strongly suggests that it is unrealistic to judge the potential in relations between Turkey and these republics over such a short time frame.

This article is an attempt to look beyond the blanket generalities that have been expressed since late 1991. It will take into account political, cultural, and economic factors in endeavoring to assess the longer-term potential for Turkey's relations with the Central Asian republics and Azerbaijan. Ultimately, the conclusions are tentative because of the many variables that could alter the nature of their relations in the years ahead.

FOREIGN POLICY: TURKEY'S PRIORITIES

There has been much speculation about Turkey's future foreign policy orientation. The rebuff that Ankara received from the European Community over Turkey's 1987 application for admission has led to conjecture about alternative groupings. The Turkish government has felt the necessity to deny that it regards the Black Sea Economic Project as an alternative to EC membership.[7] There has also been idle talk that Turkey might be looking exclusively east to the Turkic republics as a result of having failed to receive admission to the premier Western club.[8] In Ankara, and indeed among the Kemalist elite as a whole, these are considered fanciful notions. Turkey continues to place its relations with the West at the top of its list of foreign policy priorities.

Turkey remains an active member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, sharing the US and British perspectives that the organization must be sustained and reinvigorated. In November 1992, Turkey joined the Western European Union as an associate member, a lesser status than it had desired, but, nevertheless, for the first time a formal connection was established. In the economic domain, the EC market now accounts for around 50 percent of Turkey's exports. Turkey and the European Community, moreover, are striving for the introduction of a customs union by the beginning of 1996. By dint of their population size, their relative development, and their ability to trade in hard currency, EC and European Free Trade Association countries are trading partners that cannot be easily replaced.

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[4] These views have been expressed at a number of symposia and in the author's private conversations with regional observers.

[5] It was Ozal who arguably precipitated the awkwardness, at the Turkic summit in Ankara at the end of October 1992, when he attempted to force the participants into a close economic relationship. See, for instance, the summit opening speech by Ozal in which he called for the taking down of economic walls among the Turkic republics, ultimately leading to free trade. "BBC Summary of World Broadcasts," Middle East, November 2, 1992.

[6] Hugh Pope, *Independent*, June 1, 1992, special report on Turkey and Central Asia.

[7] For example, see statement by acting Foreign Ministry spokesman Ferhat Ataman in the *Guardian*, February 3, 1992.

[8] For example, see reference in the *Sunday Telegraph*, December 22, 1991.

If the Western orientation of Turkey remains undisputed, the preoccupation of the country is equally clear. New areas of instability have opened up on Turkey's borders, most notably in the Balkans and the Caucasus. Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh and Bosnia are important to Turkey for several reasons: they are proximate, taking place in Turkey's geostrategic backyard; they are perceived as having security, and conceivably even existential, implications for the Turkish republic (for example, Armenian irredentism); and they affect fellow Turks. These new problems add to an existing list of regional concerns that include Cyprus, relations with Greece, and relations with Iran, Iraq, and Syria, most obviously regarding support for the Kurdish insurgency in Turkey led by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). The Nagorno-Karabakh, Bosnia, and Kurdish issues have been fast-moving crises, requiring close and continuing attention by senior officials in Ankara, and the concentration of an enormous amount of political will. They leave senior figures at the Foreign Ministry relatively little time or energy for concertedly pursuing strategies elsewhere.

In the longer term, Turkey remains nervous about the future shape and role of Russia. In the nineteenth century, Russia was an expansionist military power that sought to devour parts of the ailing Ottoman Empire. The Soviet Union posed a similar threat under Stalin. Even when there was relatively little tension, the Soviet Union and Turkey never stabilized their great power/middle power relationship. Although Russia has turned in on itself and no longer has a common land border with Turkey—both remain Black Sea littoral states, however—it is still the largest and potentially most powerful state in the area. Short of the disaggregation of Russia, it is likely that in the future Turkey once more will have to deal with a strong state that has major interests to the south. Turkey, therefore, is wary of antagonizing Russia even at a time of weakness, an important factor informing its policy toward Central Asia. It was out of deference to Moscow that Ankara was reluctant to recognize the new republics in 1991 although the Soviet Union was in terminal decline.

Turkey and the Republics: The Pecking Order

A common problem among writers and commentators has been to overgeneralize about the six republics discussed here. It is true that the six have much in common, most obviously the experience of Soviet rule. The differences in location, ethnic composition, demographic size, and mineral wealth, however, mean that one should be cautious about making overarching statements. This is certainly the case when looking at the six from the perspective of one external state. The common cultural-cum-linguistic bond that Turkey shares with five of the six states—the exception being the Persian-speaking majority in Tajikistan—often prompts people to speak of relations with the Turkic republics as if they were one entity. The Turkish government has helped to reinforce such a view by self-consciously trying not to distinguish among the republics.[9] So, for instance, instead of focusing on those republics of most importance to it, Turkey has placed all six destinations on the travel schedules of its senior politicians, and dispatched ambassadors to all six capitals. A closer study of Turkish attitudes, however, shows that these six republics—or even only the five Turkic republics—are, for the most part, not treated by Ankara as an undifferentiated mass.

When attempting to rank the six republics in importance from a Turkish perspective, it is relatively easy to name the most and least important: Azerbaijan and Tajikistan, respectively. The fact that Azerbaijan is in Turkey's geostrategic region means that the policies Azerbaijan pursues have a direct bearing on Turkish interests. Most obviously the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh has affected Turkish relations with Armenia. This is true especially of the round of fighting in the spring of 1993 over Kelbajar, during which Armenian forces opened up a second land corridor between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Thus, Turkey insists that Armenia abandon its "expansionist policy" as one of the two preconditions for the establishment of full diplomatic relations.[10] It must be pointed out, however, that Turkish policy toward Azerbaijan is neither uncritical nor entirely supportive.

The intensity of relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey has been fostered in two additional ways. First, there exists within Turkey an important Azeri community. Organized and self-conscious, it acts as a lobby on behalf of Azerbaijan within the Turkish state, an "insider" relationship that none of the remaining five republics in Central Asia share. Second, there appears to be a strong preference among Turkish businessmen for trading with Azerbaijan rather than with the other new republics.[11] This preference seems to be based on the existence of a vigorous small business culture in that republic, together with a combination of geographical proximity and ease of language communication.[12]

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[9] Interview with a member of the Turkish Foreign Ministry working on Central Asia, Ankara, April 22, 1993.

[10] *Turkish Daily News*, June 6, 1992.

[11] For example, a poll of 1,500 Turkish businessmen who had visited the Turkic republics put Azerbaijan at the top of the list regarding the locale where the business opportunities were most attractive. Azerbaijan received an aggregate score of 6.5 out of 10. The second highest score was Uzbekistan with 5.6. *Turkish Daily News*, July 20, 1992.

[12] For Anatolian Turks, Azeri is the most readily understood language spoken in the Turkic republics, and Azerbaijan is the only republic to have embraced a new Latin alphabet to replace Cyrillic.

None of these factors exist to the same degree with respect to the other republics. Thus, it is hardly surprising that in 1992 Azerbaijan accounted for about 50 percent of the trade Turkey conducted with the six republics.[13]

Turkey's relative lack of interest in Tajikistan results from cultural and linguistic differences, compounded by the geographical distance of that republic from Turkey. Even the Turkish government's scrupulous attempts to treat all six republics equally have fallen down over Tajikistan. For example, while 2,000 scholarships were offered to students from each of the five Turkic republics to study in Turkey, this gesture was not extended to Tajikistan because of the language barrier.[14] The internal turmoil in Tajikistan has further retarded the development of closer ties. Consequently, Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel did not visit Dushanbe during his swing through the new republics in May 1992 (although the city had originally been on his itinerary). Tajikistan was also absent from the Turkic summit in Ankara in October 1992 although it had been invited despite the fact that it was not actually a Turkic republic.

Of the other four republics, Western analysts would tend to say that Kazakhstan is clearly the most important.[15] Its considerable hydrocarbon reserves, the presence of strategic nuclear weapons, the delicate ethnic mix, and the geostrategic location of the republic—adjacent to both Russia and China—could be regarded as unassailable arguments. For Turkey, however, the outlook is different. Turkey certainly has business hopes in Kazakhstan, linked principally to the energy sector. The most notable include the protocol signed by the Birlesmis Muhendisler Burosu (BMB) in July 1992 for the operation of four oilfields and the construction of a $1.7 billion thermal power station,[16] and the Turk Petrol Anonim Ortakligi/Pet Holding joint venture with the National Petroleum Company, which was concluded in November 1992, to operate five oilfields. Turkey is unlikely, however, to develop the commercial links that it is seeking. Some of its initial successes have already proved false; for example, the BMB deal ultimately fell flat.[17] From a more strategic standpoint, it seems doubtful that Kazakhstan will opt to route its oil exports via the Turkish Mediterranean oil terminal at Yumartalik, preferring instead to continue use of the Russian outlet of Novorossiysk on the Black Sea.

Kazakhstan's apparent preference for existing infrastructural ties with Russia points to a broader preference on the part of the Kazakh government born of essentially political considerations. The demographic balance in the republic between Kazakhs and Russians and the continuing interest being shown by the Russian state have made the present Kazakh government highly sensitive to Russian interests.[18] This, in turn, has restricted Alma Ata's parameters of action. Consequently, Kazakhstan has shown little inclination to rapidly develop broad-based ties with Turkey for fear of how this would be perceived by both Russia and its own Russian population. A good example of Kazakh caution came at the Turkic summit in Ankara in October 1992 when President Nursultan Nazarbayev refused to agree to any binding commitments at the summit.[19] He stated that Kazakhstan would develop ties with Turkey and the other Turkic republics only on the condition that this would not harm its commitments to other Commonwealth of Independent State (CIS) members.[20] Such views caused some pique in the Turkish capital.[21] The realities of the very limited influence Turkey was likely to have on Kazakhstan in comparison to Russia could not be mistaken.

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[13] *Independent*, June 1, 1993.

[14] The scholarships allow students to study principally social studies and management at Turkish higher educational institutions.

[15] The *Guardian*, May 19, 1992, describes Kazakhstan as being "pivotal," and goes on to say that the United States sees it as a "lynchpin" of a new security system in Central Asia. The *Independent*, February 26, 1993, refers to the United States, together with the United Kingdom, as having at first given an unbalanced initial weight to Kazkhstan.

[16] *Turkish Daily News*, July 14, 1992.

[17] *Turkish Daily News*, December 1, 1992. The BMB deal began to falter when BMB found that three out of the four oilfields it had been allocated by the Kazakh government were unproductive. BMB asked for an additional three fields, a request that appears not to have been granted.

With Kazakhstan (of necessity) a marginal ally and a distant neighbor, and Kyrgyzstan similarly distant and of poor economic prospects, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are left as the republics (after Azerbaijan) where Turkey hopes to develop the most productive ties. With respect to Turkmenistan, the issue is reducible to that of gas. Ankara is lobbying the Turkmenistan government to ensure that a future gas pipeline will traverse Turkey. This would guarantee Turkey additional supplies of gas for domestic use and income from transit fees. If, as a result of exploiting its gas reserves, Turkmenistan should become "another Kuwait," the republic could boost imports purchasable in foreign currency, an effective demand that Turkey's manufacturing and services sectors would be keen to satisfy.

The attractiveness of Uzbekistan for Turkey is, in part, commercial, because of the existence there of hydrocarbons, other minerals, and cotton that could be used in Turkey's considerable textile industry. The size and geopolitical and military importance of Uzbekistan, moreover, are also an attraction that make it a potentially more influential state than either impoverished Kyrgyzstan or underpopulated Turkmenistan. The signs are, however, that Turkey is likely to encounter with Uzbekistan problems similar to those with Kazakhstan, albeit on a reduced scale. During the Turkic summit, Uzbek president Islam Karimov, echoing President Nazarbayev, was at pains to rule out the need to establish a supranational mechanism to manage the relations of the Turkic world.[22] Tashkent has enthusiastically embraced a new defense relationship with Russia as a key to the maintenance of stability in former Soviet Central Asia.

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[18] The ethnic composition of Kazakhstan is 41 percent Kazakh, 37.8 percent Russian, 5.8 percent German, 5.4 percent Ukranian, and 10 percent other nationalities. Bulletin on Kazakhstan published by the Foreign Economics Relations Board (DEIK), Istanbul, April 1993.

[19] *Turkish Daily News*, October 31, 1992.

[20] *Turkish Daily News*, November 1, 1992.

[21] Azeri president Abulfaz Elcibey took advantage of the discomfort of some of the other visiting heads of state to make political capital in Ankara. For instance, when the issue arose of a supranational Turkic organization, Elcibey stated that those republics that were already members of the CIS—namely all of them with the exception of Azerbaijan, which simply attends as an observer—were likely to be unenthusiastic about joining another similar organization. The disappointment at the negative attitude of some of the Central Asian heads of state manifested itself in the singling out of Elcibey for public praise. One newspaper editor, for example, described him as the only visiting leader with the makings of a statesman of international calibre. *Turkish Daily News*, November 4, 1992.

In summation, therefore, Turkey is likely to have to come to terms increasingly with the fact that Russia will have much more influence over Kazakhstan than will Turkey. Ankara seems already to have accepted that its potential relations with Tajikistan are extremely limited. Turkey's special, though not uncritical relationship with Azerbaijan is more likely to continue although even in this case the common border between Iran and Azerbaijan means that the former cannot be eclipsed. Considerable potential exists for Turkey to develop relations with Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, and the nature of relations with Turkmenistan will depend, in particular, on the course of future gas pipeline construction. In the case of Turkmenistan, once again the location of Iran means that Turkey, at the very least, will have to share a potentially profitable relationship.

TURKEY'S VISION

In keeping with a country that has a highly ideological view of itself and the world, Turkey has a strong sense of "vision" for these six new republics. This is particularly evident in elite circles, and especially in the Foreign Ministry. According to this vision, the republics should emerge as essentially independent, secular, and democratic, with liberal, free market-oriented economies. Turkey believes that these are characteristics it posseses and that it, therefore, should be regarded as an economic and political model for these newly emerged states.[23] Ankara takes the view, however, that it does not have the financial resources to bring about such an economic orientation. Turkey's role, as Ankara sees it, is to usher in the necessary reforms, while working with the West to act as a "funnel of investment" for this purpose.[24]

Turkey's strong advocacy has inevitably brought it into difficulties with other interested powers, and, indeed, with some local elites. Ankara's advocacy of real independence for the six republics is regarded as a euphemism for independence from Moscow and the infrastructural, linguistic, and military ties that continue to bind these new states to the old center. Turkey's advocacy of a secular vision of government for these republics has also been perceived negatively by Iran. Tehran has interpreted Ankara as intending to marginalize Iran's influence with these new states. Rhetoric from the United States describing Turkey as a moderate Muslim state capable of acting as a bulwark against Iranian-inspired "fundamentalism" has deepened Iran's sense of mistrust. It is also likely that Saudi Arabia has had difficulty with Turkey's secular vision despite the fact that Ankara and Riyadh have discussed ways of cooperating, principally with the objective of curtailing Iranian influence. Were independent, secular, and democratic states with liberal economies in fact to emerge in the new republics, there is every chance that these countries would, indeed, be more closely linked to Turkey than to Russia or Iran.

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[22] *Turkish Daily News*, November 1, 1992.

[23] Prime Minister Demirel referred to Turkey as being "a model country" as early as December 1991. See *Newspot*, December 12, 1991. By March 1992, senior officials were specifically referring to Turkey as a model country for the Turkic republics. See Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin's statement after his return from visits to seven CIS republics in *Newspot*, March 12, 1992. Turkey has been cheered from the sidelines by influential commentators in the West in developing such a notion. See, for instance, Graham E. Fuller, *Central Asia: The New Geopolitics* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1992), p. vi, where he refers to Turkey as "the ideal model."

[24] Suleyman Demirel "Newly Emerging Centre," *Turkish Review* 6, no. 30 (Winter 1992), p. 15.

Turkey's vision for the new republics has also created problems for its relationships with their existing regimes. Pushing for democratic reforms in these new states, Ankara is all too aware that the ruling elite are largely those who held power during the Communist Party era. These regimes seem just as willing to resort to coercion and control as was the case before independence and are, in turn, suspicious of Turkey's democratic rhetoric. Ankara has, perhaps inevitably, found itself obliged to deal with such elites beyond the degree to which it is comfortable, with the fear that such action may be costly in the longer term. The major exception among leaders in the republics is President Askar Akayev of Kyrgyzstan, with whom Turkish officials appear to be noticeably more at ease.[25] For the Turks, the dilemma is to what extent they should be seen to be dealing with the old elites, and to what extent they should be trying to second guess regime change.

In some cases, Turkey has managed to back both horses to victory. In Azerbaijan, for instance, Turkey worked closely with President Yaqub Mutalibov despite his Communist Party associations. When the Popular Front eventually seized power in May 1992, Ankara found it enjoyed an even warmer relationship with the new president, Abulfaz Elcibey. The downfall of Elcibey in June 1993, and Ankara's commitment to the support of democratic processes, however, seem set to result now in a period of cooler ties with Azerbaijan.

Turkey has tried to broaden the base of its relations with all the republics. Its scholarship program and the emphasis it has placed on business contacts should be seen in this context. Even such initiatives, however, have had limited effects. In the case of the scholarships, Ankara has found it difficult to ensure that such educational placements are not subject to the patronage of the new republics' nomenklatura.[26] In addition, the absence of a stratum of entrepreneurs has usually obliged businessmen to work with state organizations.[27]

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25. For instance, after the October 1992 Turkic summit, of all the Central Asian leaders, only President Akayev was praised. One editorial said that he injected some "moderation and understanding" into the summit, thereby preventing a "rather negative situation" from emerging. See *Turkish Daily News*, November 4, 1992.

26. Interview with senior member of the Turkish diplomatic service, September 17, 1992.

27. For example, a glance at the May 1992 monthly bulletin for Uzbekistan, produced by Turkey's Foreign Economic Relations Board, lists 56 prospective joint venture project proposals—an indication of the extent to which foreign firms have to deal with ministries and state companies when they do business.

Although Turkey's vision of the republics' future has endeared it to the West, especially the United States, it has not unlocked significant volumes of aid. The vast majority of US aid to the former Soviet Union has been concentrated on the Slavic republics, in particular, the Russian Federation. Under the Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) program, there have been internal obstacles to channeling aid from the European Community through Turkey to the Turkic republics. The community is currently engaged in a protracted internal debate about whether it should use some of its TACIS funds to pay for direct Turkish participation in assisting the Turkic republics. The main obstacle to the development of such a triangular relationship is, for once, not political. Rather, it is the objections of certain member states—previously France, but now principally Italy—to the use of grant aid to benefit consultants from outside EC countries.[28]

STRATEGY AND PRACTICE

Turkey's strategy toward the six republics during the first 18 months of their independence may be divided into three areas: the establishment of formal ties; the development of infrastructural links; and the provision of aid and finance.

Formal Ties

Turkey's initial effort to establish formal ties with the new republics reflected the general absence of ties with the republics prior to their declarations of independence. It also reflected that from the outset the Turkish government did not have any concrete blueprint for developing substantive ties. The effort at the formal level was primarily confined to the diplomatic domain, although it also included the establishment of cultural centers and joint business councils. In the purely diplomatic arena, Turkey, as senior politicians from Ankara are fond of reminding their Turkic counterparts, was the first country to recognize the independence of the new republics. Again reflecting its primary importance to Ankara, Azerbaijan was the first to receive Turkish recognition, on November 9, 1991,[29] although the point has to be made that Baku had actually declared its independence in September of that year. On 16 December, Turkey extended recognition to all the republics that comprised the Soviet Union—a convenient device that permitted the low-key recognition of Armenia. Baku was also the first of the new capitals to receive a Turkish embassy, with the signing of the protocol for that purpose on January 13, 1992.

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[28] For further details, see Philip Robins, *New Trends in EC-Turkish Cooperation* (Brussels: Forum Europe, 1993), p. 27.

[29] The Turkish government might have liked to have waited longer, but their hand was forced by Azeri prime minister Hasan Hasanov. He appealed to the Turkish people over the government's head during a stopover in Ankara, saying that Turkish business might lose out were it not the first country to extend recognition. See *Turkey Confidential,* December 1991, p. 11–12.

A spate of high-level visits accompanied the extension of formal recognition to the republics and the consequent diplomatic manifestations. Senior officials and advisors from the republics were almost queuing up to visit Turkey once the republics had declared their independence. In December 1991, for instance, no less than three heads of state from five of the new Turkic republics visited Turkey.[30] There was, however, a noticeable delay before Ankara reciprocated the visits, an indication that Turkey's willingness to forge close relations was not sufficient to change existing political priorities. Consequently, it was late February 1992 before Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin paid his first visit to the republics, and the following May before Prime Minister Demirel's trip took place. When it was organized, the Demirel swing through the republics was reminiscent of Ozal's trips abroad as prime minister. Although Demirel took a 144-man delegation with him, the size of the team was balanced by the brevity of the visits; he spent little more than a day in each republic.

After the establishment of diplomatic relations came the conclusion of framework agreements, often formally concluded during high-profile visits. Such accords were brief and general, containing little more than vague assertions of the desire to forge close and coordinated relations in areas ranging from economic to cultural to information policy. These were followed by a second generation of more specific accords.[31] By February 1993, Turkey and the five Turkic republics had signed more than 140 bilateral accords on a variety of different subjects,[32] adding to the impression that formalities were increasingly a substitute for substance.

In a formal sense, business ties, as often is the case with Turkish businessmen, were running ahead of political relations. For example, both Turkish-Azeri and Turkish-Uzbek business councils had been established as early as November 1991. While commercial relations with Azerbaijan continued to develop, this formal effort appeared deceptive with respect to the Central Asian republics. Turkey's approach to these states contrasted with the rush to get involved in Russia on the back of the growing volume of gas being imported into Turkey from the federation; overall trade with the Turkic republics now stands at less than one-fifth of Turkish trade with Russia. By the end of 1992, Turkish businessmen appeared to be adopting a cautious approach toward Central Asia.[33] Concern at the lack of a legal framework, payment problems (with companies having little choice but to enter into complex counter-trade arrangements), and the absence of appropriate private sector partners were some of the main concerns most often voiced.[34]

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[30] These were President Saparmurad Niyazov of Turkmenistan, who arrived on 2 December; President Kerimov of Uzbekistan, who came on 16 December; and President Akayev of Kyrgyzstan, who arrived on 22 December.

[31] Interview with official from Turkish Foreign Ministry, April 22, 1993.

[32] Interview with political advisor to Demirel, February 18, 1993.

[33] Such a conclusion must remain somewhat tentative owing to the absence of anything approaching comprehensive statistical data on private sector involvement in the Turkic republics from official bodies and organizations representing such companies.

Infrastructural Ties

Arguably, Turkey's most tangible effort toward the Turkic republics has been in the field of infrastructural provision. The calculation by Ankara has been straightforward: If Turkey can provide an infrastructural skeleton that connects it with these new states, then Ankara will have succeeded in locking these entities into an intimate and long-term relationship. In the political domain these newly independent republics have been keen to keep their options open with other influential neighbors, such as Russia and Iran, whereas in the infrastructural field, Turkey is more favorably placed.

Turkey has been most active in four main areas of infrastructural development: transport, energy pipelines, telecommunications, and human resources. With respect to transport, the Turks early on were keen to establish air routes to facilitate contact with the republics. The fact that Turkey is not geographically contiguous with any of the republics,[35] no doubt, explains this particular preference.[36] In May 1992, direct, scheduled flights by Turkish airlines were established with Alma Ata, Baku, and Tashkent; the Baku flight is expected to be extended to Ashkhabad in 1993. The existence of business opportunities in related fields was underlined in late October 1992 when a consortium involving John Laing and the Turkish company ALARKO was awarded a contract for the expansion of the airport in Ashkhabad.[37]

Despite their strategic precariousness, Turkey also has sought the establishment of land transport links across the republics. For example, Turkish officials took part in a meeting in Kazakhstan in March 1992 to consider the completion of the Caucasian rail network. Ankara's aim is to establish a link with Azerbaijan, via Nakhichevan and Iran, and thence to the Central Asian republics by train-ferry across the Caspian Sea. The feasibility of this project, as with so many land projects for Turkey, is dependent upon free access across Iran. The omens are not especially good given that Iran disrupted Turkish land traffic bound for Kazakhstan in spring 1992.[38]

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[34] See *International Herald Tribune*, April 13, 1993.

[35] Turkey does have a seven-mile border with Nakhichevan, formally part of Azerbaijan, but itself is not contiguous with Azerbaijan.

[36] Iran, which by contrast is territorially adjacent to Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, has placed its emphasis on terrestrial ties such as the development of rail and road links.

[37] *Turkish Daily News*, November 2, 1992.

[38] *Turkish Daily News*, April 16, 1992. According to this report, unnamed diplomatic sources in Ankara speculated that the move might have been in retaliation for Turkey's seizing the Cypriot ship *Cape Maleas*, which was bound for Iran laden with arms from Bulgaria.

Hydrocarbons are the most tangible and immediately exploitable resource of the new republics. For Turkey these energy resources are attractive for a host of reasons. For instance, they are a potential direct energy supply; in addition, they offer the opportunity for engineering and consultancy in the construction of pipelines, which in turn offer the possibility of transit fees. Finally, they offer the possibility of being the motor for trade, either directly through counter-trade or indirectly through the raising of hard currency through the sale of hydrocarbons, giving the concerned republics limited ability to pay for exports of Turkish goods and services in hard currency.

With Kazakhstan's energy exports likely to continue via Russia, the most attractive energy opportunities come from Azerbaijan's oil and Turkmenistan's gas, while Uzbekistan has more modest reserves of oil and gas. On March 9, 1993, Turkey and Azerbaijan signed an accord for the construction of a 1,060-kilometer pipeline, which would connect with the existing Iraqi-Turkish pipelines that disgorge on the Mediterranean at the Yumurtalik terminal. The new pipeline was envisaged as transiting Iran and Nakhichevan.[39] The privileged position that Turkey appeared to enjoy in the negotiations was seen when the Azerbaijani oil company brought in Botas, a Turkish pipeline company, as part of the working group on the onshore pipeline.[40] With many difficult problems still to be resolved,[41] and the political future of Azerbaijan increasingly uncertain, the pipeline saga may still be far from resolution.

Turkey would like to see a major pipeline routed from Turkmenistan through Turkish territory to its outlet on the Mediterranean, with the possibility of a spur allowing Uzbekistan to feed into the line. Such a pipeline could be routed via a number of third countries. The most obvious routes would be either via Iran to the south, or across the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan and Georgia, or Armenia to the north. In October 1992, Turkmenistan and Turkey initialed an accord for the construction of such a pipeline.[42] Feasibility studies are to be completed within the next four years on six different routes. It would cause problems for Turkmenistan to snub either Turkey or Iran in selecting a route, while there would be major political uncertainties with a route through either Georgia or Armenia. As a result, the most likely route at present would seem to be one running to the south of the Caspian Sea through Iran and then west through Turkey.

Telecommunications have been described as the "industrial frontiersman" of Turkey's policy toward the six republics.[43] Once again relations with Azerbaijan are the most advanced. In October 1992, the Turkish subsidiary of Canada's Northern Telecom, Netas, connected its self-designed DMS switch in the republic. Indeed, this was the first digital switch to be installed anywhere in the former Soviet Union. A third digital exchange is in the process of being laid in Baku, utilizing the city's underground system. Netas had previously installed a DMS system in Kazakhstan.

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[39] See "BBC Summary of World Broadcasts," Middle East, March 16, 1993.

[40] Interview with foreign oil company official, April 5, 1993.

[41] For instance, how will the pipeline be financed; how will the ownership of different parts of the pipeline be arranged as it traverses different countries; how will the running of the pipeline be organized?

[42] *Turkish Daily News*, November 2, 1992.

[43] *Financial Times*, December 4, 1992.

Turkey's General Directorate of Post, Telegraph, and Telephone (PTT) also is involved in developing the phone systems of the Central Asian republics. It has a turnkey contract to supply public exchanges with 2,500-line capacities to each of the five Central Asian republics (all of which have been installed with the exception of Dushanbe). Such exchanges will service high priority needs, such as government departments, foreign embassies, hotels, and companies engaged in foreign trade. This phase will be followed by the installation of 10,000 line exchanges in the main cities of the Turkic republics, and then by the gradual expansion of modern telecommunications services to more remote areas.

These telecommunications networks will be connected, via PTT-supplied earth stations, to the Intelsat satellite, which will connect them to the Turkish gateway exchange and, hence, the wider world. A French-built satellite for Turkey's exclusive use, Turksat, is due to be launched in December 1993.[44] It will then take over as the link for phone networks in the new republics. Turkish government credits are being used to help finance such schemes. In the long run, PTT hopes to recoup the money through transit revenues. The former Soviet Union is, as a whole, becoming an important part of PTT's activities. In 1991, exports to the successor states of the Soviet Union amounted to $230 million, accounting for around 10 percent of turnover.[45]

The Turkish private sector is becoming involved in local manufacturing in the new states. In Azerbaijan, Netas has a 51 percent share in a local joint venture, Ultel, which has already produced 150,000 handsets. Netas, through joint ventures, is also in the process of establishing factories near Baku and in Kazakhstan for the manufacture of DRX-4 digital switches, which would be used in exchanges servicing rural areas.[46]

The Turkish government has also identified the area of human resources as crucial to developing its long-term ties with the new republics, and, therefore, has sought to play a role in the field of education. The best-known element of this policy has been the offer of 10,000 scholarships at Turkish educational institutions, including about 1,200 at universities. The chronic overcrowding that already exists within Turkish educational establishments inevitably restricts the potential for increasing the number of slots available. By May 1993, more than 8,400 of the scholarships offered had been taken.[47] Students arriving from the Central Asian republics first have to take a two-month language course to help overcome linguistic differences between the Turkic dialects, although such a course is probably insufficient, especially for students from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

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[44] *Independent*, June 1, 1993.

[45] *Financial Times*, December 4, 1992.

[46] Ibid.

[47] *Independent*, June 1, 1993.

Other, less dramatic, educational initiatives are in various stages of implementation.[48] There are plans for student exchanges, for the supply of school books, and for help in revising existing course books. Turkish entrepreneurs have also been examining the feasibility of establishing Turkish colleges and even Turkish schools in the republics. The Education Ministry in Turkey is trying to coordinate such initiatives, and even hopes to establish its own schools, following requests from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.[49]

Language reform is an important part of attempts at the long-term orientation of the Turkic republics toward Turkey. At present, Istanbul Turkish can be understood relatively easily only in Azerbaijan. By contrast, the difference between Kazakh and Istanbul Turkish has been described as being similar to the difference between German and Swedish. Ankara is determined to make Istanbul Turkish a lingua franca of the new republics, as a vehicle for closer political ties and as a means of facilitating commercial interaction.

Alongside the previously mentioned educational policies, the use of the media is regarded as crucial. The Turkish government has encouraged television broadcasts, often with Turkish subtitles to promote familiarity with the script. A new channel specifically for that purpose, the Avrasia Channel, began broadcasting in May 1992 with seven hours of weekday programming and thirteen hours daily on weekends. In addition, Azerbaijan can also receive TRT-1, the main Turkish state broadcasting channel.[50] Even so, it is not clear that Turkish television is being received widely, especially in Central Asia. The problem is both technical and political. The program can be beamed to the republics, via satellites, but, in the absence of a multitude of residential satellite dishes, central facilities are required to receive the transmissions and rebroadcast them locally. Individual republics appear to be reluctant to extend provisions, fearing to concede control over such a politically sensitive medium.

The ultimate form of the written language in the Turkic republics will be crucial to the long-term orientation of the states. Turkey has been campaigning vigorously for the adoption of the Turkish form of the Latin script. The competition includes Cyrillic, which is the script in current use, and the Arabic script, which both Iran and Saudi Arabia are pushing. To date, Tajikistan has announced that it will switch to the Arabic script, while Azerbaijan has declared that it will adopt a version of the Latin script. It is likely that a country like Kazakhstan, with its large and politically sensitive Russian minority will retain the Cyrillic alphabet for the time being. The other republics appear to have made sympathetic noises when tackled on the matter by Turkish government officials, but they have not taken formal or practical steps in this direction. Ankara is confident that the Latin script will eventually be adopted, if only because it is the alphabet of the international commercial language, English. Realistically speaking, it will require a generation, at least, before such a switch is broadly accepted.

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[48] For example, see the provisions included in the education protocol between Turkey and Uzbekistan in "BBC Summary of World Broadcasts," Middle East, March 3, 1992.

[49] *Turkish Daily News*, August 22, 1992.

[50] Programming described in ibid., April 27, 1992.

Credits and Finance

To foster immediate ties with the new republics, the Turkish government announced a series of largely piecemeal aid initiatives. Some aid relates to education and training, as referred to earlier. By far, the most significant has been the announcement of a large Eximbank allocation to stimulate trade with the new states. Thus far, Turkish credits to the five Turkic republics total some $850 million. A further $50 million credit was made to Tajikistan earlier this year.[51] An additional $350 million in food aid (mostly wheat and sugar) has been committed by Turkey to Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.[52]

The Eximbank allotment has been described in Turkey as being more akin to a goodwill gesture than offering the possibility of real stimulation for the economies concerned.[53] To give the allocation some perspective in terms of Turkish trade policy, in 1991 Turkey granted credits worth $1.1 billion to the Russian Federation.[54] Nevertheless, for an economy the size of Turkey's, these are considerable commitments, and they have made Turkey the fourth largest provider of aid to the Turkic republics.[55] The credits to the five republics break down as follow: Azerbaijan, $250 million; Uzbekistan, $250 million; Kazakhstan, $200 million; Kyrgyzstan, $75 million; Turkmenistan, $75 million.[56]

The facilities will have slightly differing uses from republic to republic. While in Azerbaijan some of the loan will be for financial investments, in addition to the funding of trade in basic products, in Uzbekistan the loan will be used principally to fund imports of wheat and sugar. The nature of the use of such funds and the relative indifference of the Turkish private sector toward the Central Asian republics means that Turkey's controversial State Economic Enterprises, such as the state cereals purchasing agency, are expected to benefit the most from this financial aid.[57] The extension of such credits has already had a marked effect on counter-trade deals involving Turkey and the republics, with barter arrangements being harder to conclude as the republics insist that future deals now be included under the umbrella of the credit scheme.[58]

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[51] *Independent*, June 1, 1993.

[52] Briefing paper from Turkish mission to European Communities, March 22, 1993, p. 4.

[53] *Turkish Daily News*, April 28, 1992.

[54] Ibid., April 30, 1992.

[55] Interview with senior Turkish diplomat, February 18, 1993. The three largest donors are Japan, the European Community, and the United States.

[56] Briefing paper to European Communities, pp. 3–4.

[57] *Turkey Confidential*, September 1992, p. 29.

[58] Ibid.

The Turkish government also has been grappling with the question of long-term development for the new republics. In particular, it has been toying with the relative merits and feasibility of a number of different types of institutions for this purpose. These have included a Turkish Central Asian bank, to comprise the major banks and private sector investors from Turkey; a Eurasian bank modeled on the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), seeking to attract participation by the major oil-producing Arab states, as well as funds from international agencies; and a joint venture between Turkey's Eximbank and the EBRD to render technical aid to the republics.

Some of Turkey's state banks are not waiting for the establishment of such grandiose structures. Ziraat Bankasi (Agricultural Bank) has established a joint venture in Uzbekistan, the Turkish-Uzbek Bank, owned equally by the bank and Uzagroindustrial Bank. Future joint ventures are anticipated in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. It also hopes to cooperate in such ventures with Riggs National Corporation of the United States. Emlak Bankasi (Real Estate Bank) has been the prime mover in the establishment of the Turkey-Kazakhstan International Bank, in which it has a 51 percent stake. The other partners are Kazakhstan's Kramds Bank and Alem Bank (20 percent apiece) and France's Banque Worms (9 percent). One or two of Turkey's more substantial private commercial banks have also studied the prospects in the new republics, and one of the country's strongest banks, Garanti Bankasi, is already active in terms of trade and project financing. On the whole, however, interested private banks, such as Yapi Kredi and Marmara Bank, have adopted a cautious approach.[59]

CONCLUSION AND PROSPECTS

The emerging relationships between Turkey and Azerbaijan and the Central Asian republics are complex and uneven. Turkey, philosophically and economically, still looks westward. Day-to-day policymaking is absorbed by the tensions and conflicts in the regions immediately around it. Turkey does enjoy close relations with Azerbaijan. Contacts with the Central Asian republics are more spasmodic. Ankara may have a vision for the new republics, but it neither has a practical strategy for its realization nor the political will or diplomatic clout to implement it. Regardless of the rhetoric of Turkic brotherhood, in many respects the Central Asian republics are a mystery to the Turks of Turkey. This reflects the fact that until very recently there have been no contacts between the peoples or governments of Turkey and the Central Asian republics.

The development of relations, therefore, has been predominantly formal and patchy. The Turkish private sector, with a handful of notable exceptions, has not been enthusiastic about investment prospects. Emphasis has been placed on infrastructural projects to tie the new republics to Turkey. Turkey's performance in the area of telephone communications has been impressive. Future relations will depend on decisions in a few key areas, most obviously the course of energy pipelines and the direction of language reform. The likelihood is that Turkey will benefit in part from both, but the time frames involved will be long ones.

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[59] See the article on Turkish banks in the advertising section on Turkey and the Central Asian republics in the *International Herald Tribune,* April 13, 1993, p. 11.

What is clear, after only a year and a half of independence for the republics, is that hard decisions based on interests rather than fanciful notions of ethnic solidarity are informing decisions on both sides. Neither Turkey nor the republics want to antagonize Russia as they forge closer political relations. Iran's relations with Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan are too complex for the latter parties to ride entirely roughshod over the interests of Tehran. Indications suggest that Iran, too, has been more circumspect in its policy in Central Asia than many had predicted.[60] Common membership in the Economic Cooperation Organization at least offers a forum for the regulation of such relations.

In just a few years, Turkey has changed the style, scope and even substance of its foreign policy. It is no longer the semi-isolationist power that it was until recently. It thus certainly will continue to try to develop relations with its cultural-cum-linguistic fellow states to the east. Results are likely to be incremental at best. The greatest future variables will probably be Russia and the nature of the regimes in the new republics. The greatest handicaps that Turkey faces are the limitations of its own economy and its lack of geographical contiguity with the new states. While the latter places Turkey at a clear disadvantage in comparison to Russia and Iran, Turkey cannot yet be discounted as a significant power in relation, at least, to Azerbaijan and the western part of Central Asia.

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[60] It is interesting to note that the authorities in Turkmenistan, one of the two republics bordering Iran, believe that Western fears of Iran have been exaggerated. See *Christian Science Monitor,* April 23–29, 1993.

THE GOLAN: ISRAEL, SYRIA, AND STRATEGIC CALCULATIONS

Muhammad Muslih

ALTHOUGH the Palestine question is the root cause of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the territorial disputes between Israel and Syria, both before and after 1967, have acquired a dynamic of their own. The 1949–1967 armistice disputes between Syria and Israel over small, yet strategically significant patches of land were critical in shaping relations between the two countries during that period. These disputes and the strategies behind them precipitated the June 1967 War and thus created what can be called the Golan question.

Although Israeli suspicions of Syrian motives have been the subject of numerous scholarly works since 1949, Syria's attitude toward the territorial dimension of the conflict hitherto has been largely ignored or misinterpreted. Yet, the return of the Golan to Syria is pivotal to a solution of the Israeli-Syrian conflict, and, indeed, a sine qua non for peace between the two countries. In evaluating the conflict, two questions must be addressed: What were the immediate and specific actions and policies that gave rise to the Golan question? What are the strategic considerations that shape the Israeli and Syrian positions toward this question? This article examines the Israeli and Syrian positions regarding the demilitarized zones (DMZs) created after the 1948 Palestine War and the issue of the Golan. It attempts to analyze these positions with respect to the political environment in which the Israeli-Syrian conflict emerged and through the events and policies that gave the conflict its separate dimension.

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
Mount Hermon
Lebanon
R. Litani
R. Hasbani
R. Baniyas
Majdal Shams
Baniyas
DMZ
Qiryat Shemona
1949 Armistice Line
Sa'sa
UNDOF Zone
Qunaytirah
Former site of Lake Huleh
Syria
GOLAN HEIGHTS
(Israeli occupied)
DMZ
Hazor
Rosh Pinna
Zefat
Israel
Jordan River
Nawa
Tasil
Lake Tiberias
(Sea of Galilee)
Tiberias
Bet Ma'on
DMZ
Ash Shajarah
● Israeli Settlement
0
5 Kilometers
0
5 Miles
Yarmouk River
Yavne'el
Jordan River
Jordan
AD

Source: Alasdair Drysdale and Raymond A. Hinnebusch, *Syria and the Middle East Peace Process* (New York: Council on

THE ARMISTICE DISPUTES: THE 1949–1967 PERIOD

The Palestine War ended with a truce along armistice demarcation lines extending over approximately 400 miles of frontier between Israel and four neighboring Arab states: Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. The international regime containing the provisions for the full observance of the truce was embodied in the general armistice agreements between Israel and Egypt (February 24, 1949), Israel and Lebanon (March 23, 1949), Israel and Jordan (April 3, 1949), and Israel and Syria (July 20, 1949). These agreements, signed on the Greek island of Rhodes, followed UN-brokered negotiations between the parties in accordance with Security Council Resolution 61 of November 4, 1948.[1]

The armistice agreements did not contain provisions establishing normal relations between the signatories, but were instead only "of a purely military character, intended to provide a transitional stage between the truce and a final peace."[2] Under Article 7 of the agreements, supervision of the execution of the provisions of each agreement was entrusted to a Mixed Armistice Commission (MAC) composed of five members, of whom each party to the agreement designated two, and whose chairman was the chief of staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). UNTSO was empowered to employ observers and to have freedom of movement and access to the areas covered by the armistice agreements.

Events following the agreements were more conducive to war than to peace. Despite periods of relative quiet until June 1967, major military clashes added to mutual Arab-Israeli fears. Border incidents between Syria and Israel were the most persistent of such clashes. At issue was the DMZ, an area of less than 100 square miles stretching from above Lake Huleh to south of the Sea of Galilee (Lake Tiberias). The zone was composed of three separate sectors of land along the Israel-Syria border. The northern sector was formed by Syrian, Palestinian, and Israeli villages, while the central and southern sectors were more important from a strategic point of view because they were heavily populated and straddled the Jordan River between the Sea of Galilee and Lake Huleh.

When the Palestine War ended in January 1949, Syrian forces still occupied parts of this small but strategically significant area of what was up to mid-1948 Palestine's side of the international border. As a compromise, the Syrian-occupied areas, together with two small sectors of Palestinian territory occupied by Israel, were made into the DMZ. Syria had accepted a compromise solution based on demilitarization, as suggested by UN mediator Ralph Bunche, because it had no other choice. Israel was far superior militarily, and Israel's other Arab neighbors—Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon—had already signed the Rhodes agreements.[3] Sovereignty over the area in question was to be determined at a later date, pending an overall peace agreement between the parties.

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[1] Official Records of the Security Council, Third Year, no. 61, 377 Meeting, document S/1070, pp. 28–9.

[2] Tevfik Rustu Aras, chairman of the Conciliation Committee for Palestine, Official Records of the UN General Assembly, September 2, 1950, document A/1367.

Initially, Syria was reluctant to give up the salients it had occupied during the Palestine War and demanded instead to make the old Syria-Palestine border the demarcation line between itself and Israel. Israel, however, insisted that Syria withdraw to its prewar territory.[4] The Israeli position, it appears, was not intended to forestall an impending threat from the Syrian presence, but to roll back the presence of Syrian forces west of the border, because such a presence would interfere with Israel's wish to have exclusive control over the Sea of Galilee for economic and settlement purposes. On June 15, 1948, Moshe Shertok (Sharett), then a member of the Jewish Agency executive, wrote to Nahum Goldmann, chairman of the Executive Committee of the Jewish Agency and representative of the Israeli government vis-à-vis the British Foreign Office, stating that as far as the military situation was concerned the "initiative of offensive warfare was in our hands on all fronts."[5]

Israel's creeping annexation of the DMZ and Syria's determination to check Israeli advances dominated much of the history of the 1949–1967 period. Israel's territorial encroachments were based on five points: when Israel and Syria entered into the armistice agreement negotiations, their intention was to reach a military arrangement that would exclude the armed forces of both parties from the DMZ; since the agreement was purely military in nature, it followed, therefore, that the parts of the DMZ could not be separated from the sovereign to which they formerly belonged, namely from "Israeli sovereignty"[6]; since Israel's "sovereignty" over the zones remained unimpaired, all laws in force in Israel were in force in the DMZ, and this entitled Israel to perform "non-military" duties in the area, including the building of fortifications[7]; the MAC as an entity had no jurisdiction in the zone except the limited authority granted to the MAC chairman by Israel alone[8]; Israel possessed "sovereign rights" in the DMZ, whereas Syria had only water-related interests in the sector.[9]

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[3] Itamar Rabinovich, *The Road Not Taken: Early Arab-Israeli Negotiations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), chapter 3; State of Israel, Israel State Archives, *Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel*, part 3: *Armistice Talks with the Arab Countries*, ed. Yemima Rosenthal (Jerusalem, 1983).

Syrian prime minister Khalid al-Azm's acceptance of an agreement with Israel led to strong protests in the Syrian press and among his opponents in the Syrian parliament. Khalid al-Azm, *Mudhakkirat Khalid al-Azm* (The memoirs of Khalid al-Azm) (Beirut: Al-Dar al-Muttahida li al-Nashr, 1973); Adil Arslan, *Dhikrayat al-Amir Adil Arslan* (The memoirs of al-Amir Adil Arslan) (Beirut: Manshurat Dar al-Kitab al-Jadid, 1961), pp. 28–41.

[4] Rabinovich, *Road Not Taken*, pp. 72–3.

[5] State of Israel, Israel State Archives, *Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel*, part 1: *May 14-September 30, 1948*, ed. Yehoshua Freundlich (Jerusalem, 1981), p. 162.

[6] See the September 6, 1950, secret report of Shabtai Rosenne, legal advisor to Israel's Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in Israel State Archives (ISA), Foreign Office (FO) 2433/5.

[7] Ibid.; see secret report containing minutes of a meeting between the Israeli prime minister and Foreign Ministry officials, ISA, FO 2433/5; Nissim Bar-Yaacov, *The Israel-Syrian Armistice: Problems of Implementation, 1949–1966* (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1967).

[8] UN, S/2389, November 8, 1951; S/2833, October 30, 1952.

It is not difficult to see the political considerations underlying Israel's interpretation of the legal status of the DMZ. Declassified reports prepared by legal advisors to the Israeli government clearly state that the ambiguous wording of treaty provisions should be used to minimize the obligations of the contracting parties.[10] In this case, it was Israel that was in a position to reap strategic benefits by minimizing its contractual obligations because the balance of forces was decisively in its favor. On the basis of this premise, Israel used legalistic tactics to implement a carefully planned policy whose quintessence was the imposition of Israeli sovereignty over the DMZ. The strategy behind this policy was to drain the Lake Huleh marshes, win exclusive control of the Sea of Galilee, and complete Israel's Natural Water Carrier, a project whose aim was to divert water from the Jordan River to the northern part of the Negev desert in the south.[11]

Guided by these principles, Israel refused to allow Syria to secure the rights of a riparian state with respect to the Jordan River. Senior officials at the General Headquarters of the Israel Defense Force, as well as the Foreign Ministry, were inclined to reject a proposal made by Major Ghassan Jadid, the senior Syrian delegate to the MAC, in which he suggested an arrangement based on "spheres of influence" within the DMZ. In essence, Jadid suggested a de facto settlement that would give Syria the water line.[12]

Although military pressure was the primary instrument of Israeli policy, the task of advancing the strategy to impose Israeli sovereignty over the DMZ was also approached through other avenues, such as the progressive extension of Israeli cultivation, the erection of fortifications in the central and southern sectors of the DMZ, the planting of mines and minefields in the zone, and restriction of the movement of UN military observers.[13] In the process of Israel's expansion of its area of cultivation, Arab villages were demolished and their inhabitants were forced to cross into Syria, where they lived as refugees.[14] UN documents indicate that as early as October 1952 "with the exception of Nuqeib, Al Hamma and Shamalne [which were under Syrian control] Israel police, acting under orders from police headquarters outside the demilitarized zone, exercise control over practically the entire demilitarized zone."[15] More significant still, by 1964 Israel had been able to achieve the strategic objectives it had set for itself—namely, the drainage of the Huleh marshes, the exercise of exclusive control over the Sea of Galilee, and the completion of its National Water Carrier.

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[9] Secret report of W. Eytan (of the Foreign Ministry) and M.S. Comay (Israeli UN representative), ISA, FO 4047, March 26, 1953; ISA, FO 2408/22I, April 4, 1953; ISA, FO 2433/5, September 6, 1950; ISA, FO 2434/6, December 27, 1954.

[10] See the September 6, 1950, secret report of Shabtai Rosenne, ISA, FO 2433/5.

[11] UN, S/2389, November 8, 1951; S/4270, February 23, 1960; Fred J. Khouri, "Friction and Conflict on the Israeli-Syrian Front," *Middle East Journal* 17, no. 1 (Winter 1963), pp. 17–18. For background information on this subject see the essays in Moshe Ma'oz and Avner Yaniv, eds., *Syria under Assad: Domestic Constraints and Regional Risks* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986).

[12] UN, (UNTSO chief of staff) Major General E.L.M. Burns's report of January 6, 1955, S/3343; Secretary-General's (Dag Hammarskjöld) report of May 9, 1956, S/3596, annex 7; and (acting UNTSO chief of staff) Colonel Byron Leary's report of June 27, 1957, S/3844, July 1, 1957; ISA, FO 2440/10, June 20, 1951.

[13] UN, S/3659, September 12, 1956; S/3815, April 28, 1957; S/3844, July 1, 1957.

[14] UN, S/2517, May 18, 1951; S/7573, November 2, 1966.

Syria's policy toward the DMZ was an amalgam of two variables—the legal and the political. The legal variable involved three arguments: the armistice agreement, particularly Article 5, stipulated that the DMZ was neither under Syrian nor under Israeli sovereignty[16]; since the area was not Israeli territory, Syria was entitled to check with all its strength any Israeli incursions on the zone[17]; the armistice agreement gave the MAC broad jurisdiction over military and non-military matters in the zone.[18] The political variable involved domestic and regional considerations that had a direct bearing on Syria's policy.

The alarming determination with which Israel pursued its policy of gaining possession of the DMZ, coupled with the injustice inflicted on the Palestinians as a result of the creation of Israel in 1948, made Syria place a high priority on checking Israel's advances in the demilitarized areas. The political instability of Syria and the competition for Arab leadership between Syrian leaders and Egyptian president Gamal Abd al-Nasir gave additional impetus to Syria's planning for a response. From the Syrian viewpoint, Israel was inherently hostile and illegitimate because it was created at the expense of the Palestinian Arabs. Any restraint on Israel's part, therefore, would be largely the result not of international pressure, but of the role the Syrian army could play in deterring Israel.

The UN Position

Responsible UN officials found fault with the policies of Israel, policies that posed a strategic challenge to stability on the Israel-Syria border. They also found fault with Syria's actions and often accused the two countries of triggering military engagements along the border. The opinions of these officials with regard to the status of the DMZ, however, was on the whole very close to the Syrian view. On the question of sovereignty, UN officials held that the Israeli government had taken a position that was contrary to the armistice agreement's intent. They consistently maintained that the instrument's terms were clear because they specifically stipulated that the question of sovereignty over the zone was to be resolved within the context of a final peace treaty.[19]

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[15] UN, S/2833, paragraph 58, October 1952; S/3659, September 5, 1956; S/3844, June 27, 1957; S/5401, August 19, 1963; S/7434, July 27, 1966; S/7561, October 28, 1966.

[16] UN, S/1353, special supplement no. 2, July 20, 1949; S/2833, November 4, 1952; S/3634, August 7, 1956; S/4270, February 23, 1960; see also documents cited in notes 8 through 11.

[17] UN, S/2300, August 17, 1951; S/4124, December 8, 1952; S/3122, October 23, 1953; *Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council*, supplement, 1964–1965, p. 139.

[18] UN, S/2389, November 8, 1951; S/4270, February 23, 1960; Khouri, "Friction and Conflict," pp. 17–18.

The resolutions of the Security Council supported these interpretations. First, in its resolution of May 18, 1951, the Security Council by 10 votes to 0, with 1 abstention (the Soviet Union), instructed Israel to "cease all operations in the demilitarized zone," and reiterated that Article 5 of the armistice agreement gives to the chairman of UNTSO the "responsibility for the general supervision of the demilitarized zone."[20] Again, in its resolution of April 9, 1962, the Security Council called for the "strict observance of Article V of the General Armistice Agreement, which provides for the exclusion of armed forces from the demilitarized zone, and annex IV of that agreement, which sets limits on forces in the defensive area."[21]

Second, UN officials argued that the armistice agreement legally obligated Syria and Israel to allow the MAC chairman and UN observers unhampered freedom of movement in the DMZ. Noting that UN observers had been prevented on various occasions from entering certain areas in the zone, Colonel Byron L. Leary, acting chief of staff of UNTSO, asserted in a report prepared in June 1957, in response to a request of the Security Council, that in order to carry out their duties:

> the chairman and the United Nations observers must at all times and without prior authorization have freedom of access to and freedom of movement in the demilitarized zone, whether they are on a routine visit or carrying out an investigation.[22]

Third, UN officials held that an explicit and specific purpose of the armistice agreement was to separate the armed forces of the two parties (Article 5, paragraph 2). Toward that end, the agreement only provided for "locally recruited civilian police . . . for internal security purposes."[23] Article 5, paragraph 4, of the agreement stipulates in no uncertain language that the "armed forces of the two parties shall nowhere advance beyond the armistice demarcation line."

Fourth, it was the opinion of UN officials that no party could justify a violation of the cease-fire by reference to:

> an alleged non-compliance by other parties with other clauses of the general armistice agreements than the cease-fire clause itself, and then only if and when such non-compliance were found to be a reason for the exertion of the right of self-defense

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[19] UN, S/2049, March 21, 1951; S/3659, September 27, 1956; Fred J. Khouri, *The Arab-Israeli Dilemma* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1968), pp. 192–3.

[20] UN, S/2157, May 18, 1951.

[21] UN, S/5111, April 9, 1962.

[22] UN, S/3844, July 1, 1957, p. 8. Similar UN views can also be found in Major General Burns's report of January 6, 1955, S/3343, paragraph 20, and a report of November 6, 1951, S/2389, prepared by then-UNTSO chief of staff Lieutenant General W.E. Riley; also see S/3659, September 12, 1956, for the authoritative interpretations of Ralph Bunche, who had helped write the armistice agreement in 1949.

[23] General Burns's report of January 6, 1955, S/3343; the secretary-general's report of May 9, 1956, S/3596, annex 7; and Colonel Leary's report of June 27, 1957, S/3844, July 1, 1957.

> as recognized (and subject to the conditions) in Article 51 of the Charter. Any such measure must be immediately reported to the Security Council and is subject to decision by the council. In this connection, circumstances make it necessary to emphasize again that acts of retaliation have repeatedly been condemned by the Security Council.[24]

This interpretation rested on the concept of *jus cogens,* or peremptory norms—that is, norms that must not be capable of derogation and are accepted by the community of states as a whole.[25]

Military Escalations

The policies and reactions of Israel and Syria in the DMZ generated recurring incidents of armed friction. The incidents ranged from low-intensity conflict, including infiltration, clashes with small arms, and the stealing of herds to strategic challenges involving the unlawful erection of fortifications and land cultivation in the demilitarized area. Israel had the edge in this long-running confrontation, in part because the kind of military power at the disposal of Syria was ill-suited to oppose or challenge the stronger and better-armed Israel.

In one incident, for example, Syrian-Israeli tension rose sharply in December 1955 when Syria sought to prevent by force Israeli vessels from moving on the northeast corner of the Sea of Galilee, where most fishing in that body of water was conducted. The ultimate Syrian objective was to secure fishing and navigation rights to the lake. The Syrians based their claim on the Anglo-French Treaty of 1923 that gave the inhabitants of Syria and Lebanon the right to fish and navigate in Lake Huleh and the Sea of Galilee, and on the Syrian claim that, in the military subcommittee of the conference that led to the signing of the General Armistice Agreement, the Israeli delegation made a pledge that Israel would respect the fishing rights of Syrian fishermen in these two areas.

Israel denied that such a pledge was ever made and rejected UN proposals that urged the Israeli government to recognize Arab fishing rights in the area. Israel argued that there was a possibility of considering such demands only in the context of a permanent peace.[26] Relying on its military power, Israel carried out a major raid on Syrian forces along the entire front on December 11, 1955, in which 50 Syrian soldiers were killed. Israel claimed that the aim of its attack was to clear the northeastern bank of the Sea of Galilee of Syrian troops stationed in Syrian territory on the hills overlooking the body of water.[27] By a unanimous vote on January 19, 1956, the Security Council condemned the Israeli raid on Syria.[28]

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[24] UN, S/3659, September 27, 1956, p. 3.

[25] For an elaboration on this concept, see Sztucki, *Jus Cogens and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Critical Appraisal* (1974); Hannikainen, *Peremptory Norms in International Law: Historical Development, Criteria, Present Status* (1988), pp. 21–22.

[26] ISA, FO 2434/5 n.d.; FO 2434/3, February 23, 1953; FO 2408/22, April 7, 1953; FO 2408/22, October 7, 1952.

[27] *Jerusalem Post,* December 13, 1955, p. 1.

Again, on the night of January 31-February 1, 1960, Israel sent an armed force against Tawafiq, an Arab village in the southern part of the DMZ. For the first time in years, the Israeli-Syrian MAC met to condemn the Israeli action.[29] The objective of the raid was to prevent the local Arabs from cultivating property assigned by UNTSO to the Arab sector of the southern DMZ, and to demonstrate to Syria that, if it did not acquiesce to Israeli activity on Arab-owned and disputed lands in the area, the price of opposition would be high.

General von Horn believed that the Israeli attack was a deliberate provocation.[30] In a similar vein, Israeli scholar Avner Yaniv suggested that Israel had decided to proceed with agricultural work, often backed by armed Israeli police, in order to draw Syrian fire, in which case Syria would be the culprit and Israel would have adequate pretext vis-à-vis the United Nations. The ultimate Israeli purpose was to escalate in order to inflict on Syria a "major blow for deterrence purposes."[31]

Numerous incidents occurred later, including the crisis of December 4, 1962, and that of August 19, 1963. As in previous incidents, there was a certain pattern of action and reaction. Israeli tractors would move into disputed areas, often with the support of armed Israeli police. The Syrians would fire from their high ground positions, and would often shell Israeli settlements in the Huleh valley. By trying to oppose the Israeli challenge, Syria drew on its head punitive Israeli raids, including air strikes. Observers and analysts who have taken an ideological position on this matter, and those who have not examined the historical record, argue that Syrian troops stationed on high ground bombarded the Israeli settlements before 1967 because they wanted to wage war against Israel.[32] Others, including Israelis, have questioned this thesis, arguing that the Syrians did not shell because they were above Israeli settlements, but because Israeli-Syrian relations were unstable and because of Israel's encroachments on Arab-owned and disputed lands in the demilitarized areas below.[33]

Perhaps the most significant incidents revolved around the conflict over the use of the waters of the Jordan River and its tributaries. While water disputes have always played a role in the Arab-Zionist confrontation, the struggle for water became particularly intense in the early 1960s, after Israel had made substantial progress in its plans to divert the Jordan's waters to the Negev. By 1963, Israel's water project was nearing completion. Although the Jordan's waters were vital to Jordan and Israel in particular, Syria believed that its interests as a riparian state were at stake, especially because Israel sought to reconstruct a controversial track and drainage ditch in the Ayn Tall al-Qadi area in November 1964. Near Ayn Tall is a spring believed to be the traditional source of the Jordan River. Hence, any encroachments upon such an area could cause serious flare-ups.

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[28] UN, Security Council Resolution 111 of January 19, 1956.

[29] UN, S/4270, February 23, 1960.

[30] Carl von Horn, *Soldiering for Peace* (London: Cassell, 1966), chapter 21.

[31] Avner Yaniv, "Syria and Israel: The Politics of Escalation" in Moshe Ma'oz and Avner Yaniv, eds., *Syria under Assad: Domestic Constraints and Regional Risks* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), p. 163.

[32] See Michael I. Handel, *Israel's Political-Military Doctrine,* Occasional Papers in International Affairs no. 30 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 1973); Ze'ev B. Begin, "A Vision for Israel at Peace," *Foreign Affairs* 70 (Fall 1991).

[33] Patrick Seale, *Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 117–18; Matityahu Peled, *Ma'ariv,* April 7, 1972; "Hannibal and the Golan Heights," *New Outlook,* November-December 1992, pp. 24–5.

UNTSO asked Israel to postpone work on both projects until a determination could be made on the basis of an investigation by an independent team of surveyors. UNTSO even suggested that Israel's work in the area "appeared to have been an encroachment into Syrian territory."[34] Israel rejected the UNTSO request. Syria also ignored UNTSO's instructions not to fire and continued its policy of armed opposition to what it regarded as illegal Israeli crossings of the armistice demarcation line.

As a result, on November 13, 1964, in the northern area of the armistice demarcation, particularly in the Ayn Tall al-Qadi area, the Syrians opened fire at an Israeli military patrol that had encroached upon disputed territory. Israel resorted to its air power, and before a cease-fire became effective three Israeli soldiers had been killed and nine wounded; on the Syrian side, seven people had been killed and twenty-six were injured, mostly civilians. The incident also resulted in material damage to Israeli agricultural settlements as well as to Syrian villages in the area.[35]

This incident assumed its gravity precisely because of the existence of strategically important water sources in the area of tensions. The importance of the water sources bore heavily upon Israel's initial policy decision of creeping annexation and on Syria's determination to oppose and resist such action regardless of the price that it had to pay. Frustrated with the Arab and UN failure to stop Israel from diverting the headwaters of the Jordan, Syria commenced work on its own diversion scheme in the fall of 1964, joined by Lebanon and Jordan. The Syrian efforts were quickly frustrated, however, and by July 1966 Israeli air raids eight miles inside Syrian territory were able to close down Syria's water diversion canal and the engineering equipment used in constructing it.[36]

As the contest with Israel escalated, Syria introduced Palestinian guerrillas to the battlefront, partly as a means of sustaining the border fight and partly to satisfy the emotional need for relief from the frustrations of impotence vis-à-vis Israel.[37] Large-scale military engagements in April 1967 culminated in Israeli war planes roaring over Damascus, and gave events a decisive push. When Gamal Abd al-Nasir moved to manage the crisis in May 1967, the tender was ignited.[38] Overwhelmed by the scope of Egypt's disastrous defeat in the first hours of the 1967 war, Syrian leaders decided not to throw their country's full weight into the debacle. Senior military planners in Israel, on the other hand, including Yigal Allon, chief defense advisor to Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, and David Elazar, head of the Northern Command, argued for a bold thrust against Syria with a view to capturing the Golan. From their perspective, the Golan, once captured, would be an inestimable gain, not only because it overlooked what had been Lake Huleh and the Huleh valley, but also because of its economic and strategic significance.[39] In the last two days of the war, the Golan and the strong point high on Mount Hermon were lost by Syria to Israel. The struggle for the DMZ ended at this point, to be followed by a struggle for the newly captured Golan.

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[34] UN, S/6061, November 24, 1964, p. 8.

[35] UN, S/6061, November 24, 1964; *New York Times*, November 29, 1964; Khouri, *Arab-Israeli Dilemma*, pp. 228–9.

[36] UN, S/6248, March 19, 1965, and S/7432, July 26, 1966.

[37] Seale, *Asad*, p. 125.

THE GOLAN

The Golan, a Syrian mountainous plateau with an average altitude of 1,000 meters, covers an area of 1,750 square kilometers. Israel captured about 1,250 square kilometers of this area on June 9–10, 1967. As a result of the 1973 war and the Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement of the following year, Israel returned to Syria about 100 square kilometers. The Golan has a north-south length of 65 kilometers, and an east-west dimension varying from 12 to 25 kilometers.

The Mt. Hermon massif (2,224 meters) in the north is of exceptional geostrategic value because it offers a commanding position overlooking southern Lebanon, the Golan plateau, and much of southern Syria and northern Israel. Conversely, the south Golan has a major weakness because it lacks dominating terrain features. To the east, a range of volcanic hills offers downhill access to Galilee in the west and Damascus in the east. To the west, the Golan plateau overlooks Israeli metropolitan centers. At present, the Israeli army is stationed about 35 kilometers from Damascus, while the Syrian army is stationed about 250 kilometers from Tel Aviv.

The Golan is also important for its regional water sources. This is particularly true of the area of Mt. Hermon, where the headwaters of the Jordan River lie. Additionally, the Baniyas Spring, a major Jordan River source, is located on the lower slopes of the Golan, thus enhancing the latter's importance. To the south, the Sea of Galilee and the Yarmouk River constitute two more important regional water sources.

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[38] UN, S/7683, January 15, 1967; S/7725, February 8, 1967; General Odd Bull, *War and Peace in the Middle East: The Experiences and Views of a U.N. Observer* (London: Leo Cooper, 1973).

[39] Yaniv, "Syria and Israel," p. 169; Yitzhak Rabin, *The Rabin Memoirs* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1979); Moshe Dayan, *Moshe Dayan: Story of My Life* (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1976); Ezer Weizman, *On Eagles' Wings* (New York: MacMillan, 1976).

The Israeli Perspective

In considering the Golan from the Israeli perspective, one can identify three Israeli views: those adopting an ambivalent position with respect to the extent of potential withdrawal from the area; those stressing Israel's need to retain the Golan; and those advocating an almost total Israeli withdrawal in return for full peace. The declared official position of the current Rabin government represents the first category of views—ambivalence regarding the extent of withdrawal. The writings and pronouncements of Itamar Rabinovich, Israel's ambassador to the United States and its chief negotiator with the Syrian delegation to the peace talks, outline the official Israeli position, which is based on four points: Syria must spell out the nature of the peace it will be willing to make with Israel before Israel defines the extent of the withdrawal it would be willing to make from the Golan; an extensive security regime predicated upon mutuality and reciprocity must be established; Syria must engage more in public diplomacy designed to impress and convince Arabs and Israelis alike that it wants peace with Israel; such peace must entail full-fledged diplomatic, cultural, and economic relations and must not be encumbered by linkages to Palestine, Lebanon, and other Arab-Israeli problems.[40]

There are other arguments made by Rabin himself, as well as by centrist Labor Knesset members, including Misha Harish, the secretary general of the Labor Party. One such argument is that, unlike the vast Sinai Peninsula, by virtue of overlooking the densely populated Israeli settlements of the north and containing the sources of the Jordan River, the narrow Golan plateau is of such strategic value that it cannot be returned to Syria in its entirety. Whereas the Sinai—201 kilometers miles at its widest point—provides a built-in buffer zone that facilitates agreements on DMZs, the Golan is only 15 to 25 kilometers from the pre-1967 Israeli border at its widest point, and does not, therefore, facilitate the creation of such demilitarized areas.[41]

Another argument states that, despite the geopolitics of the Golan, disengaging Syria from the Arab-Israeli conflict justifies finding a basis for territorial compromise. Disengagement means what Rabin referred to as building "bilateral bridges" between Syria and Israel, or a peace treaty that "should not be influenced by the success or lack of success of negotiations with the other Arab delegations" in the on-going peace talks.[42] Territorial compromise denotes partial Israeli withdrawals, with demilitarized zones and arrangements that give Israel a basis to exercise control over particular areas of the Golan that these advocates believe have greater importance to Israel than other areas. In particular, they refer to the Mount Hermon massif in the far north and the steep scarp overlooking positions of metropolitan Israel to the west.[43] In terms of the modalities of Israeli withdrawal, territorial compromise may also mean an arrangement based on a progression of simultaneous reciprocal concessions to be made by Syria and Israel.[44]

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[40] See Itamar Rabinovich, *New York Times*, May 19, 1993, page A19; see also Rabinovich's presentation at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 26, 1993.

[41] See Rabin's interview, *Time*, November 30, 1992, p. 51.

[42] *Ibid.*

A third argument among those advocating territorial compromise pertains to Jewish settlements on the Golan. Many of those who want some sort of territorial compromise are averse to the idea of dismantling Jewish settlements, a precedent for which was set by the Likud-led government in 1982 when Israel returned the Sinai to Egypt. Only a few doves regard the evacuation of all Jewish settlers as the inevitable price to be paid for reaching a peace agreement.[45] Some who support this position, however, do not rule out evacuation of some Jewish settlements in the Golan in the framework of a permanent peace agreement. Among them are those who argue that just as there are many Arabs living under Israeli rule, there is no reason to prevent Israelis from living under Arab rule.[46] The future of the settlements in the Golan is still an open question in Israel. Three obstacles seem to stand in the way of dismantling them: the powerful Golan lobby; the strong opposition of Labor hard-liners and the National Religious Party; and Labor's long-standing belief that civilian settlements have a military value.[47]

In the second category—those believing that Israel needs to retain the Golan—are many Likud members and a number of Labor hard-liners. Basing their argument on the assumption that Syria is not ready for peace, and that it cannot be trusted to honor peace because of the nature of its ruling regime and its Baathist ideology, advocates of this view make the further assumption that Israel can scarcely contemplate a territorial compromise on the Golan for security considerations. The source of the threat to Israel's existence, they maintain, is a ground attack. Israel, they also argue, is a small country and is surrounded by Arab states.

From their perspective, calculating time and space is critical. Israel, they argue, has a small regular army of 134,000 troops compared to Syria's regular army of 306,000 troops. Mobilizing Israeli reserves (365,000) takes up to 48 hours. Advocates of this position also maintain that, in a democracy like Israel, it takes time to deliberate, weigh the alternatives, and make a decision. On the basis of this reasoning, they conclude that if a large Syrian land force were allowed to be at or near a zero distance from Israel's population centers, the very existence of Israel would be at stake. In brief, those who share this view argue that security is territory.[48] Some also argue that the Golan is part of Israel and UN Security Council Resolution 242 has nothing to do with it.[49] Others even add an ideological dimension to the argument, calling for the inclusion of the Golan within Israel because, between 1920 and 1923, the central and northern sections of the plateau were part of Palestine before being ceded to the French Mandate in Syria.[50]

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[43] See Susan Hattis Rolef, "Syria, Peace and Labor's Platform," *Jerusalem Post,* November 4, 1991, p. 6. Rolef is editor of the Labor Party monthly *Spectrum*; Saul Bernard Cohen, *The Geopolitics of Israel's Border Question* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), pp. 83–5; Efraim Inbar, *War and Peace in Israeli Politics* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 1991), chapter 4.

[44] Author's discussion with General Aryeh Shalev, Tel Aviv, August 2, 1992.

[45] See interview with Yossi Sarid in Inbar, *War and Peace in Israeli Politics,* p. 97; see also Abba Eban, "We Can Still Trade Territory for Peace," *Spectrum,* June-July 1982, pp. 30–31.

[46] Yossi Beilin, "How to Negotiate and for What," *Jerusalem Post,* August 4, 1991, p. 6.

[47] See William Wilson Harris, *Taking Root: Israeli Settlement in the West Bank, the Golan and Gaza-Sinai, 1967–1980* (New York and Toronto: Research Studies Press, 1980), p. 71; Peretz Kidron, "All Eyes on the Golan," *Middle East International,* September 25, 1992, pp. 5–7.

All these considerations seem to have entered into the calculations of the Begin government when it extended Israeli law, jurisdiction, and administration to the Golan in December 1981. The Reagan administration criticized the Israeli action and the UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 497 of December 17, 1981, declaring the Israeli action "null and void and without international legal effect."[51]

The third Israeli view reflects the thinking of Labor Party doves and others who maintain that Israel should consider seriously the principle of an almost total withdrawal from the Golan in return for total peace. Some even call for a total withdrawal in return for full peace.[52] Regardless of the extent of withdrawal that they advocate, the outlook of those who support this view is based on three assumptions. The first assumption challenges the logic of those who argue that territory is security. According to Avraham Tamir, a retired general and a director-general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry when Shimon Peres was foreign minister, to argue that territory is security means that

> we can conquer the entire Middle East. It is equally essential to our security that missiles don't fall on us—so are we going to conquer all the territories on which there are missiles and launchers? It's time to see that peace and security can exist without being conditional on sitting on occupied land.[53]

A second assumption in this camp is that Syria will not enter into a peace agreement without getting the Golan. A third assumption is that security is not only territory, but rather real peace, strict demilitarization, and security guarantees.[54] For these people, security tops the list of Israeli priorities. Missiles and other modern weapons are not too impressed by strategic depth; if a missile is launched from Syria, it will not stop in the Golan for an entry visa so that it may continue on its course into Israel proper.[55]

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[48] Ze'ev B. Begin, "Strategic Depth Still Counts," *Jerusalem Post,* March 1, 1992, p. 5. For an analysis of this thinking, see Efraim Inbar and Giora Goldberg, "Is Israel's Political Elite Becoming More Hawkish," *International Journal* 45, (Summer 1990); Yael Yishai, *Land or Peace: Whither Israel?* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1987).

[49] *Yedi'ot Aharonot,* March 19, 1991.

[50] Saul Cohen, *The Geopolitics of Israel's Border Question,* Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies no. 7, (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Post and Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), p. 85.

[51] UN Security Council Resolution 497 of December 17, 1981.

[52] "Taking Advantage of Syrian Willingness," *Ha'aretz,* editorial, December 27, 1992, B1, as cited in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report*-Middle East and South Asia (FBIS-NES), December 29, 1992, pp. 27–8.

[53] As quoted by Michael Yudelman, "Should We Talk Land for Peace?" *Jerusalem Post,* August 9, 1991, p. 9.

Apart from the views of the more dovish elements in Israeli society, the other perspectives cited here demonstrate that Israel is still hesitant to pay the price of peace with Syria. An interpretation of the tea leaves in the brew of Israel's public policy statements suggests that the Rabin government favors returning parts of the Golan to Syria in return for peace with normal relations. Conflicting statements by Israeli officials serve to cloud the picture. For example, Housing Minister Binyamin Eliezer recently dismissed the idea that Syria would get back the Golan. "And even if we [Syria and Israel] do make progress," he said, "I do not see Israel giving up its hold on the Golan Heights."[56] Yet, the views of some politicians and opinion-makers point in the opposite direction. Moreover, polls indicate that 71 percent of Israeli reserve generals think that security arrangements are possible if much of the Golan is returned to Syria.[57] Now that the question of the Golan is publicly debated in Israel, the calculation of cost and benefit may undergo a drastic change, perhaps in favor of the more dovish elements in Israel.

The Syrian Position

In discussing Syria's position on the Golan, it is useful to sketch some of the salient factors that shape that position. One factor is the interaction between capabilities on the one hand, and fears and ambitions on the other hand. Syria is no match for Israel in terms of economic development and military prowess. Israel is a nuclear power whose security and well-being are guaranteed by the United States.[58] With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Syria lost its superpower patron. The country's long borders have no natural boundaries, and if a war erupted, Israel could outflank Syrian forces through Lebanon or Jordan. Indeed, during the 1973 war, Israeli aircraft did try to outflank Syrian aircraft defenses through Lebanon. From a geostrategic point of view, the Syrians consider the Golan a critical natural defense against Israel.[59] Another factor is Syria's perception of its role in the region. Syria views itself as the champion of Arab interests. Defending the Palestine cause and other Arab rights vis-à-vis Israel has been the guiding principle of Syria's foreign policy and the *raison d'être* of its regime.

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[54] See statement of Labor Knesset member Ezer Weizman, as quoted by Michael Yudelman, *Jerusalem Post*, May 3, 1991, p. 20; see also "Interveiw with Ezer Weizman," *Spectrum*, June 1988, p. 10; for earlier dovish positions on the Golan, see Abba Eban, "A Stumbling Block on the Golan," *Ma'ariv*, December 18, 1981; Chaim Tzadok, "A Harmful Law," *Ma'ariv*, December 18, 1981. Currently, one of the most dovish Israeli views on Syria is that of Moshe Ma'oz as reflected, for example, in his "Syrian-Israeli Relations and the Middle East Process," *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 14, no. 3 (1992), pp. 6–7.

[55] Discussion with Yossi Beilin, deputy foreign minister of Israel, New York, September 8, 1992. For an exposition of Beilin's views, see his book, *The Price of Unity* (Tel Aviv: Revivim, 1985), in Hebrew.

[56] Radio Israel, January 19, 1993, as cited in FBIS–NES, January 22, 1993, p. 33.

[57] *Washington Times*, June 22, 1992.

[58] On the military balance between Syria and Israel, see Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Yearbook 1990: World Armaments and Disarmament* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); Shlomo Gazit et al., *The Middle East Military Balance, 1990–1991* (Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Post and Boulder, CO: Westview Press, for the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1992), pp. 259–73, 355–64.

The security imperative and Syria's role perception constitute the framework that shapes Syria's views on the Golan. This framework has other components, but they act as complements—not as substitutes—for the two outlined above. First among the other components is rationality—or the rank ordering of goals in light of existing capabilities and a careful consideration of the costs and benefits associated with feasible methods of action. The second is the belief in achieving objectives deemed to be in the interests of the state and the regime.

President Hafiz al-Asad's balanced regard for these principles has given Syria the advantage of not being lured into dangerous diversions from perceived state interests.[60] Contrary to those who argue that Syria has been motivated by ideology, al-Asad's record shows a penchant for relegating ideology to a secondary status. Whether in Lebanon or the Persian Gulf, and whether in the Arab-Israeli theater or in the wider field of international relations, the message of the al-Asad government has been clear and simple: the Syrian state has interests, and, in pursuit of those interests, it has the intent to act through diplomacy where possible, and through other means at its disposal when necessary. These interests, however, must be pursued with due regard for Syria's moral responsibilities toward the Palestine question.[61]

Syria's strategy with respect to the Golan should be assessed with this background in mind. The factors that shape this strategy are of both a military-tactical and demographic-economic nature. The military-tactical considerations involve terrain and the psychological impact of alien and hostile forces of occupation. As to terrain, the continued Israeli occupation of the Golan presents strategic liabilities that are compounded by the absence of natural barriers. At the closest point the Israeli army is at a distance of only 35 kilometers from

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[59] Raymond A. Hinnebusch, "Revisionist Dreams, Realist Strategies: The Foreign Policy of Syria," in Bahgat Korany and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, eds., *The Foreign Policies of Arab States* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press and Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1984), pp. 285–6; Anne Sinai and Allen Pollack, eds., *The Syrian Arab Republic* (New York: American Academic Association for Peace in the Middle East, 1976).

[60] Bashshar al-Ja'fari, *Al-Siyasah al-kharijiyya al-Suriyya, 1946–1982* (Syria's foreign policy, 1946–1982) (Damascus: Tlas Press, 1987); Fuad al-Ashsha, *Hafiz al-Asad: Qa'id wa risalah* (Hafiz al-Asad: A leader and a message) (Damascus: Dar al-Ilm, 1992); Safwan Qudsi, *Al-Batal wa al-tarikh: Qira'ah fi fikr Hafiz al-Asad al-siyasi* (The hero and history: A reading of the political thought of Hafiz al-Asad) (Damascus: Tlas Press, 1984).

[61] See Muhammad Muslih, "Asad's Middle East Strategy," unpublished paper; Alasdair Drysdale and Raymond Hinnebusch, *Syria and the Middle East Peace Process* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1991), pp. 200–19.

Damascus. With no natural barriers to protect the capital, Syrian military planners believe that the country's strategic situation is dubious at best.

The fact that the overall balance of military power is overwhelmingly in favor of Israel makes the Syrian military particularly nervous.[62] From their perspective, a two-tiered Middle East, in which Israel has a nuclear arsenal of at least 200 weapons[63] with sophisticated delivery systems, while Syria and the other Arab states have none, is potentially catastrophic to Syria's security.[64] An arms control regime based on reciprocal reductions by all neighbors in the region may provide an alternative to this lopsided military balance, but it is inconceivable to have such a regime outside the framework of a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Thus, in terms of terrain, Syrian planners believe that the Golan plateau in Syrian hands provides a defensive depth that is indispensable for the security of Syria, while a Golan controlled by Israel poses a lethal threat to the Syrian heartland.[65]

The psychological dimension of Syria's strategy refers to Israel's introduction of hostile elements into the Golan landscape and the impact of those elements on the Syrian psyche. Sizable contingents of Israeli troops equipped with state-of-the-art weapon systems are in bivouac on the Golan. The drive south from Damascus to the Golan across utterly flat terrain takes less than an hour by car. As one American journalist has witnessed first-hand, the presence of these contingents in the direct line of sight of Damascus, and within such a short distance from the Syrian capital, has a terrifying impact on the Syrians.[66] During the 1973 war, the Syrians encountered these Israeli encampments in some of the most ferocious battles of that war.[67] Further, 2,000 meters up Mount Hermon Israel has installed electronic gear sophisticated enough to eavesdrop on the Syrians, including al-Asad himself.[68] Partly because of this, Asad and his colleagues are reported to use hand gestures to communicate sensitive information to each other.[69]

The question of demography in the Syrian strategy refers to two things: the impact of the Israeli occupation on the Syrian residents of the Golan and Israeli settlement activities. Prior to its seizure by Israeli forces in the 1967 war, the Golan had a population of approximately 130,000 people living in 139 towns and villages and on 61 farms. Today, only 16,000 people remain in five Arab villages. Druze constitute the overwhelming majority of the remaining Syrian population.[70] According to some observers, one important reason why the Druze community was allowed to remain was the initial attitude of the Israeli government, which assumed that the Syrian Druze would cooperate with Israel like their coreligionists in the Galilee.[71] When attempts to coopt Golani Druze failed, the Israeli government resorted to such measures as curfews, administrative detention, restrictions on the use of water and efforts to link the daily life of the Golanis to the acquisition of Israeli-citizenship identification cards.[72] Further, there are now in the Golan more than 35 Jewish settlements with an estimated population of 15,000. Many of these settlements are on the southern approaches above the Sea of Galilee.

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[62] See Mustafa Tlas et al., *Harb al-khalij, ghazw al-Kuwayt wa tahriruha* (The gulf war, the invasion of Kuwait and its liberation) (Damascus: Center for Military Studies, 1992), pp. 133–55; Bassam al-Asali, *Al-Tawazun al-istratiji wa al-sira' al-Arabi al-Isra'ili* (The strategic balance and the Arab-Israeli conflict) (Damascus: Tlas Press, n.d.).

[63] Leonard Spector, "Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East," *Orbis* 36 (Spring 1992); Seymour Hersh, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Random House, 1991), pp. 198–200.

[64] For a discussion of a two-tiered Middle East and its implications, see Yahya Sadowski, "Scuds versus Butter: The Political Economy of Arms Control in the Arab World," *Middle East Report*, July-August 1992, pp. 8–12.

[65] See essay of Syrian author Izz al-Din Stas, "Al-Jawlan qadiyya siyasiyya wa laysat istratijiyya" (The Golan is a political and not a strategic question), *al-Hayat*, April 17, 1993, p. 10.

[66] Milton Viorst, "The Shadow of Saladin," *New Yorker*, January 8, 1990, p. 65.

[67] Seale, *Asad*, pp. 209–11; Mohamed Heikel, *The Road to Ramadan* (New York: Quadrangle/The New York Times Books, 1975).

[68] Viorst, "Shadow of Saladin."

[69] Author's discussions with Egyptian officials who do not wish to be identified.

Israeli practices in the Golan influence Syrian strategy in two ways. First, the Syrian government believes that it is duty-bound to protect its own citizens from the adverse effects of Israeli occupation. Second, the Jewish settlements not only represent intrusions into the Syrian landscape, but are also viewed as hostile places inhabited by alien people. The Syrians consider the settlements military outposts intended to create a spatial asymmetry in the territorial balance in favor of Israel. Indeed, Syrian officials question the very logic underlying the security value that the Israelis attach to the settlements. "The Israelis claim that they took the Golan to protect their settlements," Asad remarked to former U.S. president Jimmy Carter, "but then they built new settlements on the Golan, some of them only three hundred meters from our territory."[73] The implication of Asad's comment is that the Israelis will be tempted to seize new land for the sake of creating a new buffer to protect the existing buffer.[74]

From an economic perspective, Syria's interests are primarily water-related. As noted, geography makes the Golan a particularly important region as far as water sources are concerned. If Syria were to repossess the Golan, it would enable it to better defend its interests in matters involving the riparians in the Jordan-Yarmouk basin. The fact that the water situation in the region has deteriorated progressively as the countries have faced greater water shortages makes the water dimension of the Israeli-Syrian conflict particularly significant. Many observers in the area believe the next Arab-Israeli war will be over water.

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[70] Harris, *Taking Root,* pp. 70ff; Foundation for Middle East Peace, "Report on Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories" (Washington, DC), July 1991; George Lauman, "Syria's Golan Heights Turning into an Israeli 'Land without People'," *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs,* October 1992, pp. 24–5; *Report of the UN Secretary-General under General Assembly Resolution 2252 (ES-V) and Security Council Resolution 237-A/6997 and S/8158.*

[71] Tayseer Mara'i and Usama R. Halabi, "Life under Occupation in the Golan Heights," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 22, no. 1, (Autumn 1992), p. 80.

[72] The Israeli military distributed identification cards to the Golanis immediately after the 1967 war. Not long after the Likud came to power in 1977, however, the Israeli authorities requested the Golanis to carry identification denoting citizenship. For example, a Golani could not travel in Israel, or have a driver's license, without such an identification.

[73] Jimmy Carter, *Blood of Abraham* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985), p. 71.

[74] Sufuh al-Khayr, *Iqlim al-Jawlan: Dirasah fi al-wad' al-tabi'i wa al-kiyan al-bashari wa al-bina' al-iqtisadi* (The Golan district: A study of its natural features, its population and its economic structure) (Damascus: Ministry of Culture and National Guidance, 1976); Laura Drake, "The Golan Belongs to Syria," *Middle East International,* September 11, 1992, p. 24–5.

For Syria, a total Israeli withdrawal from the Golan would mean a settlement of the territorial dimension of the conflict with Israel. The gist of Syria's policy is a solution that keeps Israel contained within its pre-1967 frontiers. The two principles defining the contours of this policy are "land before peace"[75] and "total peace for total withdrawal."[76] Placed in the context of Syria's regional policy and the public pronouncements of its leaders, these statements represent an unmistakable readiness for peace with Israel. Top aides to Rabin say he is convinced that Syria genuinely wants peace with Israel.[77]

Whereas Israel insists that Syria must spell out in advance the nature of the peace it is willing to offer, the Syrians show no hurry to do that for two reasons. One has to do with reciprocity, which is a prerequisite for a modus vivendi. There is no guarantee that Israel will commit itself to a total withdrawal from the Golan. Israel's failure to respond positively to Palestine Liberation Organization concessions makes Syria wary of making unilateral concessions without receiving from Israel a reciprocal commitment to such concessions. Any unreciprocated advance concessions on the nature of peace could adversely affect, in the Syrian view, the standing of the al-Asad regime at home and in the Arab world at large. Reciprocity here means an Israeli commitment to a total withdrawal from the Golan.

The second reason that Syria is unwilling to define in advance the nature of the peace it would offer has to do with the style of al-Asad. Unlike the late Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat, the Syrian president plays his cards close to his chest because any blunder could seriously undermine his regime. He likes to move in a gradual manner in order to scrutinize the political fallout after every move he makes. From Asad's perspective, the ground for peace with Israel must be prepared carefully and methodically. In order to do that, he believes he needs a forthright Israeli statement on the territorial question.[78]

The assumption that Syria puts the territorial component of its conflict with Israel ahead of Palestinian and other Arab rights may or may not be true. What is unquestionable is that Syria will not concede to Israel any part of the Golan. Further, it is highly unlikely that Syria could sponsor, à la Sadat, a solution that does not incorporate Palestinian and Lebanese rights. Damascus has always positioned itself as the defender of Arab rights, foremost among which are Palestinian rights. In this context, strategy plays a pivotal role. Intrinsic to this

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75. *Time*, November 30, 1992, p. 49.
76. See Patrick Seale's interview with al-Asad, *al-Wasat* (London), May 10, 1993.
77. *Jerusalem Post*, August 6, 1993, p. 1.
78. Author's discussions with Syrian officials who do not wish to be identified.

strategy has been the need for stability and for taking up the Israeli challenge. The Syrians believe that peace must be stable and durable, and to fulfil these conditions it must be comprehensive. They also believe that separate deals with Israel only enhance Israeli supremacy at Arab expense.

Yet, despite all these considerations, Syria will not hesitate to achieve progress in its negotiations with Israel before the other Arab parties. Al-Asad's thinking on this subject is revealing:

> When we speak of a comprehensive peace we do not mean that everybody marches shoulder to shoulder, like soldiers on parade. A little progress may take place on one front, a little delay on another. All the Arab parties understand that there are certain peculiarities regarding each of the issues. As long as they are satisfied that we are proceeding toward a comprehensive solution, progress on one issue can be made more speedily than on others.[79]

If progress were to occur—and this would require an Israeli commitment to a total withdrawal from the Golan—then a formula for resolving the territorial dimension of the Israeli-Syrian conflict could be reached. Drawing a timetable for withdrawal and a plan for security arrangements is the responsibility of diplomats and military planners. In this case Syria might offer Israel a state of non-belligerency that might be linked to a settlement of the Palestine question. The question of Lebanon would become easier to solve. Normal relations between the two countries would only take place once there was a comprehensive settlement on all fronts. Moreover, Syria would seek mutual and balanced security arrangements, including DMZs on both sides of the border.[80]

CONCLUSION

The evidence presented in this article sets forth the hypotheses that the territorial dispute between Israel and Syria has its own dynamic, that it is a central focus of conflict between the two countries, and that its settlement promises a diplomatic breakthrough. Embracing the proposition that Syria's repossession of the Golan would, by itself, lead to peace and normalization, however, should be tempered by an appreciation of the basic ethos of Syria and its perception of its regional role. Other conclusions also emerge from this study.

First, Israel's illegal policies and actions in the demilitarized zones before 1967 and in the Golan after 1967 posed strategic challenges that made an important contribution to keeping open the door of conflict with Syria. Israel was determined to seize the DMZ in contravention of its armistice agreement with Syria.

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[79] *Time*, November 30, 1992, p. 50.

[80] Seale's interview with al-Asad, *al-Wasat*; author's discussions in Damascus. For a discussion of simulations and their utility in resolving the Israeli-Syrian conflict, see J. Lewis Rasmussen and Robert B. Oakley, *Conflict Resolution in the Middle East: Simulating a Diplomatic Negotiation between Israel and Syria* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1992).

The Israeli policies and actions provided, in Syria's view, confirmation of Israeli expansionism and ingrained hostility toward the Arab world. At the same time, Syria's adoption of a tough line regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict and its attempts to contain Israel's territorial advances in a manner that violated the armistice agreement also played a role in keeping the conflict alive and in causing the border friction between 1949 and 1967. Today, Syria publicly expresses its readiness to live in peace with an Israel contained within its pre-1967 borders. On the other hand, Israel has not yet taken a final position on the extent of its withdrawal from occupied Syrian territory.

A second conclusion has to do with the technical aspects of a potential Israeli-Syrian settlement. The pre-1967 confrontation between the two countries suggests that any future DMZ should extend on both sides of the Israel-Syria border, with each party exercising exclusive jurisdiction over the zone on its side of the border. In addition, the experience of UNTSO indicates that in order for a force such as it to operate effectively in the future, it should play the buffer and preventive roles undertaken by full-fledged peace forces. Indeed, if any peacekeeping forces are placed between Syria and Israel, the UN Security Council should give them a mandate to be an instrument for safeguarding the peace. In this regard, they should have mobile observation posts in the demilitarized sectors equipped with state-of-the art electronic gear. Syria and Israel should agree in writing to grant to such forces full freedom of movement in the demilitarized areas. UN reports prepared on the performance of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), since the force was established in May 1974 to supervise the October war cease-fire between the two countries, indicate that a clear mandate goes a long way toward maintaining the cease-fire and keeping the operational situation in the UN force's area of operation calm.[81] Of course, the cooperation of the parties is the primary prerequisite for the effective performance of such a force.

A third conclusion relates to security and shows the divergences in the positions of Syria and Israel with regard to the Golan. In the view of the Syrians, modern missiles have diminished the significance of the Golan to Israeli security.[82] In Israel, the Golan question is not simply a question of security. It is also a question of settlements, water, domestic politics, and to some, it is even a question of ideology. As to Syria, the Golan is an integral part of the Syrian homeland. Given the balance of power that decisively favors Israel, the Golan is also a question of security for Syria. Politically speaking, no Syrian leader is likely to accept less than Egypt has accepted: total Israeli withdrawal in return for total peace and mutual and symbolically balanced security arrangements.

The gap between Syria and Israel is still wide. Yet there may be a possibility for a breakthrough. A vigorous and continuous participation by the United States at the highest government level can bridge the gap. A change of mind and heart on the part of Israel with regard to the territorial question is an even more important requirement. A settlement of the territorial dimension of the Israeli-Syrian conflict must be anchored in a comprehensive peace on all fronts.

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[81] UN Security Council, S/24821, November 19, 1992.

[82] See for example, Stas, "Al-Jawlan."

PALESTINIAN EMPLOYMENT PROSPECTS

Gil Feiler

IN recent years, social scientists have exerted much effort investigating the economic and social problems of Palestinian society. Research has focused on prevailing physical and economic difficulties and on the integration of the refugee population in various host countries.[1] No significant research, however, has been undertaken with respect to future employment options for the Palestinians.[2] The employment of Palestinian refugees and non-refugees is one of the central issues that must be addressed in order to insure stability in the region. This matter is of particular importance in the context of the negotiations for autonomy in the Israeli-occupied territories—set in motion at the 1991 Madrid conference—and in light of almost non-existent local labor infrastructures there. An analysis of

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[1] See, for example, Laurie A. Brand, *Palestinians in the Arab World: Institution Building and the Search for State* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988); Ishaq Y. Al-Qutub, "Refugee Camp Cities in the Middle East: A Challenge for Urban Development Policies," *International Sociology* 4, no. 1 (March 1989); and George T. Abed, ed., *The Palestinian Economy* (London and New York: Routledge, 1988).

[2] On employment trends and labor organization generally, see Moshe Semyonov and Noah Lewin-Epstein, *Hewers of Wood and Drawers of Water: Noncitizen Arabs in the Israeli Labor Market* (Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, 1987); International Labor Organization, *Report on the Situation of Arab Workers in the Occupied Arab Territories* (Geneva, 1990, 1991, 1992); Salim Tamari, "Building Other People's Home: The Palestinian Peasant's Household and Work in Israel," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 11, no. 1 (Autumn 1981).

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demographic changes among Palestinians,[3] particularly as a result of emigration,[4] is basic to an understanding of future employment possibilities.

This article examines the employment options of Palestinians in Israel, in Arab countries, and in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Employment trends and political conditions in Arab countries and in Israel indicate that, in the medium and long term, Palestinian workers will be replaced either by other Arab laborers or by cheaper imported labor from Asia or, in the case of Israel, by new immigrants, primarily from the former Soviet Union.[5] The creation of jobs and industry in the occupied territories is, therefore, the only viable solution to the Palestinian unemployment problem.

In the context of an overall peace treaty in the region, cooperation between Israel and Arab states could lead to a unified labor market that would be of benefit to all parties concerned. Migration in search of work is easier to countries that are geographically close. To the extent that restrictions on movement are lessened, it becomes simpler to achieve the merger of separate employment markets into a more unified unit. Such a merger occurred on a small scale after 1967 with regard to the labor markets of Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip; a major contributing factor was the overland access that enabled movement on a daily basis.

During the 1970s and 1980s, Palestinians dominated the labor force in the Persian Gulf.[6] In the current economic-political state of the region, however, cooperation in the employment sphere, with the principal purpose of finding a solution to the employment crisis of the Palestinians, seems unrealistic. Temporary solutions, at least on the micro level, must be sought. Successful planning on that level is likely to encourage the parties involved to search for solutions on the macro level.

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[3] The most accurate demographic statistics are available from the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics. The vast majority of reference works, including those compiled by international bodies and Arab researchers, rely on data provided by this body. See, for example, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, *Selected Statistical Tables on the Economy of the Occupied Palestinian Territory* (New York, 1989).

[4] In respect to migration trends, see Nabil Badran, "Palestinian Migration: Trends and Socio-Economic Consequences," *Conference on International Migration in the Arab World* (Nicosia: Economic Commission for Western Asia, 1981); Stuart A. Gabriel and Eitan F. Sabatello, "Palestinian Migration from the West Bank and Gaza: Economic and Demographic Analyses," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 34, no. 2 (January 1986); Joost Hiltermann, "Seasoned Migrants to the North," *Middle East Report*, May-June 1987, pp. 19–22.

[5] For example, about 470,000 Jews arrived in Israel from the former Soviet Union between late 1989 and July 1993, straining the country's already sluggish economy. Unemployment among these immigrants has exceeded 35 percent. Figures supplied by Israeli Ministry of Interior, July 1993.

[6] On the Palestinians in the Persian Gulf, see Bilal al-Hasan, *Al-Filastiniyun fi al-Kuwayt* (Palestinians in Kuwait) (Beirut: Palestine Liberation Organization Research Center, 1974); Eric Rouleau, "The Palestinian Diaspora of the Gulf," *MERIP Reports*, May 1985, pp. 13–15.

WORKER MIGRATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST: AN OVERVIEW

Until the 1970s, most migrations from Arab countries were to areas outside the Middle East. The number of Arab migrant workers in the Middle East did not exceed a few hundred thousand. The oil boom following the October 1973 War, however, led to a new era in Middle Eastern migration.[7] The increase in revenues of the oil-producing states brought with it extensive investment programs and an increase in consumption, which in turn entailed expansion of service sectors.[8] The demand for goods was met with imports, but other services required human resources. Most of the citizens of the oil-producing states lacked the necessary skills and were too few in number to meet the demands created by the flow of oil income.

By 1975, about 2 million foreign workers resided in the six principal oil-producing states of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Of these workers, 68 percent came from Arab countries and most of the rest were from Asia.[9] Tens of thousands of Europeans and Americans were also employed in the oil states.[10] Five years later in 1980, there were 3 million foreign workers in the Persian Gulf, 65 percent of whom came from Arab countries. The number of foreign workers increased by two-thirds in the early 1980s, in part because the Iran-Iraq War created openings in the Iraqi labor market. By 1983 in the six Arab monarchies and Iraq, there were about 5 million foreign workers, 55 percent of whom came from other Arab countries.[11] In 1985, according to the Arab League, 3–4 million foreign workers resided in the Persian Gulf states, excluding foreign workers in Iraq[12]; of those in Iraq, at least 1.25 million were from Egypt alone. In 1985, 55 percent of the foreign workers in the Persian Gulf states and Iraq were still from Arab countries. According to a report issued by the International Gulf Bank, out of a total population of 15.7 million in the six gulf monarchies at the beginning of 1988, foreigners accounted for 6.9 million, or 44 percent.[13]

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[7] For bibliographies on migration in the Middle East, see Gilbert Beauge and A. Bendiab, *Migrations internationales au Moyen-Orient: 1975–1986* (Aix-en-Provence: Institut de recherches et d'études sur le monde arabe et musulman, 1987); Ian Seccombe, *International Migration for Employment in the Middle East: An Introductory Bibliography* (Durham, UK: Center for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, 1984).

[8] In the decade following the 1973 war, the oil-producing countries invested $323 billion in extensive development projects. See *Arab Oil and Gas,* July 1984, p. 4.

[9] Asian workers primarily came from Bangladesh, India, Korea, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. In general, Asians were paid less than Arab foreign workers, and their work conditions were worse. See, for example, *Arabia,* May 1985, pp. 72–3; and Mostafa H. Nagi, "Migration of Asia Workers to the Arab Gulf: Policy Determinants and Consequences," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* 9, no. 3 (Spring 1986).

[10] For British workers, the Middle East became their second most important foreign destination in the 1970s; most were highly skilled workers on lucrative short-term contracts. See A. Findley and A. Stewart, "Migrations des travailleurs qualifiés britanniques sous contract au Moyen-Orient," *Revue européenne des migrations internationales* 2, no. 1 (September 1986).

[11] Gil Feiler, "The Decrease in Oil Prices and Its Effect on the Foreign Labour Force in the Middle East," *Middle East Focus* (Ontario) 9, no. 7 (Summer/Fall 1987), p. 13.

[12] *Al-Madina* (Jiddah), June 28, 1987, p. 8.

Iraq and Saudi Arabia were the principal labor-importing countries during the 1980s. Together they accounted for about 65 percent of the total foreign work force in the region in 1983. The other labor-importing countries included Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE.[14] The principal Arab countries supplying workers have been Egypt—which accounted for 60 percent of the foreign Arab labor force—Jordan, Sudan, and Yemen. The number of Egyptian workers in the Arab oil-producing countries rose from 200,000 at the beginning of 1973 to 500,000 in 1975, to 1.25 million in 1978 and to about 2.9 million in 1983.[15] To the south of Egypt, Sudan supplied about 46,000 workers to Arab states in 1975; by 1982, this number had risen to between 200,000 and 450,000.[16] A study presented at a 1987 conference on the economy of Sudan claimed that 350,000 Sudanese were working in the Arab oil states at that time.[17] In 1974, about 150,000 Jordanians were employed in other Arab countries; by the early 1980s their number had risen to 250,000, and in 1985 to 325,000, most of them Palestinians.[18] This figure is remarkably large in view of the fact that the entire Jordanian labor force in 1985 totaled only 592,000.[19]

Labor migration figures for other Arab countries are estimates rather than documented statistics. For example, some 290,000 North Yemeni nationals worked in the oil states in 1975, about 500,000 in 1979, and between 600,000 and 740,000 in 1982.[20] Information on Syrian migration to the Arab oil states is limited. Some 70,000 Syrians were estimated to be working in the oil states in 1975, their number rising to an estimated 250,000 in 1982.[21] About 267,000 Lebanese emigrated in 1975–1980, 47 percent of them to other Arab states and 53 percent to the Americas. In Lebanon's case, the civil war was the main reason for emigration in contrast to the principally economic factors that motivated emigration from the other Arab labor-exporting countries.[22]

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[13] *Ila al-Amam* (Damascus), August 12, 1988, p. 25.

[14] Jordan is also a labor-exporting country. See Ian Seccombe, "Immigrant Workers in an Emigrant Economy: An Examination of Replacement Migration in the Middle East," *International Migration* 24, no. 2 (June 1986).

[15] Gil Feiler, *The Number of Egyptian Workers in the Arab Oil Countries, 1974–1983: A Critical Discussion,* Occasional Papers Series no. 96 (Tel Aviv: Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1986), p. 20.

[16] Eliyahu Kanovsky, *Migration from the Poor to the Rich Arab Countries,* Occasional Papers Series no. 85 (Tel Aviv: Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1984), p. 63. Compare Uthman al-Hasan Muhammad Nur, "Hijrat al-Sudaniyyin li al-aqtar al-naftiyya" (Sudanese migration to the oil states), *al-Mustaqbal al-Arabi* 9, no. 87 (May 1987).

[17] *Al-Siyasa* (Khartoum), January 30, 1987, claimed that more than 60 percent of the Sudanese migrants were technicians and skilled workers.

[18] Gil Feiler, "Migration and Recession: Arab Labour Mobility in the Middle East, 1982–1989," *Population and Development Review* 17, no. 1 (March 1991), pp. 135–7.

[19] *Al-Dustur* (Amman), July 24, 1985.

[20] Kanovsky, *Migration,* p. 61. Compare B.R. Pridham, ed., *The Impact of Emigration on Social Structure in the Yemen Arab Republic* (London: Croom Helm, 1985).

[21] Kanovsky, *Migration,* p. 60.

The governments of labor-exporting countries have participated in this massive migration by encouraging the movement of their workers to the Persian Gulf states to increase foreign currency remittances. Little effort is made to protect these nationals from exploitation by domestic recruiting officers or gulf employers. Similarly, little is done to protect the local economy from the drain of skilled labor.[23] Although the composition of the migrant worker pool varies from one labor-exporting country to another, in all countries the vast majority are young adult males. By contrast, the educational and occupational composition of migrants varies markedly, from the usually illiterate unskilled workers from Yemen to the relatively skilled non-Arab Asian laborers.[24]

With the decrease in oil revenues that began in 1985, the oil-producing countries began to tap their reserve funds and retain only those foreign workers deemed essential to the development of their respective economies. Asians and illegal workers were the first foreign workers sent back to their countries of origin. Arab laborers were dismissed at a later stage. Within the class of Arab workers, the oil-producing countries initially dismissed groups they perceived as potentially subversive, such as Lebanese Shi'a and Palestinians.[25] Special measures were adopted to restrict the size of immigrant families, and new labor laws discriminated against foreigners, who could not become citizens or permanent residents of the country in which they worked, did not enjoy equal rights, and were isolated socially. Foreigners were also prohibited from marrying local residents and from owning land.[26]

THE OIL STATES AND PALESTINIAN MIGRATION

The past history of migratory labor trends among Palestinians and current political and economic conditions would indicate that the work force in the occupied territories cannot expect the Arab states of the Persian Gulf or Jordan to solve their employment problems. In contrast to the purely economic reasons for the migration of some Arab and Asian workers to the gulf states, the migration of Palestinian workers is also due, in part, to political reasons. In particular, substantial numbers of people migrated to, and subsequently from, the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the wake of the 1948 and 1967 wars.[27]

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[22] Hadi Zurayq, "Hijrat al-amala al-Arabiyya: Dirasat halat. Amaliyyat san' al-qarar fi al-hijra, al-mua'aqqata wa al-da'ima min Lubnan" (Migration of Arab workers: Case Study. The workers' decision to emigrate temporarily and permanently from Lebanon), *al-Mustaqbal al-Arabi* 9, no. 87 (May 1986).

[23] Roger Owen, *Migrant Workers in the Gulf* (London: Minority Rights Group, 1985), p. 9.

[24] Alan Richards and John Waterbury, *A Political Economy of the Middle East* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 382, 384.

[25] Feiler, *Migration and Recession*, p. 150.

[26] See for example, *al-Ahram al-Iqtisadi*, August 5, 1985, pp. 18–19; Owen, *Migrant Workers in the Gulf*, pp. 11–13.

In the early 1970s economic expansion in Israel was decisive in stemming the migratory tide.[28] Superior earning potential drew Palestinians into the Israeli sector, while the sizable growth rate of the Israeli economy created a strong demand for the employment of Palestinian labor. In the mid-1970s, however, a slowdown in Israel's growth, combined with the opportunities available in the Persian Gulf, resulted in a sharp increase in Palestinian migration to the gulf. Counterbalancing this migratory trend, the diminished demand for labor in Israel, coupled with previously accumulated savings by residents of the occupied territories, precipitated a rise in construction in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which sometimes was financed by external Arab sources as a means of discouraging potential migrants.[29]

Continued Israeli settlement in the occupied territories could have a variety of political and economic effects on the Palestinian propensity to migrate. An increased Israeli presence in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, political conflict, and uncertainty regarding the eventual status of this region may result in accelerated Palestinian migration.[30] On the other hand, the same phenomenon may result in an increased desire on the part of the Palestinians to remain; indeed, it seems clear that, in addition to its negative aspects from a Palestinian perspective, increased Israeli activity in the occupied territories also provides greater employment opportunities for Palestinians, thereby diminishing migratory desires.[31] Monetary donations from various states and international bodies have also helped to improve local conditions and reduce the number of Palestinian emigrants.[32] This fact also conforms to the political purposes of the Arab donors, who prefer to encourage Palestinians to develop economically within the occupied territories than to settle permanently in the gulf states.

When the rate of worker-related migration in the Middle East peaked in the early 1980s, the Palestinian share of migration had reached its nadir[33]; proportionally far fewer Palestinians left the occupied territories in search of work than was potentially possible from the Palestinian labor export market. The reason lay in the preference of the oil states to engage workers from Arab states they considered relatively moderate, and whose citizens they regarded as less politically volatile. This also explains why Syria exported fewer workers than its potential. Even after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqis—rather than employ Syrians—preferred to employ Egyptians, despite the Arabs' severance of diplomatic relations with Egypt because of its signing of the Camp David accords.[34]

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[27] Gabriel and Sabatello, *Palestinian Migration*, p. 245–62; see also Fawzi A. Gharaibeh, *The Economies of the West Bank and Gaza Strip* (Boulder, CO, and London: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 29–30; Dan Zakai, *Economic Development in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza District, 1983–4* (Jerusalem: Bank of Israel, 1986), pp. 30–1.

[28] Gabriel and Sabatello, *Palestinian Migration*, p. 247.

[29] Ibid., p. 256.

[30] According to figures provided in a 1991 study by the US Department of State and reported in an International Labor Organization report, more than 200,000 Israelis live in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights, representing approximately 13 percent of the population of these territories. As a result of the Israeli government's decision to freeze new settlements in 1992, these figures are still valid. See International Labor Organization, *Report of the Director-General*, vol. 2 (Geneva, 1991), p. 21, appendices.

[31] Gabriel and Sabatello, *Palestinian Migration*, p. 257.

[32] See, for example, Leopold Yehuda Laufer, *Western Europe and the Palestinians: The Socio-Economic Dimension*, Policy Studies no. 39 (Jerusalem: Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, 1990), pp. 3–20.

[33] In 1983, only 4,000 Palestinians left the occupied territories in search of work. See Zakai, *Economic Development*, p. 30.

Few Palestinians have ever been granted citizenship in any of the gulf states, even though some Palestinians have resided in them since 1948.[35] Kuwait and the UAE took steps in the early 1980s to ensure that their already large Palestinian populations would not increase. One restrictive measure implemented in both states—directed primarily at Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip—prohibited migrant workers from changing jobs without first leaving the country. It was not unusual for Palestinian tourists visiting gulf states to be detained and prohibited entry. Kuwait sometimes refused Palestinian researchers permission to participate in academic projects there. The Kuwaiti government even obtained a computer program from a Scandinavian company that compares the passport details of persons entering the country with a list of Palestinian names and determines if the place and date of birth have been altered. The Kuwaitis used it as part of their policy of restricting the number of Palestinians entering the country irrespective of their citizenship.[36]

Apart from actions taken as a result of fears of potential Palestinian political extremism, the Arab states also attempted to prevent what they described as an Israeli effort to push the Palestinian population out of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Thus, the Jordanian government adopted a policy of stopping Palestinians from crossing into Jordan from the West Bank if their travel documents showed that they would not be allowed to return to the West Bank.

These matters gained added importance as a consequence of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The decrease in both the price of oil and oil revenues, the development of local labor forces that reduced the need for foreign workers, and vocal Palestinian and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) support of Iraq during the gulf crisis and war were all factors that adversely affected employment prospects for Palestinians. At the beginning of August 1990, Kuwaiti amir Jabir al-Ahmad al-Sabah practically provided official sanction to anti-Palestinian attitudes when he referred to an alleged "plot" by Iraq, the PLO, and Jordan to bring about the emigration of Palestinians from Lebanon, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and Jordan and their resettlement in Kuwait.[37]

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[34] Gil Feiler, "Peace and Egyptian Labor Migration to the Arab Oil Countries," *New Outlook*, November-December 1987, pp. 22–3.

[35] United Nations, Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, *National Experience in the Formulation and Implementation of Population Policy, 1958–1979, Saudi Arabia* (New York, 1981), pp. 40–2; *al-Jazirah* (Saudi Arabia), October 23, 1979; "Gulf Limits on Palestinians," *Foreign Report* (London), July 21, 1983, p. 5.

[36] "Gulf Limits on Palestinians," p. 5.

After the war, Kuwait deported Palestinians, including those who had played key roles in the country's civil service and private sector. Many more left on their own accord. The Kuwaiti government committed itself to wholesale Palestinian replacement even, in some cases, with Soviet and Nigerian workers.[38] The Palestinian community in Kuwait dwindled to less than 85,000 by the end of 1992—down from 350,000 before the Iraqi invasion—and, subsequently has decreased even more as the result of a reregistration policy of the Kuwaiti government. Many remaining Palestinians were born or have lived most of their lives in Kuwait and have nowhere else to go.[39]

Apart from the considerable employment difficulties as a result of their expulsion from Kuwait and other Persian Gulf countries, Palestinians have had to contend with the sudden loss of a traditional source of income. Remittances from Palestinian workers in Kuwait and the gulf states constituted a significant proportion of earnings entering the occupied territories. In 1989, remittances from the gulf totaled $270 million, 70 percent of which originated in Kuwait and 20 percent in Saudi Arabia.[40] One suggested solution to the problem of Palestinians expelled from Kuwait has been employment in Libya. Diplomatic sources have said that Tripoli is waiving visa restrictions to holders of Arab *laissez-passer* documents, including Gazans holding Egyptian papers. Libya seems to be offering the same kind of arrangement that Kuwait provided—a place to work and reside temporarily pending the resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.[41]

Employment opportunities for Palestinians in Jordan are restricted. That country exported as many as 40 percent of its own work force during the 1980s. Since the mid-1980s, however, the gulf states have provided fewer work opportunities for Jordanians.[42] Indeed, beginning in 1985 Jordan has had to cope with a modest return of its citizens from the Persian Gulf and increasing unemployment at home. Between 1985 and 1986, about 70,000 Jordanians returned home as a result of an economic recession in the gulf.[43]

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[37] Quoted by *Sabah al-Khayr* (Beirut), August 11, 1990.

[38] There are prospects for the former Soviet republics to supply up to 150,000 potential workers every year to the Near East, in particular to Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. See *Megapolis Ekspres,* August 17, 1991, as quoted by "BBC Monitoring Service: Soviet Union," August 23, 1991. For Nigerian manpower, see *Middle East Economic Digest,* October 4, 1991, p. 6.

[39] See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, "The Treatment of Alleged Collaborators and Other Security Detainees in Kuwait," August 9, 1991; "Kuwait: Project to Reduce the Population by Half Under Way," *Middle East Economic Digest,* October 4, 1991, p. 6; "Middle East: Migrants Come Home to Roost," ibid., October 4, 1991.

[40] Nabil Kukali, "Ta'thir azmat al-khalij fi al-iqtisad al-Filastin (Qira'a awwaliyya) (The impact of the gulf war on the Palestinian economy [Preliminary review]), *Shu'un Filastiniyya,* December 1990/January 1991, p. 21. According to Sara Roy, in 1987 total remittances from the gulf countries amounted to $250 million. See Roy, "The Political Economy of Despair: Changing Political and Economic Realities in the Gaza Strip," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 20, no. 3 (1991), p. 62. Some Palestinian economists estimated the level of remittances to be about $150 million per year. See Joel Bainerman, "The Cost of Complicity," *Middle East,* March 1991, p. 36. For the economic costs to the Palestinians of the invasion of Kuwait, see George T. Abed, "The Palestinians and the Gulf Crisis," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 20, no. 2 (1991), pp. 35–8.

[41] P.V. Vivekanand, "Gazans Holding Jordanian Documents Off to Libya," *Jordan Times,* February 26, 1991, p. 2.

Regarding Palestinians, the Jordanian policy has been to limit their migration from the occupied territories into Jordan. Within the framework of the Jordanian Five-Year Plan (1981–85), restrictions initially imposed in 1983 resulted in a decrease in the net rate of migration from the occupied territories to Jordan to about 1,000 persons a year.[44] The effects of this policy, however, were negated by the results of the Persian Gulf War, because most of the Palestinians deported from Kuwait went to Jordan.[45] Jordan also bore the brunt of the exodus of other expatriate workers from Iraq and Kuwait. According to one report, about 750,000 refugees—mainly Asian, Egyptian, and Palestinian workers fleeing Kuwait—entered Jordan during the first six months following the Iraqi invasion. Most of them subsequently returned to their countries of origin, but between 250,000–300,000 Palestinians and Jordanians remained.[46]

The returning Palestinians represented a 10 percent increase to Jordan's total population of 3.2 million.[47] Of the returnees, 80 percent settled in Amman and Zarka, the second largest city. Such concentrations of people placed great pressure on resources, water, housing, medical services, and education. The flow of refugees also increased Jordan's already high rate of unemployment to about 25 percent.[48] In addition, Jordan's natural rate of population growth—about 3.7 percent per year—means that even greater numbers of new workers will be entering the labor force in future years.[49]

Some of the Palestinians deported from Kuwait had hoped to reach the occupied territories, but a number of obstacles stood in their way. Israeli policy is that Israel is responsible only for those people who lived in the occupied territories in June 1967 and those who hold valid Israeli identity cards and satisfy the conditions imposed by Israel, such as maintaining connections with the area when absent for a few years. In Gaza and the West Bank, hundreds of Palestinians can be found with tourist visas, or with one-, two-, or three-month permits; they must leave when their permits expire and reapply for new temporary permits.

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[42] Allan M. Findlay, *The Jordanian Migration System in Transition* (Geneva: International Labor Organization, 1987).

[43] *Al-Ra'y al-Amm* (Amman), November 25, 1986.

[44] Zakai, *Economic Development*, pp. 30–1.

[45] "Migrants Come Home to Roost," pp. 4–6.

[46] Martha Wenger, "Who Are the Refugees?" *Middle East Report*, January-February 1991, p. 32. See also Jane Araf, "Jordan Asks West to Intervene on Behalf of Departing Jordanians," Reuter wire report, August 14, 1991; "Over 10,000 Jordanians Return from Kuwait over Three Weeks," ibid., August 27, 1991. One report stated that more than 15,000 Jordanians returned home during a three-week period in August 1991. See, "One-Third Unemployed," *Insight/Middle East Update*, September 6, 1991.

[47] "Over 10,000 Jordanians Return."

[48] "Migrants Come Home to Roost," pp. 4–6.

[49] See United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook* (New York, various issues, 1980–1990).

THE PALESTINIAN LABOR FORCE

The Palestinian population of the occupied territories at the end of 1991 was estimated at 1,682,000—about 1,005,600 in the West Bank and 676,100 in the Gaza Strip.[50] The population continues to increase rapidly because of high birth rates (ranging in the years 1985–1990 between 37.8 and 41.3 per thousand in the West Bank and 47.3 and 52.1 per thousand in the Gaza Strip) and reduced infant, child, and crude mortality rates (infant mortality rates, for example, dropping in the years 1970–1990 from 38.1 to 22.0 per thousand in the West Bank and 86.0 to 26.1 per thousand in the Gaza Strip.[51] The growth in population is also affected by the changing migration patterns of the residents of the occupied territories. The population is young, with some 47 percent of Palestinians being between the ages of 0 and 14 years of age.[52] The labor force in the occupied territories averaged 312,000 in 1991—200,000 in the West Bank and 112,000 in the Gaza Strip—an increase of 1.4 percent compared to 1990. In 1991, there was an increase of 3.7 percent in the population over the age of 15—their numbers reaching 834,000—compared with 1990. In 1991, the labor force comprised 37.4 percent of the entire population compared with 38.3 percent in 1990.[53]

In 1991, the number of persons employed in the occupied territories decreased by 3 percent to about 287,000. A 7 percent reduction occurred in the West Bank, with 180,000 workers, while a rise in employment of 4 percent occurred in the Gaza Strip, with an average of 107,000 workers on a weekly basis. During 1991, the rate of unemployment in the occupied territories reached 7.9 percent, compared with 3.7 percent in 1990 and a similar figure in 1989.[54] The numbers of unemployed in the West Bank trebled in 1991: 10.3 percent in 1991 compared with 3.6 percent in 1990. In the Gaza Strip the rate of unemployment remained constant at 4.1 percent.[55] Every sector of Palestinian society was affected by unemployment.[56]

Palestinian sources, particularly the Federation of Palestinian Trade Unions of West Bank Workers, have claimed that the official Israeli statistics indicating relatively low levels of unemployment, are inaccurate. These Palestinian sources, based on sample surveys and field observations, claim a much higher rate of unemployment—about 50 percent in 1990.[57] A 1991 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) report presents various explanations for the discrepancies between official Israeli figures and Palestinian claims, including differences in definitions.[58]

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[50] Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1992* (Jerusalem, 1992), p. 732.

[51] Israel, Ministry of Health, *Health in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, 1990–1992* (Jerusalem, 1991), pp. 7, 25.

[52] Israel, Ministry of Health, *Health in Judea Samaria and Gaza, 1991–1992* (Jerusalem, 1992), p. 3.

[53] Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, "Memo 45," April 14, 1992.

[54] Ibid.

[55] Ibid.

[56] For unemployment of academics, see Peter Newman, "Palestinian Education: A Road to Nowhere?" *Middle East International*, September 28, 1984, pp. 12–13; *Sawt al-Bilad* (Cyprus), July 28, 1987; *al-Fajr*, July 26, 1987.

[57] Quoted by International Labor Organization, *Report of the Director-General*, p. 55.

The *intifada,* which began in December 1987, has resulted in significant changes to the labor force employed in the occupied territories. Mainly due to strike actions, these changes have included an increase in unemployment, a reduction in the number of hours worked per day, and a reduction in the number of days worked per month. In 1991, the number of persons who worked full time in the West Bank comprised 83 percent of the total number of employed, a figure similar to that in 1990; in 1989, that number had been 74.5 percent; in 1987, it had been 93 percent. In 1991, the number of persons who worked part time—34 hours per week or less—was about 12 percent of the total employed, compared to 14 percent in 1990, 18.5 percent in 1989, and 4 percent in 1987.[59]

In the Gaza Strip, the number of persons who worked full time in 1991 comprised 84 percent of the total number employed, compared with 72 percent in 1990. In comparison, the rate of full-time workers was 90 percent in 1987. The number of persons who worked part time rose from 3.3 percent in 1987 to about 14.5 percent in 1989, to 19.5 percent in 1990, and fell to 8.5 percent in 1991.[60] Most of those workers from the West Bank who lost their jobs tended either to cease to be part of the labor force or emigrated. In contrast, those workers from the Gaza Strip who lost their jobs tended to find alternative work rather than emigrate. Indeed, it is more difficult for Gaza inhabitants to emigrate because they do not hold Jordanian or other citizenship.[61]

West Bank and Gaza Palestinians Working in Israel

The Israeli economy has been going through a recession since the late 1980s, but there were signs of recovery during 1992. Among other effects, the recession brought with it a large reduction in the demand for workers and a rate of unemployment that exceeded 11.6 percent by the first quarter of 1992, compared to 11 percent in the last quarter of 1991 and 10 percent in the first quarter of 1991.[62] Despite this, the current economic difficulties in Israel have not affected the modernization trend of the economy. The Israeli economy is based increasingly on technology and advanced financial and organizational systems. Underpinning the economy is a stable social infrastructure that is expressed, inter alia, by rising levels of education among the work force and rising numbers of women joining the work force.

Many sectors of the economy, however, still rely on manual labor. In the Jewish sector, manual labor is considered inferior work that many, including the

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[58] United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, *Recent Economic Developments in the Occupied Palestinian Territory* (Geneva, August 9, 1991), pp. 23–4.

[59] Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, "Memo 45."

[60] Ibid.

[61] Gharaibeh, *Economies of the West Bank and Gaza Strip,* pp. 34–5.

[62] Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, "Unemployment Statistics," June 1992.

TABLE 1
Total Number of Palestinian Employees Working in Israel by Selected Economic Branches
(in thousands)

Year	Agriculture	Industry	Construction	Other	Total
1980	10.1	15.6	35.1	12.4	73.2
1985	13.8	15.7	41.4	15.2	86.1
1988	16.3	16.5	52.1	19.0	104.3*
1990	12.4	11.1	62.7	17.5	103.7

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Yearbook, 1991*, p. 736, table 27.25.
*Although the figures total 103.9 thousand, the Central Bureau of Statistics cites the total as 104.3 thousand.

unemployed, refuse. Unemployed Israelis also shun night-shift positions, such as in the printing industry. There exists in Israel, therefore, a phenomenon of "employment objectors," creating employment polarization. This is the main explanation for the inability of an economy suffering from unemployment to fill thousands of job vacancies.[63]

Until 1967, Palestinians with Israeli citizenship filled positions that Jews were reluctant to take. After 1967, these vacancies were taken by Palestinians from the occupied territories,[64] a phenomenon not unlike situations in Europe and the United States in which foreigners have taken jobs with the least social status and the lowest salaries. They also have been the last to receive services, and they suffer from discrimination and prejudice.[65] Workers from the West Bank and Gaza Strip—whose numbers in 1987, before the outbreak of the intifada, reached a weekly average of 109,000 (legal and illegal)—comprised 8 percent of the labor force in Israel.[66] The largest number—49,700—were employed in the construction sector, and their representation in this industry increased annually, reaching 42 percent in 1987.[67] About 19,700 were employed in industry—particularly food, textiles, and metallurgy; 15,800 in agriculture—mainly gathering fruit—forestry, and fishing. The remaining 23,700 were employed in services and other sectors.[68]

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[63] "Din ve heshbon hodshi shel sar ha'avodah ve harevaha" (Monthly report of minister of welfare and labor), February 20, 1989, p. 37, and July 20, 1989, p. 37. Many contractors have expressed their anger to labor bureau staff after a lack of laborers prevented them from completing work that they had undertaken to perform. See Baruch Haklai, "Baayot ha'taasukah be medinat Israel" (Employment problems in the State of Israel), *Hamiphal*, June 1984, p. 14.

[64] Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein, *Hewers of Wood and Drawers of Water*, pp. 62–3.

[65] See, for example, the research on the immigration of workers to France, Switzerland, and West Germany following World War II. Stephen Castles and Godula Kosack, *Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979).

[66] Israel, Department of Trade, "Statistical Monthly of Israel," supplement no. 4, April 1988, p. 175; idem, "Statistical Monthly of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip" March 1988, p. 35, table 6/E.

[67] In 1987, the number of employees in the building sector in Israel totaled 117,400; of these, 67,700 were from Israel and 49,700 from the occupied territories. Compared with the 1987 figure of 42 percent, in 1977 Palestinians comprised only 25 percent of construction workers. See Israel, Ministry of Housing and Construction, Center for Data and Economic Analysis, "Data on the Development of the Construction Sector and the Activities of the Ministry of Housing in the Last Month," May 16, 1989, table 1.E.

In addition to workers from the occupied territories, Israel imports labor from abroad. The majority come from Portugal, South Lebanon, and Turkey as well as Africa, Eastern Europe, and the Far East. Their numbers have been increasing, and at the end of 1988 were at 14,000, legal and illegal. According to figures supplied by the Israeli Ministry of Labor, based on the number of valid work permits granted in January 1989, 1,805 workers from South Lebanon and 3,662 other foreign workers were employed legally in Israel, whereas the remaining 8,500 worked illegally.[69]

In terms of Israel's economy, 1987 was the most prosperous in a decade: gross domestic product (GDP) increased by 5.2 percent, investments by 13 percent, exports by 17 percent; unemployment stabilized at 6.1 percent and inflation at 16.1 percent. The immediate effects of the intifada were the partial separation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip from Israel in terms of providing a market for Israeli products, as well as a source of labor. Estimates have put the damage to the Israeli economy in 1988 at 3–4 percent of its GDP, in 1989 at 2–3 percent, and in 1990 at 1–2 percent. By the end of 1988, the consumer markets had basically adjusted to the changed circumstances. This was not the case, however, with regard to employment. In spite of the relatively small number of workers from the occupied territories—officially 109,000 in 1987 out of 1.4 million—the lack of workers from the West Bank and Gaza Strip resulted in direct and indirect damage.[70]

As a result of Gaza's greater dependence on the Israeli economy, the intifada had less of an impact on the movement of laborers from Gaza to Israel than was the case with respect to the West Bank.[71] Throughout the intifada, more than 45 percent of the Palestinian labor force from the Gaza Strip continued to work in Israel; their earnings accounted for some 55 percent of the total income of the strip.[72] Even during periods when general strikes were called, many workers from the occupied territories came to work in Israel. For example, data provided by the civil administration of the occupied territories indicate that almost half the laborers reported for work during the general strike of October 8–9, 1991.

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68. Israel, Department of Trade, "Statistics of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip," March 1988, p. 35, table 6/E.

69. "Din ve heshbon hodshi," p. 49. See also *Ma'ariv*, December 17, 1991, business section.

70. Gideon Fishelson, *Forming (1970–87) and Destroying (1988–1990) a Common Labor Market* (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, Armand Hammer Fund for Economic Cooperation in the Middle East, 1992), pp. 24–5.

71. Fishelson, *Forming and Destroying a Common Labor Market*, p. 26. For Gazan workers in Israel, see Paul Cossali and Clive Robson, "The People of Gaza Speak: Part 2, A Labourer in Israel," *Middle East International*, January 11, 1985, pp. 13–14.

72. Ghasan Shihabi, "The Working Class and the Trade Unions in the Gaza Strip," *Samid al-Iqtisadi*, April-June 1991, pp. 78–9.

Since the outbreak of the intifada, both the Israeli and local markets have adjusted, but another factor was introduced at the end of 1989—the massive immigration to Israel of Soviet Jews. Given the high unemployment rate in Israel and the desperate need of these new immigrants for a source of income, the immigrants are likely in the medium term to replace workers from the occupied territories.[73] In the long run, in a normal, full employment market, workers from the occupied territories would complement the new immigrant labor.[74] In particular, it seems likely that Palestinian workers will still be required in sectors in which they have developed expertise, such as construction. In the event of a political settlement, moreover, Palestinian laborers will have to continue to work in Israel, a fact that has been recognized by senior Palestinian economists and representatives.[75]

Palestinian laborers are major contributors to the current construction boom in Israel aimed at housing immigrants and strengthening the settlements. In a national-political context, of course, the Palestinians are against immigration and settlement, but this contradiction is easily explained by the economic difficulties in the occupied territories. Traditionally, the income from Palestinian work in Israel has been a central component of the local economy. The difficult state of the local economy thus gave this component added importance because the building boom in Israel helped a large percentage of the population living in poverty. Against this background, it is possible to understand the attitude of some Palestinian activists in not making all-out efforts to prevent Palestinian workers from building houses and infrastructures for Soviet immigrants and settlers. Apparently, they are aware that such efforts could not succeed. Indeed, there have been incidents in which Palestinian workers have fought back against masked men who tried to prevent them from going to work in Israel.

Two striking changes may be noted in the nature of the employment of Palestinians in Israel over the years. First, the majority of Palestinians are now provided with work permits issued by the civil administration, whereas previously the majority of laborers worked outside the control of official labor offices. The number of licensed workers rose from 35,000 at the beginning of 1991 to about 77,000 by the end of 1991.[76] Second, the type of labor performed by workers from the occupied territories has changed. Many workers who were employed in the past in the industrial and services sector—such as restaurants and petrol stations—have been replaced by immigrants, particularly from the former Soviet

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[73] According to figures released in an internal memo by the Central Bureau of Statistics in December 1991, since late 1989 only 68,000 of some 350,000 Soviet immigrants have found employment. That leaves 44,000 registered as unemployed and thousands more in language and other training programs.

[74] Fishelson, *Forming and Destroying a Common Labor Market,* pp. 27–8.

[75] See Hisham Awartani, professor of economics at al-Najah University, as quoted in *Globes,* January 17, 1992, p. 13, and comments by Labib Terazi, PLO representative to the United Nations, as quoted in *Ha'aretz,* December 20, 1988.

[76] Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, "Labor Market in Israel," February 1992.

Union. In contrast, the sharp rise in the demand for construction workers in Israel has been met by Palestinian laborers from the occupied territories.

It seems likely that the freeze on the building of settlements in the occupied territories—ordered by the Labor Party government following the general election in June 1992—will have a significant effect on Palestinian labor. After the completion of the housing units presently under construction, the settlement boom will end, and there will be a decline in Palestinian employment. Should Palestinian construction workers, however, participate in the building of a new infrastructure within an autonomous entity, this would have the effect of compensating for the loss of employment in Israel and, indeed, might create even more employment opportunities in the long term.

The Persian Gulf War and ensuing events did not affect the size of the Palestinian work force in Israel, but did inhibit its expansion, and, in addition, led to a significant reduction in the number of days and hours worked. Thus, during 1991, Palestinians from the West Bank worked an average of 18.6 days a month, whereas Palestinians from the Gaza Strip worked an average of only 15.8 days a month. In 1991,[77] the number of Palestinians employed in Israel totaled 98,000, a reduction of 9 percent compared with 1990; they comprised 34 percent of the number of persons employed from the occupied territories.

If one takes into account subcontractors in the occupied territories supplying Israeli demands, however, the figure for direct and indirect reliance on the Israeli market is closer to 50 percent. These figures emphasize the total dependence of the occupied territories on the Israeli economy. During January-March 1991, some 80,000 workers entered Israel to work, and thereafter a gradual rise took place, with some 118,000 workers entering Israel in the last quarter of 1991 compared with 105,000 in the same period in 1990. Palestinian residents working in Israel worked 8 percent fewer hours per week in 1991 than in 1990.[78]

All sectors of the Israeli economy, including the construction sector, were affected by the impact of the gulf war and intifada on Palestinian labor in Israel. The main reduction in the number of Palestinians employed in Israel took place in industry, where the numbers dropped from 11,200 in 1990 to 7,500 in 1991, a drop of about 33 percent. In the construction sector, a slight rise was recorded, from 64,000 to 67,000. In 1991, 68.5 percent of Palestinian workers employed in Israel worked in construction,[79] about 12 percent worked in agriculture, 7.7 percent in industry, and 12 percent in other sectors.

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[77] Gil Feiler, "The Labor Market in the Territories," expert report supplied to the District Court of Jerusalem in C.A. 316/92, Taysir Atiya Mahmud Amor v. Karnit (Israel Insurance Company), Ltd., (1993).

[78] Robby Nathanzon, "Shuk ha'avodah be Israel" (The labor market in Israel), Histadrut, Institute for Economic and Social Research, June 1992.

[79] The importance of the Palestinian construction workers to the Israeli economy is reflected by the extensive losses caused to this sector by the closure of the occupied territories following incidents either inside or outside the territories. See, for example, *Globes*, June 9, 1992.

The above figures indicate that the number of Palestinian workers in Israel is influenced directly by both political factors and the Israeli GDP.[80] There are two factors influencing the export of labor services to destinations other than Israel. The first is the development of the GDP in the occupied territories: When there is economic growth, emigration in search of employment lessens. The second factor is the economic situation in the countries of destination of the labor export, especially Jordan and the Persian Gulf states. Prior to the gulf war, the growth factor in these countries had a positive impact on the demand for workers from the occupied territories.[81]

According to one view, in a situation where half of the labor force is employed outside its residential region—as a minority complementing, and partly substituting for, the larger region's inputs, mainly of labor—and where the complementary labor force has low skills—as well as low prestige, low earnings and little opportunity, if any, for advancement—the need to invest in the creation of jobs in the local region is imperative. Encouraging the creation of such opportunities in the occupied territories is also likely to benefit Israel in the long run and lead to beneficial cooperation in both Palestinian and Israeli labor markets. Economic separation of the two areas would cause negligible damage to the Israeli economy, apart from requiring adjustment in the technology of production in those sectors where workers from the occupied territories are most heavily employed. In the occupied territories, however, such economic separation would cause unemployment to rise by 50 percent, bringing with it economic and social disaster—unless huge investments were made to create a minimum of 130,000 new jobs.[82]

Israel has become an essential source of work and thus income for the Palestinians because there are no longer such opportunities for the Palestinians in the oil states of the Persian Gulf and there is no longer money coming in from relatives in Kuwait. Amman, seemingly the most viable alternative labor market, is overpopulated as a result of the influx of refugees from Kuwait, and also suffers from high unemployment. Added to these difficulties for Palestinians, is the dwindling flow of money from the PLO, Jordan, and other Arab states. The decrease in money from these various sources is felt sharply in the occupied territories. These factors have led to mutual dependence, linking the economic fates of Israel and the occupied territories, and indicate the substantial political, practical, economic, and social advantages to be gained by a program of regional cooperation.

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[80] Fishelson, *Forming and Destroying a Common Labor Market*, p. 18.

[81] Ibid., p. 20; see also Gharaibeh, *Economies of the West Bank and Gaza Strip*, pp. 33–5.

[82] Fishelson, *Forming and Destroying a Common Labor Market*, pp. 29–30.

CONCLUSION

Although the intifada and the Persian Gulf War have not had a significant impact on the number of Palestinian workers employed in Israel, both events have resulted in a complete metamorphosis in Palestinian employment patterns in the Persian Gulf states, Jordan, and the occupied territories. In the long term, high unemployment rates within Israel, shorter hours worked by the Palestinians within Israel, the substitution of Palestinian laborers with Soviet immigrants, and the anticipation of further massive immigration to Israel of Jews from the former Soviet republics will each reduce the availability of work in Israel for the Palestinians. In addition, voices have been heard in Israel calling on the Israeli government to place high on the agenda of the autonomy talks the separation of the Israeli labor market from that of the occupied territories. For example, it is argued that if such a step is not taken, hostility between Palestinians and Israelis not only will increase, but also technological progress in Israel will be hampered by continued dependency on cheap labor from the occupied territories.[83]

After more than two decades, the period of a single labor market between Israel and the occupied territories may be coming to an end. Unemployment has soared and living standards are dropping. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) is now distributing basic food supplies to the entire Palestinian population. Given that one of the demographic features of the occupied territories is the high rate of young persons who will join the ranks of those seeking work in the next few years, it appears that the situation is likely to become worse. Moreover, a decrease in emigration has an effect on the structure of age and gender of the population. If, in the past, the male population of work age tended to emigrate, causing a shortage of men, the reduction in rates of emigration may lead to higher birth rates and a greater degree of destitution and poverty. This is particularly applicable to the refugee camps, where people live without hope and without natural resources, thus fueling the frustration that sometimes leads to violence.

Significant changes in the occupied territories can be achieved only through massive injections of foreign capital and preparation of a comprehensive Marshall-type plan. Among the Palestinians of the occupied territories there is a strata of entrepreneurs capable of absorbing foreign capital. Cooperation with Israel would greatly assist in working cost effectively, which, in turn, would create an opening for reconciliation, and a new and more healthy relationship between Israelis and Palestinians.

Israel has taken some steps to help develop the economy of the occupied territories. In 1991, for example, the civil administration issued more than 100 permits for new businesses, reflecting an 85 percent approval rating, compared to less than 10 per year in the 1980s.[84] The Sadan Committee, appointed by the Ministry of Defense and whose recommendations were adopted by the Israeli government in 1991, called for the cancellation of administrative restrictions on investors and for the end of harassment on tax issues. Private foreign investors, however, are reluctant to invest in the occupied territories because of the political situation, and Palestinians themselves are unwilling to invest in local projects because of uncertainty about the future. In the Gaza Strip, where there is little available land and the price of land rises yearly, landowners attempt to maximize their profits by waiting and not appropriating their land, for example, for building factories. This reluctance to invest heavily in local enterprises halts the proper development of marketing and employment opportunities.

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[83] See for example *Ha'aretz*, July 6, 1992, p. C1.

In the absence of an established local basis of production, the Palestinian work force, both in Gaza and the West Bank, will continue to seek employment in the Israeli labor market and in Jordan and the Persian Gulf states. It has been shown, however, that neither the oil economies nor the Jordanian economy can guarantee Palestinians employment. The best hope, in the short term, lies in the Israeli labor market. In the medium and long term, other solutions have to be found. In light of the political situation by the middle of 1993, it would seem that longlasting solutions to indigenous economic and social problems—such as the creation of a local basis of production and of a significant number of employment opportunities—will become possible only in a framework of comprehensive regional cooperation.

The labor market in Israel cannot, under any circumstances, provide by itself a solution to the unemployment crisis of the Palestinians, and the economy of the occupied territories cannot provide a solution to the employment problems of the sizable population of Palestinians living on a permanent basis outside the occupied territories. In the event that autonomy or other political arrangements are established in the occupied territories, it may be anticipated that diaspora Palestinians, in particular those who reside in refugee camps and have failed to become integrated into their host countries, will wish to return and work in the area, thus aggravating an already difficult employment situation. One source estimated that between 750,000 and 1 million Palestinians could be expected to enter the occupied territories following autonomy.[85]

There is no choice, therefore, but to encourage massive foreign investment in the occupied territories, and to remove restrictions on marketing from the West Bank and Gaza to Jordan, Israel, Egypt, and Europe. A framework of peace and thoroughly planned regional cooperation would support efforts to improve employment opportunities for the Palestinians to the benefit of all the states and societies in the region.

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[84] Interviews with Palestinian businessmen and employees of the civil administration, Jerusalem, 1992.

[85] Sari Nusseibeh and Mark Heller, *Bli tupim, ve hazozrot* (No trumpets, no drums) (Tel Aviv and Jerusalem: Shoken Press, 1991), p. 72. For figures for refugees compiled by UNRWA, see *Report of the Commission General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 1 July 1990–30 June 1991* (New York, 1991), pp. 31–2; for demographic figures for Palestinians worldwide and forecasts to the year 2010, see "Ihsa'at wa istiqsa'at: Tawaqqu'at adad al-sukkan al-filastiniyyin fi sitt ashra dawla/mintaqa, 1990–2010" (Statistics and analysis: The estimated number of Palestinian inhabitants of sixteen countries/territories of the world, 1990–2010) *Majalat al-dirasat al-Filastiniyya*, no. 7 (Summer 1991), pp. 220–2.

FERTILITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN OMAN: WOMEN'S PERSPECTIVES

Christine Eickelman

WOMEN in Oman play highly active roles in sustaining the social position of their households and *hayyans* (family clusters). Their perceptions of status and prestige are closely linked to women's reproductive roles. Omani women, many of whom appear to the outside observer to be passive recipients of current economic and social transformations, use high birth rates and, more specifically, postpartum visiting as conscious personal strategies for reaffirming family and household social status and for enhancing their status in other areas.

On a general level, an analysis of the role women play in making fertility decisions and in managing postpartum visiting networks reveals how women whom both Western and Muslim observers consider highly "traditional" complement the strategies used by men to acquire social prestige, and how they contribute to the social transformations of their communities by adapting older attitudes to changing contexts. At a more specific level, this analysis suggests the conditions under which effective population strategies, which inherently involve women—and even "empower" them—might be developed in the Arabian Peninsula.

Oman's population has been growing at an estimated 3.8 percent a year, one of the highest rates in the world. The annual birth rates of other Arabian Peninsula countries—namely, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen—have been equally high, and demographers expect the population of the entire peninsula to double by the

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year 2000.[1] Population experts and some Omanis regard the pattern of high birth rates as unbeneficial for individual Omanis and for Omani society. Presently, however, it seems that Oman's oil wealth can provide a cushion against economic and social problems—such as unemployment, pollution, the depletion of food, land, and water resources, overburdened government programs, and social unrest—that the country will face if the population continues to grow at its current rate.[2]

Since the 1970s, demographers and historians have argued that women and men in premodern European societies and contemporary Third World countries could avail themselves of reproductive control through such "direct" practices as abortion, birth control, infanticide, and child abandonment and through "indirect" ones, such as late marriage and abstinence from sexual relations until a child is weaned.[3] Similar arguments about women assuming active roles in Arabian Peninsula societies are obscured by the often polemical literature concerning women's roles in Muslim societies. Until recently, demographers attributed continuing high birth rates in Middle Eastern countries to the persistence of a fertility pattern no longer curbed by a high infant and child mortality rate; some even characterized the incidence of high birth rates as a general characteristic of Islamic societies—assumptions that impute to women passive and subordinate cultural and social roles.[4]

The reluctance of political authorities in Arabian Peninsula societies to allow the open discussion of population strategies has discouraged research in this area. Baquer al-Najjar, a Bahraini sociologist, recently commented that "population policy" in the gulf states continues to be restricted to the regulation and control of the non-citizen population. State authorities prohibit public discussion of strategies to influence decisions on family size—sometimes citing religious reasons—perhaps because they believe that a large citizen population can be translated into political strength.[5]

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[1] The natural annual rate of increase is the surplus of births over deaths in a population, without regard to migration. For Kuwait the rate is 3.0, for Saudi Arabia 3.4, and for Yemen 3.5. See *World Population Data Sheet* (Washington, DC: Population Reference Bureau, 1991). Oman's first census was planned for early 1993. The 1991 estimate used by the Population Reference Bureau is 1.6 million. This includes non-citizen foreigners, who constitute roughly 21 percent of the country's population, a low proportion in comparison with other Persian Gulf states. For planning purposes, the Omani government uses a figure of 2 million. See the Sultanate of Oman, Development Council, Technical Secretariat, *Statistical Yearbook*, 1988 (Muscat: Development Secretariat, 1989).

[2] See Paul Kennedy, "Preparing for the 21st Century," *New York Review of Books*, February 11, 1993, pp. 41–2, and Michael Teitelbaum, "The Population Threat," *Foreign Affairs* 71, no. 5 (1992–93).

[3] See Stephen Polgar, "Population History and Population Policies from an Anthropological Perspective," *Current Anthropology* 13 (1972); Susan Scrimshaw, "Infant Mortality and Behavior in the Regulation of Family Size," in Nick Eberstadt, ed., *Fertility Decline in the Less Developed Countries* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981), pp. 295–318; Robert A. LeVine and Susan Scrimshaw, "Effects of Culture on Fertility: Anthropological Contributions," in Rodolfo A. Bulatao et al., eds., *Determinants of Fertility in Developing Countries*, vol. 2 (New York and London: Academic Press, 1983), pp. 245–66; Angus McLaren, *Reproductive Rituals: The Perception of Fertility in England from the Sixteenth to the Nineteenth Century* (London and New York: Methuen, 1984); and John Boswell, *The Kindness of Strangers: The Abandonment of Children in Western Europe from Late Antiquity to the Renaissance* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988).

[4] For example, see the comments on the "Islamic family" in John C. Caldwell, "Fertility in Africa," in Nick Eberstadt, ed., *Fertility Decline in the Less Developed Countries* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981), pp. 112–13. On the "Asian family," see Mead Cain, *Women's Status and Fertility in Developing Countries: Son Preference and Economic Security*, Working Paper no. 682 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1984). For a discussion of the problems that population experts face in assessing the status of women in the Third World, see Karen Oppenheim Mason, *The Status of Woman: A Review of Its Relationships to Fertility and Mortality* (New York: Rockefeller Foundation, Population Science Division, 1984).

THE IMPACT OF TIME

The interval between this author's two research visits to Oman is significant because the changes that occurred during this period dispel any assumption of fixed and enduring "traditional" practices. The first visit to al-Hamra, a provincial capital and oasis in the northern Omani interior and major town of the Abriyin tribe, was undertaken in 1979–1980, less than a decade after the beginning of Oman's economic development. The original goal of the field visit was to explore women's changing understandings of family, privacy, propriety, education, work, children, and status.[6] The second visit took place in the spring of 1988. In the interval, the population of the oasis more than doubled from 2,510 people in 1980 to about 6,000 people by 1988.[7]

Between the first and second field visits, Oman's oil economy physically transformed the northern interior of the country. In al-Hamra in 1979–1980, almost everyone lived in mud-brick houses in the older quarters. In 1988, many of these mud-brick houses stood empty and dilapidated, abandoned by households that had moved to new cement-block houses with piped water and electricity and located along a newly paved road that circled the oasis. Other houses had been built on land several kilometers from town. A bank, a garage, government offices, a house for the governor and his family, two large schools—one for boys and one for girls—and shops of Indian tailors stood alongside the road leading out of the oasis. Amid great clouds of dust, Indian technicians were installing al-Hamra's first telephone lines.

The transformations were not just physical. The effects of formal schooling for women had begun to influence daily routines. Books and magazines were visible in many of the guest rooms where women visited and drank coffee with one another. Women sometimes jotted housekeeping memos in small notebooks. Two young women from al-Hamra worked in the local girls' school, one as a teacher and the other as a secretary. Eight women in the community, including a married woman with a child, were studying in the capital area of Muscat-Mutrah and planning to return as teachers to al-Hamra. Another woman spoke with pride of a granddaughter who was studying Islamic sciences at Sultan Qaboos University, which admitted its first students in 1988. Others extolled medicine as a good career for a woman.

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[5] Baquer al-Najjar, personal communication, July 1989.

[6] Christine Eickelman, *Women and Community in Oman* (New York and London: New York University Press, 1984).

[7] Dale F. Eickelman, "Counting and Surveying an 'Inner' Omani Community: Hamra al-Abriyin," in E.G.H. Joffé and C.R. Pennel, eds., *Tribe and State: Essays in Honour of David Montgomery Hart* (Wisbech, UK: MENAS Press, 1991), p. 258.

Women in 1988 discussed fertility and birth in significantly different ways than they had in 1979–1980. During the earlier period, women often disguised their concerns and anxieties about fertility-related issues by discussing them in a joking manner. By 1988, topics such as the value of girls as compared to boys, sterility, and family size stirred active debate among women.[8] The most surprising aspect of these conversations were the statements by several women that they wanted as many as 20 children. Young children were everywhere, and many women had given birth to four or five children in eight years.[9]

The emphasis on large families was illustrated vividly through an account of a 1987 incident in al-Hamra. Two brothers, who for years had lived together with their wives and children in a single household—not an uncommon practice in Oman—were obliged to form separate households because their wives had quarreled.[10] The loss in prestige that accompanies a public quarrel was clear in the scornful tones used by women who spoke about the quarrel. It occurred because one of the sisters-in-law, who had three healthy sons, desperately wanted another child. Her sister-in-law had given birth six times in the preceding eight years.

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[8] This author's presence in Oman virtually compelled discussion of family practices because of her somewhat anomalous role as an Arabic-speaking wife and mother, accompanied during her first field visit by her husband and an adopted daughter, who was then two years old and whose features clearly did not resemble hers. On her second visit in 1988, she was accompanied by a second adopted daughter. Omanis are reluctant to raise children whose families they do not know. In questioning the author about her choices, women discussed their perspectives through examples of their own practices and those of neighbors.

[9] The birth rate in Oman prior to the 1970s is not reliably known. Using field notes from al-Hamra, this author estimates that, prior to 1970, a fertile woman could reasonably hope to raise three or four children to adulthood. Many only had one or two children survive; a few had eight or nine who survived. At least 40 percent of the children born to women in the interior of Oman died before reaching adulthood. See UNICEF, *Beliefs and Practices Related to Health, Nutrition and Child Rearing in Two Communities of Oman*, pt. 3 (Abu Dhabi: UNICEF, Gulf Area Office, 1973), p. 52. This child mortality rate is comparable to those found by anthropologists working in the Middle East in the 1930s and 1940s. See Hamad Ammar, *Growing Up in an Egyptian Village* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954), p. 112, and Karen Seger, ed., *Portrait of a Palestinian Village: The Photographs of Hilma Granqvist* (London: Third World Center for Research and Publishing, 1981), p. 56.

Oman's population grew rapidly in the 1970s. A 1977–79 United Nations survey of 11 towns reported that women gave birth to an average of 5.5 children, although the survey indicated that the true figure was probably closer to 7 or 8 children. See United Nations Economic Commission for Western Asia, *The Population Situation in the ECWA Region: Oman* (Beirut, 1981), pp. 9–16. A high fertility rate was also reported in a 1977 survey of Oman's coastal Khabura region. See J.S. Birks and Clive Sinclair, *Aspects of the Demography of the Sultanate of Oman* (Durham, UK: University of Durham, International Migration Project, 1977), pp. 39–47. The World Population Data Sheet (1991) gives as 7.2 Oman's "total fertility rate," an estimate of the average number of children a woman will have throughout her childbearing years (assuming that age-specific birth rates remain constant).

[10] In 1980, 22.8 percent of al-Hamra households contained more than one married couple. See D. Eickelman, "Counting and Surveying," p. 269.

The more prolific sister-in-law was pleased at having borne so many children in such a short time. "I am thin and ugly," the woman smiled, "because of all the children." She lifted her youngest son onto her lap and said abruptly, "I want more." When asked, "Why more? You now have six," she replied, "We want twenty. Why? I don't know." After a pause, she added, "My husband wants children, so I want them. Why? I don't know." She shrugged. There were many other women who claimed to be willing to give birth for as long as possible, or, if they were beyond childbearing age, who encouraged younger women in a joint household or extended family to continue having children.

On another occasion, a mother-in-law became furious when her daughter-in-law, who had just given birth to a fourth child, was asked if there were women in al-Hamra who said "enough" after four, five, or six births and used some form of birth control. The older woman exclaimed, "We Omanis have twenty children." "Why do you say this?" this author asked. "You know how I love children, but I would never want twenty. Twenty children cannot be good for any woman! In America a woman chooses to have two, three, or four children, and then she stops." Dismissing this reply with a wave of her hand, the mother-in-law retorted, "We are like animals." Clearly, however, she did not perceive of herself as an "animal"; rather, this was how women from al-Hamra thought foreigners—Americans or expatriate Egyptian schoolteachers (who have few children)—perceive Omani women who give birth frequently.

The daughter-in-law then spoke in a low, intense voice. "What do you use in America? Needles? Pills?" Before her question could be answered, several guests entered the room, and everyone settled down to drink coffee. The mother-in-law, who had heard her daughter-in-law's question, addressed the guests in an uncharacteristically loud and mocking voice while pointing her finger at this author: "This woman says that in America women take medicine so that they only have two children!" The guests began to laugh and to jeer at the idea of controlling births.[11]

The question regarding why women want so many children inadvertently exposed an important source of disagreement between the mother-in-law and daughter-in-law. In Inner Oman, mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law are not expected to quarrel, and open disagreement is rare. It was easy to understand the young woman's point of view, partially revealed by her hurried question on birth control. It was the older woman's emphasis on the importance of a long period of fecundity that was puzzling. The day before, the same mother-in-law had complained that the antics of her grandchildren often made her lose her temper. Also perplexing was the guests' jeering at women who wished to regulate their fertility. In 1988, many women in al-Hamra and elsewhere in Oman, often young and with some education, resisted the idea of regulating births.

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[11] Omani women occasionally said in 1979–1980 that four children were enough, although no one actually said how they controlled their fertility.

CONCEPTS OF FERTILITY

Omanis perceive children as signs of social strength. Children fill emotional needs and care for aging parents in later life. People need sons to work outside the community and help them cope with an increasingly complex world. People need daughters to build and maintain social ties within the community. The "value of the child," a demographic term, helps explain why people have four, five, or six children.[12] This explanation is not adequate, however, for understanding why many Omani women desire to prolong their years of fecundity.

Muslim populations have known of and used birth control at various times in the past, notwithstanding resistance to the idea in some contemporary Muslim societies.[13] Changes in fertility patterns reflect a micro-level response to social and economic transformations in the wider society. Islamic beliefs and values, given present and past variations, are not responsible for the high birth rates prevalent today in many parts of the Middle East. These high birth rates are relatively recent rather than a continuation of age-old fertility patterns. Demographers, however, do not fully understand the reasons behind the changes.[14]

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[12] Demographers have considered the rewards of fertility mainly from the perspective of the child. See, for example, the introduction to Rodolfo A. Bulatao *et al.*, eds., *Determinants of Fertility in Developing Countries,* vol. 1 (New York and London: Academic Press, 1983), pp. 1–26. Their framework for the study of fertility data includes the supply of children, the demand for children, and fertility regulation. For a summary of how demographers assess the costs and benefits of children, see John D. Kasarda, John O.G. Billy, and Kirsten Walsh, *Status Enhancement and Fertility Regulation Responses to Social Mobility and Education Opportunities* (Orlando, FL: Academic Press, 1986), pp. 134–44.

[13] See, for example, Basim F. Musallam, *Sex and Society in Islam: Birth Control before the Nineteenth Century* (London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Avner Giladi, "Some Observations on Infanticide in Medieval Muslim Society," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 22, no. 2 (May 1990); and Alan Duben and Cem Behar, *Istanbul Households: Marriage, Family and Fertility, 1880–1940* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). Musallam provides evidence that birth control and contraceptives were known and used in Egypt and Syria in the middle and late Middle Ages. Giladi argues that infanticide, although rejected by Islamic law, was practiced in medieval Muslim society if other means, such as *coitus interruptus* and abortion, failed. Duben and Behar report a dramatic decline in childbearing years for women living in Istanbul in 1900. This decline was not simply a characteristic of the Westernized strata. Family size decreased as Istanbul society became child-oriented and people made connections between childrearing, education, and social reform.

[14] See Eberstadt's "Introduction," in *Fertililty Decline,* p. 12. Anthropologists too have paid little attention to the high fertility rates now prevalent in the Middle East. See, for example, Soraya Altorki and Donald P. Cole, *Arabian Oasis City: The Transformation of Unayzah* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989). Indeed, given the importance of fertility in the lives of most Middle Eastern women, it is surprising how little anthropological work has been done on how women of the region perceive pregnancy, delivery, the postpartum period, and child-care and how these fertility-related activities and roles are rewarded within the family and the community. There is also a dearth of work on the importance for men of having children and the perception of male virility. These are usually taken for granted as part of regional understandings of "honor." Some accounts of child delivery in Middle Eastern countries include Soheir Morsy, "Childbirth in an Egyptian Village," in Margarita Artschwager Kay, ed., *Anthropology of Human Birth* (Philadelphia, PA: F.A. Davis, 1982), pp. 147–74, and Ammar, *Growing Up,* pp. 87–106. For Yemen, see Susan Dorsky, *Women of Amran: A Middle Eastern Ethnographic Study* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1986), pp. 153–70. For Turkey, see Carol Delaney, *The Seed and the Soil: Gender and Cosmology in Turkish Village Society* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991), pp. 25–72. For Oman, see UNICEF,

Many women in Oman find it difficult to understand discussions of fertility that focus on individual pregnancies, "choice," and birth control. For Omani women, the act of giving birth to a live child is as significant a social event as raising a child. In the late 1970s, when women were asked the number of children they had, they often responded with the number of times they had given birth to a live child, even though many of the children had died shortly after birth. Postpartum visiting takes place even if an infant dies a few hours after birth. (In the late 1970s, such deaths were still commonplace.) The parents mourn the infant only when they are alone. In front of guests, the death of the child is not mentioned.

The Omani concept of fertility encompasses giving birth *regularly* to a live child, which is acknowledged in the community by postpartum visiting, and nurturing the child and the mother-child relationship, which has its own set of rewards. *Regularly* is stressed because regular sequences of births are valued most of all. It is common to hear women ask a mother with a child not old enough to walk whether she is again pregnant. Women often say that they pity mothers who give birth only two or three times.

The birth of a first child is a rite of passage that transforms a woman into a social adult. She may then visit households that are neither kin nor close neighbors in the community. Infertile women or women who never marry participate much less intensively in visiting networks, and they start visiting at a later age. They cannot reciprocate postpartum visits, which places them at a considerable social disadvantage because births are the most frequent reason for formal visiting. These visits are essential to recognition as a full social person.[15]

The relation between birth and hospitality is firmly embedded in the taken-for-granted, practical routines of daily activities for women in Oman. Giving birth and providing hospitality go hand in hand somewhat similarly to the roles of "wife and mother" in some segments of Western society. Indeed, the Western role of "wife and mother" does not apply in Oman. The role of wife belongs to the private world of family life, never disclosed to outsiders, while the role of mother is one that a woman can display in public.

Beliefs and Practices, pp. 53–67. For a discussion of the social impact of the postpartum confinement period among Muslim women of Mandarin China, see Barbara L.K. Pillsbury, " 'Doing the Month': Confinement and Convalescence of Chinese Women after Childbirth," in Margarita Artschwager Kay, ed., *Anthropology of Human Birth* (Philadelphia, PA: F.A. Davis, 1982), pp. 119–46. Recently, anthropologists have collected stories to portray how Middle Eastern women construct their lives and the lives of those near them. Some of the stories provide a wealth of information on women's attitudes toward fertility and birth. See Erika Friedl's *Women of Deh Koh: Lives in an Iranian Village* (Washington and London: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1989), pp. 12–25, 47–65, and Lila Abu-Lughod's *Writing Women's Worlds: Bedouin Stories* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 127–65.

[15] Fertility even affects informal coffee-drinking among close neighbors, who avoid gathering in the households of childless women. In 1979–1980, one neighbor in al-Hamra, a respected midwife who had never given birth, drank coffee daily in the households of immediate neighbors. Her own house, however, was never used as an informal gathering place.

The way Omanis present themselves in photographs demonstrates these cultural differences. In al-Hamra it is impossible to take a family snapshot that includes a husband and a wife surrounded by their children. This is not because the nuclear family is not a familiar concept; indeed, a significant percentage of households in al-Hamra are nuclear. Rather, it is unthinkable for a woman to be photographed next to her husband because it would imply her private role as wife. Husband and wife never visit in the community as a couple, and men and women go to great lengths to avoid being in the same room when a non-family member is present. Occasions when husband, wife, and children interact together are not shared with non-family members of either gender.

In contrast, women display their public roles as mothers with ease in the community and to strangers. In al-Hamra women willingly allow themselves to be photographed with a child and often place themselves next to coffeepots or trays of fruit, which is to suggest hospitality to anyone viewing the photograph.[16] In this respect, they are presenting themselves in the two roles that usually go hand in hand—as mothers and as persons who receive guests generously and participate in visiting networks.

FAMILY CLUSTERS AND VISITING NETWORKS

The concept of family clusters is crucial to understanding social life and networking throughout Oman. The term is applied to a wide range of paternal and maternal kin who live in several households—in the past often clustered together, but now spatially dispersed—and perceive themselves as bound by obligations of mutual support, including the sharing of information that is not revealed to others. Family clusters are linked to one another through kinship, marriage, and patron-client ties, and, until the 1970s, most political and economic activities were built upon them.[17] These interrelated family clusters were, and are, the basis of tribes.

Until the mid-twentieth century, virtually all aspects of peoples' lives in Inner Oman revolved around the framework of tribal politics. A tribal elite monopolized economic and political resources as well as religious learning. Everyone else depended almost totally on the tribal elite for protection. Oman's post-1970 economic growth, however, lessened the control of the tribal leaders over economic opportunities. After the economic and political improvements that followed Oman's 1970 *coup d'état,* many men from al-Hamra who had been obliged to seek wage labor in neighboring countries to feed their families returned home. Many found jobs as drivers and guards in the rapidly expanding state bureaucracy; others joined the army and the police. A few households moved to the capital area, but the lack of affordable housing, together with the strength of extended family ties, kept most families in al-Hamra, with men returning to their homes in the oasis on weekends.

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[16] For two examples of women who present themselves in this manner, see the photograph in C. Eickelman, *Women and Community,* p. 158, and the lead photograph of "Growing Up in the Gulf," *Middle East,* August 1985, p. 45.

[17] See Christine Eickelman, "Women and Politics in an Arabian Oasis," in Farhad Kazemi and R.D. McChesney, eds., *A Way Prepared: Essays on Islamic Culture in Honor of Richard Bayly Winder* (New York and London: New York University Press, 1988), pp. 199–215.

For people who do not belong to the tribal elite, social mobility in post-1970 Oman has meant obtaining a government job and sustaining the image of their family clusters as large, cohesive, economically autonomous, educated, and hospitable. Until the 1970s transformation, only the tribal elite could successfully present themselves as possessing these qualities. Wealth, education, and extensive extra-tribal political contacts continue to give the tribal elite a competitive edge, but this advantage is rapidly narrowing.

Social competition now occurs in two mutually interactive arenas: the local community, where many more women than men live full-time, and the cosmopolitan, urban setting of the capital area, where many men work and where some households now have moved from the oases of the interior. People need local ties, however, to present themselves to their best advantage in the capital area, just as some use the status acquired in the capital to manipulate and improve their standing in their oasis of origin. Households that have moved to the capital area return regularly to al-Hamra to maintain their land and houses, to oversee small local businesses, and to sustain their extended family ties and those of their visiting networks. In spite of the better medical care available in the capital area, women who live there often return to al-Hamra to give birth (unless they anticipate a difficult pregnancy) or return there immediately afterward. Most women return to the oasis regularly to participate in postpartum visiting networks.

The need for women to network has increased, and hospitality has become more elaborate as the tribal elite competes with other upwardly mobile family clusters and as men increasingly work outside the oasis.[18] The large guest rooms for women in the newly constructed cement block houses in al-Hamra indicate the value placed upon women's visiting networks. In one household that this author visited in 1988, men used an old mud-brick guest room adjacent to the new, concrete block house for their visiting. Its bare simplicity stood in sharp contrast to the women's luxurious setting. An older woman from the tribal elite described how full the house had been at a recent wedding: "Fifty cars were parked outside." Weddings, which were generally restricted to the family cluster in the late 1970s, are now public occasions for large-scale hospitality.

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[18] The dramatic increase in *qat* parties in the Yemen Arab Republic during the 1970s is an example of the need to represent spatially, through the ritual of qat chewing, transformations in the social order. The chewing of qat, a mild, tobacco-like narcotic, was once reserved for special occasions, but is now practiced regularly. Migrant labor is transforming social categories, and Yemenis use the qat chewing network both to manipulate their status in their local communities and obtain information about others. See Shelagh Weir, *Qat in Yemen: Consumption and Social Change* (n.p.: British Museum Publications Limited, 1980), pp. 109–67.

Postpartum Visiting

Postpartum visiting occurs in a climate of intensive social competition, image-building of family clusters, and testing of the social order. The *murabbiya* (postpartum visiting period) extends over several weeks, and women representing all households of the community and the surrounding countryside are obliged to visit at least once. During murabbiya, guests are received by the new mother's mother-in-law and other married women who live in her household. Other close female relatives who live in the oasis attend the murabbiya for several hours daily. No other occasions except mournings—not even weddings—brings so many people together for so long.

When a woman is about to begin labor, she does not speak of it to anyone outside her household. Birth is a private occasion, assisted only by close relatives and a midwife.[19] Once the child is born, however, the news spreads quickly throughout the community, and a murabbiya ensues.[20] The new mother lies on a steel cot at the head of a room and receives visitors from morning until sunset. A woman who is descended from a *khadima* (slave) is hired for the occasion to serve guests and help with housework during the entire period.

As stated earlier, an infant need only live a few hours for the full cycle of postpartum visiting to take place. The sex of the infant and the number of times a woman has given birth do not affect the public aspects of postpartum visiting in any significant way. There are, however, differences in what households do in private. For a first-born son, members of a family cluster may collect money to buy an animal as a gift for the child.

Men claim to have nothing to do with the murabbiya and other birth-related activities although this is not wholly truthful. Men from the household in which a birth has taken place buy the food, incense, and perfume used in offering hospitality, and they stay away from their homes until women visitors have left. The use of pickup trucks and automobiles has complicated the choreography of gender separation. Although women in Oman are permitted to drive, few women in the interior do so, and most households have only one vehicle. Thus, men are enlisted to drive women to visits and sometimes there are problems of coordination and "getting the car." In practice, maintenance of the strictly segregated men's and women's visiting networks requires careful coordination on the part of both men and women.

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[19] In 1988, most women in al-Hamra gave birth in their own homes, going to hospitals only in case of anticipated difficulties. A 1973 UNICEF survey of Omani health practices found that many women in Nizwa, the largest oasis of the northern interior, preferred to give birth alone and then to call a relative or neighbor to cut the umbilical cord. Six percent of the women interviewed in Nizwa delivered one or more of their children by themselves, including cutting the cord. See UNICEF, *Beliefs and Practices*, p. 56.

[20] In many parts of the Middle East, there is a confinement period after a woman gives birth. The length of the postpartum visiting period varies regionally from 2 weeks to 40 days.

Between this author's visits in 1979–1980 and 1988, the public aspects of the murabbiya changed. During the earlier period, guests rarely saw newborn infants because they were left in a side room. By 1988, women began to use plastic bathtubs as cribs, and mothers would keep their newborn infants, no longer swaddled, close to them so that they could tend to the infant's needs as they received guests. The guests, however, would not speak of the birth or the child, and they would leave gifts unobtrusively at the entrance to the guest room. These gifts, often coffee beans or fruit, usually consisted of items that could be served to subsequent guests. The gifts were never items for the mother or for the newborn child.

In general, postpartum visits are not oriented toward children, and younger children are kept away from the guests. If a toddler is known to be difficult—and from a young child's perspective, a murabbiya is a period of great tension—he or she may be sent to a relative's house for its duration. Women often complain about the "problems" young children cause for guests. For example, children sometimes play with the guests' sandals, which are left at the entrance of the guest room, often misplacing them; the children would sometimes have temper tantrums, and, in general, grow restless. Women arrange for child-care prior to visits unless the visit is within their own family cluster.

One aspect of the murabbiya involves items—such as clothes, perfumes, pots and pans—that many women sell to guests during postpartum visits. These objects are placed on shelves around the room, and guests can ask to see them, although they are under no obligation to buy. Women of the tribal elite cannot sell items because of their social position, but in 1988, a client was observed selling items in the household of her patron, a member of the tribal elite. The young elite woman who had given birth recorded each transaction in a small notebook for her client because the woman was illiterate. At another time, in the same household, another client used a room adjacent to where the guests sat to perform medicinal branding, a traditional form of medicine still practiced in the Arabian Peninsula.

Conversations during a murabbiya remain polite and neutral. A new machine embroidery stitch for pantaloons, a visit to the recently opened Qaboos University in the capital area, even some mild joking or teasing about who is pregnant are typical topics of conversation. Most visits to households outside one's own family cluster last no longer than 30 minutes. If all the women present know one another well, the atmosphere is more casual and relaxed. If, however, there are wide discrepancies in the social position of the women present, or there are disagreements between the family clusters of the visitors and the host, then guests remain silent unless spoken to.

The number and range of persons a murabbiya attracts reflect a family's social standing. The size of the room where visitors are received, the quality of the rug, the food and perfumes offered, the size and composition of the clusters of guests, the number of women of slave descent serving guests, and the presence of clients offering a variety of services are all factors considered when attempting to present the household as a generous one, and one accustomed to receiving and pleasing guests. Other factors—seating arrangements, greeting etiquette, and the demeanor of the hosting women and their guests—can change rapidly. Women who are smooth conversationalists lapse into silence or offer monosyllabic responses to direct questions when women from the tribal elite enter a guest room. Some women, in formal deference to such guests, will also move immediately to the least prestigious seats in the room. Likewise, coffee, fruit, and perfume may be served in a relaxed manner for some guests, while it may be a rushed affair with others.

The length and frequency of visits are also indicators of status, so the matter-of-fact exchange of information on visiting patterns during the visits provides an almost direct means of challenging social claims.[21] For example, during one visit a woman of the tribal elite was asked whether she often visited the wife of the *wali* (governor).[22] She replied that she did not know the governor's wife and changed the subject. Yet, later in the privacy of the car on the way home, she added, "You know at the mourning for *x*"—she named a well-known older woman of the tribal elite—"the governor's wife only came once!" The single visit was a bitter insult, suggesting that the governor's family perceived the tribal elite as no more than clients. Although the tribal notables and the governor appeared to have cordial relations at official functions, the women's formal networking suggested underlying tensions.[23]

Similarly, women seeking to enhance their claims to higher social ranking—such as women of slave descent or clients of the Abriyin tribe whose husbands or brothers have become officers in the police, army, or security services—avoid visits that place them at a social disadvantage. Even if their men are accorded respect at formal gatherings for state and religious holidays, earlier understandings of their client status prevail at women's gatherings, and thus they seek to avoid them.

The women of the tribal leadership now indirectly compete with other family clusters to attract large numbers of guests. The physical dispersal of housing away from the original mud-brick village has not only blurred spatial representations of status, but it has also made frequent visits to acknowledge respect and status much more difficult than when most members of the community lived less than a

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[21] A woman from the tribal elite once proffered simple guidelines for visiting obligations for a birth or a mourning: daily visits to households which are part of one's own family cluster, "occasional" visits to a neighbor's household, and once only to households of descendants of slaves. In practice, however, the decision as to how little or how much to visit is not so simple.

[22] In Oman, governors are usually not from the provinces they administer.

[23] For an excellent account of the complementarity of men's "official" visiting networks and the "informal" ones of women, see Nancy Tapper, "Gender and Religion in a Turkish Town: A Comparison of Two Types of Formal Women's Gathering," in P. Holden, ed., *Women's Religious Experience* (London: Croom Helm, 1983), pp. 71–88. For an analysis of visiting rituals and the ambiguous power relationships between guests and hosts, see Aida Sami Kanafani, *Aesthetics and Ritual in the United Arab Emirates: The Anthropology of Food and Personal Adornment among Arabian Women* (Beirut: American University of Beirut Press, 1983).

20-minute walk from the extremes of the oasis. The need for women living in al-Hamra to arrange for transport as well as child-care sometimes cuts the number of visitors well below what hosts may be expecting.[24] Visiting obligations are numerous, and women regularly combine two or three formal visits in one afternoon. These sets of visits, however, must consist of the same level of formality; for example, formal visits to non-kin households are not mixed with those to one's own family cluster or informal gatherings of neighbors. Murabbiya visits can, however, be combined with those to offer condolences after a death. Typically, women visit in small groups of twos or threes, usually neighbors, sisters, or mother and daughter.

Before committing to a visit, some women may need a day to weigh their options. Which women in the household should participate in a visit? Younger women tend to visit more often for births and older women for mournings, but there are many exceptions. How long should they stay? Lengths of visits are more difficult to control because women are increasingly dependent on male drivers. Who else can they visit on the same day? Will a delay of three or four days be interpreted unfavorably? Should they come at all? Are people whom they wish to avoid likely to visit on certain days?

As discussed earlier, women who have moved to the capital area often return to al-Hamra to give birth or for postpartum visiting. Women from elsewhere in Oman also return to their towns and villages of origin. One woman from Salala—the capital of Oman's southern Dhufar region—seven months pregnant with a fifth child, said she was returning to Salala for six months. A co-wife, herself two months pregnant, was to follow in a few weeks. The eyes of both women shone as they talked of Salala postpartum visiting, insisting that nothing compared to it in the capital area or elsewhere in Oman.

THE LIMITS OF DIRECTED CHANGE

In Oman, issues such as decreasing natural resources do not motivate individuals to make better personal choices regarding family size, especially when medical care, education, and social services are perceived as cost-free. In addition, there are no indications that married couples actively discuss the options open to them and their social implications. Yet, Oman and other countries of the Arabian Peninsula cannot afford to wait for fertility rates to stabilize on their own. Oman has no official family-planning policy, but, unlike Saudi Arabia, which bans the sale of contraceptives,[25] modern birth control is available in pharmacies in the capital area and from private doctors, some of whom reputedly encourage women to space their births. Oman's official religious spokespersons—including Shaykh

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[24] For a discussion of the transportation problems Saudi women face today, see Altorki and Cole, *Arabian Oasis City*, pp. 216–18.

[25] See Robert J. Lapham, "Population Policies in the Middle East and North Africa," *Middle East Studies Association Bulletin* 11, no. 2 (May 1977), p. 13.

Ahmad bin Hamad al-Khalili, Oman's mufti—have not taken a clear stand on family planning, although many do speak out on the role of women in society.

From an outsider's perspective, Omani women appear to be in a quandary not unlike that of women in Sudan and East Africa, where government efforts to prohibit female circumcision have been widely ignored and even denounced by women who fear that abandoning the practice would deprive them of marriage and prevent them from becoming responsible adults.[26] In the Omani case, the conundrum is more subtle: the degree to which many women are able to participate actively in the process of social transformations remains tied to prolonging their period of fertility.

To perceive women's postpartum networking as merely a reflection of status is to simplify the meaning Omani men and women attach to formal visiting. Face-to-face interaction continues to be the most valued way of obtaining "reliable" information in Oman, yet communities are rapidly losing their physical closeness. People are no longer as able to maintain extensive and active face-to-face ties. Men and women need to "divide up the labor" of social obligations in order to collect and disseminate information among themselves and to keep up with constantly changing versions of social relations within their expanding communities.

Because of the importance attached to postpartum visitation, any Omani government effort to encourage decreased fertility is not likely to be successful. In fact, cumbersome bureaucracies and an insensitivity toward religious and cultural values have plagued many Third World population-control programs.[27] A program that stresses a lifestyle for women that is perceived as Western is also unlikely to succeed. In Malaysia, for example, the government's population program backfired because it privileged the mother-child relationship, reflecting the Western family model, while ignoring the central role of the Muslim father's conjugal and paternity rights.[28] In Egypt, in contrast, the government's National Population Council claims that family size decreased from 7 children in the 1970s to 4.3 children in 1991. It attributed the reduction to media appeals, including the use of popular soap operas.[29]

In Oman, it is doubtful that the media is sufficient to change attitudes toward fertility. Women and men place little trust in the media, and there is no precedent for applying its messages to their immediate concerns. Although official pronouncements call for formal obedience to the sultan in all matters, in practice, the government rarely interferes in the private aspects of people's lives. Government measures in the past, including the placement of limits on the amount that men could pay in *sadaq* (bride wealth) for marriage, are widely ignored.

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[26] See Scilla McLean and Stella Efua Graham, eds., *Female Circumcision, Excision, and Infibulation: Facts and Proposals for Change,* Report no. 47, 2nd rev. ed. (London: Minority Rights Group, 1985).

[27] See, for example, "India to Shake Up Birth-Control Bureaucracy," *New York Times,* March 14, 1990, p. A9.

[28] See Aihwa Ong, "State versus Islam: Malay Families, Women's Bodies, and the Body Politic in Malaysia," *American Ethnologist* 17, no. 2 (May 1990), p. 266.

[29] See "Egyptians Use Soap Operas to Preach Birth Control," *Valley News* (Upper Connecticut River Valley), May 23, 1991, p. 14.

In Muslim countries such as Morocco, family-planning programs utilize, with some success, workers who visit households to explain birth control options and distribute contraceptives. Again, it is doubtful that a similar program could be implemented in Oman given the unwillingness of Omanis to interfere in the private affairs of other family clusters and the close link between women's reproductive roles and perceptions of status and prestige. The concern for privacy is not unique to Oman. Population experts have discovered that in Botswana, Kenya, and Zimbabwe, regions of Africa with some of the highest fertility rates in the world, fertility declined rapidly when contraceptives became available in private pharmacies rather than in public clinics.[30] The highest demand for contraception came from women who wanted to defer pregnancy for a variety of reasons and who valued a distribution system that afforded them privacy.

More important than discussions on how to implement birth control policies, however, are efforts to "objectify" issues related to family planning. One of the consequences of modern education is broader discussion of decisions affecting family matters. A strength of Persian Gulf society has been the spatial representation of social relations in oasis societies and the use of visiting networks as means of conveying information. Population programs must take account of the "division of social labor" that takes place in Omani society. Such programs will need to reorient people toward a transformed lifestyle, where networking is no longer dependent on women giving birth. New social occasions for visiting in urbanized gulf society include departure and arrival from a long voyage, moving into a new house, and children's birthday parties, a recent innovation adopted by capital-area Omanis and Omanis overseas. Breaking the pattern of multiple births quickly and effectively in Oman requires a program that sensitizes people to the subtle relation between fertility and other aspects of culture and prompts them to articulate issues related to fertility, potency, and family planning.

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[30] See "Why Africans Want Fewer Babies," *Economist*, January 9, 1993, p. 74.

Chronology

April 16, 1993-July 15, 1993

ABBREVIATIONS

FBIS, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report—Middle East & North Africa and South Asia; Western Europe; Central Eurasia*
FT, *The Financial Times*
JP, *The Jerusalem Post*
NYT, *The New York Times*
WP, *The Washington Post*
WSJ, *The Wall Street Journal*

Arab-Israeli Conflict

See also, Regional Affairs, Israel, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia

1993

Apr. 16: During a meeting in Damascus of the Arab delegations to bilateral Middle East peace talks, Palestinian delegation spokesperson Hanan Ashrawi announced that her delegation had made a recommendation to the other Arab delegations urging the postponement of the ninth round of bilateral talks scheduled to begin in Washington on 20 April. The announcement came in response to frustrated talks between US government officials and Palestinians in Washington the preceding week on issues pertaining to the 394 Palestinians exiled to southern Lebanon by the Israeli government in December 1992, the return of other Palestinians exiled since 1967, and the March 1993 closure of the West Bank and Gaza Strip by the Israeli government. In Tunis, Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) chairman Yasir Arafat seconded the suggestion and expressed hope that the obstacles could be removed before the resumption of talks so that the Palestinians could participate. [4/17 NYT, WP, 4/19 FBIS]

The 394 exiled Palestinians stranded in southern Lebanon protested their expulsion by marching from their makeshift camp toward Israeli military positions. Israeli troops opened fire, injuring one of the marchers. [4/17 FT]

At a restaurant frequented by Israeli soldiers near the settlement of Mehola in the West Bank, a car-bomb explosion killed two Palestinians and wounded eight Israeli soldiers. An anonymous caller to an unnamed international news agency claimed that the Qassam wing of the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) was responsible for the blast. [4/17 NYT]

Apr. 17: Unidentified officials claimed that the Jordanian, Lebanese, Palestinian, and Syrian delegations to bilateral peace talks had formally requested that the United States postpone the talks—scheduled to begin 20 April in Washington—until 3 May. The officials said that the United States had told the Syrian government that it would agree to delay the talks until 26 April. US government officials did not confirm the postponement request nor the US response. [4/18 NYT]

Palestinian leader al-Husseini said that he would not replace Haidar Abd al-Shafi as head of the Palestinian delegation to bilateral peace talks, but would instead take on general supervision and coordination between the Palestinian multilateral and bilateral delegations. Israel had agreed to al-Husseini's participation in the delegation in mid-April. [4/19 FT]

Apr. 18: At the conclusion of a two-day meeting in Damascus, the Jordanian, Lebanese, Palestinian, and Syrian peace delegates and foreign ministers traveled to Cairo for an Arab League meeting.

Syrian foreign minister Faruq al-Sharaa informed US secretary of state Warren Christopher that the four delegations would delay their return to talks until 27 April to allow time for Israel to ease its stance regarding the 394 Palestinian exiles stranded in southern Lebanon and to protest Israel's closure of the occupied territories. In Tunis, PLO chairman Arafat expressed doubt that the 27 April date could be kept. [4/19 FT, WSJ, FBIS, 4/20 FT]

The Israeli cabinet decided to maintain its closure of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. [4/19 NYT]

In Gaza City, two masked men entered an office and stabbed to death Israeli lawyer Ian Feinberg. The Red Eagle group of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) reportedly claimed responsibility in retaliation for a 16 April Israeli assassination attempt against PFLP senior official Samir Suwaydan in southern Lebanon. [4/19 FBIS]

Apr. 19: In Latakia, Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad met with PLO officials, including chairman Arafat, and Palestinian delegation coordinator al-Husseini to discuss the resumption of peace talks. [4/20 WP, FBIS]

Apr. 20: The Israeli army imposed an early morning curfew on the Tuffah neighborhood of Gaza City to allow Israeli soldiers to search homes in the area. During the raids, Israeli soldiers shot dead an allegedly armed Palestinian after using guns and explosives to force him from his home. The army also sealed the homes of Salami Mari in Qarawat Bani-Hasan and Muhammad Raji in Azzum. [4/21 NYT, FBIS]

Apr. 21: Following a Palestinian agreement to put aside the issue of the 394 Palestinian exiles in southern Lebanon, Arab peace delegates meeting in Damascus announced their planned participation in the ninth round of bilateral peace talks rescheduled for 27 April in Washington. Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin affirmed Israeli intentions to participate in the talks, adding that although his government did not plan to conduct further expulsions, it would not abandon the "right" to do so. [4/22 NYT, WP]

After announcing their decision, the Palestinians issued a statement condemning Israel for causing the delay through its "aggression against Lebanese territory," mass expulsions of Palestinians, destruction of Palestinian homes, closure of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the growth of Jewish settlements. Palestinian delegation leader Abd al-Shafi said the decision to resume negotiations surprised him, explaining that "our recommendation to the PLO leadership was that we should not go until Israel has responded to our requests." Palestinian delegation members Ghassan al-Khatib and Samir Abdallah of the Palestine People's Party said their party would suspend participation in the delegation to protest the decision to return to talks. [4/22 NYT, WP, FT, FBIS]

Following these announcements, US secretary of state Christopher praised the Palestinians for returning to the talks. He also criticized Israel's December expulsion of more than 400 Palestinians as "counterproductive" and exhorted Israel to improve conditions in the occupied territories.

Israeli prime minister Rabin agreed to increase the number of Palestinian workers being permitted into Israel daily from 5,000 to 13,000, effective the following week.

During widespread clashes throughout the Gaza Strip, Israeli soldiers shot dead Muhammad Abu Shawwish, 16, in Nusayrat and Wael Saad, 17, in Gaza City. Palestinians said at least 68 people were wounded during the clashes; the Israeli army said the wounded numbered 34. Palestinian sources said the clashes followed a call from HAMAS for a strike protesting the Israeli army's killing of a HAMAS member.

Israeli police commander Rafi Peled announced that he had suspended border guards who were filmed on 20 April by a Reuters news team as they slapped, kicked, and punched a Palestinian youth at a Gaza Strip refugee camp. [4/22 NYT, WP]

Apr. 22: In a second day of heavy protests in the Gaza Strip, Israeli soldiers shot and wounded at least 39 Palestinians. [4/23 FT]

Apr. 23: Israeli foreign minister Shimon Peres announced that Israel would offer Palestinians in the occupied territories a plan for greater autonomy, including a Palestinian police force, possibly before an agreement regarding self-rule.

Israel television reported that the Israeli government had agreed to allow the return of between 35 and 50 Palestinians out of an estimated 1,200 expelled from the occupied territories between 1967 and 1987. [4/24 NYT]

Israeli labor minister Ora Nemir and Police Minister Moshe Shahal decided to allow police to fire Israeli employers who illegally hire laborers from the occupied territories. [4/28 FBIS]

In the Tuffah neighborhood of Gaza City, Israeli soldiers wounded some 43 Palestinians following a stone-throwing clash that erupted when the Israeli army raided a ceremony held at the site of 14 Palestinian homes destroyed 20 April by the army. In a separate clash in the Gaza Strip, Israeli troops shot and killed one Palestinian and wounded twenty-two. [4/24 NYT]

Apr. 24: After consultations with peace talk delegation members in Ramallah, Palestinian delegation head Abd al-Shafi decided to reverse a decision he made earlier that day to resign from the delegation. [4/26 FBIS]

Apr. 25: In Rafah, masked gunmen shot and killed Kamal al-Arkan, 24, a suspected collaborator. [4/28 FBIS]

Apr. 26: The *Wall Street Journal* reported that Israeli foreign minister Peres had offered the Palestinians "a role in directing $75 million in investments toward the occupied territories." [4/26 WSJ]

Israeli artillery fire halted a procession of the 394 Palestinians exiled in southern Lebanon as they marched toward the Israeli post at Zumraya to protest the resumption of bilateral peace talks in

Washington. The exiles staged a sit-in at the location where they were stopped. [4/27 NYT, WSJ]

In the Gaza Strip's al-Shifa camp, Najah Abu Talal died from wounds suffered the preceding week in a clash with Israeli soldiers. In a stone-throwing clash in Khan Yunis, Israeli soldiers shot dead 12-year-old Ahmad Hamdan. [4/27 FBIS]

Apr. 27: Bilateral Middle East peace talks resumed in Washington. During a meeting of all the delegations, Secretary of State Christopher took an active role, emphasizing that the talks should "focus on the substance of the negotiations" and no longer be bogged down with discussion of the negotiation process. [4/28 NYT, WP]

The Israeli government increased the number of Palestinian laborers from the occupied territories permitted into Israel daily to 20,000. [4/28 FT]

Abd al-Aziz Rantisi, spokesperson for the 394 Palestinian exiles stranded in southern Lebanon, said the exiles would not consider valid any document signed by the Palestinian delegation at bilateral Middle East peace talks in Washington. The exiles contended that the negotiators did not represent the Palestinian people. [4/28 NYT]

Apr. 28: At the second day of bilateral peace talks in Washington, the Israeli delegation agreed to allow 30 Palestinians exiled between 1967 and 1987 to return home. The Palestinians were included in a list of 55 exiles submitted to the Israelis by Palestinian negotiators. Palestinian officials said they primarily were intellectuals and leftists expelled for political activities. US government officials said that Israeli authorities were considering additional exiles for return. [4/29 NYT, 4/30 WP, 5/1 WP]

Senior US officials disclosed that the US government had prompted the Saudi government to make an offer to Palestinian delegation coordinator al-Husseini to reinstate financial aid to the Palestinians halted during the 1990–91 Persian Gulf crisis and war in exchange for a Palestinian promise to return to peace talks. Both US and Palestinian officials said that in spite of the offer, the Saudis had not yet resumed payments. [4/29 NYT]

In a speech before a House foreign affairs subcommittee, Assistant Secretary of State Edward Djerejian said that "tangible progress " in the Middle East peace talks was "essential" and stated that the US government would become more involved in the negotiations. [4/29 WSJ]

During a clash in al-Burayj in the Gaza Strip, Israeli soldiers shot and killed Khalid Ali al-Ahil, 20. In Kafr Nimah near Ramallah, Israeli forces shot dead a Palestinian after he allegedly aimed a homemade gun at them from his window. During other clashes in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Israeli soldiers shot to death two Palestinians and wounded fifty-seven. [4/28 NYT, WP, 4/29 FBIS]

Apr. 29: The Palestinian and Israeli delegations to bilateral peace talks established three subcommittees to discuss Palestinian autonomy, land and water issues, and human rights. [4/30 FBIS]

Syrian negotiators at the peace talks rejected an Israeli proposal concerning an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights. Syrian negotiator Muwaffiq al-Allaf said the proposal included items that were a repetition of and in some cases more objectionable than previous proposals. The principal difficulty involved the definition of withdrawal. The Syrian delegation threatened to leave the talks if no progress occurred the following week. [4/30 NYT, WP, WSJ]

In Geneva, multilateral talks on water issues came to a halt following objections to a Palestinian call for a neutral team to study water rights in the occupied territories. [4/30 FT]

The Israeli government agreed to allow 5,000 Palestinian expatriates visiting family in the occupied territories to remain there permanently. [4/30 WP, 5/1 WP]

In al-Burayj, Ramzi Mansur, 17, died of gunshot wounds inflicted the preceding day by Israeli soldiers. [4/30 FBIS]

Apr. 30: At the end of the first week of bilateral peace talks in Washington, Palestinian delegation spokesperson Ashrawi praised the more active US role in the talks, and said that the US Department of State would brief Palestinian officials on Israeli settlement growth. According to a senior US official, however, the US government had promised only to offer evidence of Israel's reduced settlement activity.

The Israeli delegation proposed an offer of formal residency to thousands of Palestinians who married and settled in the occupied territories. They previously had been subject to expulsion. The Israeli delegation also said the government would agree to review demolition orders for Palestinian houses built without permits and offer money for Palestinian schools and hospitals. [5/1 WP]

Fifteen of thirty Palestinian exiles permitted by Israel to return to the occupied territories arrived in the West Bank. Among those returning were Hassan Abd al-Jawad, a former mayor of al-Birah expelled in 1986 for alleged ties to the PFLP, Rawhi Khatib, a former mayor of East Jerusalem expelled in 1968, and Hanna Nasser, a former president of Bir Zeit University expelled in 1974. The 394 Palestinians exiled in southern Lebanon decried the willingness of the thirty to return as a "stab in the back." [5/1 NYT, WP]

May 2: An unidentified source in the Israeli Foreign Ministry said that the Israeli government was willing to permit Palestinians living in East Jerusalem to vote in elections for an interim Palestinian ruling council during the proposed five-year self-rule interim period. They would not, however, be allowed representation on the council. [5/4 FBIS]

May 3: Fourteen more of the thirty Palestinian exiles allowed to return to the occupied territories arrived. The final exile was scheduled to return 5 May. [5/4 NYT]

Israeli foreign minister Peres said on Israeli television that the government should relinquish the Gaza Strip before agreement on the other territories and pursue a confederation between Jordan and the Palestinians in the occupied territories. [5/4 WSJ]

A senior Israeli government official said the Iranian government had increased its financial aid to HAMAS since the end of the 1990–91 Persian Gulf war and crisis and, in response, the Israeli government had begun to increase funding to other Palestinian groups in the occupied territories. [5/1 NYT]

In the Gaza Strip near al-Burayj, Israeli soldiers shot and killed Palestinians Hani Mahmud Hasan Muammir, 23, Ahmad Salim Dib, 23, Ahmad Hamid Salama Abu Saylah, 21, and Muhammad Mahmud Muhammad Bahadah, 21, when they failed to stop their car at a roadblock. [5/4 FT, 5/6 FBIS]

May 4: Israeli prime minister Rabin responded negatively to remarks made the preceding day by Israeli foreign minister Peres urging a confederation between Jordan and the Palestinians, warning that negotiations should not move too quickly. [5/5 WSJ]

The US Department of State announced that it would make available $14 million to help create jobs in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. [5/6 WP]

Clashes erupted throughout the Gaza Strip over the killing of four Palestinians at a roadblock by Israeli troops the preceding day. In al-Shati, Israeli soldiers opened fire on stone-throwing protestors, killing Ahmad Subuh, 20, and wounding at least 10 others. Undercover Israeli soldiers shot dead suspected Fatah member Yusif Abu Muhaysin and his brother Jumaa as they walked through the Mughazi camp. In Nablus, Anwar al-Bakah, 19, died of wounds inflicted by Israeli soldiers 24 April. [5/5 NYT]

May 5: Following a meeting in Washington the preceding night, the Arab delegations to bilateral peace talks announced a decision to extend the talks at least until the end of the following week. In spite of the extension, the Palestinian delegation announced the suspension of its participation in the subcommittee on human rights until the middle of the following week to protest the high number of Palestinian deaths in the occupied territories during the preceding week and Israel's refusal to release the names of additional Palestinians who would be permitted to return home. [5/6 NYT, WP, FT]

In Rome, a two-day session of multilateral talks on regional economic development ended. [5/6 FBIS]

May 6: In Washington, the Israeli delegation presented the Palestinians with a draft of a joint declaration of principles on Palestinian self-rule. The Palestinians immediately rejected the offer. The Israelis also proposed to Lebanon a withdrawal of Israeli troops from the south in exchange for Lebanese protection of the border. [5/7 WSJ, 5/11 WP]

May 7: In Washington, Israeli delegation spokesperson Yossi Gal said his delegation had agreed to "external monitors" for Palestinian elections of a council to govern during the proposed five-year self-rule interim period. The Israeli government had previously refused a Palestinian request for international monitoring of elections in the occupied territories on the grounds that it would undermine Israeli authority. [5/10 FBIS]

May 10: The Israeli government agreed to allow the return of another 25 of the 394 Palestinians in exile in southern Lebanon, in addition to the 101 exiles it had approved for return in February. (The 101 refused to return to their homes unless all those exiled in December 1992 were allowed to return.) The newest decision followed a review of the exiles' cases.

The Palestinian delegation to bilateral peace negotiations sent only three of its members to that day's talks and suspended its participation in the two subcommittees on land and water issues and self-rule. The actions were to protest the failure of the Israeli government to fulfill promises made earlier to encourage the Palestinians to return to negotiations, especially concerning the acceleration of the return of the 394 Palestinians exiled in southern Lebanon. The actions were also to protest the "lack of seriousness" of the 6 May Israeli draft statement concerning the principles of self-rule and the killing of 18 Palestinians by Israeli soldiers since the beginning of the ninth round of peace talks. [5/11 WP, FT]

May 11: In Oslo, multilateral talks on refugees began. [5/13 FBIS]

The *New York Times* reported that as a partial repayment for US assistance during the 1990–91 Persian Gulf crisis and war, the Kuwaiti and Saudi governments had promised to stop the blacklisting of US companies that traded with Israel and companies that did business with blacklisted companies. [5/11 NYT]

Fearing a loss to the PLO in Hebron University's student council elections, university HAMAS supporters called for a boycott of the elections and then took over the university's main building. Assurances from university trustees to look into their complaints concerning the conduct of the elections ended the standoff. [5/12 WP]

May 12: In an attempt to prevent the ninth round of peace talks from ending without progress, the US government proposed a set of principles for future bilateral negotiations on Palestinian self-rule. The US document described a two-phase, five-year process that would include the establishment of an interim self-government in the third year. It also discussed aspects of the structure of the proposed self-rule, including the dissolution of the Israeli civil administration and the creation of a yet unspecified ruling body to administer daily Palestinian life. The document also stated that the final status of the occupied territories would be based on UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. US government officials had planned a meeting to discuss the proposal with the Israeli and Palestinian delegations, but the Palestinian delegation declined to attend. [5/13 WP, 5/14 NYT]

Israeli army officials disclosed that during the preceding four days, troops had shot and killed six alleged Palestinian "terrorists" attempting to cross the Israeli border into Egypt. After their death, Israeli authorities identified them as members of HAMAS. In Shabura, Israeli troops shot dead 13-year-old Muhammad Taima during a demonstration protesting the six Palestinian deaths. [5/12 FBIS, 5/13 NYT]

In Dayr al-Balah, Israeli soldiers shot dead Fuad Ismail Timraz, 20, during a stone-throwing incident. [5/13 FBIS]

May 13: In Washington, US officials met with the Israeli and Palestinian delegations to persuade them to accept the US declaration of principles on self-rule submitted the preceding day. Neither party would agree to the proposal. All peace talk delegations said, however, that they planned to return to the next round of talks, scheduled for early June 1993. [5/14 NYT, WP, FT]

Yasir Abd Rabbuh, a PLO executive committee member, declared the Palestinian's rejection of the US declaration of principles on the grounds that it was merely a copy of a previous Israeli plan, both of which disregarded UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. Palestinian delegation head Abd al-Shafi denied that his delegation had rejected the US proposal. [5/14 FBIS]

May 14: Jamil Hilal, director of PLO information, said that the return of the Palestinian delegation to bilateral peace talks would be unlikely unless Israel first ended the closure of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and accelerated the return of the 394 Palestinians exiled in southern Lebanon. [5/15 FT]

Israeli television reported that, for security reasons and on the grounds that they were prominent Fatah activists in the Gaza Strip, the Israeli government had banned from traveling abroad six administrative members of the Palestinian delegations to multilateral peace talks on security, economic development, and refugees. [5/17 FBIS]

May 16: Outside the Gadid settlement in the Gaza Strip, gunmen in a passing car shot and killed two Israeli and two Palestinian vegetable merchants. Fatah and HAMAS jointly claimed responsibility, explaining that it was in retaliation for the May Israeli army killing of Palestinian "guerrillas." [5/17 NYT, WP, FT]

Israeli prime minister Rabin told the cabinet that the government would make no further concessions to the Palestinians in peace negotiations without some reciprocation. [5/17 WSJ]

At the Jabalya camp, Israeli soldiers shot dead an 18-month-old baby who was playing close to a clash with Palestinian youths. At al-Shati camp, Israeli soldiers shot dead 11-year-old Muhammad Durrul who, according to witnesses, had started to run after seeing soldiers entering the street where he was playing. Israeli military sources said the boy was shot after throwing stones at soldiers. [5/17 NYT, WP, FBIS]

May 17: In Washington, multilateral peace talks on regional security and arms control began. [5/19 FBIS]

The *New York Times* reported that during the preceding week, the Israeli army had announced it had confiscated weapons from an alleged group of Kakh-affiliated Jewish settlers in the West Bank attempting to establish a private police squad to combat any Palestinian police force created under a peace agreement. [5/17 NYT]

In Bayta near Nablus, Israeli soldiers shot and killed a 17-year-old Palestinian. In a separate incident near Nablus, soldiers shot dead a stone-thrower. [5/20 FBIS]

May 18: During a funeral in Jabalya for one of six HAMAS followers killed by Israeli soldiers the preceding week, Israeli forces opened fire, killing at least three people, including Awni Makusi, 18, and wounding at least thirty-five others. [5/19 NYT, 5/20 FBIS]

Al-Shuruq (Tunis) reported that a Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) source had disclosed that in Damascus, Nayif Hawatimah of the DFLP and George Habash of the PFLP had met during the preceding two days to discuss a possible merger between the two groups. [5/19 FBIS]

In al-Shati, Ahmad al-Kurd, 11, died of gunshot wounds received the preceding day when Israeli soldiers shot him by mistake during pursuit of a fleeing "prominent activist." Israeli army sources denied that there had been troops in the area. In Nusayrat, Israeli soldiers shot dead Talib Ahmad Abu Ataya, 20, during a clash. In al-Mughazi, Kamal Aslan, 28, died of wounds sustained the preceding day during clashes with Israeli troops. [5/19 NYT, 5/20 FBIS]

May 19: During a press interview, Palestinian delegation head Abd al-Shafi called for the suspension of Palestinian participation in bilateral peace talks because of Israeli intransigence on basic issues and the pro-Israel bias of US mediators. [5/21 FBIS]

In Hebron, Israeli soldiers fired antitank shells at a building housing allegedly "armed terrorists." The people inside were killed. Israeli soldier Theo Samuel, 21, died of stab wounds incurred the preceding week. [5/20 FBIS]

May 22: Palestine National Council (PNC) speaker Abd al-Hamid al-Saih announced his plans to resign primarily because of his dissatisfaction with the state of peace talks—especially in light of Israel's increased pressure on the occupied territories during the talks, the Palestinian delegation's willingness to return to talks in spite of their apparent fruitlessness, and unfulfilled US promises. He planned to submit his formal resignation during the next PNC meeting. [5/24 FBIS]

May 23: The Israeli cabinet earmarked 30 million shekels to create some 20,000 jobs in the occupied territories, but rejected a proposal to provide unemployment benefits for the tens of thousands of Palestinians out of work because of the closure of the territories. [5/24 FT]

May 24: In Tokyo, multilateral talks on the environment began. [5/25 FBIS]

In Rafah, Israeli soldiers shot and killed an alleged member of Islamic Jihad. In Nablus, Israeli forces shot dead a 17-year-old Palestinian after stones were thrown at an Israeli bus. [5/25 FT, FBIS]

May 25: The *Financial Times* reported that during the preceding week, Palestinian economists had told Ilter Turkmen, commissioner-general of the UN Relief and Works Agency, that the closure of the occupied territories was costing the Palestinians some $5 million per day in lost wages and other "side-effects." [5/25 FT]

May 27: According to Israeli army sources, the Israeli government released 250 Palestinian detainees and planned to release another 30 in a gesture marking the Muslim holiday of Id al-Adha. Those released were minors, women, elderly or ill persons, or those who had nearly completed sentences for lesser offenses.

Palestinian sources said that during the preceding three days in the Gaza Strip, Israeli soldiers had confiscated about 1,000 Palestinians' permits for entry into Israel. [5/28 FT]

May 28: An Israeli man was stabbed to death as he walked to the Cave of the Patriarchs to pray. [5/28 FBIS]

May 30: In the Gaza Strip, Israeli troops shot and killed two suspected HAMAS members reportedly during a shootout that followed the blasting of the suspects' hideout with missiles and explosives. In Hebron, Jewish settlers set fire to at least one Palestinian home and fired on Palestinian stone throwers to protest a 28 May killing of an Israeli. [5/31 WP]

May 31: In Hebron, armed Jewish settlers fired shots into the air and damaged Palestinian property after soldiers prevented them from entering al-Ibrahimi mosque during Id al-Adha prayers. [6/1 NYT]

June 6: Palestinian representatives and the foreign ministers of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria met in Amman to coordinate plans for the tenth round of peace negotiations scheduled to begin 15 June in Washington. [6/7 FT]

A senior Shin Bet official said that the organization had arrested four Palestinians suspected of involvement in the December 12, 1992, abduction and killing of Israeli soldier Nissim Toledano, an incident precipitating the expulsion of more than 400 Palestinians to southern Lebanon. According to the official, the suspects had confessed to the killing and added that they had not been affiliated with HAMAS at the time. [6/7 NYT]

June 7: Israeli foreign minister Peres said that the previous round of peace talks had brought the Israeli and Jordanian delegations so near to an agreement that "we just have to take out a pen and sign." Israeli prime minister Rabin, however, cautioned Labor members of the Knesset that he expected no advances in the next round of talks. [6/8 NYT]

June 8: The US Department of State announced that all delegations to bilateral Middle East peace negotiations had agreed to return to the tenth round of talks in Washington scheduled to begin 15 June. [6/9 NYT]

Kuwaiti foreign minister Sabah Ahmad Sabah announced that the Kuwaiti and other Arab governments had discontinued their "indirect" boycott of Israel for reasons relating to "the national interest of the state." [6/9 NYT, WP]

June 10: *Al-Quds* published the text of what reportedly was the first interview given by Israeli prime minister Rabin or any other Israeli leader to a Palestinian newspaper. During the interview, Rabin suggested that a US congressional team would be permitted to oversee elections held in the occupied territories for the proposed interim period of Palestinian self-rule. [6/11 NYT]

June 14: The Israeli government offered an "early empowerment" plan to the Palestinians in the occupied territories that would grant them control of such areas as health, education, and transportation. Control of security, foreign relations, and welfare of settlers would remain in Israeli hands. [6/15 NYT]

The Palestinian delegation to peace talks said that US government officials had failed to provide clear answers during a week of discussions in Washington aimed at clarifying US positions on key issues in the peace talks, including whether the United States viewed the territories as "disputed" or "occupied," how it viewed the connection between the interim period and a final settlement, and how East Jerusalem would be governed during the interim period. [6/15 FT]

June 15: In Washington, the tenth round of bilateral Middle East peace talks resumed with low participation: the Israelis sent only part of their delegation to Washington, and Palestinian delegation leaders Abd al-Shafi and al-Husseini were not in attendance. Those present from the two delegations decided to establish a subcommittee to set down the basic principles governing the structure of Palestinian rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. [6/16 NYT]

June 16: The Israeli army announced that Muhammad Jarad, a Palestinian-American arrested in Israel on 25 January on suspicion of distributing money to HAMAS, had pled guilty and was sentenced to six months in prison. With time already served, Jarad would be released in July 1993. [6/17 NYT]

June 24: The Israeli government announced that it had allotted $13 million for the construction of fences around the West Bank and Gaza Strip. [6/28 FBIS]

June 25: US Department of State spokesperson Michael McCurry said that regarding bilateral Middle East peace talks, the US government was "not yet satisfied that enough progress has been made or that the delegations have the authority to go beyond familiar positions," and added that a US envoy might be sent to the Middle East to reinvigorate the negotiations. [6/26 NYT]

Israeli authorities announced that Palestinians in the occupied territories over the age of 50 would be permitted into Israel. [6/28 FBIS]

June 29: In Washington, Palestinian delegation spokesperson Ashrawi criticized the US government for not backing up US non-recognition of Israel's annexation of Jerusalem with tangible action and urged it to put forward a statement of principles that included the issue of Jerusalem. US government officials said that from the outset, the United States had pledged to accept discussion on any matter, including Jerusalem, but would not force any matter upon Israel. [6/30 WP]

The *Washington Post* reported that a newly released Middle East Watch study had asserted that Israeli undercover military units were given license to kill, claiming that they had repeatedly killed Palestinians without justification and regularly opened fire unnecessarily. The Israeli army denied the accusations. [6/29 WP, 6/30 NYT]

June 30: In an "informal working paper" presented to the Israeli and Palestinian delegations in Washington, US government officials attempted to find common ground between the two groups by focusing on responsibilities that the Palestinians in the occupied territories could assume from the Israelis regardless of the status of their territorial disputes. Such responsibilities would include management of the budget, health, education, land issues, and police force. The document also made provisions for discussion of the final status of Jerusalem. The US government promised to send a delegation to the Middle East the following week to energize the talks.

Elyakim Rubenstein, head of the Israeli delegation, criticized the Palestinian delegation for making the status of Jerusalem the central issue of the tenth round of peace talks. [7/1 NYT, WP]

July 1: On the final day of the tenth round of bilateral peace talks in Washington, both Palestinian and Israeli negotiators severely criticized the US working paper presented to them the preceding day. The Palestinians were so troubled by the document that they scheduled a meeting to discuss it with US secretary of state Christopher the following week. They disliked the document on the grounds that it contradicted the idea of land for peace expressed in UN resolution 242 by putting off the question of territorial sovereignty until talks on the final status of the territories. They also were dissatisfied with the proposal's ideas concerning the status of Jerusalem.

In the French Hill neighborhood of Jerusalem, two suspected HAMAS members shot to death Olga Haichov, 42, on a public bus they had boarded. Fleeing the bus, the two gunmen hijacked a car and were killed during a shootout with soldiers at an army roadblock. The owner of the car, Jeanette Kadosh Dayan, 39, was shot dead either by the gunmen or the Israeli soldiers during the shootout. In Jerusalem several hours later, a Jewish man opened fire on Palestinians working at a construction site in what was believed to be retaliation for the incident. [7/2 NYT]

July 4: Israeli prime minister Rabin accused the US government of making alterations to previous proposals to suit Palestinian demands in its latest statement of principles.

US secretary of state Christopher suggested in a television interview that the United States might cut back its role in Middle East peace talks, saying that "if the parties don't want our assistance . . . of course we will not impose ourselves." [7/5 NYT]

Israeli television reported that more than half of the Israeli cabinet favored direct talks with the PLO. [7/5 FT]

July 8: A team of US officials led by peace talk coordinator Dennis Ross arrived in Israel for the first part of a tour of the Middle East whose propose was to rejuvenate peace talks.

In Rafah, Israeli undercover soldiers shot dead an allegedly armed Palestinian. In the West Bank near Tekoa, gunmen shot and killed an Israeli motorist. [7/9 NYT]

July 12: Both PLO chairman Arafat and PLO adviser Nabil Shaath said that senior PLO officials had met with Israeli government officials during peace talks in June in Washington. The Israeli government denied the claims. Arafat later recanted, saying that the PLO had only made unsuccessful attempts to meet with Israeli officials. [7/13 NYT, FT]

July 13: The Israeli police announced the arrest of four members of Kahane Lives, an anti-Arab group run by the son of Rabbi Meir Kahane, in connection with a November 1992 grenade attack in Jerusalem's Old City that killed a Palestinian man. [7/14 NYT]

Central Asia and Transcaucasia

1993

Apr. 21: Armenian president Levon Ter-Petrosyan met with Turkish prime minister Suleyman Demirel in Ankara to discuss the Armenian conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. [4/29 FBIS]

May 3: Turkish foreign minister Hikmet Cetin announced a tripartite initiative sponsored by Russia, Turkey, and the United States to bring peace to the disputed area of Nagorno-Karabakh. The plan was concluded at a 29–30 April meeting in Moscow between government officials from the three countries. [5/6 FBIS]

The Kyrgyz parliament voted to replace the Russian ruble with the Kyrgyz som. The new currency would be backed by $90 million from an aid package promised by Western countries. [5/4 FT]

May 5: The Kyrgyz parliament ratified a new constitution that called for a 105-seat, full-time, unicameral parliament and a separation of the heads of state and government. [5/6 WSJ]

May 10: The Kyrgyz government put into circulation the som at a rate of one som per two hundred rubles. [5/11 FT]

May 17: Kyrgyz sources said that the Uzbek government had cut off telephone lines, closed the border, and severely reduced gas supplies to Kyrgyzstan to protest Kyrgyzstan's replacement of the ruble with the som. [5/18 FT]

May 24: Azeri authorities announced a five-day unilateral cease-fire as a show of good will toward Armenia and to curtail reports of a renewed offensive in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. [5/27 NYT]

May 25: Following a meeting with Russian president Boris Yeltsin, Armenian president Ter-Petrosyan announced his support for the tripartite peace plan for Nagorno-Karabakh. [5/27 NYT]

May 26: Following talks in Moscow, the Armenian and Azeri governments unofficially agreed to a cease-fire in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Although the Azeri government had already signed the tripartite agreement, the Armenian government was awaiting approval of the plan by Nagorno-Karabakh officials. The defense chief of Nagorno-Karabakh had already rejected the cease-fire, claiming that it "did not guarantee the safety of Karabakh's citizens." The agreement called for a 60-day cease-fire, the end to a transport and energy embargo against Armenia, and Armenian withdrawal from the town of Kelbajar by 4 June. Under the plan, peace talks would resume 6 June in Geneva, sponsored by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. During the preceding 16 days, fighting over the disputed territory had stopped. [5/27 NYT]

June 1: The Uzbek government doubled wages and prices. [6/4 FT]

June 2: The Azeri government began the introduction of a new currency, the manat, with plans to completely replace the ruble by 15 June. [6/16 FT]

June 4: In Azerbaijan's second largest city, Gyandzha, Azeri government forces attacked the garrison of military commander Suret Huseynov after his refusal to follow general command orders. Huseynov's forces repulsed the attack and took over Gyandzha and its airport. [6/8 WP, 6/25 NYT]

June 7: Azeri prime minister Panakh Huseynov offered to resign following reports that rebel leader Suret Huseynov had demanded the prime minister's resignation as a primary condition for opening talks with the government. The government denied reports that Suret Huseynov had seized four top government officials and asserted that the Azeri prosecutor general had reached an agreement with him on the surrender of his forces' weapons. Some 60 people had died and another 200 wounded in fighting that began 4 June between government and Suret Huseynov forces. [6/8 NYT, WP]

June 12: Shortly past a deadline for Nagorno-Karabakh officials to sign the proposed cease-fire agreement, Armenian forces from the enclave attacked and surrounded the Azeri city of Agdam, located just east of Nagorno-Karabakh, and reportedly captured several Azeri villages. Both the governments of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh denied involvement in the offensive.

The Azeri government disclosed that the rebel forces of Suret Huseynov had captured the towns of Yevlak and Barba, 60 miles east of Gyandzha, placing 15 percent of Azeri territory in Huseynov's control. Armenian forces were in control of 10 percent of the territory. [6/13 NYT]

June 13: Under pressure from rebel leader Suret Huseynov, Isa Gambarov, the Azeri speaker of parliament, resigned. Gambarov explained that he was resigning "to preserve the country's stability and prevent civil war." [6/14 NYT]

June 14: Azeri president Abulfaz Elchibey announced that military force would be used against rebel forces led by Suret Huseynov, who had come to within 60 miles of Baku. According to rebel leaders in Baku, government forces, under orders to hold fire to prevent full-scale war with Huseynov's forces, used aircraft to bomb a group of rebels advancing toward the town of Qazimammed. [6/15 NYT]

June 15: The Azeri parliament elected Haidar Aliyev as its speaker. Aliyev called on Suret Huseynov and his forces to end their revolt. Huseynov threatened to enter Baku with his forces if President Elchibey were not removed from power. The government suspended the final phase of the introduction of the manat, which was to have totally replaced the ruble by 15 June. [6/16 NYT, FT, 6/19 NYT]

June 17: Two Russian officers were shot and killed at a military base near the Tajik town of Pyandzh near the Afghan border. [6/20 NYT]

June 18: Azeri president Elchibey fled Baku following repeated failures to reach an agreement with rebel commander Huseynov, who had advanced to within 50 miles of the city, and the military high command's refusal to defend him against Huseynov's advancing forces. Parliamentary speaker Aliyev formally assumed power, but after intense questioning from parliament about the legality of his action, he said he would continue to recognize Elchibey as the legitimate president and called for his immediate return. In a subsequent television debate, Aliyev urged Elchibey's resignation or impeachment for the abandonment of his position. Elchibey reportedly called Aliyev from his refuge in Nakhichevan, telling him that he had fled Baku to avoid bloodshed, and that he would return upon Aliyev's request. [6/19 NYT, WP, FT]

June 20: Acting Azeri president Aliyev decided to hold an emergency session of parliament the following day to discuss the country's situation, and called on President Elchibey to attend. He said that he would remain in Nakhichevan until rebel leader Huseynov moved his forces away from Baku and ended his revolt. Elchibey reportedly continued to run the country from his refuge and was in constant contact with government administrators. An Azeri Defense Ministry official said that he had persuaded Huseynov's troops to halt their advance on Baku. According to Reuters, a contingent of Huseynov's forces had advanced to within eight miles of the city, encountering no resistance from the Azeri army along the way; Huseynov's troops had taken control of about half of Azerbaijan. [6/21 NYT, FT]

June 21: In a vote of 50 to 27, members of the Azeri parliament put rebel leader Huseynov in power. In a televised speech, Huseynov said that in light of "the power vacuum," he would "take all responsibilities and powers on myself." At a separate news conference, Huseynov said he was willing to negotiate a solution to the governmental crisis and encouraged President Elchibey to take part, but added that he would, in any case, call for Elchibey's resignation. [6/22 NYT, WP]

June 23: The Azeri government suspended a contract with European and US companies to develop Azerbaijan's proven oil reserves. [6/28 FT]

An Uzbek court sentenced former vice president Shukrullo Mirsaidov to three years in prison for abuse of power, but then granted him a presidential pardon and fined him $5.6 million, the amount his actions had allegedly cost the nation. [6/24 FT]

June 24: Following an attempt by Azeri president Elchibey to hold on to his position by offering to transfer all his powers except for a few formal functions to Acting President Aliyev, the Azeri parliament voted 33 to 3 to remove Elchibey from power. The vote was made pending a report from a parliamentary committee, composed primarily of Elchibey's opponents, commissioned to investigate his involvement in a 4 June attempt to disarm the Gyandzha garrison of commander Huseynov. In a televised announcement read by Acting President Aliyev, Huseynov proclaimed that he would not be responsible for events in the nation and that there could be further "civil disturbances" if Elchibey did not formally resign. According to Azeri law, Aliyev, as parliamentary speaker, was vice president and, therefore, in line to become president following the resignation or dismissal of the president. [6/25 NYT]

June 25: Azeri president Elchibey denounced the parliament's decision of the preceding day to remove him from power, saying that the installation of Suret Huseynov as leader was "contrary to the constitution." [6/26 WP]

June 27: Azeri rebel commander Huseynov arrived in Baku to negotiate with Acting President Aliyev on Huseynov's future role in the Azeri government. [6/29 WP]

Armenian forces captured Mardakert, the last Azeri-held town in Nagorno-Karabakh, following a day of heavy fighting and severe casualties. [6/29 NYT]

June 28: Armenian forces reportedly launched a new offensive against the Azeri city of Kedabek in the ongoing struggle for control of Nagorno-Karabakh. [6/29 NYT]

June 30: Acting President Aliyev appointed Suret Huseynov prime minister, as well as minister for defense and the interior. The parliament gave an almost unanimous vote of approval of the appointment. Abulfaz Elchibey continued to refuse to resign as president. [7/1 NYT]

July 4: Armenian forces mounted a heavy artillery attack on Agdam. [7/5 NYT]

July 6: The Azeri Defense Ministry ordered as many as 2,500 troops and 20 tanks into the city of Agdam to fend off Armenian attacks. Eyewitness accounts disputed that the order had been carried out. [7/7 FT]

July 13: Tajik opposition forces aided by Afghan rebels attacked a Tajik border post and village in Kulyab, killing as many as 200 Tajiks and 26 Russian soldiers. Russian officials protested the incident to the Afghan government. [7/15 WP, FT]

July 14: Russian deputy defense minister Konstantin Kobets called for the use of "all possible force" against Afghan and Tajik rebels along the Tajik-Afghan border. Russian defense minister Pavel Grachev announced the dispatch of additional troops to reinforce troops already in place along the Afghan-Tajik border. [7/15 FT]

Petroleum Affairs

See also, Central Asia, Iraq

1993

June 10: Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) officials closed a three-day meeting in Geneva with an accord that would maintain OPEC's ceiling output until the end of September and push up prices. Kuwaiti officials, who had come to the meeting demanding a 30 percent increase in its oil production quota, rejected the agreement and promised to raise its production by 20 percent by 1 July and by another 7 percent by 1 September. [6/11 NYT]

Regional Affairs

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Lebanon

1993

Apr. 18: In Cairo, the Arab League Ministerial Council decided to establish a committee comprised of the foreign ministers of Egypt, Morocco, and Mauritania to facilitate Arab reconciliation, particularly between Iraq and Kuwait. The decision met with disapproval from the Iraqi and Kuwaiti representatives. [4/23 FBIS]

Apr. 25: In Karachi, the Organization of the Islamic Conference convened. [4/26 FBIS]

Apr. 30: The US Department of State released its annual report on global terrorism, which described the Iranian government as "the most dangerous sponsor of terrorism in 1992," and accused it of responsibility for more than 20 terrorist incidents, including the March 17, 1992, truck bombing at the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires. For the first time, the report listed the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) as a terrorist organization. Contrary to prior notices, the report did not list the Pakistani government as a sponsor of terrorism. [5/1 NYT]

May 3: Unidentified Arab diplomats said that the Libyan and Russian governments had proposed that an international tribunal under UN authority try Lamen Khalifa and Abd al-Basset Ali Meghrabi, the two Libyans charged in the December 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. [5/4 WSJ]

May 6: At the Organization of the Islamic Conference meeting in Karachi, Iranian sources revealed that the preceding month Iranian foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati had made an agreement with Iraqi foreign minister Muhammad Sa'id Sahhaf to resume political negotiations. [5/7 FBIS]

May 7: US investigators disclosed that Mahmud Abu Halima, a suspect charged in the 26 February World Trade Center bombing, had told Egyptian authorities that bombing suspect Muhammad Salamah had participated in the plan to assassinate Kakh leader Rabbi Meir Kahane in 1990. Abu Halima claimed that testimony he gave to Egyptian authorities had been obtained during torture, and, therefore, was invalid. [5/8 NYT, WP]

Muhammad Ahmad Ajaj, a 27-year-old Palestinian, was charged in a US court with conspiracy for his suspected involvement in the World Trade Center bombing. [5/8 WP]

May 14: In his first direct statement about the 26 February World Trade Center bombing, El Sayyid Nosair, convicted on weapons charges in connection with the 1990 murder of Rabbi Meir Kahane and who was an acquaintance of World Trade Center bombing suspect Muhammad Salamah, denied any involvement in the bombing and accused US investigators of attempting to keep his name alive in the media "to prepare the public for my indictment in the trade center bombing on something, anything." [5/19 NYT]

May 18: Gulf Cooperation Council finance ministers met in Doha to discuss Damascus Declaration financial aid for countries hurt economically by the 1990–91 Persian Gulf crisis and war. Disagreement over contributions to the cause, the structure, and the recipients of the aid stymied the day-long talks. [5/19 FBIS]

May 26: The *New York Times* reported that according to Howard Teicher, a former White House aide during the Reagan administration, during the 1980s the US government sent Libyan rebels to train in Iraq for the overthrow of Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi. The rebels made an unsuccessful coup attempt in May 1984. [5/26 NYT]

May 27: Iranian deputy foreign minister Ali Mohammad Besharati met with the Saudi ambassador to Iran to protest a Saudi ban on an anti-US demonstration by Iranian pilgrims in Mecca. Saudi forces had prevented the demonstration, scheduled for that day. [5/29 WP]

May 28: The *Washington Post* cited a *New York Newsday* report that the same formula and diagram for the bomb used in the 26 February World Trade Center bombing was found in 1990 in the apartment of El Sayyid Nosair. Also found was a speech by Shaykh Abd al-Rahman, the Egyptian cleric and spiritual leader of the Islamic Group, in which he urged the destruction of "symbolic targets" in the United States, and photos of Saint Patrick's Cathedral, the Washington Monument, Saks Fifth Avenue, and the World Trade Center. US investigators were evaluating the sermon as a potential motive in the bombing. [5/28 WP]

According to *al-Gumhuriya*, Egyptian president Husni Mubarak accused the US government of employing Shaykh Abd al-Rahman as a CIA agent, pointing to the US issuance of a multiple-entry visa to Abd al-Rahman in spite of his presence on a US Department of State list of individuals ineligible for admittance into the country. Abd al-Rahman's lawyer, Barbara Nelson, said that Abd al-Rahman had denied working for the CIA. CIA spokesperson Peter Ernest also emphatically denied the accusation. According to US government officials, the US embassy in Sudan, which issued Abd al-Rahman's visa, had not noticed his name on the list of ineligible individuals, although a week prior to granting the visa, the embassy had received a warning about Abd al-Rahman from the US embassy in Cairo. [5/29 WP]

May 30: Mafuz al-Ansari, editor of *al-Gumhuriya*, apologized in a front-page article for misquoting Egyptian president Mubarak. In the 28 May issue, Mubarak was quoted as accusing the CIA of employing Egyptian cleric Shaykh Abd al-Rahman. Al-Ansari claimed that what was attributed to Mubarak was actually analysis quoted from US newspapers and media. [5/31 NYT]

May 31: One hundred ninety-two Libyans arrived in Jerusalem for an official three-day visit to the Islamic holy sites. The group, met personally by Israeli tourism minister Uzi Baram, was sent by Libyan leader Qadhafi because Saudi Arabia had refused to suspend international sanctions that would allow the group to visit Mecca. [6/1 NYT]

June 1: The 192 Libyan pilgrims visiting Jerusalem announced that they would leave 2 June, cutting their visit short by one day, saying that they had completed their prayers. Their decision came after a news conference at which group leader Daj Salim Tajury called the establishment of Israel "a conspiracy against both Arabs and Jews" and urged the "liberation" of Jerusalem and the creation of a democratic Palestinian state to be populated by both Arabs and Jews. Tajury denied that the Libyan's trip in any way recognized Israel. [6/2 NYT, 6/3 WP]

June 24: In Queens, Brooklyn, and Yonkers, New York, and Jersey City, New Jersey, US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) authorities arrested eight men suspected of involvement in a conspiracy to blow up the United Nations, local FBI headquarters, and the Lincoln and Holland tunnels, and to assassinate Egyptian president Husni Mubarak, UN secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali, US senator Alfonse D'Amato and New York state legislator Dov Hikind. Five of the suspects, including alleged group leader Siddig Ibrahim Siddig Ali, were arrested while assembling explosives reported to be the same type as those used in the 26 February World Trade Center bombing. Of the eight, five were Sudanese citizens holding US green cards, while the others were reportedly of US and Jordanian citizenship. They were later charged with conspiracy and attempting to destroy buildings used in interstate commerce. [6/25 NYT, WP, FT, WSJ]

In weeks preceding the arrest, Ali had confided to an FBI informer that he and some of his colleagues were involved in preparations for the World Trade Center bombing and in plans to bomb the United Nations and the Lincoln and Holland tunnels. Some US officials said that the men arrested had not been suspects in the World Trade Center bombing, and, aside from Ali's comments to the FBI informer, there was no definitive evidence of their involvement. US authorities asserted that there was no evidence of any foreign government's participation in the alleged conspiracy. [6/25 NYT, WP]

Shaykh Abd al-Rahman said that Ali had been his interpreter until the preceding week. US investigators searched the apartment of Shaykh Abd al-Rahman. [6/25 NYT, WP, 6/26 NYT]

June 25: US authorities disclosed that Emad Salem, a former Egyptian military officer with ties to Shaykh Abd al-Rahman, was the FBI informant involved in the preceding day's arrests of eight people suspected of conspiring to blow up the United Nations and other sites. Salem occasionally had served as a bodyguard and translator for Shaykh Abd al-Rahman. [6/26 NYT]

June 26: US authorities disclosed that FBI informant Emad Salem had obtained recordings of private conversations of Shaykh Abd al-Rahman. US investigators said the recordings did not provide enough incriminating evidence to justify the shaykh's arrest. They also sought to allow him to remain at-large in order to learn more about his followers' activities. [6/27 NYT]

June 27: In spite of evidence that Shaykh Abd al-Rahman had known details of a plot to blow up the United Nations, US attorney general Janet Reno decided against his arrest. US government officials asserted that foreign policy issues had not influenced the decision. [6/29 NYT]

June 29: Sudanese Lieutenant General Umar Hasan al-Bashir denied reports that the five Sudanese men arrested 24 June for involvement in the UN bombing plot had any connection to the Sudanese government. [6/30 WSJ]

June 30: FBI officials arrested Earl Gant in connection with the UN bombing scheme. He allegedly met with Siddig Ibrahim Siddig Ali, the plot's leader, in May in Philadelphia to discuss obtaining explosives. [7/1 WP]

July 1: US attorney general Reno decided to rescind the immigration parole status of Shaykh Abd al-Rahman that had allowed him to remain at-large while appealing a request for political asylum. She ordered him detained. [7/2 WP]

July 2: In Brooklyn, New York, Shaykh Abd al-Rahman turned himself in to US authorities. The preceding day's decision to detain Abd al-Rahman came after interviews with witnesses and documents seized at his apartment indicated that he had been aware of several terrorist plots in the past.

In an interview, an Islamic Group leader in Imbaba, Egypt, vowed to initiate a terrorist campaign against US targets in Egypt and the United States in retaliation for Abd al-Rahman's arrest. [7/3 NYT, WP]

July 3: According to some US and Egyptian officials, Egyptian foreign minister Amr Musa requested the extradition of Shaykh Abd al-Rahman while meeting with US ambassador Robert Pelletreau in Cairo. Later, Pelletreau refused to confirm that the request was made and US Department of State officials said they had no knowledge of it.

The Higher State Security Court in Fayyum, Egypt, ordered Abd al-Rahman's arrest in order to establish a legal foundation for his extradition. The arrest warrant sought to retry him for allegedly inciting a riot outside a Fayyum mosque in 1989. [7/4 NYT]

July 4: US secretary of state Warren Christopher said that the United States would process Egypt's request for the extradition of Shaykh Abd al-Rahman, but noted the process "could take some time" because of Abd al-Rahman's appeal for political asylum and probable appeal of the extradition order. [7/5 NYT]

July 6: The US government received a formal extradition notice for Shaykh Abd al-Rahman from the Egyptian government. [7/7 WP]

July 8: Senior US government officials said that the extradition treaty between the United States and Egypt did not include justification of extraditions "for any crime or offense of a political character," putting in question the grounds of Shaykh Abd al-Rahman's extradition, which were based on a speech he gave in 1989 that allegedly started a riot. [7/9 NYT]

July 9: The US Board of Immigration Appeals rejected an appeal for political asylum filed by Shaykh Abd al-Rahman and upheld a March 1993 US Immigration and Naturalization Services order for his deportation. [7/10 NYT]

July 14: US authorities disclosed that Ibrahim Elgabrowny had been charged in connection with the plot to bomb the United Nations and other sites. Elgabrowny was the cousin of El Sayyid Nosair, the man acquitted of the 1990 murder of Rabbi Meir Kahane, and an acquaintance of World Trade Center bombing suspect Muhammad Salamah. He was also a follower of Shaykh Abd al-Rahman. [7/15 NYT]

July 15: Osama al-Baz, the chief foreign policy advisor to Egyptian president Mubarak, detailed a confession by Mahmud Abu Halima, a suspect in the 26 February bombing of the World Trade Center, made to Egyptian authorities during a period of detention in Egypt. Al-Baz reported that Abu Halima had said that the plan for the World Trade Center bombing had originated among former Arab veterans of the war in Afghanistan and was sanctioned by Iranian intelligence agents in Peshawar, Pakistan, and by the Islamic Group's spiritual leader, Shaykh Abd al-Rahman. Abu Halima had claimed that the confession was invalid because he made it during torture. [7/16 NYT]

Western Sahara

1993

May 20: Polisario leader Muhammad Abd al-Aziz announced that in Laayoune, Moroccan troops had arrested 200 Sahrawis following the publication of an allegedly seditious leaflet and the raising of Sahrawi flags. [5/25 FBIS]

Afghanistan

See also, Central Asia

1993

Apr. 16: The voluntary repatriation of Afghan refugees from Iran began, with 601 people traveling from Zahedan via Khorasan to Afghanistan. They were to receive aid donated by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) before reaching Afghanistan. [4/19 FBIS]

Outside the village of Pul-e-Khumri, 100 miles north of Kabul, an Afghan military helicopter crashed, killing all 15 people aboard. [4/17, 4/18 NYT]

Apr. 17: In southwest Kabul, four rockets hit the Kart-e Seh Hospital, run by the ICRC, killing three people. [4/18 NYT]

Apr. 18: During clashes the preceding day in western Kabul, five people were killed and at least fifty wounded. A presidential spokesperson announced that the government had called on the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) to investigate cease-fire violations. [4/19 FBIS]

Apr. 19: The *Wall Street Journal* reported that, according to the ICRC, more than 200 people had been killed during fighting between "loyalists" and rebels in the province of Qandahar. [4/19 WSJ]

Apr. 23: Briton Jack Dodds, Dutchman Gert Piening, and German Stephan Elhert, three anti-narcotics officials working in Pakistan, were abducted a few miles inside the Afghan border after they had "illegally" crossed the border from Pakistan. Pakistani government officials blamed the kidnapping on Hezb-e-Islami/Hekmatyar commander Nabi Noorzai. [4/24 FT, 4/26 FBIS, 5/1 WP]

Apr. 25: Pakistani government officials agreed to release two tribesman arrested on drug charges on the condition that Jack Dodds, Gert Piening, and Stephan Elhert—the Europeans kidnapped on 23 April—would first be released. [4/26 FBIS]

Apr. 29: A military plane crashed in bad weather near the town of Tashkurghan. The flight was carrying passengers from Kabul to Mazar-e-Sharif to attend a celebration marking the first anniversary of the mujahidin victory. [4/30 NYT]

Apr. 30: President Burhanuddin Rabbani met with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Yunis Khales, Sayed Ahmad Gaylani, Abdul Rab Rasul Sayyaf and other mujahidin leaders in Jalalabad, Pakistan, to discuss the formation of a cabinet and the maintenance of the cease-fire laid out in the March 1993 Islamabad treaty. [5/3 FBIS]

May 1: The *Washington Post* reported that the three European anti-narcotics officials kidnapped on 23 April by an Afghan rebel group had smuggled out a letter saying they were being held in chains in a cave with little food and were doing "very badly." [5/1 WP]

May 2: A rocket and shell attack on Kabul left seven people dead and twenty-nine injured. [5/3 FBIS]

May 6: Rebel factions attacked government positions in western Kabul and rockets fell on the city center. At least four people were killed during the attack. [5/7 WSJ]

May 12: In Kabul, General Abdul Rashid Dostam's forces joined government forces to fight against separate Hezb-e-Wahdat-e-Islami and Hezb-e-Islami/Hekmatyar attacks. More than 300 rockets fell on the city. Some 71 people were killed and, according to the ICRC, at least 576 people were wounded. [5/13 NYT, FBIS]

May 13: Afghan kidnappers released Jack Dodds, Stephen Elhert, and Gert Piening, three Europeans kidnapped 23 April. [5/14 FBIS]

May 15: In Kabul, despite a new cease-fire agreement, fierce fighting continued as government and mujahidin forces exchanged artillery and rocket fire. [5/17 FBIS, 5/18 NYT]

May 16: Hezb-e-Islami/Hekmatyar and Hezb-e-Wahdat-e-Islami fired as many as 125 rockets into

Kabul while government planes bombarded rebel positions in the southwestern suburbs. [5/17 NYT]

May 17: Battles continued in Kabul as government forces fought to free territory taken by Hekmatyar forces. The ICRC reported that at least 700 people had been killed and 3,000 wounded since 12 May. [5/18 NYT]

In Jalalabad, representatives of President Rabbani and the 10 major mujahidin groups agreed to a plan giving Rabbani control of the Defense Ministry and Prime Minister Hekmatyar control of the Interior Ministry for a period of two months. [5/18 FBIS]

May 19: In Jalalabad, the main mujahidin factions agreed to a two-month cease-fire. The agreement also included the creation of a commission to oversee the cease-fire and to prepare elections as described in the March 1993 Islamabad agreement. In spite of the accord, fighting between the government and Hezb-e-Islami/Hekmatyar continued in Kabul. [5/20 FBIS]

May 20: In Jalalabad, President Rabbani and leaders of the 10 major mujahidin factions signed a cease-fire agreement that assigned cabinet positions to two members from each of the mujahidin parties and called for Defense Minister Ahmad Shah Massoud's resignation. It also called for the creation of a council, led by Rabbani and comprised of two commanders from each province, to appoint permanent defense and interior ministers. [5/21 FBIS]

May 22: A government jet accidentally dropped a bomb on the old city of Kabul that had been intended for a nearby rebel area, killing a boy and wounding at least ten. [5/24 NYT]

May 23: President Rabbani pledged to confiscate heavy weapons in Kabul that had been used in factional combat there. [5/24 NYT]

June 17: Prime Minister Hekmatyar and his cabinet were sworn in by President Rabbani. [6/17 FBIS]

June 26: The commission established by the May 1993 Jalalabad agreement to enforce a cease-fire was dissolved after continued violations of the truce. [6/29 FBIS]

July 3: In Kabul, General Abdul Rashid Dostam met with President Rabbani and other government officials to discuss a peace agreement. [7/7 FBIS]

Algeria

1993

Apr. 18: In an ambush at Msila, nine policemen were killed. [4/20 FBIS]

Apr. 19: Police killed three suspected "terrorists" in Algiers and another in the Oued Ouchiah district of the Badjarah municipality. [4/20 FBIS]

Apr. 20: In Naama, police killed three alleged terrorists. [4/21 FBIS]

Apr. 24: The government detained Hachemi Cherif, head of al-Tahaddi Party, Omar Belhouchet, director of *al-Watan,* and Cherif Ouazzani, *al-Watan's* operator, for a statement by Hachemi Cherif in the paper that accused the government of arresting Abd al-Hamid Ben Zine for political reasons. [4/27 FBIS]

Apr. 25: In al-Harrach, a ten-hour clash between police and alleged terrorists left Boulembraouat Ahmad and his three companions dead. [4/26 FBIS]

Apr. 26: In al-Harrach, police killed three alleged terrorists as they reportedly attempted to flee. They also killed Ben Yattou Othman. [4/27 FBIS]

Apr. 28: In the Eucalyptus municipality, gunmen shot and killed Slimani Kamel, head of the area's executive municipal delegation. [4/29 FBIS]

May 4: In Sidi Bel Abbes Province, gunmen killed a policeman. [5/5 FBIS]

May 5: East of Algiers, clashes between Islamists and police left four Islamists dead. [5/6 FBIS]

May 10: The *Financial Times* reported that High State Council head Ali Kafi had announced that in order to facilitate a "return to democracy" the government would change political party laws, increase market-oriented economic policies, and, following further meetings with political groups, organize a referendum before the end of 1993. [5/10 FT]

May 12: The *New York Times* reported that during the preceding month, the Algerian government sent 15,000 troops into Algiers. [5/12 NYT]

In Chlef Province, gunmen shot and killed two policemen. [5/13 FBIS]

May 15: In Chlef Province, government forces killed Abd al-Kader Osmani and Muhammad Sghir as they attempted to escape a police ambush.

In Tenes, about 150 miles west of Algiers, police killed three people suspected of participation in the killing of two policemen. [5/17 FBIS]

May 16: In Tlemcen, gunmen shot and killed Muhammad Sa'id, the Tlemcen public prosecutor.

In a suburb of Algiers, government forces killed two alleged terrorists during a clash. [5/17 FBIS]

May 31: In Algiers, police shot dead three suspected Islamists who had allegedly shot writer and journalist Tahar Djaout. [6/1 FT]

June 7: German police detained Rabah Kabir, an Islamic Salvation Front leader who escaped from house arrest in Algeria in 1992 and was sentenced to death *in absentia* in May 1993 on charges involving an August 1992 explosion at the Algiers airport. The German Justice Ministry said that, in practice, it did not extradite persons facing death sentences, but would agree to extradite Kabir if assured that his death sentence would be commuted. [6/9 FT]

June 21: Following three weeks of consultations between the High State Council and several of the main opposition parties, the council issued a document delineating a plan for presidential elections. According to the draft, the High State Council would turn over power to a presidential body that would supervise a transitional period of two to three years preceding presidential elections. Advising the presidential body would be a national consultative council comprised of members of political, social, and economic groups, and a new transitional government. The document would be discussed at a later national conference of political and other interest groups. [6/23 FT]

June 22: In Algiers, the head of the National Institute for Global Strategy, Muhammad Boukhobza was stabbed to death in his home. [6/23 FT]

June 23: The *Financial Times* reported that between 19–20 June in the Chrea mountains above Blida, 40 soldiers searching for Islamists were killed. [6/23 FT]

June 29: More than 1,000 Algerians gathered at the tomb of former president Muhammad Boudiaf to mark the one-year anniversary of his assassination and to protest what they called a whitewash of the circumstances behind his death. [6/30 FT]

Cyprus

1993

Apr. 25: The New Birth Party merged with the Democratic Party. [4/26 FBIS]

May 20: Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash offered the use of the port of Varosha to the United Nations in exchange for the end of a 29-year-old international embargo on Turkish Cypriot ports and airports. He added that such a transfer would necessarily be part of a broader agreement on Cyprus. [5/21 FT]

May 24: In New York City, UN-sponsored talks between Greek Cypriot president Glavkos Kliridhis and Turkish Cypriot president Denktash resumed. [5/26 FBIS]

May 27: The UN Security Council approved a resolution restructuring the financing of the UN Force in Cyprus. The resolution introduced mandatory payments by all member states to supplement already existing voluntary funding. Greece and Cyprus volunteered to pay $25 million annually, while a remaining $22 million required would be borne by the other UN member states. [5/28 FT]

July 10: The *Financial Times* reported that Turkish Cypriot president Denktash had quit UN-sponsored negotiations with Greek Cypriot president Kliridhis following a UN rebuke for the lack of progress achieved at the previous round of talks held in New York in May. [7/10 FT]

Egypt

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Regional Affairs, Saudi Arabia, Sudan

1993

Apr. 18: President Husni Mubarak replaced Interior Minister Abd al-Halim Musa with Hasan al-Alfy, the governor of Asyut. Mubarak gave no reason for the dismissal, but Prime Minister Atif Sidqi suggested that the cause had been a meeting the preceding week between Musa and a group attempting to "mediate" with Islamists for a solution to the government's conflict with Islamists. Sidqi denied media reports that the Interior Ministry had held contacts with Islamists "accused of committing terrorism." [4/19 NYT, FBIS]

The *New York Times* reported that during the preceding week, R. James Woolsey, director of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), met secretly in Egypt with President Mubarak. They discussed the Iranian government's role in alleged terrorist training camps in Sudan, believed by the Egyptian government to be used as bases for attacks on tourists, government officials, and others in Egypt, and the possible use of Port Sudan by Iranian naval vessels. [4/18 NYT]

A bomb placed at an al-Tahrir Square bus stop near Arab League headquarters was found and defused. A "security source" denied that there had been a bomb. [4/19 FBIS]

Apr. 19: The *Washington Post* reported that according to journalist Fahmy Howeidy, during the preceding month, Islamic Group leaders had announced from prison that they were "ready to stop the violence," following a meeting with former interior minister Musa. [4/19 WP]

Apr. 20: In Cairo's suburb of Heliopolis, two gunmen fired on Information Minister Muhammad Safwat al-Sharif in an apparent assassination attempt. The Islamic Group claimed responsibility. [4/21 NYT, WP]

Apr. 21: The Egyptian government offered a $15,000 reward for information concerning the preceding day's assassination attempt against Information Minister al-Sharif. [4/23 FBIS]

Apr. 22: A military court sentenced seven of forty-nine Islamic Group members to death, six of them for involvement in a November 1992 attack on a tour bus that left four German tourists wounded. Another twenty-five received lesser sentences and seventeen were acquitted. [4/23 NYT, WP]

Apr. 23: Police announced that they had arrested more than 300 suspected Islamists in the Cairo area in connection with the 20 April assassination attempt against Information Minister al-Sharif. [4/24 WP]

Apr. 24: In Asyut, alleged Islamists ambushed and stabbed to death a teenage Copt. [4/27 FBIS]

Apr. 26: The government's commanding general in Asyut Governate was dismissed because of his severe tactics against Islamists. [4/28 WSJ]

May 8: According to an unidentified Foreign Ministry official, the Pakistani government had deported to Sudan some 230 Egyptian Islamists wanted in Egypt for insurrectionary activities. [5/10 FBIS]

May 9: In Asyut, gunmen shot and killed Yahya Ahmad Abd al-Malik, the assistant chief intelligence officer in al-Qusiyah. In a separate incident in Asyut, gunmen shot and killed policeman Ramadan Abd al-Karim Masud.

The Pakistani Foreign Office denied reports that it had expelled more than 200 Egyptian Islamists, but said that some may have left the country voluntarily. [5/10 FBIS]

May 10: Following a pardon by President Mubarak, Americans Richard Dugan, Brian Eckheart, and Robert Cunningham were freed. They had been detained without charges since February 1993 for allegedly proselytizing on behalf of Christianity. [5/11 WP, 5/14 NYT]

May 11: The government released New Zealander Thomas Martin following a pardon by President Mubarak. He had been detained without charges since February 1993 for allegedly promoting Christianity. Egyptian Abd al-Halim Adel-Nefa, detained along with Martin and the three Americans released 10 May, was taken to a mental hospital for observation. [5/14 NYT]

May 19: According to police officials, authorities had arrested more than 800 people in the preceding 10 days in an attempt to quell the influence of a previously unknown group, the Vanguards of the New Holy Struggle, that reportedly recruited in schools and universities and sought full application of Islamic law. [5/20 FT]

In Asyut, gunmen shot and killed Fitlis Boutros, a prominent Coptic member of the Mutiah community. [5/21 FBIS]

May 20: Security officials corrected earlier reports that police had arrested 800 members of the Vanguards of the New Holy Struggle during a 10-day period, saying that the arrests had taken place over three to four months. [5/21 FT]

May 21: A car-bomb explosion outside the Ezbekiya police station in Cairo left at least one 12-year-old girl dead and several people wounded. [5/24 WP, FBIS]

In Abu Tij in Asyut Governate, gunmen shot dead Taha Abdallah Ali, a policeman who had recently finished a jail sentence for excessive use of force in the shooting of an Islamist. [5/22 WP, FBIS]

May 23: Authorities defused one bomb found in a Cairo metro station and three bombs in Damietta, 125 miles northeast of Cairo. [5/24 FBIS]

May 24: In Cairo and al-Qalyubiya Governate, police arrested 92 suspected members of the Islamic Group. Since the 21 May car-bomb explosion in Cairo, police were reported to have arrested some 200 suspects.

In Abnub in Asyut, police killed three people during a shootout that occurred during a police search for illegal arms. [5/25 FBIS]

May 25: In Aswan, a border policeman shot at a tourist bus apparently by mistake after the bus failed to stop at the entrance to a restricted area. Three Australians and a Briton were wounded. [5/26 NYT]

May 27: A military court sentenced six Islamists to death, one of them *in absentia,* for their involvement in attacks that included the attempted assassination of Information Minister al-Sharif and several bomb attacks. [5/28 NYT]

June 8: A bomb explosion, apparently aimed at a tour bus on the road to the Giza pyramids, hit a car, killing its driver. Fourteen people were wounded, including five British tourists. [6/9 WP]

June 13: In Alexandria, the government executed Sharif Hassan Ahmad Muhammad, an Islamist convicted of killing a police officer. [6/14 NYT, WP]

June 19: A bomb explosion on a crowded Cairo street killed seven people and wounded fifteen. [6/20 NYT]

June 21: The *Financial Times* reported that during the preceding two days, the Muslim Brotherhood had denounced the 19 June bombing in Cairo. [6/21 FT]

June 22: The *Washington Post* reported that military investigators had questioned retired army general Mourad Dessouki and journalist Mohammad Sid-Ahmed for their comments published in a 14 June *Wall Street Journal* article describing the dissatisfaction of many Egyptians with the government's handling of the Islamist challenge. Both of them were reportedly under investigation for revealing military secrets. [6/22 WP]

July 8: The government executed seven Islamic Group members convicted of attacks on foreign tourists and plotting to overthrow the government. [7/9 NYT]

July 11: President Mubarak won the support of 92 percent of the parliament to run as the only candidate in presidential elections. [7/12 FT]

Iran

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Regional Affairs, Afghanistan, Egypt, Iraq

1993

Apr. 22: The Iranian press agency reported that the government had released 200 Iraqi prisoners reportedly taken during the Iran-Iraq War. [4/23 NYT]

Apr. 24: An Iraqi Foreign Ministry statement said the 200 Iraqis released 22 April were Iraqi soldiers "forced" into Iranian territory during the 1990–91 Persian Gulf crisis and war. [4/26 FBIS]

May 6: The Iranian government released 200 Iraqi prisoners of war. [5/7 FBIS]

May 8: The Council of Guardians approved five candidates for presidential elections scheduled for 11 June: President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, former labor minister Ahmad Tavakkoli, chancellor of Open University Abdollah Jasbi, and former Majlis members Rajab Ali Taheri and Qasim Meinari. [5/10 FBIS]

May 22: The *Tehran Times* reported that the People's Mojahedin had attacked and damaged several oil pipelines in Khuzestan. The organization claimed to have killed or wounded a "large number" of Iranian military personnel during the attacks. [5/26 NYT]

May 23: In an interview with *Jomhuri Islami,* Mohammad Ali Jafari, commander of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps ground force, warned that if Iranian rebels in Iraq continued to make cross-border attacks into Iran, his forces would "chase [the] rebels back to their base" in Iraq. [5/24 FT, 5/26 NYT]

May 27: The *New York Times* reported that the US government had drafted a plan, as a part of an extensive policy review, to isolate Iran in order to curb the country's allegedly increasing threat to Western interests. The plan included urging US allies to cut off loans, arms sales, and investments in Iran. US government officials suggested that the isolation should end only when the government ceased supporting terrorism, ended its subversion of other governments, and curtailed its pursuit of nuclear weapons. [5/27 NYT]

German prosecutors involved in the case of the September 17, 1991, shooting deaths in Germany of four senior Kurdish leaders made new indictments asserting that the Iranian intelligence service had hired Iranian Kazem Darabi and four Lebanese assistants to carry out the killing. [5/31 NYT]

June 9: At a semiannual meeting of European Community foreign ministers in Luxembourg, US secretary of state Warren Christopher asked the ministers to prohibit the sale of militarily useful technology to Iran. He also urged the adoption of a "collective policy of containment" to persuade the Iranian government to end its development of weapons of mass destruction. [6/10 NYT, FT]

June 11: Presidential elections were held.

The People's Mojahedin claimed to have bombed a large oil refinery; government officials denied the claim. [6/12 NYT]

June 13: Election results were issued, showing that President Rafsanjani had won with 63 percent of the vote. Ahmad Tavakkoli won 24 percent, Abdollah Jasbi 9.1 percent, and Rajab Ali Taheri, 2.4 percent. Fifty-six percent of the twenty-nine million eligible voters participated. [6/14 NYT]

June 22: The Iranian government released some 450 Iraqi soldiers detained during the 1990–91 Persian Gulf crisis and war. [6/24 NYT]

June 23: Ali Shafiei, Iran's head "anti-drug" officer, reported that a five-day police sweep ending 20 June had resulted in the arrest of as many as 8,615 drug users and some 882 dealers. [6/24 NYT]

July 4: The government announced that it had agreed to buy a 300 megawatt nuclear power station from China. Both countries emphasized that the station would be used solely for non-military purposes. [7/5 FT]

Iraq

See also, Regional Affairs, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait

1993

Apr. 17: Voice of the People of Kurdistan (clandestine) reported that on 12 April, the government launched large-scale arrests, detaining some 7,035 people. According to the report, Interior Minister Samir Abd al-Wahhab al-Shaykhali, Talat Slih, and Usamah al-Jabburi were arrested and later executed. [4/19 FBIS]

Apr. 18: A US warplane attacked an Iraqi radar station near the Qayyarah West airfield, below the northern "no-fly" zone, after radar locked onto the plane during a routine patrol. [4/19 NYT]

Apr. 19: According to Serchil Qazzaz, Ankara representative of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, Iranian troops fired rockets across the border into Kurdish settlements in northern Iraq in an apparent attempt to hit bases belonging to the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan. [4/20 NYT]

Apr. 26: Kuwaiti government officials reported that Kenneth Beatty, an American businessman last seen along the Kuwait-Iraq border, was missing. [4/29 FBIS]

Apr. 29: At a news briefing in Washington, scientists and representatives from human rights groups said that advanced chemical analysis of soil samples collected at the Kurdish village of Birjinni in northern Iraq in 1992 revealed traces of mustard and nerve gases, confirming reports that in 1988 Iraqi warplanes had bombed the village with what residents had suspected were chemical weapons. The Iraqi government continued to deny that such weapons were used. [4/30 NYT, FT]

May 1: The *Washington Post* reported that, during the preceding week, US vice president Albert Gore, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and other US officials met with a delegation of Iraqi opposition representatives that included several members of the Iraqi National Congress's Presidential Council. During the meeting, Sayyid Muhammad Bahr Ulum, member of the delegation and Shi'i cleric, appealed to the United States for the expansion of the northern and southern "no-fly" zones, the removal of international trade sanctions in the Kurdish region of Iraq, and additional humanitarian aid for the Shi'a in the marshes of southern Iraq. US officials assured the Iraqis that the US government would urge the United Nations to establish human rights monitoring throughout Iraq and establish an Iraqi war crimes commission to investigate crimes committed during the 1990–91 war. [5/1 WP]

A UN weapons inspection team led by Richard Hooper visited two undisclosed Iraqi nuclear sites where they took water samples to examine for traces of nuclear activity and checked equipment with dual-use capabilities. [5/2 NYT]

May 5: In a move intended to strengthen the economy, the government closed the country's borders to everyone but officials and diplomats and announced a six-day period for the exchange of Swiss-printed 25 dinar notes for Iraqi-printed notes, after which the Swiss notes would be withdrawn. Iraqi Kurdish leaders said that the Swiss notes would remain valid throughout the Kurdish region. [5/6 FT, 5/7 FBIS]

The US Department of State disclosed that, on 3 April, Iraqi authorities had arrested US businessman Kenneth Beatty on charges of illegal entry and espionage, and had convicted and sentenced him to eight years in prison. The Iraqi government would not confirm Beatty's detention. [5/6 NYT]

Iraqi Kurdish leaders said that thousands of Kurds in northern Iraq had fled their homes following Iranian cross-border attacks. [5/6 WSJ]

May 9: According to Ahmad Sharif Ali, vice minister for the interior of the Iraqi Kurdish opposition government, the Iranian army continued attacks begun in April against northern Iraq and said that some 5,000 Iraqi Kurdish families had fled as a result. [5/10 FBIS]

According to Iraqi National Congress reports, several hundred Iraqi troops attacked the town of Uwaynah, 15 miles south of Irbil. [5/11 FBIS]

May 11: The government reopened the country's borders. [5/12 WP]

May 12: Safeen Dizayee, spokesperson for the Kurdish Democratic Party, said that Iraqi forces in combine harvesters had approached two northern Iraqi villages near Irbil, apparently intending to seize crops. This followed an 8 May government decree giving harvest collectors the powers to fine or jail farmers who failed to harvest crops. [5/13 FT]

May 13: UN officials announced the withdrawal of 236 guards protecting aid workers in northern Iraq because of insufficient funding. [5/14 FT, FBIS]

May 15: In Ankara, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan envoy Serdjil Kazzaz appealed to the Turkish government to allow the Kurdish areas of Iraq, seriously hurt by the Iraqi government's removal of the 25 dinar note from circulation in early May, to use the Turkish lira in lieu of the dinar. [5/18 FBIS]

May 20: The US Department of Defense announced that on 17 and 19 May, Iraqi forces launched antiaircraft fire in the direction of US planes patrolling the southern "no-fly" zone. The US planes did not retaliate. A Department of Defense spokesperson said it was unclear whether the antiaircraft fire, which exploded well below the planes, was actually aimed at the planes. [5/21 NYT]

May 22: The government disclosed that on March 9, 1993, 13 people were killed during a riot at the Radha refugee camp near the Saudi border. The riot was ignited by an Iraqi demand that Saudi Arabia open its borders to more Iraqi refugees. News of the riot was withheld until the completion of an investigation of the incident. [5/23 NYT]

May 23: The *New York Times* reported that during the preceding week, UN secretary general Boutros Boutros-Ghali sent a letter to the president of the UN Security Council warning that unless participating countries increased their funding, UN aid to northern Iraq and elsewhere in Iraq would end in the following few weeks. He also said that the Iraqi government had approved the extension of an accord granting the United Nations permission to provide relief assistance to Iraq. [5/23 NYT]

May 24: The *New York Times* reported that Iraqi forces had been building up military forces along 280 miles of the Kurdish frontier. [5/24 NYT]

US secretary of state Christopher issued a warning to President Saddam Hussein not to make an attack on the Kurdish enclave in the north. [5/25 NYT]

May 25: In the east, Iranian planes attacked People's Mojahedin bases in Ashraf and Jalula in retaliation for "recent sabotage raids." [5/26 NYT]

May 26: According to the Iraqi-based Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, Iranian forces shelled 12 villages in Iraqi Kurdistan, including the group's headquarters near Qala Diza. [5/27 FT]

June 4: A UN weapons inspection team led by Nikita Smidovich of Russia arrived in Baghdad to install monitoring cameras at two missile test sites. [6/26 NYT]

June 10: The Iraqi government refused to permit UN weapons inspectors to install cameras at two missile test sites, defying UN resolutions allowing UN monitoring. [6/11 WSJ]

June 11: Deputy prime minister Tariq Aziz criticized US efforts to isolate Iraq, saying that cutting off its secular and development-minded government would further destabilize the region. He urged the US government to "sit and discuss those accusations, misunderstandings, and misapprehensions" regarding noncompliance with UN resolutions with Iraqi officials. [6/12 WP]

June 13: A British Foreign Office spokesperson confirmed that Briton Simon Dunn and German Kai Sondermann were in the Abu Ghraib prison outside Baghdad after being arrested 28 May and sentenced on 6 June to eight years in prison for illegal entry. [6/14 FT]

June 18: The UN Security Council passed a resolution warning "serious consequences" if the Iraqi government continued to refuse to allow UN weapons inspectors to install cameras at missile test sites. [6/26 NYT]

June 23: US intelligence officials disclosed that Iraqi troops had moved closer to the Iranian border and had put their air defenses on high alert. [6/24 NYT]

June 24: In Baghdad, a bomb explosion at a nightclub frequented by government officials left at least two people dead and fifty wounded. [6/25 NYT]

June 25: US president Bill Clinton said during a press conference that the Iraqi government's refusal to allow UN monitoring of its missile test sites could have "quite serious" consequences. [6/26 NYT]

A UN team of nuclear experts led by Bob Kelley of the United States arrived in Baghdad to arrange the removal of about 90 pounds of uranium useful for making nuclear weapons. [6/26 WP]

June 26: US ships in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea launched 23 Tomahawk missiles against Iraqi intelligence service headquarters in Baghdad in retaliation for a suspected plot by the Iraqi intelligence services to assassinate former US president George Bush during an April visit to Kuwait.

The Iraqi Ministry of Information said US missiles hit a residential area, a claim backed by Reuter reports. According to Reuters, Iraqi civil defense officials said three people were killed and three houses destroyed in the attack. [6/27 WP]

June 27: US military officials said that 16 of the 23 missiles fired the preceding day targeting the Iraqi intelligence service headquarters in Baghdad were on the mark. Four other missiles hit within the compound, and three others hit al-Mansur, a residential area of Baghdad. According to the Iraqi News Agency, the attack had left at least eight people dead and twelve wounded; the statistics were undisputed in US reports.

Ten thousand Iraqis gathered in Baghdad for the funeral of six people reported killed in the preceding day's US attack. Among those killed was Layla al-Attar, a prominent Iraqi artist. [6/28 NYT]

Before the UN Security Council, US ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright invoked Article 51 of the UN Charter as legal grounds for the US attack on Iraq. The article guarantees nations the right to defend themselves against armed attack. European allies of the United States expressed general approval of the attack, while the Arab states, except Kuwait, were critical of the strike. [6/28 NYT, WP]

June 28: Foreign Minister Muhammad Sa'id Sahhaf sent a letter to the UN Security Council protesting the 26 June US attack. [6/29 WP]

June 29: Near Basra in the southern "no-fly" zone, a US warplane fired a missile at an Iraqi antiaircraft site after being targeted by its radar during a routine patrol. [6/30 NYT]

French state radio reported that French engineer Jean-Luc Barriere had received an eight-year jail sentence after straying into Iraq 10 days prior with his Moroccan colleague, who was missing. [6/30 FT]

June 30: The *New York Times* reported that a US congressional subcommittee report stated that Iraq had restored its conventional military manufacturing ability to 80 percent of its pre-gulf war capacity. [6/30 NYT]

Bob Kelley, head of a UN weapons inspection team that had just completed a five-day visit to Iraq, said that the country's nuclear weapons had been successfully dismantled. [7/1 WP]

July 1: Deputy prime minister Aziz said in a Cable News Network (CNN) interview that Iraq would not retaliate for the US attack on Baghdad, although, he said, it was "completely unjustified." [7/2 NYT]

The government expelled CNN correspondent Rob Reynolds and British Broadcasting Corporation correspondent Jeremy Bowen and his crew for their reportedly objectionable reporting. [7/2 WP]

July 2: The *Financial Times* reported that US ambassador to the United Nations Albright had said the US government was willing to allow the Iraqi government to begin exporting small amounts of oil in exchange for food and medicine. [7/2 FT]

July 5: A UN weapons inspection team led by Nikita Smidovich left Iraq after the Iraqi government refused to grant the team permission to install monitoring cameras at missile test sites. [7/6 NYT]

July 6: The United Nations rejected an Iraqi request to delay the installation of UN monitoring cameras until Iraq presented UN officials with evidence of its compliance with resolutions regarding its weapons of mass destruction. [7/7 NYT]

July 7: In New York, an Iraqi delegation met with UN officials to discuss the limited resumption of Iraqi oil exports to pay for food and medicine for the Iraqi people.

In an emergency session, the National Assembly voted to prevent the United Nations from installing monitoring cameras at missile test sites and threatened to retaliate against any further US attacks. [7/8 NYT]

July 8: A UN weapons inspection team led by Mark Silver of the United States arrived in Baghdad to temporarily seal missile test sites at which the Iraqi government had refused to allow UN cameras to be installed for monitoring purposes. [7/9, 7/10 NYT]

July 11: The government refused to allow a team of UN weapons inspectors to seal a missile test site, prompting the team to depart Iraq. Rolf Ekeus, chief UN weapons inspector for Iraq, said that the next course of action would be decided by the UN Security Council. In a letter to the Security Council, Foreign Minister Sahhaf said that the Iraqi government was not seeking to snub UN resolutions, but was reacting to impressions that the United Nations was fabricating grounds for renewed attacks on Iraq. [7/12 NYT]

July 12: British, French, Russian, and US representatives to the United Nations decided to send Rolf Ekeus to Iraq to inform the government that no exports of oil would be permitted without the installation of UN monitoring cameras at missile test sites, and that Iraq must either allow the installation of the cameras, temporarily seal the test sites, or dismantle them. [7/13 NYT]

July 14: In New York, talks on the resumption of Iraqi oil exports were suspended so that the Iraqi delegation could consult with its superiors in Iraq. The talks were scheduled to resume at an unspecified date the following week. [7/16 NYT]

July 15: In Baghdad, Rolf Ekeus, chief UN weapons inspector for Iraq, met with Foreign Minister Sahhaf to resolve the impasse over the monitoring of Iraqi missile test sites. [7/16 NYT]

Israel

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Regional Affairs, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia

1993

May 2: The government approved a comprehensive reorganization of the nation's banking system in the hopes of spurring competition among banks, decreasing bank holdings in non-financial companies, and reducing the banks' role in capital markets. [5/3 NYT]

May 6: The Sephardic Torah Guardians Party (SHAS) demanded that Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin remove Education Minister Shulamit Aloni of MERETZ from her post because of her positions on religion. [5/6 FBIS]

May 9: Ari Der'i, interior minister and SHAS party leader, submitted his resignation in response to Prime Minister Rabin's refusal to dismiss Education Minister Aloni. His resignation was to take effect in 48 hours. [5/10 NYT, WP, FT]

May 11: Interior Minister Der'i withdrew his resignation just as it was to take effect and gave Prime Minister Rabin another week to resolve the dispute concerning Education Minister Aloni. Both Aloni and Der'i agreed to turn over their positions to Rabin, making them ministers without portfolio, while the situation was reconciled. [5/12 NYT, WP]

May 13: Ezer Weizman was sworn in as president. [5/14 NYT]

May 17: Foreign Minister Shimon Peres arrived in New Delhi for the first official visit to India by an Israeli leader in 40 years. [5/18 NYT, FT]

May 23: The Israeli Treasury issued a report saying that the closure of the occupied territories was causing Israel's economic growth to slow and inflation to increase, primarily through losses in the construction and agricultural industries. [5/25 FT]

May 30: Prime Minister Rabin appointed Shulamit Aloni minister of communications, science, and technology and Amnon Rubinstein of MERETZ education minister. [6/1 NYT]

June 2: The government disclosed in an official statement that Yossi Amit, a major in army intelligence, had been convicted in 1987 on charges of spying and having contacts with a foreign agent, and was sentenced to 12 years in prison. Unidentified Israeli sources said that Amit had provided information to the United States. The case had previously been kept quiet to protect state security, but was brought into the open as a result of an Israeli court ruling. [6/3 WP]

Jerusalem mayor Teddy Kollek announced that he would run for a seventh five-year term. [6/3 NYT]

June 8: Austrian chancellor Franz Vranitzky arrived in Israel for a four-day visit to meet with Israeli leaders. [6/9 WP]

June 13: The cabinet approved plans to establish a private sector free trade zone, located either in the Galilee or Negev, designed to increase foreign investment and create jobs. Investors would receive a 20-year income amnesty and indefinite exemption from customs duties and import taxes. [6/14 FT]

June 21: Following a notice from the attorney general that he was to be charged with aggravated fraud, accepting bribes, fraudulent registration of corporate documents, and violating the public trust, Interior Minister Der'i said he would resign. [6/22 FT]

Jordan

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Saudi Arabia

1993

May 18: The *Wall Street Journal* reported that the Jordanian government had passed a law rescinding its unlimited authority to penalize newspapers, and gave journalists the right to due process. [5/18 WSJ]

May 22: During a private meeting with editors, King Hussein announced that he no longer supported the leadership of Saddam Hussein and the Baath Party in Iraq, explaining that that government's positions had greatly harmed Jordanian interests. He also reprimanded the Jordanian press for defending the Iraqi government while disparaging the Saudi and Kuwaiti regimes, saying that the negative reports had perpetuated ill feelings between Jordan and Kuwait and Jordan and Saudi Arabia. [5/27 NYT]

May 29: King Hussein appointed a new government following the resignation of Prime Minister al-Sharif Zayid bin Shakir and his government. The new positions were:

Abd al-Salam al-Majali, *Prime Minister*
Ma'n Abu Nuwwar, *Information*
Walid Asfur, *Energy and Mineral Resources*
Abdallah Uwaydat, *Youth*
Yanal Hikmat, *Tourism and Antiquities*
Ratib al-Wazani, *Justice*
Ziyad Fariz, *Planning*
Bassam al-Sakit, *Industry and Trade*
Mahmud al-Samrah, *Culture*
Ahmad al-Aqayilah, *State*
Abd al-Salam al-Abbadi, *Awqaf and Islamic Affairs*
Muhammad Mahdi al-Farhan, *Municipal and Rural Affairs; Environment*
Bassam Qaqish, *Water and Irrigation*
Sami Qammuh, *Finance*
Salamah Hammad, *Interior*
Muhammad al-Suqur, *Social Development*
Khalaf al-Hawwari, *Public Works and Housing*

Salman al-Tarawinah, *Transport*
Radi Ibrahim, *Supply*
Khalid al-Ghizani, *Labor*
Marwan Kamal, *Agriculture*
Tariq al-Suhaymat, *Communications*
Abd al-Rahim Malhas, *Health*
Khalid al-Umari, *Education* [6/1 FBIS]

June 16: A US Government Accounting Office report was made public that claimed to prove Jordanian government cooperation with Iraq during the 1990–91 Persian Gulf crisis and war which included joint military exercises with Iraq, providing Iraq with US technology, and sharing Israeli and coalition intelligence. Both the US Department of State and the Jordanian government rejected the report as inaccurate and unfounded. [6/17 NYT]

June 18: King Hussein traveled to Washington, where he met with US president Bill Clinton. [6/19 NYT]

July 7: King Hussein was hospitalized for an irregular heartbeat. [7/8 WP]

Kuwait

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Petroleum Affairs, Regional Affairs, Iraq, Jordan

1993

Apr. 16: Former US president George Bush completed a two-day "victory tour" of Kuwait. [4/17 NYT]

The Grupo Torras arm of the Kuwait Investment Office (KIO) filed a civil suit with Britain's high court to recover more than $500 million lost to fraud. Fahad al-Sabah, cousin of Amir Jabir al-Ahmad al-Sabah and former chairman of the KIO, was among the 22 defendants in the case. [4/19 WSJ]

Apr. 26: The Kuwaiti Interior Ministry announced that it had detained a group of "Iraqi-supported terrorists" but would not confirm a report in the Saudi *al-Sharq al-Awsat* that the group had been carrying explosives and confessed to plans to assassinate former US president Bush during his 14–16 April visit to Kuwait. [4/27 WP, FT]

Apr. 27: A Kuwaiti defense official announced that the Kuwaiti government had charged 17 men with attempting to destabilize the country in connection with an assassination plot against former US president Bush. One suspect reportedly confessed to plans to assassinate Bush during his 14–16 April visit. [4/28 WSJ]

May 3: The *New York Times* reported that the preceding week, the cabinet had approved the construction of a 120-mile ditch along the entire Kuwait-Iraq border to discourage Iraqi infiltration. The ditch would be more than nine feet deep and sixteen feet wide, with twelve-foot sand hills along the Kuwaiti side. [5/3 NYT]

May 7: US government officials disclosed that they had obtained credible, but not yet definitive, evidence that the Iraqi government had attempted to assassinate former US president Bush during his visit to Kuwait. [5/8 WP]

May 8: Iraqi information minister Hamed Yusif al-Hammadi countered Kuwaiti and US accusations that a group with ties to the Iraqi government had attempted to assassinate former US president Bush. [5/10 NYT]

May 9: Parliament member Mubarak al-Dawilah announced the establishment of a parliamentary subcommittee to investigate allegations that Defense Ministry officials had defrauded the government of millions of dollars through defense contracts made after the 1991 war. [5/10 FT]

May 10: US government officials disclosed that an examination of a car bomb seized by Kuwaiti authorities in connection with the alleged assassination attempt against former US president Bush had shown that the combination of components and design of the bomb resembled that of bombs used previously by the Iraqi government. The Kuwaiti government announced that it would try the suspects instead of allowing the United States to do so. [5/11 NYT]

May 19: US Federal Bureau of Investigation officials questioning 10 Iraqis in the group of suspects being held in Kuwait on charges of plotting to assassinate former US president Bush said that one of the suspects had confessed to leading the assassination plot in collusion with the Iraqi intelligence service. The US officials also said that other suspects questioned had also confessed to working with the Iraqi government. [5/20 NYT]

June 5: During the first day of the trial of 14 persons suspected of conspiring to assassinate former US president Bush, defendant Wali Abd al-Hadi al-Ghazali testified that an Iraqi intelligence agent had sent him to Kuwait to carry out the assassination. Raad al-Assadi, the alleged leader of the group and the only other defendant who confessed to involvement in the plot, said he was unaware that Bush was the target until after his arrest. Many of the defendants said they collaborated in the plot because they feared the Iraqi intelligence service. [6/6 NYT, WP]

A defense lawyer in the case said that only one lawyer had been permitted to meet with his client before the trial, and that each of the other suspects had met with lawyers during a fifteen-minute recess. At the end of that day's hearings, the trial was suspended until 26 June. [6/6 WP, 6/8 NYT]

June 7: US government officials said that it would determine the nature of retaliation for the alleged Iraqi plot to assassinate former US president Bush only after the completion of the trial in Kuwait of the suspects charged in the plot and after the Kuwaiti judicial proceedings were deemed fair. [6/8 NYT]

June 21: Finance Minister Nasir Abdallah al-Ridan announced that the government had asked Interpol to arrest Fahd Muhammad al-Sabah and Khalid al-Nasser al-Sabah, both members of the royal family and managers of the Fund for Future Generations, and Fuad Jaffar, former vice president of the KIO. The three were wanted for mismanagement of $4-5 billion dollars in public funds during their tenure at the KIO. [6/24 NYT]

June 26: A Kuwaiti court heard the testimony of Wali al-Ghazali and Raad al-Assadi, two Iraqi suspects held in connection with the assassination plot against former US president Bush. [6/27 WP]

June 30: US intelligence officials revealed that "key suspects" in the George Bush assassination plot had been recruited by an Iraqi intelligence officer in Basra, but said that no direct evidence had yet been found linking the plot to Iraqi president Saddam Hussein. [7/1 WP]

July 7: The *Financial Times* reported that according to confidential evidence submitted to Kuwaiti investigators, KIO former chairman Fahd Muhammad al-Sabah had transferred $300 million from Grupo Torras to accounts in London, where the money was used to buy political support for Kuwait around the world during the 1990–91 Iraqi invasion and war. The Kuwaiti government and current KIO leadership denied the existence of the London fund. [7/7, 7/8 FT]

Lebanon

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Sudan

1993

Apr. 16: Near the village of Yatar in the south, Israeli helicopter gunships attacked the motorcade of Samir Suwaydan, commander of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine in southern Lebanon, killing his wife, daughter and another person. [4/18 NYT, 4/19 FBIS]

Apr. 17: A South Lebanon Army (SLA) soldier was killed in a mortar attack on the Israeli self-declared "security zone." Hizballah and Amal claimed responsibility for the attack. Israeli forces retaliated with attacks near the villages of Zawtar and Qaqaiyyat al-Jisr. [4/18 NYT]

Apr. 19: In the south, gunmen shot and killed Ibrahim Abd al-Majid Turkiyya, a Fatah official. [4/20 FT]

Apr. 21: Following a Hizballah rocket attack on the Galilee, SLA forces shelled the towns of Humin al-Fawqa, Mlita, Jarju, Ayn Bu Siwar, and Arab Salim, killing two people. The SLA attacks prompted further Hizballah rockets attacks on Israeli positions. [4/22 NYT, FT, FBIS]

Apr. 22: According to UN accounts, some 50 Hizballah rockets fell in the Israeli self-declared "security zone" and northern Israel. Israeli and SLA forces retaliated with attacks north of the zone. [4/22 FBIS, 4/23 NYT]

Apr. 25: In Ayn al-Hilwa, a gunman shot and killed Shaykh Thair Hulayhil at an Islamic Group school. [4/27 FBIS]

Katyusha rockets fired from Hizballah-controlled Kafra and Yatar fell on the Israeli self-declared "security zone." Israeli forces retaliated by shelling the two villages. [4/26 NYT, 4/27 FBIS]

Apr. 26: Near Tallush, SLA soldiers killed two men as they reportedly were trying to cross into the Israeli self-declared "security zone." [4/27 FBIS]

Apr. 30: A military court ruled the 1983 suicide truck bombing of the US embassy in Beirut a political crime, allowing those who carried it out to go free according to a 1991 general amnesty for all political crimes committed during the 1975–1990 civil war. The court also ruled the 1986 assassination of French military attaché Christian Gouttière a political crime. [5/1 WP]

The government suspended publication of *Nida al-Watan* until 20 May for the publication of an article accusing Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri of buying large areas of land owned by Lebanese Christians in an attempt to "Muslimize" the country. The government contended that the article harmed its efforts at national reconciliation. The government also suspended transmission by the Independent Cable Network for broadcasting too many reports that allegedly undermined public security. [5/3, 5/4 FBIS]

May 1: A roadside bomb explosion in the Beaufort Hill area in the south killed Yuval Ratig, 18. [5/3 FBIS]

May 4: In the south, Israeli tanks and helicopters attacked suspected Hizballah bases, killing two people. [5/5 WSJ]

May 12: The government suspended publication of *al-Safir* for a week for publishing what it called an Israeli proposal for withdrawal from its self-declared "security zone," violating a law prohibiting the publication of secret documents. Faisal Salman, an *al-Safir* official, said that there had been no sign that the document was secret. [5/18 NYT]

May 16: The army sealed off the area of al-Minah in the north to carry out an extensive search for some 49 wanted persons. The sweep resulted in the arrest of 58 people. [5/19 FBIS]

May 17: Prime Minister al-Hariri met with leaders of news organizations to assure them that he had not begun a crackdown on the press. [5/18 NYT]

May 18: An Israeli soldier was killed during a gunfight between Hizballah and the Israeli army in the Israeli self-declared "security zone." Israeli and SLA forces retaliated with attacks on Lebanese villages. [5/19 WP]

May 20: During a hearing on the government's suspension of *al-Safir's* publication, clashes erupted between police and journalists. The trial was rescheduled for 1 July. [5/21 WP]

May 24: In the central area of the Israeli self-declared "security zone," four Israeli soldiers were killed when one squad of soldiers mistook another for enemy attackers and began shooting, prompting the other squad to return fire. According to Lebanese media reports, nearby Hizballah forces heard the gunfire and began firing rockets in the belief that a battle had begun between their comrades and Israeli forces. Israeli forces responded with a helicopter attack. [5/25 NYT, WP]

June 10: In the south, gunmen shot dead Ahmad Muhammad Mahzoumi, a Fatah security official. Fatah officials accused Fatah–Revolutionary Council of the attack. [6/11 NYT]

June 29: In the south, Hizballah launched at least seven rocket attacks on the Israeli self-declared "security zone," which were met with Israeli artillery bombardment. One child was killed and ten people were wounded. [6/30 WSJ]

July 8: On a road to Aishiyah in the Israeli self-declared "security zone," Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command (PFLP-GC) rebels killed two Israeli soldiers when they bombed an Israeli convoy and attacked with anti-tank rockets and machine guns. During pursuit of the rebels, Israeli troops killed one person. Israeli forces struck back with artillery attacks north of the zone. [7/9 NYT]

July 9: A Hizballah rocket attack on the Israeli self-declared "security zone" left three Israeli soldiers dead. Israeli helicopters fired missiles at a PFLP-GC base near Beirut. [7/10 NYT]

July 11: The Israeli government accused Syria of supporting rebel attacks against Israeli forces in southern Lebanon and threatened retaliation. The Syrian government denied the charge. [7/12 NYT]

July 14: The Israeli government sent 1,000 soldiers, tanks, and armored vehicles into its self-declared "security zone." [7/15 FT]

Libya

See also, Regional Affairs, Sudan

1993

May 9: The government asked the Saudi government to suspend its participation in the UN air embargo because it was preventing Libyan pilgrims from flying to the Muslim holy sites. [5/14 FBIS]

May 10: The *Financial Times* reported that during a speech televised 8–9 May, Colonel Muammar Qadhafi suggested that the country end its ban on tourism and encourage mass development of the industry. He also proposed making the Libyan dinar convertible to attract new foreign investment. [5/10 FT]

May 12: The government called for an Islamic boycott of Great Britain following a meeting on 11 May between British prime minister John Major and Salman Rushdie, author of the *Satanic Verses.* [5/13 FT]

May 14: The Arab League submitted an official request to the UN Security Council for the exemption of Libyan pilgrims from the UN air embargo in order to allow them to fly from Libya to the holy Muslim sites outside the country. [5/14 FBIS]

June 24: The *Washington Post* reported that the US government had successfully persuaded the governments of Ukraine and Singapore to seize militarily useful materials en route to Libya from Russia and Malaysia, advancing a US goal to convince nations not to cooperate in the transfer of technology used in weapons of mass destruction. [6/24 WP]

July 2: The *Washington Post* reported that as a part of the international embargo against Libya, the US Department of State had refused entry to a delegation of 79 Libyan athletes seeking to participate in the World University Games in Buffalo, New York. According to the US Department of State, the athletes were an "instrumentality" of the Libyan government and so required licensing by the US Treasury Department to legally spend money in the United States. Without the license, they would not be allowed entry. [7/2 WP]

July 15: The *New York Times* reported that Abraham Sofaer, a former US State Department employee who drafted the legal bases for the 1986 trade embargo against Libya and the US military attack on Colonel Qadhafi's headquarters in Tripoli, had decided to represent the Libyan government in the case of the bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland, of Pan Am Flight 103 in December 1988. [7/15 NYT]

Morocco

See also, Regional Affairs

1993

June 25: Parliamentary elections were held. [6/27 NYT]

June 26: In election results, the government coalition won 116 of 222 seats and the four opposition parties won 99. Other parties received 7 seats. [6/27 NYT, 6/28 FBIS]

Pakistan

See also, Regional Affairs, Afghanistan, Egypt

1993

Apr. 17: During a nationally televised speech, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif accused President Ghulam Ishaq Khan of "unscrupulous and dirty politics" and of conspiracies to oust him. [4/19 WP, FBIS]

Apr. 18: Using troops to secure Islamabad, President Ishaq Khan dismissed the cabinet and parliament, accusing them of corruption, economic mismanagement, and subversion of military authority. He called for elections within 90 days, named Balakh Sher Mazari of Punjab as the caretaker prime minister, and chose members of both the Pakistan Muslim League and the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) to participate in his caretaker government. Army chief of staff Abdul Waheed Kakar announced that the army would support the president's move. PPP leader Benazir Bhutto also supported the dismissal and met with Ishaq Khan for the first time since his dismissal of Bhutto's government in 1990. [4/19 NYT, WP, FT]

Apr. 19: President Ishaq Khan began to assemble a bipartisan government and scheduled elections for 14 July. Former prime minister Gohar Ayub Khan filed a petition in the high court against the president's dismissal of the cabinet and parliament. [4/19 FBIS, 4/20 NYT, FT]

Apr. 20: The Pakistan Muslim League elected Nawaz Sharif its president.

The Terhik-i-Nifaz-Jafria Party quit the People's Democratic Alliance coalition because of coalition leader Bhutto's relations with President Ishaq Khan following the government's dissolution. [4/20 FBIS]

Apr. 22: A nationwide commercial strike was called to protest the dismissal of the Sharif government. [4/22 FBIS]

Apr. 24: In Karachi, police charged and used teargas against some 4,000 people who had gathered in support of deposed prime minister Sharif. [4/27 FBIS]

Apr. 26: Four members of the caretaker cabinet were assigned portfolios:

Anwar Saifullah Khan, *Housing and Works*
Mir Hazar Khan Bijarani, *Defense*
Asif Ali Zardari, *Water and Power*
Sardar Fateh Muhammad Hasni, *Local Government and Rural Development* [4/27 FBIS]

Apr. 27: Caretaker Prime Minister Mazari announced further cabinet appointments:

Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao, *Defense Production*
Arbab Muhammad Jahangir Khan, *Petroleum and Natural Resources*
Ghulam Murtaza Jatoi, *Manpower and Overseas Pakistani Affairs*
Mir Ahmed Nawaz Bugti, *Special Education and Welfare*
Sardar Wazir Ahmed Jogezai, *Women's Affairs*
Makhdoom Tanvirul Hasan Gilani, *Parliamentary Affairs*
Zahid Sarfaraz, *Labor*
Manzoor Ahmed Gichki, *Management Services* [4/28 FBIS]

Apr. 28: The *Financial Times* reported that PPP leader Bhutto had called for the dissolution of the provincial assemblies so that national and provincial elections could be held concurrently. [4/28 FT]

Apr. 29: Caretaker Prime Minister Mazari made further cabinet appointments:

Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, *Foreign Affairs*
Ehsan ul-Haq Piracha, *Commerce*
Jahangir Badar, *Food and Agriculture*
Zafar Ali Leghari, *Industries*
Malik Muhammad Qasim, *Railways*
Sardar Asif Ahmad Ali, *Narcotics*
Amanullah Khan Jadun, *Kashmir and Northern Affairs*
Muhammad Afaq Khan Shahid, *Health*
Zulfiqar Ali Shah Jamot, *Popular Welfare* [4/30 FBIS]

May 1: In Karachi, gunmen shot and killed Azim Ahmed Tariq, a founding member of the Muhajir Qaumi Movement. [5/3 FBIS]

May 9: Explosions occurred in several cities in Sindh, coinciding with a strike called by the Zulfikar Organization to observe the first anniversary of the deaths of seven members killed by the Pakistani navy. [5/10 FBIS]

May 15: The Home Department of North West Frontier Province issued a statement advising all Arabs residing illegally in Pakistan to leave the country by 31 May. [5/17 FBIS]

May 26: The high court overturned President Ishaq Khan's dismissal of the government, restoring Prime Minister Sharif's parliament and cabinet to power and nullifying the elections scheduled for 14 July. The court ruled that the dismissal was "not within the ambit of powers conferred on the president." [5/27 NYT, WP, FT]

May 27: In response to a motion of confidence introduced by Minister for Parliamentary Affairs Amir Hussain, at least 120 of 217 parliament members voted in favor of the Sharif government. PPP leader Bhutto and members of the Pakistan Muslim League that had been part of the caretaker government boycotted the vote. [5/28 NYT]

May 31: During a speech to parliament, Prime Minister Sharif offered to hold talks with PPP leader Bhutto. She accepted the offer, which would bring about their first talks in five years. [6/1 NYT]

June 16: In Quetta, dozens of Pakistani soldiers accompanied by at least five US officials cordoned off several city districts and raided homes in search of Mir Aimal Kansi, the key suspect in the January 26, 1993, shootings at Central Intelligence Agency headquarters in Langley, VA. [6/17 NYT]

July 14: US State Department spokesperson Michael McCurry said that following US warnings, the Pakistani government had made efforts sufficient to curtail state involvement in terrorism to remove any possibility of the country being placed on the US list of nations sponsoring international terrorism. [7/15 WP]

July 15: After reaching an undisclosed army-supported deal, PPP leader Bhutto called off a "long march" scheduled for the following day to demand that Prime Minister Sharif hold elections. [7/16 FT]

Saudi Arabia

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Regional Affairs, Iraq, Jordan, Libya

1993

May 1: The *New York Times* reported that during the preceding week, the Interior Ministry decreed that it would forbid any Islamic religious or civic group from taking donations for any Islamic causes without prior government authorization. The move was apparently in partial response to longstanding requests from the governments of Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia and from Palestinians to limit Islamist movements funded by charitable donations collected in Saudi Arabia. [5/1 NYT]

May 3: Six Saudis headed by Shaykh Abdallah al-Masaari announced the creation of the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights, whose goal was to "alleviate injustice and defend the right secured by Islamic law." It claimed to be the first Saudi human rights organization. Some of the founders had been vocal advocates of a strictly Islamic political structure. [5/14 NYT]

May 6: Lawyers for Khalid bin Mahfouz, the former chief operating officer of the National Commercial Bank of Saudi Arabia, requested that a US federal court dismiss a $10.5 billion suit against Mahfouz concerning the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) scandal, and accused the government of Abu Dhabi of "orchestrating" the case. The lawyers also claimed that the US court handling the case had no jurisdiction because Mahfouz was in Jiddah and the charges against him had been made in Europe. BCCI's liquidators filed the suit against Mahfouz and his bank in December 1992, charging that he had illegally acquired his stake in BCCI with almost $1 billion of his bank's money and then sold out, leaving the bank's depositors at a loss. According to an agreement with the liquidators, the government of Abu Dhabi would receive half of all damages won in the case. [5/6 WP]

May 13: The government dismissed Abdallah bin Abd al-Rahman Jibrin, Abdallah bin Humud Tuwaijri, Abdallah Hamid, Hamad Sulayqih, Sulayman bin Abdallah Rushudi, from their jobs at state-run universities and closed the offices of two Islamist lawyers, all of whom were founders of the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights. The government-appointed Senior Muslim Scholars Authority condemned the group as "superfluous" and "illegitimate." [5/14 NYT, WP]

May 16: In a statement to the press, the Cairo-based Arab Organization for Human Rights said that Saudi authorities had arrested some 400 supporters of the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights. [5/17 FBIS]

May 25: The *Financial Times* reported that the Saudi government had issued a warning that no one would be permitted to distribute political leaflets, books, or tapes during the pilgrimage to Mecca. [5/25 FT]

June 1: In a statement marking Id al-Adha, King Fahd promised to support all efforts to end the state of war between the Arab nations and Israel and bring peace to the region. He rebuked Islamists for portraying Islam "as if it were the force that would destroy human civilization and take the world back to the Middle Ages." [6/2 NYT]

July 1: Amnesty International released a report saying that public executions had increased to "shocking proportions," adding that between May 1992 and May 1993, 105 public beheadings occurred—four times more than the previous year. [7/1 WP]

July 10: King Fahd decreed the formation of a Ministry of Islamic Affairs, headed by Shaykh Abdallah bin Abd al-Muhsin al-Turki, and a Ministry of the Hajj, headed by Mahmud bin Muhammad al-Safar. [7/12 FT, FBIS]

Sudan

See also, Regional Affairs, Egypt

1993

Apr. 17: The *New York Times* reported that increased factional fighting and an attack on a UN relief worker in Kongor had resulted in the suspension of food deliveries and removal of UN workers from Kongor and neighboring towns. [4/18 NYT]

Apr. 24: During a press conference in Khartoum, Lieutenant General Umar Hasan al-Bashir disclosed that he was in possession of documents exposing a plot to overthrow the Sudanese government by the rebel movement supported by the so-called Alliance and the Egyptian government. He accused the Egyptian government of providing supplies for Sudanese insurgents training in Lebanon who sought to overthrow the government and reinstall former prime minister Sadiq al-Mahdi. [4/27 FBIS]

Egyptian foreign minister Amr Musa denied Sudanese media reports of an Egyptian-backed coup plot against the Sudanese government. [4/26 FBIS]

Apr. 25: Lebanese interior Minister Bisharah Mirhij denied claims by the Sudanese government that the Egyptian government had been training Sudanese opposition in Lebanon. [4/27 FBIS]

Apr. 26: Egyptian military authorities warned the Sudanese government that any movement of troops north of Muhammad-Qawl would be considered a "hostile act against Egypt." [5/10 FBIS]

In Abuja, Nigeria, a new round of peace talks between the government and John Garang's Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) began. [4/27 FBIS]

May 4: The Egyptian government issued a warning that any movement of Sudanese troops north of Port Sudan would be considered a threat against Egyptian national security. [5/10 FBIS]

May 8: During a meeting with Arab ambassadors in Khartoum, Interior Minister Abd al-Rahim Hussein and other government officials said that more than 5,000 Egyptian troops had been deployed in the disputed Hala'ib region, compared to less than 1,000 there the preceding month. The officials announced that the Egyptian government had sent them an ultimatum on 6 May demanding a halt to all construction and military activity in the town of Hala'ib within 48 hours. [5/10 FBIS]

May 10: In Nairobi, peace talks began between the government and a SPLA-United faction delegation led by Lam Akol. [5/11 FBIS]

May 11: The government announced the mobilization of its armed forces in response to a reported Egyptian demand that Sudan withdraw its police officers from the Hala'ib region. [5/12 NYT]

May 12: US officials declassified a Department of State document that accused Sudanese government troops of involvement in massacres, kidnapping, and the transport of forced labor into Libya. [5/13 NYT]

Interior Minister Abd al-Rahim Hussein said before parliament that the Egyptian government had stationed a second brigade of troops in the Hala'ib region, greatly outnumbering Sudanese troops there. [5/14 FBIS]

The International Committee of the Red Cross announced that deliveries to the south had resumed two days prior. [5/13 FBIS]

May 15: According to *al-Wafd* (Cairo), Ghazi Salah al-Din, minister of presidential palace affairs, announced that the Iranian Voice of the Islamic Revolution would begin broadcasting from Port Sudan in the following few days. [5/19 FBIS]

May 18: Government sources said that the government had summoned Egyptian ambassador Hasan Jad al-Haq following his reported admission to hiring Sudanese criminal Muftah Basha. Basha had been arrested for plotting to threaten and bomb foreign missions in Sudan in exchange for large sums of money from the Egyptian government. [5/19 FBIS]

Egyptian foreign minister Musa denied Sudanese claims that the Egyptian government had hired a Sudanese national to carry out insurrectionary activities in Sudan. [5/20 FBIS]

In Abuja, peace talks between the government and SPLA representatives ended without any progress because of discord concerning the issue of religion and state. A government spokesperson said the talks were scheduled to resume 19 June. [5/19 FBIS]

May 28: In Nairobi, the main SPLA faction led by John Garang and the SPLA-United faction agreed to a cease-fire and the withdrawal of all troops from within a 72-mile radius of the Ayod, Kongor Waat, and Yuai airstrips by 5 June to allow for the delivery of emergency aid. [5/29 WP, 6/1 FBIS]

June 30: At the conclusion of a three-day Organization of African Unity summit, Lieutenant General al-Bashir and Egyptian president Husni Mubarak met for the first time since tensions between the two countries rose at the beginning of the preceding year. Al-Bashir assured Mubarak that his government was not supporting Islamists staging attacks in Egypt. [7/1 WP]

Syria

See also, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Lebanon

Tunisia

See also, Saudi Arabia

1993

June 3: Amnesty International released a report claiming that the Ministry of the Interior and police had detained and intimidated hundreds of women and had tortured, sexually abused, beaten, and threatened with rape scores of others. The report said that since 1992, not only female activists of al-Nahda, but also of the Parti Communiste des Ouvriers Tunisiens had been subjected to human rights violations. [6/3 FT]

Turkey

See also, Central Asia, Iraq

1993

Apr. 16: During a press conference in Bar Ilyas, Lebanon, Abdallah Ocalan, leader of the Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK), announced the indefinite extension of a 25-day cease-fire begun 20 March. He was joined at the conference by Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader Jalal Talabani. [4/20 FBIS]

Apr. 17: In Ankara, President Turgut Ozal died at age 66 of heart failure. Parliament speaker Husamettin Cindoruk took over as acting president until parliament could elect a successor. [4/19 FT, WSJ, FBIS]

Apr. 23: Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel received the endorsement of his True Path Party to run for the presidency. Elections were scheduled for 8 May. [4/24 FT]

May 8: In the first round of elections, parliament failed to elect a successor to late president Ozal. Prime Minister Demirel, receiving 234 of 450 votes, did not obtain the two-thirds majority needed for victory. [5/10 FT]

May 16: After the second round of elections failed to produce a winner, in the third round the parliament cast 244 of 450 votes in favor of Prime Minister Demirel's succession to the presidency. Deputy Prime Minister Erdal Inonu became caretaker prime minister while Demirel's True Path Party decided on a permanent prime minister. [5/17 NYT, FT]

May 24: During a special meeting of the National Security Council, President Demirel and other council members approved a plan to reduce sentences of Kurdish rebels charged with direct involvement in violence. It also offered to lower Kurdish death sentences to life imprisonment and to pardon those rebels not involved in violence who had fled to the mountains. [5/26 FT]

Near the city of Bingol, PKK rebels stopped a civilian bus, ordered the passengers to disembark, and then shot dead at least 34 people, including 33 off-duty soldiers. The rebels also stopped five other vehicles and abducted approximately sixty passengers. [5/26 NYT, FT, FBIS]

May 25: During searches for the ambushers of the preceding day, soldiers killed 10 rebels. Turkish forces struck against Kurdish targets.

Acting Prime Minister Inonu suspended the amnesty established the previous day offering lighter sentences or pardons to PKK rebels.

In Beirut, PKK officials set conditions for a continuation of a cease-fire begun 20 March.

A rebel statement to the government demanded the lifting of the state of emergency in the southeast, an end to attacks on and torture of Kurds, the release of detainees, and the recognition of Kurdish identity. [5/26 NYT, FT]

May 30: In the Kurdish areas of the provinces of Bingol, Bitlis, Elazig, and Diyarbakir, Turkish troops launched a heavy land and air attack in retaliation for the deaths of 33 soldiers 24 May. At least 50 Kurds and 2 soldiers were killed during the attack. [5/31 WP]

June 8: PKK leader Ocalan announced the resumption of the PKK military uprising against the government, saying that it had ignored a PKK cease-fire declared in March.

Economy minister Tansu Ciller resigned to run for prime minister in elections scheduled for 13 June. [6/9 FT]

June 12: During a visit to Ankara, US secretary of state Warren Christopher asked the Turkish government for compliance with a US proposal aimed at reducing human rights violations in Turkey. Christopher indicated that the Turkish government would be rewarded economically for cooperation. [6/13 NYT]

June 13: In a second ballot during an emergency session, the True Path Party elected Tansu Ciller party leader, giving her 933 of almost 1,170 votes. [6/14 NYT]

June 14: President Demirel appointed Tansu Ciller prime minister. [6/15 NYT]

June 24: Suspected PKK rebels attacked Turkish diplomatic missions and businesses in 29 West European cities, including Munich, where the rebels took ten hostages. The incidents were to protest "Turkey's unjust war against our [the Kurdish] homeland." [6/25 NYT, WP, FT, 6/26 WP]

June 25: Prime Minister Ciller named part of her cabinet:

Hikmet Cetin, *Foreign Affairs*
Nevzat Ayaz, *Defense*
Erdal Inonu, *Deputy Prime Minister* [6/26 WP]

The PKK claimed responsibility for the preceding day's series of attacks on Turkish establishments across Europe. [6/26 WP, FT]

June 27: In Antalya, three bombs exploded, injuring 22 people. [6/28 FT]

June 28: Near Genc in Bingol, Kurdish rebels opened fire on a train, wounding six people. In clashes at Usakli near the Iraqi border and Yuksekova near the Iranian border, ten Kurdish rebels and three soldiers were killed. [6/29 WP]

July 2: Islamist rioters set afire a hotel in Sivas accommodating a convention of leftist writers and intellectuals, whom they accused of spreading atheism. The rioters' primary target was apparently Aziz Nesin, the editor of *Ayadinlik* who in May had published excerpts of Salman Rushdie's *Satanic Verses*. Forty people died in the fire, but Nesin was unharmed. [7/3 NYT]

July 6: The parliament passed a vote of confidence in Prime Minister Ciller. [7/6 FT]

July 15: The constitutional court banned the Kurdish-backed People's Labor Party. [7/16 FT]

UAE

See also, Saudi Arabia

1993

June 26: The *Financial Times* reported that First American Bank filed a $1.5 billion suit in a US court against Abu Dhabi leader Shaykh Zayid bin Sultan al-Nuhayyan and his family, blaming them for the bank's $500 million loss in sales value and $1 billion in deposits because of al-Nuhayyan's role since 1972 as "dominant controlling shareholder" in BCCI. [6/26 FT]

July 13: The UAE attorney general charged 13 former BCCI officers, including Swaleh Naqvi and Zafar Iqbal, two former BCCI chief executive officers, and Agha Hasan Abedi, a BCCI founder, with fraud. The indictments came at the end of a two-year investigation of the scandal by the government of Abu Dhabi. [7/14 WSJ]

Yemen

1993

Apr. 24: In al-Zuhrah, parliamentary candidates Yahya al-Shabi of the General People's Congress and Muhammad al-Saghir al-Shami of Islah were killed during an armed clash between supporters of the two parties. Four other people were also killed during the incident. [4/27 FBIS]

Apr. 26: In Aden Province, police fired on a group of Islah followers, killing or wounding several people. [4/27 FBIS]

Apr. 27: General elections for 301 seats in parliament were held. Rival tribal groups clashed over the elections, causing two deaths and the suspension of elections in one electoral center. Government officials in Sanaa reported that as many as 95 percent of eligible voters, who for the first time included women, had participated in voting. [4/27 FT, 4/28 WP, FT, 5/3 WP]

Apr. 29: The Islah Party issued a statement accusing the two government parties, the General People's Congress and Yemen Socialist Party, of using security forces to terrorize its candidates and of "interfering grossly and flagrantly" to influence voters. It also threatened to boycott parliament if the parties continued such activity. A group of international observers present during the 27 April elections said that they had seen several irregularities but which, they claimed, would not affect election results. [4/30 FT]

Apr. 30: According to official results of the 27 April elections, the General People's Congress won 121 of 301 available seats, the Islah Party 62, and the Yemen Socialist Party 56. Other parties took the remaining seats. [5/3 WP]

May 2: President Ali Abdallah Salih said in an interview that he would ask parliament to limit presidential tenure from an indefinite number of terms to a maximum of two. [5/3 WP]

May 11: Agreements were signed merging the General People's Congress and the Yemen Socialist Party. [5/12 FT]

May 26: Near a Hunt Oil Company plant, two US company employees and their Yemeni driver were kidnapped. [5/27 FT]

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Book Reviews

Arab Intellectuals on Trial

Review Article by As'ad AbuKhalil

Cruelty and Silence: War, Tyranny, Uprising, and the Arab World, by Kanan Makiya. New York and London: W.W. Norton, 1993. 327 pages. Notes to p. 357. Index to p. 367. $22.95.

From the first sentence of *Cruelty and Silence*—"On August 2, 1990, when I heard that Saddam Husain had just invaded Kuwait, I felt sick" (p. 15)—the reader knows that Kanan Makiya has not written a scholarly book. In the words of the author himself, "this book is a polemic" (p. 26). The text resembles a series of articles—not always tied together coherently—that contain the author's own reflections and observations.

Makiya's book is divided into two parts—"Cruelty," which provides details of Saddam's tyrannical system, and "Silence," which includes the author's criticisms of Arab intellectuals. (Even in the first part of the book, however, the author engages in attacks against Arab intellectuals.) *Cruelty and Silence* has received rave reviews in much of the US and British press, although most, if not all, of its reviewers in the mainstream press lack knowledge of Arabic. This linguistic requirement is essential, however, because the book makes assumptions and generalizations about Arab political discourse. Not surprisingly, one of the few critical and negative reviews of *Cruelty and Silence* that has appeared to date was published in an Arabic newspaper and was written by an Arab scholar (who is, incidentally, a critic of Saddam).[1]

The book's first part contains a graphic description of Saddam's savage system of oppression. It includes accounts by victims of the regime and its practices. Any reader concerned with human rights and dignity will find this section of the book valuable, although one would have hoped for more thorough documentation[2] and a departure from the constant

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[1] See Ahmad Dallal's review in *al-Hayat*, May 23, 1993.

[2] One such "document" cited by Makiya is a "fax of a fax of a photocopy following probably in the wake of many other photocopies" (p. 287). This manner of documentation would be deemed unacceptable for a student research paper in most academic institutions. The document in question lists the activity of a Baath security functionary as "violation of women's honor." Cruelty of all kinds is to be expected of Saddam's regime; nonetheless, the authenticity of this particular document—in the absence of verifiable documentation—strains credibility.

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invention of pseudonyms (which Makiya himself has used, at least twice,[3] in his earlier writings). That the Arabs should "wash their dirty linen in public" (a phrase taken from a Russian, not Arabic, proverb), is necessary, not only because it is the honest thing to do, but also because Arabs can no longer afford to suppress the truth of the grim and harsh conditions under which they are living. The longevity of suffering in most Arab countries dictates the need for a comprehensive and deep self-examination by the Arabs of themselves. This self-examination should entail a critique of past behavior and a rejection of transmitted myths. For too long, many Arabs have refrained from self-criticism for fear of providing ammunition to their enemies. Arabs must confront the reality of historical as well as current oppression of and discrimination against Christians, Jews, Blacks, women, homosexuals,[4] Kurds, Berbers, and all other minorities and anticonformists who have suffered and continue to suffer at the hands of the majority. Makiya, despite his reputation in the West and his own self-congratulatory declarations, is not the first to engage in such self-criticism.

But herein lies a major problem with this work—there is a streak of conceit that runs throughout the book, which affects Makiya's evaluation of Arab intellectuals. The author seems to suggest that he alone possesses the moral fortitude and honesty to scrutinize the Arabs, despite his references to no more than a few writers whom he considers moral like him. Those writers whom he praises are almost always mentioned in the endnotes, rather than in the body of the text (with the exception of Walid Khalidi). Makiya makes reference to Arab intellectuals who began engaging in self-criticism in the wake of the 1967 defeat—individuals such as Sadik al-Azm, Adonis, Hisham Sharabi, Kamal Abu Dib, and Halim Barakat, although Makiya only refers by name to the first two (p. 313) in this context—but he complains that their criticism does not go far enough.[5] The author is mistaken, however, if he believes that his works go deeper and further in their self-criticism than Adonis' three-volume study of *al-turath*[6] or al-Azm's critique of Islam.[7] The work lacks criticisms of Islam and Arab Islamic fundamentalist intellectuals. Makiya might have examined, for example, the statements of the influential Islamic fundamentalist thinker Muhammad al-Ghazali of Egypt, who recently seemed to sanction the murder of the Egyptian secular writer Farag Fouda.[8] Rather, the author focuses on a few Arab nationalist and secularist intellectuals, and then limits himself largely to obscure remarks made in newspaper columns.

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[3] In addition to "Samir al-Khalil," Makiya wrote under the name "Muhammad Ja'far" in the leftist journal *Khamsin* in the mid-1980s. See Muhammad Ja'far, "The Gulf War as Extinction of Politics," *Khamsin*, no. 12 (1986).

[4] Contemporary manifestations of homophobia (and contemporary puritanical Victorian values) in Arab society are largely imported from the West. This is not to say that one cannot find antihomosexual tendencies in Islamic and Arab history, but intolerance of homosexuals has never come close to the degree of the Western ideology of homophobia. In an era when homosexuals were hunted down as criminals in Europe, they served as rulers and ministers in Islamic countries. See the profile of the Abbasid caliph al-Wathiq, for example, who devoted his life and poetry to his male lover, Muhaj, in al-Suyuti, *Tarikh al-khulafa'* (History of the caliphs) (Cairo: Ahmad al-Babi al-Halabi, 1305 AH [*ca.* 1887]), pp. 135–7.

[5] One should note in this context the original contributions by exiled Iraqi writers and artists to the surrealist journal *al-Faradis*, of which Makiya makes no mention. This journal contains devastating critiques of the Baath, Islam, and Arab culture. See, for example, nos. 4–5 (August 1992). Ed. note: The reviewer is grateful to Bassam Haddad for bringing this journal, published in Germany, to his attention.

[6] Adonis, *Al-Thabit wa al-mutahawwil* (The constant and the changing), 3 vols. (Beirut: Dar al-Awdah, 1974–78). Dar al-Saqi in London will soon publish the long-awaited fourth volume.

[7] See Sadik al-Azm, *Dhihniyyat al-tahrim: Salman Rushdi wa haqiqat al-adab* (The mentality of tabooing: Salman Rushdie and the truth of literature) (London: Riyad al-Rayyis Books, 1992). Also see his earlier *Naqd al-fikr al-dini* (Critique of religious thought) (Beirut: Dar al-Tali'ah, 1969).

[8] In court testimony, al-Ghazali, who is considered a moderate Islamic intellectual, maintained that the killer of an apostate should not be punished under Islamic law. He also expressed his belief that the execution of an apostate is obligatory under Islamic law. See excerpts of al-Ghazali's court testimony in *al-Hayat*, June 23, 1993. The Egyptian Organization for Human Rights condemned the testimony of al-Ghazali and labeled it "a blunt call for murder." See excerpts from its statement in *al-Hayat*, June 23, 1993.

This first part is weakened by generalizations and assumptions concerning Arab culture. Such a discussion would have been useful had Makiya recognized some limitations of knowledge or a measure of modesty. Instead, he writes as a political analyst, sociologist, literary critic, historian, psychoanalyst, and architect (although only architecture is his true specialty). The author's analysis is sprinkled with references to shame and honor in Arab culture that seem to be borrowed from Raphael Patai's *The Arab Mind.*[9] In a bizarre role as psychoanalyst, Makiya discusses cultural differences between Arabs and Westerners in their attitudes toward belching and flatulence. He informs the reader that Arab guests, contrary to Western cultural norms, "are expected to make appreciative noises at the dinner table that greatly please their hosts" (p. 42). In reality, making noises at the dinner table is now considered rude in most Arab cities, while it is encouraged in some non-Arab Asian cultures. The author also maintains that "the one thing that an Arab man must not do in public is the very thing that in a Western setting is considered involuntary and excusable: fart" (p. 42). Not only is it quite inaccurate to maintain that attitudes toward flatulence are different in Arab and Western cultures, but, more importantly, Makiya fails to show the reader the significance of this digestive subject in a book addressing war and tyranny. Assuming that Arabs are more intolerant than Westerners toward public flatulence, does it follow that this makes Arabs more cruel than Westerners?

Makiya also examines Arabic poetry. Here the author is clearly on extremely weak foundations. His familiarity with *al-turath* (heritage) and with the field of Islamic studies is embarrassingly superficial. Makiya equates the notion of *al-riddah* (apostasy) with the notion of *al-kufr* (unbelief or infidelity),[10] although a clear distinction is made between the two within Islamic jurisprudence. He then traces prejudice in Arab culture to a form of Arabic poetry known as *al-hija'* (which, according to A.J. Arberry, one of the foremost authorities on Arabic literature of this century,[11] should be translated as "satire," although Makiya translates hija' as "invective diatribe" [p. 43]). The evidence for Makiya's theory of hija' as a source for Arab prejudice is provided in the form of a racist poem written by Abu al-Tayyib al-Mutanabbi (d. 965).[12]

There are several problems with this argument. First, al-Mutanabbi wrote hundreds of other poems in which he used hija' against his own people, declaring, for example, "I only saw deception in their amicability, and I only saw hypocrisy in their religion."[13] Further, al-Mutanabbi wrote far more *madih* (praise) poetry than hija' poetry. To claim simply that hija' is bad and prejudicial is to stigmatize criticism itself. One can criticize in a racist way or in a nonracist way. Makiya's blanket condemnation of hija' is akin to prohibitions of dissent by Arab governments because they equate it with defamation.

The practice of hija' in Arabic poetry in fact attests to the political and social openness of the times, when people and governments—often, though not always—tolerated criticism. Writing in the classical form of hija' today would place one in prison in most Arab countries. Some poets—including the master of the art of hija' poetry himself, al-Hutay'ah,[14] who refrained in his poetry from vulgarities and obscenities—even engaged in hija' against themselves, as a form of self-criticism. Al-Hutay'ah commented on his own mother, as well as himself and the way he looked.[15]

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[9] Raphael Patai, *The Arab Mind* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973).

[10] See p. 90.

[11] See A.J. Arberry, *Arabic Poetry: A Primer for Students* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1965), p. 3.

[12] See pp. 43–4. This poem is cited by Bernard Lewis, *Race and Color in Islam* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), pp. 78–80. It is translated into English in A.J. Arberry, *Poems of al-Mutanabbi* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1967).

[13] See *Al-'Arf al-tayyib fi sharh* diwan *Abu al-Tayyib* (The pleasant fragrance in the interpretation of the *diwan* of Abu al-Tayyib), ed. Nasif al-Yaziji (Beirut: Al-Matba'ah al-Adabiyya, 1887 [1305 AH]), p. 301.

[14] His death generally is placed in the mid-seventh century CE.

Makiya also focuses here on the poetry of Nizar Qabbani, whose writings against the oil princes he considers prejudicial toward Gulf Arabs. Although there is prejudice against Gulf Arabs in the Mashriq, Qabbani's cited poetry must be understood in its political context. To be certain, Qabbani's vulgar poetry over the years has contained prejudicial elements, and he is guilty of the sexual objectification of women.[16] In a typical tactic used by Makiya against all those with whom he disagrees, the author traces Qabbani's style to "early Ba'thism" (p. 50). In this case, Qabbani deserves to be condemned, as he has written offensively sycophantic praise of Saddam Hussein. Yet Qabbani's poetry is more commercial than principled, even though he is, unfortunately, widely read. He is widely read, however, because he is harshly critical of the Arab condition, and not because he is silent.

In depicting Saddam's cruelties and savagery, Makiya provides details that will make it hard for the reader to remain dry-eyed. Even here, however, the choice of a member of the Kuwaiti royal family to represent the victims of Saddam's brutal invasion of Kuwait is curious. This royal family member complains to Makiya that he was so traumatized by the invasion that his "sexual urge multiplied maybe tenfold over what it was before" (p. 52). The informant also goes out of his way to impress Makiya with his knowledge of Western culture, and Makiya is impressed. The section concerning the Shi'i uprising is quite revealing and it raises troubling questions about the political transition to post-Saddam Iraq. The scars of Saddam's brutality are so deep that random and vengeful violence could accompany the collapse of the Baathist regime. Makiya honestly reports acts of violence and mutilation of bodies by Shi'i rebels in southern Iraq.[17] Of course, the prospect of widespread violence in post-Saddam Iraq should never be used to rationalize the preservation of the Baathist regime, the continuity of which is an act of violence against all Iraqis. Makiya's description of the plight of Kurds in Iraq should be required reading for all Arabs, as there still remains too little appreciation by many Arabs of the magnitude of Kurdish suffering. Yet, whenever Makiya examines the plight of the Kurds, he brings in the plight of the Palestinians, as if to imply that there has been too much attention paid by the West to the cause of the latter. Makiya writes:

> Millions upon millions of words have been written about the destruction of hundreds of Palestinian villages in order to bring about the creation of the Israeli state. And rightly so. Yet many of the very intellectuals who wrote those words chose silence when it came to the elimination of thousands of Kurdish villages by an Arab state.[18]

In fact there are virtually no scholarly works on the subject in Arabic.[19] Arabs should write and read about the plight of the Kurds and about the plight of Blacks, Palestinians,

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[15] Of himself, he wrote, "I see a face deformed by God, I curse this face, and I curse its carrier." See *Diwan al-Hutay'ah* (The *diwan* of al-Hutay'ah), 1st ed. (Istanbul: n.p., 1308 AH [*ca.* 1890]). When al-Hutay'ah was dying, he was asked about his possessions and reportedly said, "My children, males and females, are to inherit equal shares." When he was told that this ran counter to God's judgment, he quipped, "This is my judgment."

[16] Surprisingly, Makiya praises Qabbani's stance on women's rights. See p. 45.

[17] See, for example, p. 93.

[18] See p. 201. Makiya has made similar—if not exact—statements in an article in *al-Hayat*, and in a British Broadcasting Corporation documentary, "The Road to Hell," that originally aired on January 12, 1992.

[19] The first comprehensive book to be published in English on the subject is *All That Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948*, ed. Walid Khalidi (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992). The Bir Zeit University Center for Research and Documentation published several studies of individual villages in the 1980s. The project, however, remains incomplete.

Native Americans, Jews, Bosnians, and other victims. Victimization is evil regardless of the identity of the victims or the victimizers.

Makiya's understandable revulsion at Saddam's actions leads him to loath his own Iraqi identity. When visiting a Kurdish site, he admits feeling a "deep, inexpressible shame that I was born an Iraqi" (p. 162). On another occasion, he states that "the day I received the letter granting me British nationality in 1982 was one of the happiest in my life" (p. 233). Of course, every person should choose the identity she or he wants. Makiya rightly attacks those who have called him a self-hating Arab,[20] although the author should have indicated that there is no Arabic-language counterpart for the term and that it was not invented by Arabs. The invocation of the term "self-hating" in any community is intended to instill fear of deviation from the party line. No community should have the right to force national identity on any one member of the group.

But why would Makiya be ashamed of being an Iraqi? Iraqis should not be held responsible for Saddam's crimes. Makiya asserts that "everyone acquiesced and compromised with dictatorship" (p. 225). This is simply not true. The hundreds of thousands of Iraqis who were killed or imprisoned by the regime did not acquiesce or compromise. Those Iraqis who fled into compulsory exile did not compromise either, nor did the innocent victims in Halabja. One is left to wonder whether Makiya's sense of guilt derives in part from past business ties between his family's company (where he was employed) and the Iraqi regime.[21]

The second part of *Cruelty and Silence* specifically addresses the issue of Arab intellectuals. This section should be read, in part, as a defense of the author's earlier book, *Republic of Fear*.[22] The author implies that all Arabs were obsessed with this book, and he manages to unearth perhaps every word that was published about the book in Arabic. In reality, the book did not have the publicity that it had in the West. Its impact was never near that of the brilliant book of Hanna Batatu on modern Iraq, for example.[23] Yet Makiya manages to convince the Western reader that Arabs were outraged by his book, which thus puts him in the position of a victim of Arab intolerance. In fact, the book was—rightly or wrongly—largely ignored by Arabs, until the attention it received in the West after August 1990 generated parallel Arab interest. Best-sellers in the West are now automatically translated into Arabic. For the purpose of exaggerating Arab interest in *Republic of Fear*, Makiya expends much time debating obscure columnists in the London-based newspaper *al-Quds al-Arabi*.[24]

To make his task easier, Makiya dismisses all books against the Iraqi regime written by Egyptian and Gulf Arab intellectuals, because they were written after Saddam's invasion of Kuwait (p. 18). Yet this sudden "discovery" of the true nature of Saddam's savage regime also applies to the West. His own *Republic of Fear* became famous only after Saddam's invasion of Kuwait, more than a year after it was first published. There is much about Arab intellectuals to be criticized, but it is odd for Makiya, living in the West, to expect Arabs to rebel against their oppressive governments. It is rather ironic that Makiya wrote *Republic of Fear* in 1989 under a pseudonym and yet he does not feel uncomfortable urging Arabs to speak out against their regimes.

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[20] Makiya never identifies any specific individual here, however. See p. 239.

[21] A reference to this fact was made in a profile of Makiya published in the *New Yorker*, January 6, 1992. Makiya might have noted here that Makiya Associates was involved in the architectural work for the Government Headquarters Building in Baghdad and the Ceremonial Parade Grounds in Tikrit, among many other projects for Saddam's regime. See Kanan Makiya, *Post-Islamic Classicism: A Visual Essay on the Architecture of Mohamed Makiya* (London: Saqi Books, 1990), pp. 154–5.

[22] Samir al-Khalil, *Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).

[23] Hanna Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978). Batatu's book was discussed and debated in Arabic long before its full Arabic translation was published in 1992.

[24] Subhi Hadidi, among those attacked by Makiya, persuasively shows, in his review of *Cruelty and Silence*, how the author has blatantly distorted Hadidi's writings. See *al-Quds al-Arabi*, May 20–21, 1993.

This reviewer must affirm, without reservation, that criticism and self-criticism can only be healthy in the life of a people. No political leader, religious authority, or cultural idol should be above reproach. Hero worship has proved fatal in contemporary Arab history; the Arab world has yet to recover from the impact of Gamal Abd al-Nasir's charismatic spell. Yet there are two primary types of moral and ethical inconsistencies that one can fall into when criticizing the human rights situation in the Middle East. The first is when one focuses exclusively on Israeli violations of human rights with complete disregard for Arab violations of those same rights. Many Arab intellectuals and all Arab regimes are guilty of this kind of inconsistency. The second is when an individual (primarily in the West) focuses exclusively on Arab violations of human rights with complete disregard for US and Israeli human rights violations.

Makiya is guilty of the latter inconsistency. Although his analysis is harsh and understandable with regard to Arab violations of human rights, at times he appears apologetic concerning US policies. When the United States finished its military campaign against Iraq, Makiya was one who believed that it did not go far enough. He called on the US military (from the comfort of the West) to go all the way to Baghdad. This opens him to charges of insensitivity. Makiya is at pains to assure readers that "there was no widespread destruction and damage to residential areas" in Iraq (p. 202). He makes this claim despite US Air Force figures which revealed that

> 70 percent of the 88,500 tons of bombs dropped on Iraq and Kuwait in [the first] 43 days of the war missed their targets . . . smart bombs were about 90 percent successful . . . [yet] 81,980 tons of unguided bombs had an accuracy rating of only about 25 percent. Of these, 62,137 tons missed their targets.[25]

Moreover, a forthcoming book by *Washington Post* reporter Rick Atkinson reveals that

> 76 of 167 laser-guided bombs dropped by F-117A "stealth" attack jets in the first five days of the war missed their targets because of pilot error, mechanical or electrical malfunction, or weather. These results remained classified, while public briefings depicted unbroken success.[26]

The author even seems to fault some US officials for not destroying the Victory Arch in Baghdad (p. 212). When he mentions—merely mentions—the seasonal Western interest in the Kurds, he adds, "I do not praise or criticize anyone for this" (p. 344, n. 5). But why would Makiya not criticize anyone in the West? He does not adopt this cautious (and politically safe) attitude when it comes to Arab insensitivity to the plight of the Kurds.

When Makiya mentions—again, merely mentions—"racism towards Arabs" in the West, he adds, in an off-hand manner, "racism exists everywhere else in the world" (p. 280). But could not one use the latter sentence to rationalize racism in the Arab world? There should be no belittling the impact of racism by anybody, whether they are Arabs or non-Arabs. Makiya in fact does discuss Israeli violations of human rights. But again he seems to adopt an unusually defensive and even apologetic tone in this respect. When he cites an example of Palestinian suffering, he follows it by asserting that "Israel is more open than any other country in the Mashriq" (p. 295). That is true, but the statement seems out of place here; it reads more like the clichés about Israel often invoked in the United States that are designed to soften the impact of Israeli human rights violations. With regard to anti-Arab racism in US popular culture, Makiya oddly chooses one cartoon from the US leftist *Z Magazine*.[27] If Makiya is arguing that *Z Magazine* is less sensitive to Arabs than, for example, the *New York Times* or the *Washington Post*, he will convince only those who wish to absolve the mainstream media of any responsibility for the prevalent anti-Arab, anti-Islamic tone of much Persian Gulf war coverage. Or does his quarrel with *Z Magazine* derive from the latter's opposition to the war and the political safety in the United States of any condemnation of a leftist publication?

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[25] See Tom Wicker, "An Unknown Casualty," *New York Times*, March 20, 1991.

[26] See Rick Atkinson, *Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, forthcoming). Excerpts from the book were published in the *Washington Post*, July 25, 1993.

In censuring Arab intellectuals, Makiya is often unacceptably inaccurate and imprecise. He applies rigid and dogmatic criteria to assess the positions of Arab intellectuals—those who opposed the war are equated with those who supported Saddam. In one passage Makiya seems to imply that those Arab intellectuals who urged Palestinian writer Emile Habibi to refuse an Israeli literary prize are guilty of human rights violations and, possibly, of support for Saddam (p. 357, n. 5). By Makiya's logic, no supporter of democracy, nor any opponent of Saddam, could legitimately oppose the Persian Gulf war. He wonders in one instance how Syria's "most enthusiastic supporters of democracy and liberalization were also the harshest critics of Syria's participation in the Allied coalition" (p. 244), as if there is an inherent contradiction between the two positions.

The author suffers from a fixation with Edward Said. So obsessed is Makiya with Said that he digs out sections from *Orientalism*[28] to challenge, even though they are completely irrelevant to the subject of his book.[29] Makiya's attacks on Said are undisguised personal attacks. He distorts and misconstrues Said's statements about the Persian Gulf war. What emerges of Said in Makiya's book is a caricature, with Said unfairly associated with the vulgar school of apologetic Arab nationalist chauvinism. This is particularly ironic, for among Arab intellectuals in the Arab world and abroad, Said stands out for never having changed his message to suit the national mood of his audience. He has deplored Arab regimes when addressing Arab audiences as well as Western ones. Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Said wrote that "Saddam is a deeply unattractive, indeed revoltingly tough and callous leader, who has suppressed personal freedoms, subjected his gifted and hard-working people to unimaginable rigors, and harassed and invaded his neighbors."[30] Said has examined Arab conditions in a self-critical manner for much longer than Makiya. In 1978, he wrote:

> Most of our best writers and intellects have either been co-opted or jailed into silence. It is not only in Israel—I must remind you—that human rights are trampled on. Where is our Israel Shahak, our Felicia Langer?[31]

Whether in English-language articles in *The Nation*,[32] or in Arabic-language articles in *al-Majallah*,[33] Said has explicitly condemned Saddam Hussein's regime and favored Arab self-criticism. Consequently, placing Said in the category of pro-Saddam writers is a gross error. Not only does Makiya distort or ignore Said's written record, but the author even insists that Said's argumentation is "precisely" (p. 278) similar to that of Saddam Hussein. The attacks on Said are too personal in tone to be considered seriously, however.

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[27] See p. 331, n. 15.

[28] Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978).

[29] See pp. 317–18. On p. 319, Makiya compares Said's *Orientalism* to Qabbani's crudest and most vulgar poetry. Further, it is unlikely that any reader of *Orientalism* agrees with Makiya's stated view that Said maintains "that 'every European' in what he or she has to say about [the Arab] world is or was a 'racist' " (p. 319).

[30] Edward W. Said, "Behind Saddam Hussein's Moves," *Christian Science Monitor*, August 13, 1990.

[31] Edward W. Said, "The Arab Right Wing," *Reaction and Counterrevolution in the Contemporary Arab World*, Information Paper no. 21 (Belmont, MA: Arab-American University Graduates, 1978), p. 6.

[33] Edward W. Said, "Ignorant Armies Clash by Night," *Nation*, February 11, 1991.

[33] See, for example, *al-Majallah*, September 28, 1988; March 13, 1990; and September 5, 1990.

A second major Arab intellectual whose views are distorted is the Saudi-born Abd al-Rahman Munif. With Munif, and with other Arab intellectuals cited in the text, Makiya seems far more interested in writings in newspapers and magazines than in books. He typically singles out one article written during the Persian Gulf war, while ignoring the author's larger body of works. Munif became known in the West after the translation of the first two volumes of his five-volume work, *Mudun al-Milh* (Cities of Salt).[34] Makiya rightly condemns Munif for writing that "Kuwait is not important" (p. 43), but, to be consistent, he should also have cited Fouad Ajami's description of Iraq as a "brittle land, a frontier country between Persia and Arabia, with little claim to culture and books and grand ideas."[35] No one has the right to dismiss any country as unimportant; every territory is important to its inhabitants.

Makiya cites one article by Munif without noting the latter's other works, particularly his best-selling *Sharq al-Mutawassit* (East of the Mediterranean)[36] and its sequel, *Al'an . . . Huna* (Now . . . Here).[37] These works shaped Arab public understanding of the depth of the political crisis in the Arab world from North Africa to the Persian Gulf states, where his books are banned but still widely read. Munif eloquently and powerfully depicts the suffering of the Arab individual—the individual; not the group, not the tribe, and not the political party—at the hands of the military and intelligence apparatus. Munif's contribution lies in his ability to transcend the narrow political agendas of various Arab opposition groups that have allowed themselves to be used as tools in the service of various Arab governments. To be certain, Munif can—and should—be criticized for his past Baathist sympathies, but in his most recent writings he appears to have freed himself from the Baathist antidemocratic dogma. How can Makiya quote one phrase in one article without quoting tens of other articles Munif wrote on the Persian Gulf war? Munif has been stripped of his Saudi citizenship and now lives in Syria under extremely difficult circumstances.[38] Makiya's readers should be aware that many Arab intellectuals refuse to leave the Arab world, and thus are compelled to operate there under the most oppressive conditions.

In one article, Munif addresses the Kurdish question:

> The other problem that requires treatment is the Kurdish problem. The Kurds who live in northern Iraq constitute a different and distinctive national environment, as far as language and housing are concerned, even though they participated in the national struggles of Iraq. A problem like the Kurdish problem is similar to other problems in other societies, and those societies were able to resolve and absorb the problem, not by elimination or disregard, but by providing for the conditions of mutual coexistence and recognition of legitimate national rights, and finally by self-rule and democracy combined.[39]

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[34] Abdelrahman Munif, *Cities of Salt*, tr. by Peter Theroux (New York: Random House, 1987); and idem, *The Trench*, tr. by Peter Theroux (New York: Pantheon Books, 1991).

[35] Fouad Ajami, "The Summer of Arab Discontent," *Foreign Affairs* 69, no. 5 (1990–91), p. 1.

[36] Abd al-Rahman Munif, *Sharq al-Mutawassit* (East of the Mediterranean) (Beirut: Al-Mu'assasah al-Arabiyya li al-Dirasat wa al-Nashr, 1985).

[37] Abd al-Rahman Munif, *Al'an . . . huna* (Now . . . here), 3rd ed. (Beirut: Al-Mu'assasah al-Arabiyya li al-Dirasat wa al-Nashr, 1992).

[38] Munif addressed an open letter to a UN conference on human rights, held in Vienna in June 1993, in which he detailed Saudi oppressive measures against him because of his views and writings. His letter was reprinted in full in *al-Hadaf*, June 13, 1993.

[39] Abd al-Rahman Munif, *Al-Dimuqratiyya awwalan . . . al-dimuqratiyya da'iman* (Democracy first . . . democracy always) (Beirut: Al-Mu'assasah al-Arabiyya li al-Dirasat wa al-Nashr, 1992), pp. 110–11. Most of the articles in this book—with its indicative title—were published previously in Arabic magazines. Makiya could easily have had access to them.

This ardent Arab nationalist also writes, "the use of force is the last method that could be contemplated for the establishment of unity or for the annexation of some parts."[40] Munif stresses the imperative of democracy for the Arab world, as a solution to the problems of majorities and minorities alike.[41]

Makiya also attacks the Arabic literary critic Kamal Abu Dib, who has made important contributions in his field, but whose self-righteous pomposity has made him unpopular among some in the Arab world.[42] Yet no Arab intellectual living in the West can accuse Abu Dib of compromising with dictatorships. Abu Dib is a courageous critic of Arab governments, who was expelled from Jordan because he chose to speak on behalf of victims of state oppression. Of all the Arab intellectuals cited in Makiya's book, Said and Abu Dib qualify as the two most distorted and most misconstrued. To illustrate, a passage by Abu Dib—cited, edited, and translated by Makiya—is quoted below. It is followed by this reviewer's translation, without deleting parts of the sentences cited, as Makiya has done.

In Makiya's book, Abu Dib is portrayed as having written:

> We cannot but be with the nation. . . . The nation may be a gargantuan tyrant. . . . The nation may be a policeman whose dogs chase us everywhere inside its walls. The nation may be the cave of our disillusionment, or the slaughter-house of our sweet dreams, or the grave of our freedom and honor. . . . And the nation may be a thousand worse and even more terrible things. Still, we cannot but be with the nation (p. 245).

In the original (unedited) passage published in Arabic, Abu Dib wrote:

> We cannot but be with the nation. And the nation in this war is not a ruler or a regime or a political party or a geographic location fenced off and called a state. The nation is not a religion worn by some as a hat for camouflage, or as an ornament to cover up their dangling heads. And the nation is not a farm for a sultan, or a magical chicken producing its golden eggs to this family and that. And the nation is not a chain of descent and ring of houses and clans, and the nation is not a back of a horse mounted by every greedy adventurer. The nation may be an arrogant tyrant; so we become with dignity, humanitarianism, and determination against his arrogance and tyranny. The nation may be a policeman whose biting dogs chase us in every inch inside the walls and in every space we seek refuge in outside the walls; so we stand in his crude face with stubborn faith in freedom and human dignity exposing the nakedness of our bodies to his biting teeth. . . .[43]

Abu Dib—not his caricature that appears in Makiya's book—also writes, "Yes, O Nation. We will eulogize you in your predicament that was caused by your sons as much as it was woven by your enemies."[44] How Makiya's representation of Abu Dib could be so distorted is hard to imagine. Other Arab intellectuals attacked by Makiya include Adonis, who is condemned not because he refrained from criticizing Saddam—he did so in no uncertain terms—but because he refused to compare Baathist Iraq with Nazi Germany (p. 250).

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[40] Munif, *Al-Dimuqratiyya*, p. 130.

[41] Ibid. p. 148.

[42] For an example of Abu Dib's pomposity, see an interview with him in *al-Hayat*, May 27, 1993.

[43] "Sarkhah fi matah" (A cry while led astray), in Riyad Najib al-Rayyis *et al.*, *Awdat al-isti'mar: Min al-ghazw al-thaqafi ila harb al-khalij* (The return of colonialism: From cultural invasion to the gulf war) (London: Riyad al-Rayyis Books, 1991), pp. 147–8. The punctuation has been reproduced as it appeared in the Arabic original. Makiya translates *"sarkhah fi matah"* as "screaming in a wasteland;" the word *"matah"* lends itself to a variety of connotations.

[44] Abu Dib, p. 153.

Certainly some intellectuals deserve to be admonished, including the brilliant Tunisian philosopher Hichem Djait.[45] Djait was unreserved in his support for Saddam Hussein during the war.[46] Muhammad Abid al-Jabiri of Muhammad V University, Morocco, one of the most influential Arab thinkers today, is also condemned by Makiya, who again ignores this author's large body of philosophical works. Typically, Makiya concerns himself with newspaper articles. In some articles al-Jabiri took an immoral position that did not criticize Saddam Hussein. But al-Jabiri, who toured the Gulf region after the war,[47] has engaged in a highly advanced level of self-criticism of his works on Arabic thought and philosophy. He has spoken out forcefully on democracy and civil society in the Arab world.[48]

There are only a few writers, cited mostly in the endnotes, whom Makiya commends. He praises Hazim Saghiyyah and Waddah Shararah, two former leftists turned neoconservatives from Lebanon. Shararah recently wrote an article supporting press restrictions in Lebanon "in support of the unity of the state."[49] Both writers were apologists for the rule of rightwing Phalange leader Amin Gemayyel. Yet, what matters to Makiya is that they opposed Saddam. The author also praises an article by the Saudi ambassador in London—whom he identifies only as "Saudi writer Ghazi Gossaibi" (p. 332, n. 21)—because Gossaibi condemned a poem by Nizar Qabbani, which contained racist references to Sri Lankans. Surely Makiya knows of human rights violations in Saudi Arabia against Asian workers. Or, as the Arabic saying has it, "If you know, it is bad; and if you do not know, it is worse."

Some important Arab intellectuals are omitted altogether from Makiya's discussion. Halim Barakat's views on the Persian Gulf war are not cited, perhaps because Barakat, who opposed the war, called on the Iraqi people to hold their leadership responsible[50] and termed official Iraqi discourse "despicable."[51] Makiya seems uninterested in those Arab intellectuals who opposed Saddam. There are, of course, other Arab intellectuals who should have been singled out in the context of this book, yet are left unmentioned. Makiya might have cited the Syrian intellectual Burhan Ghalyun, author of some important works in Arabic and French.[52] Ghalyun wrote, in the spirit of 1967 Arab propaganda claims, "Iraq has recorded a moral victory, the echoes of which will reverberate throughout the world and will constitute the beginning of a new era in human history."[53]

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[45] Djait is the author of several important works: *L'Europe et l'Islam* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1978); *La personalité et le devenir arabo-islamiques* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1974); *La Grande discorde* (Paris: Gallimard, 1989); and *Al-Kufa: naissance de la ville islamique* (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 1986). Djait, who examines abstract ideas and philosophical concepts with a unique intellectual ease and literary elegance, may be criticized for a fondness for Arab nationalist ideologies, including the Baathist dogma. Of the Baath, Djait characterized it as "a school of thought and struggle, the radiance [*rayonnement*] of which was great in the Arab conscience." See *La Personalité*, p. 80. Yet, in this same work, he wrote critically of the Arab situation: "It is also essential that the Arabs discard the hazy romanticism [*romantisme fumeux*] that for a long time took the place of political thought, and that they open their eyes to their inadequacies [*insuffisances*] and their futile fury" (p. 108). He also wrote that "we live in a world of favoritism, arbitrariness, where cleverness [*habileté*] and submissiveness are rewarded, and not in a world where man aspires to enjoy the fruits of his labors or of his effort, in an atmosphere of stagnation and mediocrity, not in one of creativity and of impetus toward truth and beauty. Never perhaps in the course of our history have we lived in so much deception" (p. 226).

[46] See the interview with Djait in *L'Express*, February 7, 1991. In the same issue, however, an article characterized the attitudes of Arabs in France by the title "Ni Bush ni Saddam." A public opinion survey published in this issue revealed strong opposition to Saddam among Maghribi Arabs living in France.

[47] According to one Arab intellectual from the Persian Gulf region who invited al-Jabiri, large crowds turned out to hear him during his speaking tour. A school of thought known as "al-Jabiriyya" now comprises admirers of this thinker. Unfortunately, none of his works are translated into English.

[48] See "Ishkaliyyat al-dimuqratiyya wa al-mujtama'i al-madani fi al-watan al-Arabi" (The problem of democracy and civil society in the Arab homeland), *al-Mustaqbal al-Arabi*, no. 167 (January 1993).

[49] See his article, "Al-Tadamun al-Lubnani ma'a al-huriyya al-sahafiyya yughfil mas'alat wihdat al-dawlah . . . faqat" (Lebanese solidarity with press freedoms ignore the question of state unity . . . only), in *al-Hayat*, May 19, 1993.

[50] Halim Barakat, *Harb al-khalij: Khutut fi al-raml wa al-zaman* (The gulf war: Lines in the sand and time) (Beirut: Markaz Dirasat al-Wihdah al-Arabiyya, 1992), p. 191. Parts of the book were published during the war in *al-Hayat*, which Makiya seems to follow.

[51] Barakat, p. 143.

Makiya is at his weakest as a political analyst. He explains Western support for Israel and Saudi Arabia by arguing that "they [the US and western European states] stick to countries like Saudi Arabi and Israel because they are there" (p. 277). There are many other countries that "are there" which do not receive the support of the West. Makiya could have found more convincing arguments. The author also attacks the Palestine Liberation Organization's support for Iraq. There is no question that all major PLO groups (Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine) rallied to the support of Saddam Hussein; some of the statements the PLO leaders made in support of Saddam—not only of Iraq—were quite reprehensible. PLO elements rushed to open offices in Baghdad after claiming for years that the Iraqi regime was working against Palestinian interests. Yasir Arafat unashamedly called Saddam Hussein *Faris al-'Urubah* (The Knight of Arabism).

By the same token, however, should not Makiya condemn the Iraqi opposition for its close ties to antidemocratic governments, such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Syria? Makiya should be consistent in subjecting both the Iraqi opposition and the PLO to the same strict standards. (A delegation of the Iraqi National Congress, with which Makiya is affiliated, went to Saudi Arabia on an official visit in May 1993.) Or is his cause more noble than any other cause, which allows him to excuse its associations with tyrannical regimes? It is also odd that Makiya wonders why Palestinians refuse to talk directly with Israelis (p. 319). Is Makiya unaware of the changing situation of the Arab-Israeli conflict, in which PLO officials now literally beg Israeli leaders to negotiate directly with them?

There is much to be criticized concerning the reality of Arab society. The harshness of criticisms reflects the harshness of conditions under which Arabs live. There are some brave voices in the large Arab prison, authors such as the Iraqi poet Mudhaffar al-Nawwab[54] and the Iraqi writer Hadi al-Alawi,[55] neither of whom are noted in Makiya's book. How can

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[52] See, for example, Burhan Ghalioun [Ghalyun], *Le malaise arabe: l'état contre la nation* (Paris: Editions La Découverte, 1991); and his Arabic best-seller *Bayan min ajli al-dimuqratiyya* (A communiqué for democracy), 4th ed. (Beirut: Mu'assasat al-Abhath al-Arabiyya, 1986).

[53] Burhan Ghalyun, *Ma ba'da al-khalij, aw asru al-muwajahati al-kubra* (Beyond the gulf, or the age of great confrontations) (Cairo: Maktabat Madbuli, 1992), p. 229.

[54] Mudhaffar al-Nawwab, *Watariyyat layliyya* (Nocturnal playing on strings) (n.p., n.d.). Al-Nawwab's poetry is banned in all Arab countries, although he remains widely read. Pirated copies of his poetry are sold in most Arab countries, and tapes of his poetry readings are circulated extensively. An Iraqi friend who left his country in 1991 told this reviewer that al-Nawwab is read avidly inside Iraq (in secret of course). His tapes also are circulated throughout Iraq, especially in the south, from where al-Nawwab hails. The literary page of *al-Thawrah* published excerpts from al-Nawwab's poetry for the first time after the Persian Gulf war. These writings were critical of the United States. Ed. note: The reviewer is grateful to this Iraqi friend who must remain anonymous.

[55] Al-Alawi has published several critical works on Islamic history. Most of his books are published by small or underground publishers. See, for example, *Al-Ightiyal al-siyasi fi al-Islam* (Political assassinations in Islam) (Nicosia and Damascus: Markaz al-Abhath wa al-Dirasat al-Ishtirakiyya fi al-Alam al-Arabi, 1987); and *Min tarikh al-ta'dhib fi al-Islam* (From the history of torture in Islam) (Nicosia and Damascus: Markaz al-Abhath wa al-Dirasat al-Ishtirakiyya fi al-Alam al-Arabi, 1987). Al-Alawi has been expelled from several Arab countries. His most recent book was published in Budapest, Hungary. See Hadi al-Alawi, *Fi al-siyasah al-Islamiyya* (On Islamic politics) (Budapest: Sahara, 1991).

Makiya ignore the 41 courageous Arab writers who, on March 5, 1989, issued a statement from Damascus in support of Salman Rushdie? Their statement, "In Defense of the Writer's Right to Life," began by stating that "forces of darkness continue their struggle [*jihad*] against reason and its defenders," and added that Rushdie "defended the people and freedom."[56] There is a famous Arab novelist who holds a Ph.D. in comparative literature from a major Western university, and who used to be a professor at a major Arab university. This professor was expelled from the faculty at the university and was asked to teach at a high school because he dared to criticize the regime publicly. If his name is given here he might be asked to teach at an elementary school. There are some who are not silent, but Makiya does not like what they have to say. At the same time, many have been co-opted by the regimes, and some are even tied to the apparatus of oppression in places such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Syria.

There are serious ills in Arab popular culture. The tendency to avoid self-criticism and blame Arab problems on external conspiracies still prevails among many Arabs. Some still interpret the world according to their reading of the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, which unfortunately remains a best-seller in most Arab capitals, due to its promotion by various regimes and political parties, including the Syrian Social National Party and various fundamentalist groups. But, as Said has written, "we cannot discuss the non-Western world as disjunct from developments in the West."[57] How can Makiya ignore the responsibility of the West when over half a million troops were deployed in the Persian Gulf region? Or when an unnamed US "specialist" on human rights and democracy expresses strong opposition to democratic reforms and elections in Arab countries because Arab democracy would bring to power "the folks who tried to blow up the World Trade towers in New York?"[58] Does he believe that the West still has a "mission civilisatrice?" His call for the US military to go all the way to Baghdad indicates that he does.

Arab wounds are partly, and perhaps largely, self-inflicted. The nationalist and Islamic apologetic schools want to blame the outside world for all miseries in the region. Unless chauvinistic taboos are lifted, and unless Arabs show willingness to examine themselves critically and mercilessly, the road to national recovery will be prolonged. In the words of Hasan Hanafi, "the current circumstances through which the Arab nation passes necessitate a reconsideration of everything: the beginnings, the introductions, and the axioms. No prohibitions and no taboos."[59] Makiya's book adds little to the important self-critical debate, with the exception of his attention to minority rights, an issue that receives no serious attention from the nationalists or the fundamentalists. The credibility of this book is undermined, however, by Makiya's inaccurate references and his apologetic stance toward the West. Makiya consistently sacrifices accuracy and rigor for small—and undeserved—polemical victories.

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[56] Excerpts from the statement were published in *al-Safir*, March 14, 1989. The full text is reprinted in an appendix in al-Azm, *Dhihniyyat al-tahrim*.

[57] Edward W. Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), p. 325.

[58] *Washington Post*, May 5, 1993, p. A-29.

[59] Quoted in *al-Hayat*, June 9, 1993. Hanafi is the author of numerous philosophical works, including his important *Min al-aqidah ila al-thawrah* (From doctrine to revolution), 5 vols. (Cairo: Maktabat Madbuli, 1990). Hanafi's works, however, reflect the constraints of Islamic taboos.

ALGERIA

State and Society in Algeria, ed. by John P. Entelis and Phillip C. Naylor. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992. xii + 266 pages. Abbrevs. to p. 269. Bibl. to p. 287. Contribs. to p. 288. Index to p. 307. $34.50 paper.

Reviewed by Mary-Jane Deeb

This book covers an important transitional period in Algeria's history—the end of the socialist one-party system and the emergence of an altogether different but as yet insubstantial political and economic system. The volume is divided into 10 chapters, written by different authors who chronicle the demise of the old system and outline the shape of things to come.

John Entelis, in the introduction, analyzes the reasons for the collapse of the old political order:

> In the world of the 1990s, the political systems of the Arab world in general and North Africa in particular are probably the most prone to fundamental challenge. Clearly they have all failed to deliver on their exaggerated promises, the presumed advantages of authoritarian practices for economic development have proved to be but a mirage (p. 6).

Bradford Dillman and Lynette Rummel analyze the political and economic liberalization process that began in the mid-1980s with the collapse of oil prices in 1986 and the October food riots of 1988. The authors discuss the impact of democratization and privatization on the Algerian state and society, and the emergence of new forces and new conflicts on the political scene. Despite divergent interpretations of the effect of those processes on society, both authors come to the conclusion that, although difficult, the process of democratization in Algeria is irreversible.

In three separate chapters, Phillip Akre, Karen Pfeifer, and Will D. Swearingen discuss the economic policies of the Algerian state since independence. Akre sees the strategy of the 1970s of "rapid energy-based industrialization" as having distorted and limited Algeria's economic development, by making it dependent on the international market. Swearingen blames the October 1988 riots on faulty food policies and the failure of agrarian reforms. Pfeifer, on the other hand, looks at the major economic reforms undertaken by the Algerian state in the 1980s in response to both internal and external pressures, and concludes that "unless there is a sharp break with the current national and international regimes in the offing, the trend toward liberalization in Algeria . . . seems inexorable" (p. 115).

The next two chapters examine Algerian women in a changing society. Peter Knauss analyzes their role since independence, and their disenchantment with the family code of 1981 and the revised version of 1984. Boutheina Cheriet looks at their role within the context of the present-day debate between Islamists and secularists. Neither Cheriet nor Knauss appear to be optimistic about a significant improvement in the status of women in the near future.

Phillip Naylor and Robert Mortimer discuss Algeria's foreign policy dilemmas in the final chapters of the book. While Naylor sees the memory of colonialism as interfering in the relations between France and Algeria, Mortimer sees Algeria's domestic problems as limiting its ability to project the image of a strong and independent Third World nation that had been the building block of its international relations in the 1970s.

This work should be the first volume in a series that chronicles the rapid transformations taking place in North Africa. Thematically arranged, it provides fresh and engaging perspectives on major issues of interest to those who teach contemporary Middle Eastern politics. It is an important study that would have benefitted from an additional chapter on the role of Islamic movements.

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ISRAEL

Land of Paradoxes: Interest Politics in Israel, by Yael Yishai. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991. xvi + 366 pages. Appends. to p. 378. Notes to p. 390. Bibl. to p. 410. Index to p. 414. $54.50 cloth. $17.95 paper.

Reviewed by Scott D. Johnston

This volume by Yael Yishai, associate professor of political science at Haifa University, is a systematic and comprehensive study of Israeli interest groups within the framework of interest-group theory. The research methodology is impressive and includes questionnaires sent to 277 interest groups (of whom 162 replied), interviews with leaders of 62 interest groups, and 41 interviews with senior officials in 13 government ministries. This work is the most comprehensive study of interest groups in Israel to date. It is thoroughly competent and of a qualitatively high level, although not as provocative as Sam Lehman-Wilzig's *Wildfire: Grassroots Revolts in Israel in the Post-Socialist Era,*[1] or quite as focused as Marcia Drezon-Tepler's *Interest Groups and Political Change in Israel.*[2]

Yishai places considerable emphasis on a methodological approach and theoretical structure that includes three models of interest-group politics—a pluralist pattern stressing influence from below, a corporatist configuration of shared influence, and an elitist model emphasizing influence from above. The study is set within a framework of Israeli parties, state, and society, which is a useful setting for an account of the varied world of Israeli interest groups such as settlement movements, professional associations, immigrants, public interest groups, and those keen rivals over policies for the occupied territories, Gush Emunim and Peace Now.

The examination of interest groups and political parties is particularly well done. The author considers the Histadrut, and the kibbutz and moshav movements; and their decline in governmental representation and influence. Yishai sees the Labor Party as increasingly representing the upper middle class, the affluent, and the professionals—a development bound to further attenuate the links between the Labor Party and the Histadrut.

Yishai repeatedly finds ambiguities and contradictions concerning interest groups, parties, and state. A thoroughly useful chapter examines strategies of influence, including materials related to the Knesset. The interrelationship between the media (newspapers and television) is well explored, with revealing examples cited; the Israel Medical Association successfully campaigned against the government's attempt to pass a national health insurance law. This effort included the use of huge daily advertisements and editorials that looked unfavorably on the proposed law.

Despite Israel being a party democracy, Yishai avers that decisions most important to interest groups are centered in government administration. She states that findings on interest groups in the policy process "appear to be inconclusive, even confusing. The answer to the main question regarding the role of interest groups in the public policy process remains equivocal" (p. 309). Yishai states in her final chapter that her study has clearly exposed the vulnerability of Israeli parties to changing times, but within a few sentences refers to the dominance of the parties.

Yishai sets Israel's interest group system in cultural perspective with other models, mainly those of western Europe. She concludes that the Israeli case is unique, however, within a corporatist structure that emphasizes high centralization in the state and interest groups.

Yishai has brought forth a definitive study of Israeli interest groups in organization and action within a theoretical, albeit laborious, framework. She is to be congratulated, however, for the systematic and substantial effort she has made and with the results produced, which should be of genuine value to students of Israeli politics and those with a serious concern in comparative studies of interest groups.

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[1] Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992.

[2] Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990.

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KURDS AND KURDISTAN

The Kurds of Iraq: Tragedy and Hope, by Michael M. Gunter. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992. xi + 118 pages. Notes to p. 152. Bibl. to p. 166. Index to p. 175. $35.00.
No Friends but the Mountains: The Tragic History of the Kurds, by John Bulloch and Harvey Morris. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. xiii + 238 pages. Index to p. 242. $25.00.

Reviewed by Joost R. Hiltermann

In the late 1980s, the Kurds of Iraq suffered repeated chemical attacks, the destruction of the vast majority of their villages, mass deportations, and the killing of tens of thousands of men, women, and children in a campaign (known as Anfal), which is now finally being characterized as genocide.[1] Although many of these facts were known at the time, they merited little attention in Western countries, whose governments supported Iraq in its war against Iran. Then and now, scholarly and journalistic interest has followed closely in the footsteps of empire.

Today, thanks to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the subsequent uprisings in Iraq, and the establishment of a no-fly zone over part of the Kurdish region in April 1991, the Kurdish question has found its way onto the Western agenda. Not surprisingly, these events have sprouted an instant literature on the Kurds, most of it—unfortunately but understandably, given the speed with which it was produced—of rather low calibre. The two books reviewed here fall into that category.

Michael Gunter's book is the less substantive of the two, an unconvincing attempt at scholarship that is based on (largely unchecked and at times highly distorted) newspaper accounts, framed by a cursory historical introduction. The bulk of the book consists of a description of developments in Iraqi Kurdistan in the period following the collapse of the movement of Mullah Mustafa Barzani in 1975. The two Gulf wars each receive a chapter; the post-uprising period gets three; and a final chapter is devoted to the role of Turkey in recent events.

The Iraqi Kurds deserve a serious analysis of their modern history, but unfortunately this book does not provide one. Gunter's two main problems are his apparent personal unfamiliarity with the situation on the ground in northern Iraq, and his decision to depend almost exclusively on journalistic accounts, often as selected and translated by the US Government's Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). Derivative research is fraught with danger, and Gunter has crashed headlong into both the Scylla of copying his sources' factual errors and the Charybdis of reproducing their biases and rhetoric (and thus their political agendas). For example, he accepts wholesale UN assertions that UN guards in Iraq are providing protection to staff involved in the humanitarian aid program (pp. 82–3). Any casual observer in Kurdistan knows that the guards are not equipped to protect anyone, and in fact are themselves being protected by Kurdish *peshmerga*. Their sole purpose was to provide by their presence a psychological reassurance for the Kurdish civilian population, but even that dissipated soon after their arrival, and today they are the objects of local scorn.

Turkish hysteria concerning the possibility that Kurdish self-government in Iraq might stoke irredentism among Turkey's own Kurds is faithfully reproduced in Gunter's text. Turkish newspapers (usually as read through the prism of FBIS) are quoted even when they make unsubstantiated allegations. The most obvious example is the claim, supported with plenty of innuendo but no hard facts, that the Partia Karkaren Kurdistan (PKK) began receiving financial and weapons support from the Iraqi regime in 1992 (pp. 112–13). Elsewhere, Gunter cites a Turkish journalist (via FBIS) who in turn quotes a "spokesman" for the Iraqi Kurdistan Front, an individual whom the front has disavowed, as saying that the front had decided to exclude the National Turkoman Party of Iraq and the PKK from the elections in Iraqi Kurdistan in May 1992 (p. 91). The "spokesman's" claim goes unchallenged both by the Turkish journalist and Gunter, even though the National Turkoman Party decided of its own accord not to participate in the elections, while the PKK (being a Kurdish party in Turkey, not Iraq) was never even considered—nor considered itself—as a participant in the elections.

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[1] See *Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds* (New York: Middle East Watch, 1993).

Gunter often takes the statements of his sources—be they UN officials or Turkish journalists—at face value, even when they contradict facts on the ground. With regard to claims by the Iraqi Kurdish leadership that the Kurds are not trying to set up an independent state in northern Iraq, however, Gunter openly disagrees, again ignoring the evidence. On more than one occasion (for example, p. 95), he claims that the Kurds have been developing a *de facto* state in northern Iraq. In fact, the Kurdish administration has sought to manage local affairs while refusing in any way to act as a sovereign. Their leaders have publicly supported a federal solution to the Kurdish question, and have joined an opposition coalition, the Iraqi National Congress, that advocates the replacement of the current Iraqi regime with an elected government.

Gunter is also careless in his perusal of secondary sources. He refers, for example, to a report in the *Jordan Times* in April 1992 that the Kurds had established a company called "Kurdoil" and "had started to export oil by truck to Turkey" in the amount of "20,000 to 25,000 barrels of oil a day" (p. 94). A close reading of the article (as reprinted in FBIS-NES, April 21, 1992, pp. 18–19) reveals that Kurdoil had done no more than ask the United Nations for permission to export oil, and that oil was "being trucked across the border." Kurdoil in fact never received permission from the United Nations; it never pumped or exported any oil; and for all practical purposes it was stillborn. Kurdish drivers from Turkey bought gasoline and diesel oil from the Iraqis in Mosul and drove it through Iraqi Kurdish territory into Turkey as early as fall 1991. They did this in violation of UN sanctions, but at great profit to all concerned, as any serious visitor to the area would have been able to observe.

Some of Gunter's own observations (which are few and far between) border on the absurd. He reasons that "trends toward creating a de facto Kurdish state were reinforced by the new revelations concerning the Anfal operation" (pp. 87–8). To whom was Anfal being revealed? Surely not the Kurds, who lived through it and whose stories of Iraqi genocidal practices were largely ignored in the West at the time. It was Gunter himself who had just learned—like many others, including this reviewer—of the extent of Anfal. He then proceeded to impute his own reaction to these revelations to the Kurds, who were the original source of the revelations in the first place.

Finally, mention should be made of the map on p. xi to which—strangely, though perhaps fortuitously—no reference is made in the text. The map, produced by the Kurdish Library in New York, purports to highlight the sites of Iraqi chemical attacks, but refers only to those that took place in August 1988 (excluding all those attacks that occurred in the preceding year and a half), and manages to misplace about half the villages shown.

Unlike Gunter, a scholar relying on journalistic references, John Bulloch and Harvey Morris are reporters who have done much serious research and are good writers to boot. The result is a lively book, but their sojourn to liberated Kurdistan was too brief—they were there less than a week, and only at the end of the uprising—and their interest apparently was too ephemeral to spawn a thorough and accurate narrative of the uprising (or *raparin*, as it is known in Kurdish). Most dangerously, the two describe only what they saw and then somehow assume that this was the total picture. Having visited only the area from Zakho to Erbil, and having spoken only to representatives of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), their narrative does not accurately describe the liberation of Kirkuk (p. 26) and completely leaves out the rather important role played by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in the uprising—or even in 1988, at the height of the Anfal campaign, which the authors, without even mentioning it by name, mistakenly situate in the late summer rather than the early spring.

Their historical analysis is nevertheless quite thorough for this type of book, and always informed. Unlike Gunter (p. 16), for example, they rightly see the 1970 autonomy agreement as a tactic by Saddam Hussein to gain breathing space for the Baathists who had just come to power (pp. 129–31). They also shed bits of light on issues that often receive little attention, for example, the rivalry between the PUK and KDP in the late 1970s (p. 148). As they approach the 1980s, however, factual errors start piling up. It is the predicament of the Kurds that to date, despite independent researchers' recent untrammeled and unprecedented access to northern Iraq, no serious research has been conducted on this vital and tragic period in the Kurds' modern history.

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LIBYA

Libya: The Struggle for Survival, by Geoff Simons. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993. xxvi + 329 pages. Appends. to p. 353. Notes to p. 373. Bibl. to p. 377. Index to p. 396. $35.00.

Reviewed by Ronald Bruce St John

Few revolutions in this century have proved more impenetrable and thus more controversial than that initiated in September 1969 by the Libyan Free Unionist Officers under the leadership of Muammar al-Qadhafi. Although the quantity and quality of Libyan studies have improved markedly over the last two decades, the definitive study of the Libyan revolution has yet to appear. The publication of *Libya: The Struggle for Survival* does little to improve on this regrettable state of affairs.

The most lengthy section of this book provides a conventional overview of the history of Libya from earliest times to the present. The author emphasizes the colonial past in a country subject to invasion and occupation for centuries. The character of the Libyan revolution under Qadhafi and the significance of Libyan oil resources to the domestic and foreign policies of the revolution are also reviewed.

That said, the foreign relations of the Qadhafi regime are the true focus of the book. The author is especially concerned with Western reaction, in particular that of the United States government, to alleged Libyan involvement in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Scotland in 1988 and the subsequent downing of UTA Flight 772 over Niger in 1989. He argues persuasively that the available evidence strongly suggests that other governments also were involved in these outrages and that the Western response thus has focused unfairly on Libya. In this regard, the author performs a valuable service, as many observers, including this reviewer, repeatedly have emphasized that considerable evidence exists to suggest that other states or organizations beside Libya could have been involved in these terrorist attacks.

In the process of assessing the Libyan role in international terrorism, the author develops several highly controversial, and largely unproven, propositions concerning the foreign policy of the United States, especially as it relates to Libya. The author asserts that "US manipulation and violation of the UN Charter and other international agreements are well illustrated throughout the entire history of the United Nations" (p. 23). "In fact Washington, with the support of pliant Security Council permanent members, manipulated the UN on the Gulf question through 1990–1, as it has subsequently manipulated the Security Council on the Libyan question through 1991–2" (p. 25). "It is a central theme of the present book that in a 'new world order' framed by the United States, independently minded countries such as Libya are far from secure" (p. 183). In a similar vein, the author suggests that "the bitter US hostility to Libya over the years has nothing to do with terrorism (the US has always supported its own approved terrorists); the hostility stems from the simple fact that Libya was able to rock the international oil industry and, in so doing, embarrass and inconvenience the global corporations" (p. 189).

To support such assertions, the author depends heavily on journalistic sources, especially London daily newspapers. Few book-length studies and scholarly journal articles are cited either in the footnotes or the bibliography, and those that are cited tend to contain dated material.

A few examples illustrate this point. The information in the sections covering the Libyan economy, democracy, religion, and women is generally limited to events in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Neither the notes nor the bibliography, and certainly not the text, suggest that the significant work on these subjects published in the last decade by authors such as Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Lisa Anderson, or Mary-Jane Deeb have been consulted. Similarly, neither the analysis in the chapters on foreign policy nor the footnotes and bibliography in support of them suggest that the author has consulted the important works on Libyan foreign policy published over the last six years by Mary-Jane Deeb, John Wright, Mahmoud G. ElWarfally, René Lemarchand, and this reviewer.

Libya: The Struggle for Survival adds little of substance to the existing body of literature on Libya in general or Libyan foreign policy in particular. The information provided is highly selective in outlook and content. The resulting imbalance contributes to the development of many controversial observations and interpretations, but does little to develop or support them. In fact, the single-minded content and tenor of much of the analysis diminishes rather than contributes to the credibility of the conclusions drawn. The overall quality of the book is also marred by occasional editing or typographical errors. The worst example of this is the failure to print the last 17 footnotes from chapter 6 in the "Notes" section at the end of the book.

Ronald Bruce St John is the author of Qaddafi's World Design: Libyan Foreign Policy, 1969–1987 *(London: Saqi Books, 1987); and the* Historical Dictionary of Libya *(Metuchen, NJ and London: Scarecrow Press, 1991).*

MODERN HISTORY AND POLITICS

The Future of the Arab Nation: Challenges and Options. London and New York: Routledge; and Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies, 1991. xvi + 495 pages. Notes to p. 509. Index to p. 520. $95.00.

The Arab World: Nation, State and Democracy, by Fawzy Mansour. Tokyo: United Nations University Press; and London and Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books, 1992. viii + 127 pages. Bibl. to p. 129. Index to p. 135. $49.95 cloth. $17.50 paper.

Reviewed by Naseer H. Aruri

The place of Arab society in the contemporary world, as well as possible future paths that could be taken by Arabs, constitute a common theme of the two books under review. Both works examine the concepts of nation, state, and democracy as aspects of sociopolitical reality whose interaction helps explain the Arab present.

The Future of the Arab Nation is the English-language edition of a seven-year project undertaken by the Beirut-based Center for Arab Unity Studies and completed in 1988. It has been skillfully edited by Roger Owen. The original project was a monumental work, which was supervised by Khair el-Din Haseeb and a team of more than 200 social scientists and researchers of varied backgrounds. The impressive data, which they accumulated and carefully evaluated, make this study unique in terms of scope, method, substance, and conceptual sophistication.

In no other work on the subject has such a wealth of data been amassed concerning population, finance, trade, resources, employment, education, and other vital sectors. Fifty tables, placed throughout the volume, provide useful and necessary data for evaluating the challenges of the present and the future in the context of the book's various scenarios. These data are essential for projecting the economic, social, and political structures of the Arab world at the beginning of the 21st century. The project attempts to define options and future courses for the Arab world, to establish prospective analytic methodology for use in future studies, and to influence decision makers to pursue long-term objectives.

Specifically, it centers on three substantive themes—first, society and the state as the constituents of the Arab polity; second, the driving force of the polity—development; and third, the polity's place and relations in the world. The network of relations between the variables of each theme is then evaluated quantitatively and qualitatively in order to ascertain the correlation between the variables and the determinants of the themes in light of different scenarios. These include the status quo (division of the Arab world), cooperation and coordination, and federal unity with centralized institutions of decision making.

The authors' commitment to Arab unity is reflected in the seriousness given to the scenario of the Arab federal state. Only through greater economic and political unity will there be a viable future for Arabs now suffering from the effects of paralysis, stagnation, and dependency. The data and analysis, however, are also employed in the treatment of the two other scenarios. Hence the authors, who attempt to sketch these scenarios as objectively and scientifically as they can, are also determined to arouse greater concern for the future: "We will never allow our nation and motherland to languish in a position of subservience" (p. 19). In that sense, this work represents a call for action.

The principal shortcoming of the book is that the original version was not brought up to date to take into account the sweeping changes in Eastern Europe, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the 1991 Gulf war. All these events make some of the analyses in the Arab unity scenario within the context of the international environment (chapter 9) rather dated and less relevant.

The Arab World: Nation, State and Democracy was written by the Egyptian Marxist economist Fawzy Mansour as part of the "Studies in African Political Economy," under the general editorship of Samir Amin. Mansour takes the reader through 13 centuries of Arab political development in an attempt to shed some light on the future of Arab society on the basis of its past and present. The major question of concern is the failure of Arabs to adapt to modern reality and respond adequately to challenges. Given that most preconditions for the emergence of capitalism had existed in Arab lands, the author asks why such development, which occurred in Europe, did not extend to any Arab societies. Mansour further probes the failure of the Arabs to develop their own autonomous development base, socialist state, or socialist type of democracy.

The empires that existed in the first and second centuries of Islam were unable to develop further because they "did not achieve integration through a common economic life" (p. 31). Much like the rest of the Third World (the periphery), such development was hampered by a forced integration into the world capitalist system in a way that served the economic and geopolitical needs of the center.

Mansour's main contribution, however, goes beyond the external aspects of center-periphery analysis—the factors governing the world capitalist system. Through a concise and conceptual analysis of the Arab past, he looks for concrete internal factors that impeded autonomous political development. One is identified as a failure to produce a viable society, from the golden age of Islam to the present, that is not dependent on the *rentier* state. Another is a failure to transcend the inbuilt bias in favor of the authoritarian state and absolutist rule, and against independent reflection on the nature of power. The lack of a clear, well-defined system of civil law and an independent judiciary in Arab societies inhibited capitalist development, which requires final determination of the meaning of the law, which in turn is essential for contractual obligations and property rights. Mansour also examines other inhibiting factors, such as climatic conditions—aridity and semiaridity—sharecropping, and political instability. The failure to create a stable and acceptable framework for conflict resolution and governance impeded progressive and modern development. The author holds that for 13 centuries the creative impulse of society was repressed and thwarted by the absence of such a framework and by the emergence of military power as the central factor in arbitrating civil strife and other conflicts.

The author's probing into internal dynamics and political culture through history to diagnose the much-discussed phenomenon of "impasse," of a deepening Arab crisis, distinguishes this thought-provoking study from many others that touch the surface but fail to subject the current Arab condition to objective and dispassionate scrutiny. Both Haseeb's team and Mansour focus on the nature of the state as a form of dependent bureaucratic state capitalism in which the state controls the main sources of revenue and aspects of social life without relating this control to an overall societal project. Both works allude to waste, corruption, and durable consumption as ills that afflict Arab society and retard progressive development. They each conclude that there is no future outside a national unification project.

Both books view the development of a common economic life through a strategy of autocentered, self-reliant development, and under the leadership of social forces other than the present ruling coalitions, as essential for Arab nationhood, indeed for the very survival of the Arabs as an independent group. Each is must reading for students of political economy in the Middle East and the Third World.

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Islamic Fundamentalism, by Youssef M. Choueiri. Boston, MA: Twayne Publishers, 1990. 160 pages. Bibls. to p. 169. Index to p. 178. $29.95 cloth. $14.95 paper.

Islam: The Fear and the Hope, by Habib Boularès. London and Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books, 1990. xii + 138 pages. Index to p. 144. $49.95 cloth. $15.00 paper.

Reviewed by Jacqueline S. Ismael

There has been a veritable explosion of literature on Islam since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, when Islam burst onto the arena of world politics. Reflecting this trend, a Sociofile (computerized index) scan of the literature base reveals that from 1975 to 1980 there were 92 articles published on Islam; between 1980 and 1985, 134 articles were published, representing a 46 percent increase; and from 1985 to 1990, 193 articles, representing another 44 percent increase. This explosion of literature mirrors the changing nature of scholarly interest in Islam. Transformed by political events from a largely passive object of intellectual curiosity to an active agent of change, understanding Islam has become a policy problem as well as an academic pastime. The industrialization of scholarship on Islam has ensued; and, with it, pollution has become a substantial byproduct of production. The two books reviewed here are a refreshing and enlightening addition to a murky body of literature.

Youssef M. Choueiri's *Islamic Fundamentalism* provides a comprehensive historical analysis of the topic, which the author identifies as a sociopolitical reaction to forces of change. From this perspective, three historically grounded, ideologically reactionary political movements are identified—revivalism, reformism, and radicalism. Revivalism and reformism are first reviewed as the historic precursors of radicalism. The main body of the book addresses the sociopolitical, social, and normative base of Islamic radicalism; the contemporary manifestation of Islamic fundamentalism, examined in terms of the historical context; and the external and internal forces of change shaping the movement.

Islamic revivalism emerged in the 18th and 19th centuries among tribally organized political groups in hinterland areas of the Muslim world—from Sumatra and the Indian subcontinent to central Arabia, northern Nigeria, and, finally, Sudan. Within these diverse areas, revivalist movements emerged as a reaction to the contraction of internal and external trade brought about by European encroachment. Revivalist movements were basically millenarian in nature, purely internal in their discourse and orientation, and peripheral in their geophysical, political, and economic status. They all suffered defeat at the hands of "urban political forces possessing superior firearms and methods of organization" (p. 29). By the mid-19th century, revivalism as a form of "reaction against European commercial expansion, agricultural stagnation and corrupt practices" (p. 30) was eclipsed by Islamic reformism.

Islamic reformism emerged in the mid-19th century among the educated urban middle-class—professionals, intellectuals, clergy, and civil servants. Concerned with the state of decline of Muslim societies, reformists believed that the Muslim world could overcome the intrusion of Europe by adopting European methods to modernize society. This attitude of relative openness contrasted sharply with their revivalist predecessors. By the end of the 19th century, Islamic reformism spread throughout the Muslim world.

Choueiri examines the main variants of the reform movement—Ottoman, Salafism, and the Muslim Brotherhood. In spite of the far-reaching influence of reformism, however, it failed as a political movement. "It was in the main a cultural and educational reaction seeking, on the one hand, to reinterpret Islam under the influence of Western capitalism, and inject, on the other, the new interpretations into existing political systems" (p. 50).

The author views the rise of Islamic radicalism against the backdrop of change that reshaped the Muslim world in the 20th century. From the breakup of the Ottoman Empire to the rise of nation states, the Muslim world experienced increasing Western political, economic, and social encroachment. By the end of World War II, the processes of change culminated in the polarization of politics around two models of social development, "American democratic capitalism and Soviet socialism" (p. 58), each attracting different social forces. The emergence of Nasirism in Egypt epitomized the politics of the era by embodying "socialism, nationalism and popular democracy based on a one-party system, in addition to a defiant attitude toward both the West and Israel" (p. 62). As nationalism and communism gained ascendance among political activists in the Muslim world, "the relevance of Islam as a political and economic system seemed to fade into the background as a cultural curiosity" (pp. 59–60), provoking a backlash among Islamicists and giving rise to a new fundamentalist movement.

How do radicals view the problems of Muslim societies? And what, in their view, is the prescription for setting things right? In chapters 5 and 6, the author attempts to address these questions by focusing on the writings of Sayyid Qutb and al-Mawdudi as the intellectual foundations of radical thought. He argues that all Islamic fundamentalists share a common world view that has two basic dimensions. First, it is "an essentialist world view, or the theory of ascribing permanent and inherent qualities, properties and attributes, to individuals as well as their concepts" (p. 93); second, there is an assumption of an "ever-recurring conspiracy" against Islam throughout the ages by "the same enemy masquerading under various disguises" (p. 94).

Basic to the doctrine of Islamic radicalism is the belief in the exclusive and transcendental sovereignty of God symbolized by Islam. God is the master of an "orderly and harmonious universe," which unfolds in a definite direction in accordance with His will. "The function of the human being is to receive, respond to, adopt and apply the immutable characteristics of divine rules" (p. 121). There is no room for "the legal and political sovereignty of human beings, individually and collectively" (p. 123). Humanity today is oblivious to this fact, since religious ignorance prevails. This state of affairs calls for the reinstatement of Islam as a political system, both as a recognition of the supreme authority of the one God and as a catalyst for the moral cleansing of the whole world. Only Islam is capable of salvaging a world on the verge of disaster.

Concomitant with the doctrine of Islamic radicalism is the concept of a revolutionary vanguard committed to *jihad* (struggle). It was Qutb who put forward "the necessity of organizing a body of believers" as a "vanguard of professional revolutionaries" dedicated to the single purpose of undertaking the long and arduous task of restoring Islam (p. 135). The vanguard would first of all dissociate itself from the existing system, rendering the latter's ideology and laws illegitimate. The act of "dissociation," "withdrawal," or "non-cooperation" would constitute a declaration of war. The struggle would then move on to take over power in the name of Islam. The forms of struggle may vary; the most important, however, is violence. Choueiri describes Qutb's concept of jihad as "a well-planned *putsch* launched to replace one government with another" (p. 138).

In the final chapter, the author examines the social basis of radicalism's appeal by focusing on the Iranian Revolution as a case study. The presence in rapidly urbanizing centers of marginalized classes of people—disenfranchised economically and politically by modernization, and threatened with downward mobility by ill-conceived economic development programs—offered fertile recruiting grounds for a doctrine that has both cultural legitimacy and revolutionary implications. Choueiri concludes, however, that radical experiments are not only unrealistic and irrelevant to the solution of basic problems, but also definitely detrimental to the ordinary Muslim.

In contrast to the systematic historical design of Choueiri's scholarly analysis, Habib Boularès, in *Islam: The Fear and the Hope*, relies on insight and reason to argue the imprudence and intemperance of Islamism (a term the author prefers to fundamentalism). The logic of the analysis thus rests on the author's claim to wisdom. Through an examination of the historical record, Boularès attempts to place Islamism in historical and sociopolitical perspective. The two books address the same subject matter, but with different methods appropriate to different audiences.

Suitable for a general audience rather than specialists, *Islam: The Fear and the Hope* is "both a report of actual events and an essay" (p. x). As a report, it attempts to challenge common myths about Islam and provide insight into the world of Islamism. As an essay, it provides normative and prescriptive exhortations for the creative adaptation of Islam to the contemporary world. The volume's overall purpose is to challenge common stereotypes about Islam and to examine the issues underlying the resurgence of Islamism.

A major task of the book is to spell out the social and political conditions that have given rise to Islamism. Boularès argues that Islamic activism "is political in its immediate motivation and in the tension that characterizes it" (p. 23). The 1970s constitute a point of departure for Islamist movements; it was a time when Muslim countries experienced a "rupture between the economic and the social order" (p. 13). The rise of Islamist movements was connected with the struggle for independence.

How is one to understand the recourse to religion as a form of political struggle? This is conditioned by the "crisis of values provoked by the technological advances we are presently witnessing" (p. 19). Islamists resort to religion in part because of "the existential need to find stability in a troubled world" (p. 20). Further, under conditions of political repression, mosques "become the focal points for unauthorized meetings" (p. 23) and resistance. Even the humblest of the faithful feels a sense of empowerment that "transcends social, political, or economic hierarchies" (p. 35).

Does Islamism pose a threat, and to whom? Although the intervention of religion in politics is hardly unique to the Muslim world, Islamic activism is perceived as a threat by many. Boularès believes that the threat is exaggerated, because "Islamist activism is still small, even if its violent outbreaks often shake worm-eaten systems" (p. 23). The West, however, is alarmed by the political and economic implications of the fall of the regimes in power (p. 27). There is also the fear of countries where Islam "represents an extraordinary force of resistance to assimilation" (p. 29), as in the former Soviet Union and China.

The choices facing Muslims today are fundamental. The Iranian Revolution sounds a warning, for it provides one model for societies in trouble. Although Iran provides a case study of the shortcomings of the religious state, the secular state is faced with a daunting task—it "must find the ideal equation integrating the economic, the social, and the spiritual" (p. 90). Turkey, Iran under the shah, and the case of Islam in the then-Soviet Union all provide examples of the dangers of excluding religion from the equation.

The final three chapters of the book address the question "what is the best way to demonstrate the universal aspect of Islam while freeing it from the matrix of customs and tradition?" (p. 114). In the tradition of the 19th-century reformers, Boularès provides a prescription to reconcile Islam to modernity. It is essentially a normative discourse that advocates the birth of "a new theology" and "a new ethic" wherein "science and conscience" are reconciled (p. 132).

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Passion and Politics: The Turbulent World of the Arabs, by Sandra Mackey. New York and London: Dutton, 1992. xvi + 410 pages. Bibl. to p. 417. Maps to p. 423. Index to p. 448. $23.00.

Reviewed by John K. Cooley

It is not easy to write and publish a trade book that contains ample information about the Arab world and that also has wide popular appeal. Sandra Mackey, author of *The Saudis: Inside the Desert Kingdom* and *Lebanon: Death of a Nation*, now definitely has established this as an art form. One suspects that Mackey's good work as a commentator for Cable News Network (CNN) during the Gulf crisis impelled publishers to ask her for this third book. The general reader will draw both pleasure and profit from it; while for the specialist it is living proof that a book which is mostly sympathetic to the Arabs and their problems need not appeal, in the United States especially, only to a limited audience of scholars.

Using a broad brush, Mackey interjects many touches of detail and color; anecdotal material, basically, that holds the reader's interest. As she announces in her opening author's note, she examines the *mashriq* rather than the *maghrib*. She follows the famous rule given to fledgling wire service journalists: "Tell 'em what you're going to tell 'em; tell 'em; then tell 'em what you've told 'em." She introduces the almost schizophrenic nature of the Arab world's cultural divisions as "World of the East, World of the West." Part one, including five chapters, sketches the history of the Arabs under the general heading "The Mythology of Unity," quoting the assassinated King Abdallah of Jordan: "For how many arbitrary unities have collapsed, even before they had seen the dawn of life?" She begins this first part with a well-observed description of the Arabian heartland's climatic and geographical rigors, and how both produced the Beduin character. She ends with the wars for Palestine.

The book's second part, entitled "The Reality of Division," explains in well-written historical terms such phenomena as Egypt's Abd al-Nasir, the probity and endurance of King Hussein and the internal dynamics of the Hashemite family, as well as the rival and contrasting House of Saud in Saudi Arabia, where the author has lived. Her remaining heroes and antiheroes are familiar enough; Anwar Sadat, whom like such contemporaries as Muhammad Heikal she describes as "the Pharaoh," Hafiz al-Asad, Saddam Hussein, and finally, preserving the symmetry of part one, concluding with Palestine and Yasir Arafat.

One of the book's most satisfying features for serious students of US policy in the Middle East is the concluding essay, "The Arab Reality, The American Response." The mistaken and outmoded policy approaches of the Reagan administration are described; in particular, the deadly Mideast arms race—escalating it considerably—and the Arab-Israeli conflict—evading it to concentrate on counterterrorism and the Persian Gulf. Flawing the book are a few historical errors, such as placing the French surrender of mandated Syria's Alexandretta enclave to Turkey in 1921. This action was taken in 1938–39, and helped keep Turkey neutral and out of the Axis sphere in World War II (p. 278). There are also errors of taste, such as calling Hama, before its destruction by government forces in the Sunni Muslim uprising of 1982, "Syria's loveliest city" (p. 291). Never mind; this is a good book. Writers who know something about the region and want to shatter wrong stereotypes, while introducing the Arab world to a wider audience, should produce more works of this kind.

John K. Cooley, an ABC News correspondent specializing in the Middle East, is the author of Payback: America's Long War in the Middle East *(McLean, VA: Brassey's, 1991), and other books on the region.*

Statecraft in the Middle East: Oil, Historical Memory, and Popular Culture, ed. by Eric Davis and Nicolas Gavrielides. Miami: Florida International University Press, 1991. xviii + 247 pages. Bibl. to p. 247. Index to p. 274. $39.95 cloth. $17.95 paper.

Reviewed by Linda Schatkowski Schilcher

Despite the fact that more than two years have passed since the appearance of this book—in the midst of the Gulf crisis—its approach, findings, and insights are still immediate and timely. The issues raised here have not been resolved. Six of the book's nine chapters are written by Arab scholars who, at the time of publication, held positions in Arab countries, giving the book a native voice and a clear indication that the goals of democracy are well understood among the intellectual elites of these countries.

Eric Davis' first chapter presents the dilemma of the state apparatus in Arab countries. He examines what are in fact weak state structures, whose power has been enlarged not only due to oil wealth, but also because they represent the only institutional framework beyond the family left in those societies that can cope with unprecedented social change. He sees the reasons for Iraq's war with Iran and its invasion of Kuwait as "indicative of an incomplete process of nation building" and part of a "strategy to avoid seriously addressing the internal cleavages that beset Iraqi society and its refusal to recognize cultural difference and ideological diversity" (p. 4).

The wide disciplinary and geographic range of the chapters that follow makes for fascinating reading. The various authors endeavor to make comparisons between countries and to integrate materials from the realm of literature, popular culture, and propaganda in the wider sense of the word. The book's most common thread is to discover the legitimization strategy of various countries since their recent independence and the impact oil wealth has had on that process.

In an engaging survey of elite formation, ending with the stalemate of "the era of military dominance" of the 1960s, Khaldoun Hasan al-Naqeeb gives a critical, independent, and sobering native view of the influence of US foreign policy in the Gulf. Regimes that have seized the state, suppressed the political process, co-opted the masses, and monopolized the economy generally have been tolerated in the *Pax Americana.*

The two editors present an agenda for comparative research on Kuwaiti and Iraqi propaganda of statecraft, with some preliminary hypotheses that might better have been placed in the introduction. By their own admission the agenda is largely and unfortunately restricted to written texts. State television and radio programs, monuments, public festivals, or even school texts and curricula are not analyzed, but the preliminary findings are nonetheless interesting. Whereas Iraq mobilizes the public political mind, the power of the Kuwaiti regime works to "demobilize" it (p. 140). The authors avoid directly criticizing the fig-leaf concept of "stability" in the Pax Americana, but lead the reader nonetheless to the conclusion that it is indeed an excuse for a multitude of sins, not least of which has been the frustration and exhaustion of freethinking native artists and intellectuals.

Several of the individual contributions are particularly noteworthy. Noura al-Falah's study of the way in which education in Kuwait has shattered "the barriers between the private and the public spheres" posits that these changes "have not been matched by changes in the patriarchal ideology or in the system of social values" (p. 149). Although the overall standard of living has improved and social services have expanded, Kuwaitis of the former pastoral and urban working classes have become "nonproductive groups dependent on state salaries" (p. 174). The pursuit of the symbols of the good life and, in particular, the reliance on largely foreign household servants, combined with the gender-specific division of employment, has had stultifying effects on women and the society as a whole.

Lisa Anderson points to the way in which overcoming the colonial past makes the writing of history in Libya an exercise in simply proving that Libya has a history. Whereas the Italians contested that fact and wrote of Libya's Roman past, the Sanusi monarchy legitimized the role of their own sufi order. Muammar Qadhafi has pursued a predictably anticolonialist line. Due to the improving quality of historical writing and the conjuncture of this trend with that of the "new" European history, as well as the influx of oil wealth, the most recent Libyan historical writing combines social historical methods into narratives of the struggle for national independence. Although the regime prefers chronological narrative to anthropology and ethnography, because it is not averse to incorporating popular culture into the historiography of the "era of the masses," the "new" history largely has held its own.

If there is a shortcoming to this fine collection, it is in the rather meager treatment of Saudi Arabia, both the richest oil state and one of the most important "exporters" of political culture.

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ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

Living the Intifada, by Andrew Rigby. London and Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books, 1991. 202 pages. Append. to p. 219. Bibl. to p. 223. Index to p. 233. $55.00 cloth. $19.95 paper.

Reviewed by Erika G. Alin

Over the past five years, a substantial body of literature has examined varying dimensions of the causes, character, and consequences of the Palestinian uprising. *Living the Intifada* analyzes the impact of the uprising and, more important in Rigby's view, the effect of Israel's response to the uprising on the individual and collective welfare of West Bank and Gaza Palestinians. The author does so from a perspective that combines personal empathy with Palestinians' human suffering and national aspirations, and an informative examination of post-1967, and especially post-1987, social and economic developments in the occupied territories.

The central chapters of the work cover the medical, educational, economic, and informational consequences of the *intifada*. They follow a uniform format in which Rigby, after analyzing pre-1987 Israeli policies and developments relating to the subject under consideration, details Israel's response to the eruption of the uprising; for example, deportations, curfews, the closing of Palestinian universities and schools, and other forms of collective punishment. The author then assesses Palestinian efforts, through the creation of popular committees to coordinate the provision of services under the uprising, to disengage from the dominant structures of the occupation. Although popular committees have established the foundation for greater autonomous Palestinian institution building in the territories, as Rigby recognizes, their potential for developing into an alternative base of authority in the West Bank and Gaza has been limited by Palestinians' continued economic dependence on Israel, Israeli suppression of such organizational initiatives, and growing political divisions among Palestinians that have affected the cohesion and ability of the committees' work, as well as of the intifada more generally.

Throughout *Living the Intifada*, Rigby's concern with the consequences for Palestinians of the occupation and the uprising—and the Israeli response—encompasses not only issues of physical welfare and the deprivation of political and economic rights, but also the impact of prolonged intercommunal hostility and confrontation on the present and future values and standards for individual treatment and social interaction among both Israelis and Palestinians. Rigby writes that both communities, "in the process of 'demonizing' each other . . . will also lose something of their own humanity" (p. 96). He holds the Israeli occupation primarily responsible for Palestinians' continued suffering, presenting an empathetic view of the intifada as an "explosion" of individual and collective frustrations rooted in two decades of oppression, injustice, and humiliation under Israeli rule.

Yet he is also critical of the overarching strategy of resistance on which the uprising has been based, arguing that "the Intifada has not been a nonviolent struggle in the sense of refraining from inflicting physical harm and injury upon Israelis" (p. 91). "The determining impetus to make Israel withdraw from the occupied territories must come from within Israel itself" (p. 193) and stones and Molotov cocktails, "even when they do not kill . . . reinforce the image of the other as fundamentally threatening" (p. 191), thereby counteracting the positive impact on Israeli political sentiments of post-1987 diplomatic initiatives that indicated a Palestinian readiness to live peacefully alongside Israel.

The intifada, Rigby concludes, has not been sufficiently nonviolent and, therefore, has failed to convey a consistent political message to Israelis concerning Palestinians' desire for peaceful coexistence. An evaluation of its primary accomplishments, therefore, should not be confined to the status of contemporary diplomatic initiatives, but should also include the potentially significant future political consequences of the "process of self-regeneration" that has accompanied the uprising, under which "a people traditionally cast as subjects have transformed themselves into active citizens" (p. 202) and participants in the struggle for their national rights.

Living the Intifada presents a valuable examination of the significant social and economic developments that have affected the lives and welfare of Palestinians during the intifada. The analytical and conceptual foundations of the overall framework of civil disobedience and nonviolent resistance, within which successes and shortcomings of the uprising are analyzed, could have been more thoroughly developed in order to provide better synthesis to the book's component chapters. Yet Rigby's forthright analysis and concentration on the human consequences of the post-1987 social and economic developments in the West Bank and Gaza make *Living the Intifada* a worthwhile contribution to the growing literature on the Palestinian uprising.

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LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE

Ali and Nino, by Kurban Said, tr. by Jenia Graman. London: Robin Clark, 1990. Distrib. Quartet Books, London. 237 pages. £5.95 paper.

Reviewed by Hasan Javadi

Ali and Nino was published originally in German in 1937. It is a delightfully written story of a Georgian princess and an Azeri khan that begins in Baku around the turn of the century. Nino Kipiani and Ali Khan Shirvanshir meet when they are in high school and, in spite of their many differences in upbringing and family, they marry.

Two main themes blend together throughout the novel—differences between East and West, and Christianity and Islam; and the short-lived history of Azerbaijan as an independent republic from 1918 to 1920. Now, following the disintegration of the former Soviet Union and the re-emergence of Azerbaijan as an independent nation, and with the sad tragedy of the conflict over Nagorno Karabagh still continuing, the reprint of this powerful novel comes at an appropriate time. It gives a graphic and almost eyewitness account of Azerbaijan from the beginning of World War I, through the Russian Revolution, the conquest of Baku by the troops of Aver Pasha, the defeat of the Ottoman Empire and the occupation of the city by British troops, and finally to the victory of the Bolsheviks and the collapse of the Azerbaijani republic. Ali Khan twice valiantly defends his country, once against the Russians and Armenians, and then a second time against the Russians, when he dies. In the interval he and his family are driven into exile to Iran, from where the family originates. This gives the author the opportunity to describe life in the aristocratic circles of Tehran just before the rise of Reza Shah to power.

Ali and Nino is a novel in the tradition of E.M. Forster's *A Passage to India.* In spite of living in the same country and having many similar Caucasian traditions, the protagonists are different because of their upbringing. Characters are drawn true to life and in a most credible fashion. Sometimes they are shown in contrast to each other. Nachariyan is a rich Westernized Armenian friend, who takes off with Nino and, in a dramatic and symbolic scene, is pursued and killed by Ali Khan. In contrast, Seyd Mustafa, a religious and old-fashioned friend of Ali, remains faithful to his ideals and his friends to the end. Ali Khan loves Seyd Mustafa because of his inflexibility—a character that he himself as a modern Muslim cannot afford to have. Ali wants to make concessions and adapt his faith to changing circumstances, provided only that the essence remains undiluted.

Mystery surrounds the life of the author, Kurban Said. His original name was Lev Naussimbaum, the son of a Jewish governess and a Jewish businessman. Apparently he was born in 1905 in Baku and was converted to Islam in his youth, changing his name to Essad Bey. In the early 1920s he attached himself to literary and journalistic circles in Berlin. In the 1930s he moved to Vienna and, in 1938, fleeing from the Nazis, he ended up in Italy. In 1942 he died of a self-inflicted wound by which he had tried to escape deportation—he had stabbed himself in the foot and succumbed to blood poisoning. Of his fiction one more example is preserved, *The Girl with the Golden Horn.* His other works are mostly biographies, including Muhammad, Reza Shah, V.I. Lenin, and Tsar Nicholas II.

The author provides an authentic historical background and an excellent account of the first republic of Azerbaijan. There are occasional inaccuracies in historical details, however, mostly in the passages concerning Iran. For instance, the Babi heroine Qorratol 'Ayn (given as Hurriet ul Ain) was not burnt to death in Tehran in the reign of Nasir al-Din Shah, but strangled. When a Tehran mob stormed the Russian embassy and killed the ambassador, the Qajar ruler Feth Ali Shah was not "satisfied," and Abbas Mirza, the crown prince, was not "very happy," nor did the clergyman who had instigated the mob "receive a big reward" (p. 115). Instead the shah sent his grandson Khusrov Mirza to Russia to apologize for the incident. The statement that Tiflis was taken "seven" times by Timur is not true (p. 116).

Despite these inaccuracies, *Ali and Nino* is a brilliant novel with well-depicted characters and beautifully descriptive scenes. It is a story of love and personal heroism, blood feud and adventure, set in a turbulent period of Azerbaijani history.

Hasan Javadi, Jahan Books, Bethesda, Maryland

A Grammar of Contemporary Persian, by Gilbert Lazar, tr. by Shirley A. Lyon. Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers; and New York: Bibliotheca Persica, 1992. Persian Studies Series, no. 14. vii + 301 pages. $35.00 cloth. $19.95 paper.

Reviewed by Mahvash Shahegh Hariri

This text originally was published in French in 1957. For several reasons, including the unwillingness of the French publisher to relinquish copyright, it was not available in English for over 30 years. Finally in 1992 an English-language translation, prepared by Shirley A. Lyon in 1975, was published with the help of the author, Gilbert Lazar, and Professor Ehsan Yarshater.

As the title of the book indicates, the emphasis is mostly on contemporary Persian grammar and colloquial language, based on the dialect of Tehran. Particular attention also has been paid, as Lazar notes in his foreword, to "certain little studied points which play an important role in the functioning of the language (especially colloquial), such as the uses of the personal suffixes, of the postposition *râ*, of the particle *ke*" (p. 2).

This book can be reviewed from the perspective of Persian phonetics and writing, as well as Persian morphology. In the former domain, Lazar, like an accurate tape recorder, has reproduced Persian dialogues and native speakers' conversations. When a native Persian speaker reads this book, the individual must stop, rethink, and remake the sounds to realize what Lazar is describing, and appreciate how accurate the author is. For example, on p. 24, Lazar mentions that the final *y* after *â* and *u* is facultative: *jây/jâ* "place;" *muy/mu* "hair." He then explains that in words of this type the forms having *y* are exclusively literary, and that the simple modern language uses only the forms with final vocalic. This point is a commonly known fact, at least to scholars. The astonishing part in Lazar's analysis is the last part: "in colloquial language, this final *y* having disappeared, the pronunciation frequently wavers between *i* and *y*; final *i* after a vowel is pronounced *y* in rapid speech: *miâi* 'you are coming' > *miây*" (p. 24). This is a brilliant and outstanding observation.

Regarding Persian morphology, Lazar's keen analysis is also at work. To give but one example, *hâ* is the plural marker in Persian. Among the different usages of this marker, Lazar mentions two specific ones that other Persian grammar books rarely mention: emphasis rather than plurality, in the case of massive nouns, for example, *pulhâ*, "a pile of money," *in pulhâ* "all this money," and extension or approximation, in the case of adverbs of place and time, and of certain abstracts, for example, *âxarhâ*, *zudihâ*, and *âsânihâ* (p. 65).

Lazar has studied Persian phonetics, its writing, and colloquial Persian accurately and comprehensively. In accordance with Yarshater's preface, Lazar's book may be described justifiably as "in fact the most detailed, systematic and comprehensive grammar of contemporary Persian written so far" (p. v). This book will be useful to native Persian-speakers as well as those who are interested in learning Persian. It is also a precious resource to linguists interested in the contemporary Persian language.

Mahvash Shahegh Hariri, Persian language instructor, the Middle East Institute, Washington, DC

Veils and Words: The Emerging Voices of Iranian Women Writers, by Farzaneh Milani. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1992. xix + 239 pages. Notes to p. 270. Bibl. to p. 283. Index to p. 295. $34.95 cloth. $16.95 paper.

Reviewed by Michael Beard

The logic of card catalogues and indices suggests that Iranian women writers might be a slighter, less substantial subject than the undifferentiated but mostly male subjects of the old-fashioned literary histories. The reader of this book, however, is likely to feel that the focus on women has widened the scope instead. Not only are women in Iran responsible for a disproportionate amount of the most interesting writing, but they have redefined culture, backlit Iranian society to make unexpected depths visible.

Farzaneh Milani uses veiling as a conceptual frame, looking at the *chador* and its history, the contradictory justifications for it, and the mentalities supported by it, but noting that veiling is also such a common figurative image in Persian that it can serve as an introduction to Persian esthetics. The reader will not find the tired equation of unveiling and creativity: she describes the barriers to self-disclosure and the pressures that make the public act of writing a threat, but presents them as part of the whole complex network of links that have evolved between society and art.

An historical summary reclaims the heretofore sketchy record of poetry by Iranian women under the title "From Tahereh to Tahereh," ironic because the two Taherehs were so different. The first is Tahereh Qorratol 'Ayn (1817–1852), a charismatic poet and Baha'i martyr whose unveiling was central to her public persona (and whose inclusion in a history of Persian literature counters a deeply imbedded compartmentalization). The other Tahereh is the contemporary poet Tahereh Saffarzadeh, famous for a 1969 book of secular poems in English, who has since reveiled and become a spokeswoman for values of the Islamic republic. Between the two Taherehs is a similarly contrasting pair, the reclusive Parvin E'tessami and the relatively flamboyant modernist Forugh Farrokhzad.

Throughout this account of diverse figures, and its close-grained attention to detail, there persists a celebratory tone. The material often requires scenes of unfairness and frustration, pain and oppression, but the emphasis is on the artist's triumph over obstacles. Often Milani writes as if from within each writer's sensibility, paraphrasing the logic behind the work in a way that co-opts the writer's voice. Quotations from poetry serve as an object of analysis, but also as an extension of her argument, verifying her point in its voice.

It is a new voice, which achieves an unusual and much welcome balance between engagement and dispassionate observation. Something subversive underlies Milani's argument, a radical questioning of the established order, but an equally powerful sense of reconciliation, which is exemplified in the concluding section, an evocation of the poetry of Simin Behbani. Behbani—a contemporary of the late Farrokhzad who publishes in Iran, veiled, still not widely read or translated—represents the possibility of dialogue within the system of veiling, and reminds readers again that women in the Middle East are the emerging center of the discipline.

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SOCIAL CONDITIONS

Development and Disenchantment in Rural Tunisia: The Bourguiba Years, by Mira Zussman. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992. xviii + 182 pages. Appends. to p. 188. Bibl. to p. 200. Index to p. 212. $34.00 paper.

Reviewed by Thomas K. Park

The originality of Mira Zussman's work lies primarily in her convincing portrayal of the rural attitudinal ambiguities and recurring disappointments of *fallahin* in the Medjerda region northwest of Tunis. Zussman argues that the local dichotomy between *suri* (Syrian, French, foreign) and *arbi* (local, Arab) lifestyles and products shapes identity and agricultural practice in a pervasive fashion. Much of the book is devoted to documenting the range of alternative strategies, commodities, and cultural traditions defined under these two rubrics. Another facet of the book describes the way past colonial practice and recent national development practice are assimilated in the local view to ambiguously charged and ever changing suri practice. They are ambiguous, because they seem tied both to commercial advantages and repeated broken promises as well as to aesthetic and moral disadvantages.

At the syntactic level the book is well written, but at a higher level it suffers significantly from the appearance of being a composite of several only partly connected and disappointingly brief studies. The introduction, chapter 6 ("Access to the Souri World"), and chapter 7 ("Mutual Disenchantments") develop the main theme, while other chapters touch more or less briefly on it. Chapter 3 ("Local Distinctions") examines the history and local status of new and traditional ethnic groupings, but this is tied only in the most ephemeral way to the suri and arbi dichotomy. Chapter 4 ("Debates over Mentality") and chapter 5 ("Strategies of the Fellahin") suddenly interject a brief summary of Tunisian development policy in all its variety since independence in order to make a few simple points—colonial stereotypes of risk-averse (read irrational) peasants still color national development policy, and that policy has had so many failures, reversals, and revisions that local fallahin are quite rational in viewing it with skepticism. These points are undoubtedly well taken but are by no means surprising.

Zussman provides eight "representative" case studies in chapter 5 that provide some support for her echo of the local critique of Tunisian development policy but, overall, the book lacks any significant general data on demographic or economic changes in the region. This lacunae, and the general impression the book conveys that people are more prosperous now than during the colonial period, makes the choice of theme and the book as a whole somewhat unsatisfying. The example of colonial opportunism over the land of Sidi Ug'ud (chapter 1, "Land and Cynicism") is memorable, and many of the local proverbs and pithy critiques will also delight the reader. Yet it would have been a far better book if the author had focused more narrowly on the proposed topic—development and disenchantment—or renamed the book in line with the main, and original, focus on the ambiguous identities and allegiances that have developed in the Medjerda region. Readers learn only a little about the differences in this regard between young and old, male and female, former immigrants and locals who have never travelled, and the educated and uneducated. The role of religious education in identity formation also is scarcely addressed.

Thomas K. Park, Department of Anthropology, University of Arizona

A Matter of Honor: Experiences of Turkish Women Immigrants, by Tahire Kocturk. London and Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books, 1992. xiii + 131 pages. Refs. to p. 141. Index to p. 145. $49.95 cloth. $19.95 paper.

Reviewed by Jenny B. White

The premise of this book is laudable; the author, a Turkish nutritionist in Sweden, sets out to tell the story of Turkish women within the context of their history and of women's experiences in Europe. She points out that much research on Turkish immigrants focuses on cultural norms, which are then compared to norms of the host country. These researchers, she argues, do not understand the context (particularly the historical context) of the Turkish cultural perspective. The implication is that this leads to the stereotyping of Muslim women as subordinated and as powerless victims of patriarchy.

The first two chapters present historical overviews of Turkish history and Islam. This is followed by a description of the status and lifestyle of present-day Turkish women of different classes and rural and urban origins. Although these narratives may be useful introductions for those with no knowledge of Turkey, they are marred by an oversimplification of complex issues. This is perhaps inevitable in any attempt to pack the history of the Turks, Islam, and the status of Turkish women into three short chapters. More disturbing are the generalizations made about the interaction of patriarchy, history, and Islam, which reflect the author's Kemalist bias. This results in a sometimes contradictory juxtaposition of factual narrative and authorial commentary about the "subjugation" and "salvation" of Muslim women.

It is only in the last two chapters that the focus is brought back to Turkish women in

Europe—an historical account of migration to Europe, and the results of the author's study of gender and family relations among Turks in Sweden. This section is the most interesting, as it presents new data, often in the words of the migrant women themselves. They discuss such issues as childhood socialization, marriage, employment, battering, and divorce.

Although the book offers few new insights for the scholar of Turkey, it does provide a much-needed general overview of Turkish history and culture for those with little previous knowledge. Teachers, social workers, civil servants, those presenting and representing Turkey, and Turks themselves would benefit from reading this book. In particular, the placing of Turks and Turkish women in the context of a history beyond their present status makes the construction of stereotypes more difficult, as the author intended.

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A World of Difference: Islam and Gender Hierarchy in Turkey, by Julie Marcus. London and Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books, 1992. x + 174 pages. Notes to p. 185. Bibl. to p. 196. Index to p. 201. $49.95 cloth. $17.50 paper.

Reviewed by Emelie A. Olson

In this study of Islam and gender hierarchy in Aegean Turkey, Julie Marcus calls for a "radicalizing of the entire field" of ethnography (p. 60) and related disciplines. Dismissing as outmoded any notions that knowledge can be objective, she declares her intentions at the outset: "to make clear the ways in which . . . the relations of power of dominating economies are reproduced through their representations of other's cultures" (p. vii). In keeping with this view, she focuses on the influence of global processes on local phenomena: "I began by asking what effect the processes of the incorporation of the Ottoman economy into the periphery of the developing world economy had on gender hierarchy" (p. 112). Her answer: the effects were multifaceted, pervasive, and decisive.

Marcus also charges that dominant Western views of the Middle East are still Orientalist, despite the critiques by Edward Said and others. She indicts conventional "history" in particular and describes her own odyssey of discovery of the "way in which the processes of writing the western past . . . become an impediment to observation, shaping careful observation into recognizable and familiar narratives that are part of European, rather than Turkish, history" (p. 8).

The author also provides detailed description and analysis of little-known phenomena that are worthy of far more attention, for example, the recital of the Turkish *mevlid* (nativity poem) and of Sura 36 at saints' shrines, and the cultural visions reflected thereby, the May festival of Hidrellez, and the symbolic importance of rain and the movement of fluids generally.

Marcus argues that gender systems play a fundamental role in the organization of cultures and societies. For example, adapting Victor Turner's approach, she demonstrates how the domains of "structure and anti-structure" in Turkish society are divided by gender, though with considerable overlap. The dominant male model of society has its sacred structural center in the mosque and its sacred anti-structural center in the pilgrimage shrine at Mecca. The corresponding centers for the female model are mevlid recitals in the household and the local pilgrimage (saints') shrines. Unexpectedly, she views the ideal male model as a "tightly bounded and closed model of the world," while the ideal female model is "necessarily open in its concern with universal values" (p. 162). That is, both the mevlid recitals and the shrine rites "make manifest a vision of a moral community which is unified . . . one of equals, one which focuses on life and death and the transcendent birthing role of women in both" (p. 148). Through the allocation of women's "ground space" (p. 108) these rituals, as well as "female'' festivals such as Aşure and Hidrellez, validate women in both religious and secular realms. Although Westerners equate this spacial division with oppression, in fact, she argues, in its denial of female space, the ''universal, male, Christian moral community'' denies women certain strengths and freedoms generally enjoyed by Muslim women'' (p. 170).

Marcus draws on a remarkable array of sources, and this brief review cannot do justice to the range, richness, and complexity of the ideas presented in this slim volume—ideas that this reviewer hopes Marcus will develop more fully in the future.

A World of Difference is an important book whose theoretical insights and ethnographic data should stimulate useful discussion of epistemology, gender, Islam, and Turkish society and culture.

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EDUCATION

Education and the Making of Modern Iran, by David Menashri. Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1992. xvii + 328 pages. Sources to p. 342. Index to p. 352. $47.50.

Reviewed by Shahrzad Mojab

Although education is studied extensively as a motor of social change or an agency for reproduction of the status quo, it has been largely ignored by students of Iranian history and society. There are less than a dozen book-length treatments of education in English, and these are outdated and of poor quality. David Menashri's work is undoubtedly a breakthrough, not matched by published research in English or Persian.

The book ''examines the contribution of education to the overall process of social, economic, and political change in the two centuries since the country was first exposed to Western schooling'' (p. xi). Focus is on higher education, although the work devotes considerable space to the primary and secondary levels. The book's 13 chapters, divided into three parts, examine education under the Qajars and the two Pahlavi monarchs, and are followed by an epilogue addressing developments under the Islamic republic. The research is based on field work in Iran conducted in 1974 and 1975–77; and primary sources, including archival material, press reports, government documents, official surveys, and interviews. Evidence from these sources, analyzed within the framework of conflict theory, provides a lively picture of Iran's intellectual and cultural life. (Menashri examines the great theoretical divide—functionalism and conflict theory—and leans toward the latter.)

Education in Iran, much like journalism and literature, has been the arena of immense struggles between the state, social classes, the religious establishment, students and professors, nationalities, women, political parties, and others. Although alliances within this complex array of forces were subject to change, two fronts can be discerned clearly—the state, Western powers, and their supporters on one side; and those fighting for independence, freedom, democracy, and socialism on the other.

Menashri is at his best when he examines the conflict within the state, although he does not ignore the struggle of the opposition against the ruling power and its Western supporters. His study shatters the standard view of modernization theorists and monarchist authors such as Donald Wilber, who pose the Pahlavi monarchs as the torchbearers of enlightenment in a wasteland of ignorant and backward people.

Menashri demonstrates that Iranians in both pre-Islamic and Islamic times glorified the acquisition of knowledge. However, the adoption of modern Western education—motivated by the Qajar state's desire to cope with the military power of the West—resulted in considerable tension, especially between those promoting secular education and the religious establishment that had exercised a monopoly over the system during the Islamic period. In spite of the indispensability of

Western education, present-day Iran tries to separate Western culture from Western science and rejects the former without allowing "public consciousness" to understand the impossibility of this separation (p. 17).

The author concludes that, despite many shortcomings, "education has undoubtedly been one of the most—if not the most—important social instruments shaping modern Iran" (p. 303). Discussing the contribution of new education to the Islamic revolution, Menashri refers to the shah, who found out that the "control of education by an autocratic regime did not necessarily guarantee genuine support," a lesson the Islamic regime has yet to learn. During the revolution, "alongside the clerics it was the educated class who was in the forefront of the opposition" (p. 306).

It is impossible to do full justice here to the wealth of insights and findings of this book. Historians will benefit from Menashri's discussion of the first modern polytechnical school, Dar al-Fonun, whose establishment involved a conflict between the Qajar monarch, the enlightened prime minister Amir Kabir, Western powers, and the religious establishment (pp. 53–8). To cite another example, the fear of the ruling circles over the radicalization (Bolshevism) of students sent abroad was one factor in the establishment of Tehran University (pp. 142–4). Unlike many Western and monarchist authors, Menashri gives credit to the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic of 1946 for establishing the first provincial university in Tabriz (p. 214), although other educational achievements of the Azerbaijan and Kurdish autonomous regimes (including native-tongue education in Turkish and Kurdish) are not covered.

As is evident from his sources, the author did not use or have access to sufficient information regarding the student movement. Although he is aware that both "education" and the "making of modern Iran" meant different things to different social forces, his treatment of the changing contributions of two major components of higher education—students and faculty—is not adequate. For example, the book does not provide a faithful picture of the universities that emerged as *sangar-e azadi* (bastions of freedom). The issue is relevant to the book's topic; the student movement in Iran, as in other developing countries, has not been interested in educational demands *per se*, but rather in national political issues. Students, in Iran and abroad, never ceased fighting against the state even when every voice of opposition had been effectively silenced outside the campus, from the 1930s to 1941, from 1953 to 1960, and from 1964 to 1977. This was only partly due to the nature of higher educational institutions, which allows the concentration of thousands of young people, relieved of all duties other than intellectual work. This is true in all developing countries. More important was the relationship between the campus and other social and political forces and their politics. Looking only at Mohammad Reza Shah's period (the focus of the book), one may argue that although the student movement was largely reformist and "constitutionalist" prior to 1964 (with the slogan "the shah must reign not rule"), it became radicalized in the mid-1960s, and advocated the overthrow of the monarchy and its replacement with a democratic and independent republican regime.

Similarly, the faculty became active and radicalized after 1977 and played a major role in the revolution. With the weakening of his authority in 1978, the shah finally granted what the faculty had been demanding since the 1940s, the autonomy (in Iran, "independence") of the universities. This time, however, the faculty rejected this "independence"—not primarily because the state was faltering, as Menashri argues (p. 298), but rather due to their radicalization, as they rejected the previous legalistic approach to university autonomy, and argued that autonomy could not be achieved as long as the institution of the monarchy and Western domination persisted. Had the political line of liberals like Ali Akbar Siyasi prevailed among the faculty, there is little doubt that they would have accepted the fledgling shah's offer. It is also relevant to note that the faculty of Aryamehr (now Sharif) University were among the first state institutions to challenge openly the authority of the state, when, in August 1978, they declared their authority to admit students independent of the government's preference. Thus the weakening of the state was in part due to the radicalization of the faculty and the ongoing revolution, rather than vice versa. The liberals proved their willingness to support the monarchy, even when it was at its weakest moment of life.

Contrary to his earlier claim that the Islamic republic "utterly and totally reversed" the Westernization trend, Menashri notes elsewhere the continuity between the educational system of the monarchical and republican regimes (pp. 326–7). Still, the significance of the Islamic cultural revolution is overemphasized when he claims that its "scope . . . was as large as that of the Chinese Cultural Revolution" (p. 304). The cultural revolution in China sought to prevent the restoration of capitalism, as the Chinese believed had occurred in the Soviet Union in the wake of Nikita Khrushchev's "coup" of 1956. However, the Islamic cultural revolution was initially a quasimilitary offensive against the universities, aimed at extending state control over the leftist-dominated campuses. The subsequent Islamization, admittedly most carefully planned and with full support from Khomeini, has largely failed to turn the universities into non-Western, nonmodern institutions. Higher education is tied to the now dominant capitalist economy of Iran and its sizeable middle class, neutralizing the Islamic state's effort to achieve its most ambitious Islamization goal—establishing a "unity between *howze* (Shi'i centers of learning) and the university." The failure to Islamize higher education, even when lead by a popular leader like Khomeini, is most revealing, for it is in this area that Islam has a strong and venerable history.

Some of the analytical weaknesses referred to above are related in part to the author's view of the history of political struggle in Iran. Aspects of modernization theory and functionalism mar Menashri's historiography. Central to any study of "the making of modern Iran" is the struggle for the overthrow of the ancient monarchical system. The monarchy was challenged several times during this century. However, many historians ignore the fact that the religious establishment was the last to call for the monarchy's replacement with a new or different order. In the 1920s the clergy and their howzes opposed the formation of a republican regime. Khomeini himself did not advocate the overthrow of the monarchy until 1971. This was years after the student movement and the new leftist organizations—Feda'is, Mojahedeen, and others, all rooted in the universities—fought for the formation of a democratic, popular, and independent republican regime. Khomeini joined the left in part to challenge its hegemony.

As a major contribution to the study of Iranian history and education, Menashri's work is indispensable for understanding an important aspect of the modern history of Iran.

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Recent Publications

ARMENIA

Looking toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History, by Ronald Grigor Suny. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993. xi + 289 pages. Notes. Bibl. Index. $39.50 cloth. $14.95 paper. Contains 14 chapters, including three not previously published: "Rethinking the Unthinkable: Toward an Understanding of the Armenian Genocide," "Looking toward Ararat: The Diaspora and the 'Homeland'," and "Armenia on the Road to Independence, Again." The volume is in two parts, "Imagining Armenia" and "State, Nation, Diaspora." Also provides an extensive "Bibliography of Books and Articles in Western Languages on Modern Armenian History."

EGYPT

Contemporary Egypt through Egyptian Eyes: Essays in Honor of Professor P.J. Vatikiotis, ed. by Charles

Tripp. London and New York: Routledge, 1993. xi + 156 pages. Index. $49.95. Contains nine chapters, including "The Political Press in Egypt, 1882–1914" by Abbas Kelidar, "Ali Mahir and the Politics of the Egyptian Army, 1936–1942" by Charles Tripp, "Egypt in the Balance" by Walid Kazziha, "Interpretations and Misinterpretations of the Egyptian Economy" by Adel Beshai, and "Egyptian Diplomacy: East-West Detente and North-South Dialogue" by Butros Butros-Ghali.

IRAN

Yāddāshthā-ye 'Alam, jald-e dovom: 1349 ve 1351 (The Diaries of 'Alam, vol. 2: 1970–71 and 1972–73), ed. by Alinaghi Alikhani. Bethesda, MD: Iranbooks, 1993. 424 pages. $25.00. A Persian-language text of diaries by Assadollah Alam, former prime minister and court minister in the shah's government. The diaries are also available in English translation, and were published in 1991 by St. Martin's Press as *The Shah and I: The Confidential Diary of Iran's Royal Court, 1969–1977.*

ISRAEL AND ZIONISM

Israel and Diaspora Jewry: Ideological and Political Perspectives, ed. by Eliezer Don-Yehiya. Ramat Gan, Israel: Bar-Ilan University Press, 1991. 257 pages. n.p. Contains 17 chapters, including "Israel in the Mind of American Jews" by Charles S. Liebman, "The Lessons of the Pollard Case" by Daniel J. Elazar, "The Jewish Diaspora News Media and the 1982 Lebanon War" by Yoel Cohen, "Jewish Linkage Politics: *Commentary*'s Neo-Conservatism and its Attitude towards Israel" by Amiel Unger, "The Socio-Political Origins of the Israel-Diaspora Relationship: The Territorialization of the Zionist Movement, 1917–1935" by Shmuel Sandler, "Israel and the Iraqi Jewish Community in the Political Crisis of 1949" by Moshe Gat, and " *'Galut'* in Zionist Ideology and in Israeli Society" by Eliezer Don-Yehiya.

Israeli Democracy under Stress, ed. by Ehud Sprinzak and Larry Diamond. Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993. xvi + 383 pages. Contribs. Index. $45.00 cloth. $16.95 paper. A collection of 18 articles, based on a 1990 conference at the Hoover Institution, sponsored by the Israel Democracy Institute. Chapters include "The Historical Origins of Israeli Democracy" by Yonathan Shapiro, "Elite Illegalism in Israel and the Question of Democracy" by Ehud Sprinzak, "The Politics of Provocation Revisited: Participation and Protest in Israel" by Gadi Wolfsfeld, "The Israeli Public and the Intifada: Attitude Change or Entrenchment?" by Ephraim Yuchtman-Yaar, and "Political Education in the Midst of a National Identity Crisis: The Compatibility of Judaism and Democracy as a Pedagogical Theme" by Arye Carmon.

KURDS AND KURDISTAN

Entre la *'umma* et le nationalisme: L'Islam kurde au tournant du siècle, by Hamit Bozarslan. Amsterdam: Middle East Research Associates, 1992. Occasional Paper no. 15. 28 pages. Bibl. $8.00 paper.

KUWAIT

Kuwait: Dependency and Class in a Rentier State, by Jacqueline S. Ismael. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1993. xiv + 240 pages. Appends. Notes. Bibl. Index. $19.95 paper. A revised and updated edition of the author's 1982 book, *Kuwait: Social Change in Historical Perspective.* Chapter 8, "Post-Modern Kuwait: The Limits of Dependency," examines Kuwaiti politics, economy, and society in the 1980s, and through the Iraqi invasion and liberation of Kuwait. Tables, notes, and the bibliography have also been updated.

LEBANON

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Abbreviations

A./a., Asia, Asian, Asiatic, Asie, asiatique, etc.
Acad., Academy
Admin., Administration, Administrative
Aff., Affairs
Afr./afr., Africa, African, Afrique, africain, etc.
Amer., America, American, etc.
Ann., Annals, Annales
Annu., Annuaire
Anthrop./anthrop., Anthropology, Anthropological, Anthropologie, anthropologique, etc.
Assoc., Association
B., Bulletin
BSOAS, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies
C., Central
Cah., Cahiers
Comp., Comparative
Contemp./contemp., Contemporary, contemporain, etc.
Cult., Culture, Cultural
Cur., Current
D., Deutsch, etc.
Dept., Department
Dev., Developing
Develop., Development
East., Eastern
Econ./écon., Economics Economie, économique, etc.
For., Foreign
Fr./fr., France, French, français, etc.
Geog./géog., Geography, Geographic, Geographical, Géographie, géographique, etc.
Hist./hist., History, Historical, Histoire, historique
IBLA, Institut des Belles Lettres Arabes
IJMES, International Journal of Middle East Studies
Inst., Institute, Institut, etc.
internac., internacional
Internat./internat., International, international, Internationale, etc.
internaz., internazionale
J., Journal
JPS, Journal of Palestine Studies
Lit., Literature, Literary
Lab., Labor, Labour
Mag., Magazine
Maj., Majallah, Majallat
Med./Méd., Mediterranean, Méditerranée, etc.
MEJ, Middle East Journal
MERIP, Middle East Research and Information Project
MESA, Middle East Studies Association
Mid., Middle
Mod./mod., Modern, moderne, moderno
Nr., Near
O., Orient, Oriental, Orientalia, oriental, oriente, etc.
Org., Organization
Pak., Pakistan
Polit./polit., Politics, Political, Politique, politique, Politica, etc.
Probs., Problems
Quart., Quarterly
Rel., Relations
Rep., Report
Res., Research
Rev., Review, Revue, Revista
Riv., Rivista
S., School, Schools
Sci., Science, Sciences, Scienze, etc.
Soc./soc., Society, Social, Société, social, etc.
Sociol./sociol., Sociology, Sociological, Sociologica, Sociologie, sociologique, etc.
Stud., Studies, Studia
Supp., Supplement
Univ., University, Université, etc.
US, United States
Z., Zeitschrift

The Bibliography of Periodical Literature has been prepared by the book review editor, with the assistance of **Joanna Dubois, Eleni Eleftheriou, Amy C. Ezrin, Elissa A. Goldman, Lea-Rachel Kosnik, Michelle A. Tadros, Pinar Taşkin, Stacy L. Tobin, and Nancy Wood.**

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To the Editor:

Amira Sonbol commented on mainstream reviewers' tendencies to dismiss or label scholarly work competing for "space" in intellectual discourse (*Middle East Journal* "Communications," 47:2:93). I sadly now respond to a dismissal of my book, *Revealing Reveiling: Islamist Gender Ideology in Contemporary Egypt* (MEJ 47:2:93). Barbara Larson fails to disclose the topic of my book, but instead criticizes its style and the introduction of "too many voices" of Middle Eastern women, and claims the book is unsuitable for general readers. The *Journal*'s readers (are they general readers?) deserve a statement about the book's subject and conclusions.

The main theme of the book is not "self-image" but Islamist (i.e. Muslim fundamentalist) gender ideology. That thought system, a complex collection of ideas about the roles, attributes, and ideals of the sexes was studied through Islamist writings and in the views of Islamist and non-Islamist Egyptian women. Women's views on motherhood, male-female relations, the workplace, and political activism are included in this ideology. It is an important topic given Islamists' mass appeal, and the dilemma of Middle Eastern states confronting them. It is also significant inasmuch as the history of women's entry into public life is entwined with a debate between "womanist" or feminist perspectives in Egypt, and the region. I have not condemned Islamist ideology or attempted to deny its growth, believing that it is more essential to assess its impact.

Self-image is just one tool for explaining the appeal of a new ideal for Muslim women. Jungian notions of archetype and syzgy, and Foucault's discussion of morality helped me make sense of Islamist usages of women's history. However, Egyptian women realized the contemporary political import of this discussion, as might Larson.

I employed a multidisciplinary approach to this topic, for the historicity and political significance of women's views are too often minimized. An historical survey frames the problem, illustrating Islamist usage of female archetypes through short "cameos" of important Muslim women. Larson suggests that I have utilized too much material and I reply that previous work deserves comment and citations.

Field work involves "listening to culture" as well as "reading" it. The position of the researcher is but one problem. Then too, Islamist women are not well represented in Islamist publications. Consequently, I explored the interaction of the state, oppositionist social movement [*sic*]. Women's responses to interview questions were divided into two categories—those of veiled and unveiled women. . . . Correlations between age, the influence of a working mother, and ideology were more interesting than those based strictly on class origin. Larson complains that she cannot keep track of the different voices. Given the impossibility of reviewing a sufficiently large sample, I am pleased that women of opposing views, different ages, and class origins spoke. They attested to the growth and nuances of Islamism, and reactions to it.

"Core" Islamist ideology differs somewhat from individuals' views, though all stressed piety and a moral responsibility to Islamize, while maintaining flexibility on work, childcare, and activism so as to attract adherents. Unveiled Egyptian women provided a counterpoint. They viewed the Islamist expansion anxiously, and feared polarization of the sort that is now occurring in Egypt. They are after all far more invested in the outcome than are Western academics. . . .

—*SHERIFA ZUHUR*

To the Editor:

I do not take issue with Dr. Zuhur on either the importance of her topic nor on her methodology. I fully agree that an understanding of Islamist gender ideology and its appeal to women is timely and important. I also applaud her desire to be interdisciplinary in focus, to incorporate the results of both fieldwork and historical analysis, and to present the multiple and diverse voices of Egyptian women on the various topics she addresses.

The sole point of my criticism was that she did not present and analyze the results of her various inquiries as effectively as she might. It was for this reason that I suggested the book might be of more use to students already familiar with the area than as an introduction for students and general readers. This criticism has nothing to do with either the importance of the topic or the number of different voices represented, but only with how effectively this information is analyzed and presented to the reader.

A final note: I did not lay out the substantive topic of the book in so many words because it was clearly spelled out in the title, and it seemed unnecessary to repeat it. Instead, I called attention to what I thought was Zuhur's theoretical approach and perspective on the topic, namely to notions of self-imaging and archetype. Since the titles of three of the seven chapters in the book contain the words self-image or archetype, and both concepts are discussed under the rubric of definitions in her introductory chapter, I hardly think calling attention to them in my review was inappropriate.

—*BARBARA K. LARSON*
Associate Professor of Anthropology
University of New Hampshire

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